JUDGMENT : K.S. MUDAGAL, J. 1. Challenging the judgment and decree for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (‘the Act’ for short), the respondent in M.C. No. 53/2021 on the file of I Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Mysuru has preferred this appeal. 2. The appellant was the respondent and the respondent was the petitioner in M.C. No. 53/2021 before the trial Court. For the purpose of convenience, the parties are referred to henceforth according to their ranks before the trial Court. 3. Brief facts of the case: (i) The marriage of the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 24.02.2011 at Chanakya Kalyana Mantapa, Vishveshwaranagar, Sterling Theatre Road, Mysuru. The parties are Hindus and governed by the Act. The parties had troubled marriage. The petitioner filed M.C. No. 1661/2012 before the Family Court, Bangalore under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act seeking decree for divorce. On transfer to the Family Court, Mysuru, that was renumbered as M.C. No. 35/2013. The respondent filed M.C. No. 196/2012 against the petitioner seeking decree for restitution of conjugal rights. (ii) The Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Mysuru, on consolidating both the petitions, recorded the evidence and on hearing the parties, by considered judgment as per Ex.R5 dated 09.02.2016 dismissed M.C. No. 35/2013 holding that the allegation of cruelty was not proved. The said court allowed M.C. No. 196/2012 holding that the petitioner husband has deserted the wife without reasonable excuse. The decree in M.C. No. 196/2012 directed the husband to take back the wife/ respondent to the matrimonial home within two months from the date of the order. (iii) The husband/petitioner challenged the said judgment before this Court in M.F.A. No. 1905/2016 connected with M.F.A. No. 1906/2016 (FC). This Court by judgment Ex.P2 dated 03.11.2020 on hearing the parties disposed of the appeals reserving liberty to the petitioner to file the petition under Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Act seeking dissolution of his marriage, if there is no resumption of cohabitation. It was further observed that, if the petitioner is unsuccessful in the petition under Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Act, liberty is reserved to him to revive the appeals. It was further observed that, if the petitioner is unsuccessful in the petition under Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Act, liberty is reserved to him to revive the appeals. (iv) Subsequent to such judgment, the petitioner filed M.C. No. 53/2021 before I Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Mysuru for divorce under Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Act claiming that after the decree for restitution of conjugal rights in M.C. No. 196/2012, there was no resumption of cohabitation and the marriage is irretrievably broken down. (v) The respondent contested the petition claiming that after the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, she along with her relatives went to the house of the petitioner for resumption of matrimonial cohabitation, but herself and her relatives were thrown out after abuse. She further alleged that thereafter the petitioner joined male PG to make cohabitation impossible. Therefore, he himself is guilty of non-resumption of cohabitation and he cannot take advantage of his own wrong. 4. In support of the case of the petitioner, he got himself examined as PW-1 and got marked Exs.P1 to P6. The respondent was examined as RW-1 and on her behalf, Exs.R1 to R5 were marked. 5. The trial Court on hearing the parties by the impugned judgment and decree allowed the petition on the ground that, if once there is no resumption within one year after the decree for restitution of conjugal rights either of the parties can seek decree for dissolution of marriage. The trial Court held that mere disinclination of the party to resume the marital life does not amount to wrong within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act. The respondent has preferred the above appeal challenging the said decree. 6. In this appeal, since there is interim stay, I.A. No. 2/2022 is filed by the petitioner for vacating interim stay. I.A. No. 2/2023 is filed under Order XLI Rule 27 read with Section 151 of CPC to adduce additional evidence. By way of additional evidence, the petitioner seeks to produce some printouts dated 26.01.2022, 26.02.2022 and 30.04.2022 said to be issued by some matrimonies and the alleged e-mail chats between the respondent and one Hariharasudan. By producing such documents, the petitioner claims that the respondent has given advertisement in those matrimonies seeking another marriage, she is not interested in resumption of cohabitation. By producing such documents, the petitioner claims that the respondent has given advertisement in those matrimonies seeking another marriage, she is not interested in resumption of cohabitation. Therefore he claims that no purpose would be served by reversing the judgment on any grounds. The said application is opposed by the respondent. Submissions of Narayana V.S. learned Counsel for the respondent/wife: 7. The petitioner himself in his evidence unequivocally admitted that the respondent and her relatives had gone to his house for resumption of marriage and there was galata. He himself admits that soon after that he joined male PG. Such acts of the petitioner were clear plot to make resumption impossible. Having done that, again he took advantage of his own wrong. Such conduct of the petitioner cannot be said to be simple disinclination under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act. The documents produced under I.A. No. 2/2023 are concocted one. The application shall be dismissed as the same does not satisfy any of the requirements of Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC and Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The judgments relied on by the trial Court and by the petitioner’s Counsel in this matter are not applicable to the facts of the case. 8. In support of his contentions, he relies on the following judgments: 1. Ravindra vs. Kalpana, 2002 (3) Mh. L.J. 741 2. T. Srinivasan vs. T. Varalakshmi, (1998) 3 SCC 112 3. Krishna Bhattacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury, (2016) 2 SCC 705 Submissions of Sri Dhyan Chinnappa, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri T.P. Srinivasa, learned Counsel on record for the petitioner/husband. 9. If once there is no resumption of marital cohabitation within one year of passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, either of the parties get the right to seek decree for divorce under Section 13(1A) of the Act. Even assuming that the petitioner was disinclined to comply the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, that does not amount to wrong as contemplated under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act. The parties are living separately for more than 12 years. The marriage is irretrievably broken down. Even if the decree is reversed, no purpose would be served and the marriage survives only on papers. Under the circumstances, the Court shall grant decree for divorce. The parties are living separately for more than 12 years. The marriage is irretrievably broken down. Even if the decree is reversed, no purpose would be served and the marriage survives only on papers. Under the circumstances, the Court shall grant decree for divorce. The judgments relied on by learned Counsel for the respondent wife are not applicable to the facts of the case. 10. In support of his contentions, he relies on the following judgments: 1. Dharmendra Kumar vs. Usha Kumar, AIR 1977 SC 2218 2. Martin Sujay vs. Smt. Amulyabrinda, ILR 2021 KAR 4324 3. Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511 4. Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli, (2006) 4 SCC 558 5. K. Srinivas Rao vs. D.A. Deepa, (2013) 2 SCR 126 6. Rakesh Raman vs. Smt. Kavita, (2023) 3 SCR 552 11. Considering the submissions of both side and on careful perusal of the materials on record, the points that arise for consideration of this Court are: (i) Whether the impugned judgment and decree for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Act is sustainable? (ii) Whether I.A. No. 2/2023 for adducing additional evidence deserves to be allowed? Analysis Reg. Point Nos. 1 and 2: 12. There is no dispute between the parties regarding facts and events stated supra. The question that has to be considered in this case is whether on non-resumption of cohabitation after decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the decree for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1A) of the Act is inevitable/automatic. The next question is whether willful non-compliance of decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not amount to ‘wrong’ as contemplated under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act. 13. In his petition, the petitioner did not allege that non-resumption of cohabitation was due to disinclination on the part of the respondent wife. He did not even say in the petition that he made any effort for resumption of cohabitation or compliance of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, though decree directed him to resume cohabitation within two months. He simply says that there was decree for restitution of conjugal rights based on the petition of the respondent wife and the same is not complied within one year. He simply says that there was decree for restitution of conjugal rights based on the petition of the respondent wife and the same is not complied within one year. He refers to the judgment in M.F.A. No. 1905/2016 connected with M.F.A. No. 1906/2016 to say that liberty is given to him in the said judgment for seeking decree for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Act. 14. Whereas the wife in her statement of objections contended that she tried for resumption of cohabitation, when she approached the petitioner in his house, herself and her relatives were abused and thrown out. Thereafter to defeat the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the petitioner started residing in male PG making resumption of cohabitation impossible. 15. After filing of such objections, the petitioner filed rejoinder to the statement of objections. He has not claimed that after decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the wife did not make any efforts for resumption of cohabitation and the marriage is irretrievably broken down. The wife filed objections to the rejoinder denying the allegations made by him claiming that the case falls under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act which says that, in a proceeding under the Act whether defended or not if the Court is satisfied that the petitioner is seeking decree taking advantage of his or her own wrong, then such decree cannot be granted. 16. PW-1 in his evidence did not dispute that, after decree for restitution of conjugal rights the wife visited his house with her relatives to resume cohabitation and the galata having taken place there. In the cross-examination, he admits that after the decree he did not ask the respondent to lead marital life with him nor suggested to her to join him in Bangalore. He states that through his mother he came to know that the respondent and her relatives visited his house in Bangalore in 2nd week of March 2016 at 9.30 a.m. He denies that he was at home at that time and locked the gate of the house and went away. He claims that at that time, he was in office. In his cross-examination, he clearly declares that he is not ready to accept the respondent. He claims that at that time, he was in office. In his cross-examination, he clearly declares that he is not ready to accept the respondent. PW-1 in his chief examination states that after the respondent approached his house, his mother asked him to stay separately, therefore he moved to male PG and has been living there. That itself goes to show that there was no possibility for the respondent to pursue cohabitation and the petitioner himself made that impossible. 17. Relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharmendra Kumar’s case and the judgment of this Court in Martin Sujay’s case referred to supra it was contended that mere disinclination of the party does not amount to wrong within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act. In Para 3 of the judgment in Dharmendra Kumar’s case referred to supra, it was held that to constitute a wrong under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act, the conduct alleged has to be something more than mere disinclination to agree to an offer of reunion and it must be misconduct serious enough to justify denial of the relief to which the husband or the wife is otherwise entitled to. It was held that wife’s refusal to receive the letters written by the husband appellant therein does not amount to such wrong. 18. However, subsequent to that, three judges/larger Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T. Srinivasan’s case referred to supra held that when the wife made demand to the husband to let her join him and he refused to allow her to enter the house, rather he drove her and her relatives whoever attempted to rehabilitate the wife, such acts were positive wrongs amounting to misconduct, uncondonable for the purposes of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act. 19. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 17 of the judgment in Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar vs. Sunanda, (2001) 4 SCC 125 has narrated which acts amount to wrong within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act as follows: “17. Now we come to the crucial question which specifically arises for determination in the case; whether refusal to pay alimony by the appellant is a “wrong” within the meaning of section 23(1) (a) of the Act so as to disentitle the appellant to the relief of divorce. Now we come to the crucial question which specifically arises for determination in the case; whether refusal to pay alimony by the appellant is a “wrong” within the meaning of section 23(1) (a) of the Act so as to disentitle the appellant to the relief of divorce. The answer to the question, as noted earlier, depends on the facts and circumstances of the case and no general principle or straitjacket formula can be laid down for the purpose. We have already held that even after the decree for judicial separation was passed by the Court on the petition presented by the wife it was expected that both the spouses will make sincere efforts for a conciliation and cohabitation with each other, which means that the husband should behave as a dutiful husband and the wife should behave as a devoted wife. In the present case the respondent has not only failed to make any such attempt but has also refused to pay the small amount of Rs. 100 as maintenance for the wife and has been marking time for expiry of the statutory period of one year after the decree of judicial separation so that he may easily get a decree of divorce. In the circumstances, it can reasonably be said that he not only commits the matrimonial wrong in refusing to maintain his wife and further estrange the relation creating acrimony rendering any rapprochement impossible but also tries to take advantage of the said “wrong” for getting the relief of divorce. Such conduct in committing a default cannot in the facts and circumstances of the case be brushed aside as not a matter of sufficient importance to disentitle him to get a decree of divorce under section 13(1A).” (Emphasis supplied) 20. Reading of the above paragraph shows that both the spouses shall make sincere efforts for conciliation and cohabitation with each other, which means the husband should behave as a dutiful husband and the wife should behave as a devoted wife. If that is not complied, it can be reasonably said that the husband not only committed wrong in further estranging the relation making it impossible to resume the marriage, but also tried to take advantage of the said ‘wrong’ for getting divorce. 21. If that is not complied, it can be reasonably said that the husband not only committed wrong in further estranging the relation making it impossible to resume the marriage, but also tried to take advantage of the said ‘wrong’ for getting divorce. 21. In Para 14 of the said judgment it was held that before granting prayer of the petitioner to permanently snap the relationship between the parties to the marriage, every attempt must be made to maintain sanctity of the relationship which is of importance not only for the individuals or their children but also for the society. In Para 15 of the said judgment it was clarified that earlier judgment in Dharmendra Kumar’s case referred to supra cannot be read to be laying down a general principle that the petitioner in an application for divorce is entitled to the relief merely on establishing the existence of the ground pleaded by him or her in support of the relief; nor that the decision lays down the principle that the Court has no discretion to decline relief to the petitioner in a case where the fulfillment of the ground pleaded by him or her is established. 22. In Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar’s case referred to supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the judgment of the Madras High Court in Soundarammal vs. Sundara Mahalinga Nadar alias Linga Nadar, AIR 1980 Mad 294 has approval of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In Para 28 of the judgment in Soundarammal’s case referred to supra, Madras High Court considering the interplay of the Amending Act 1964 and Amending Act 1976, and the scope of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act held as follows: “28. Before I deal with other aspects, I will briefly deal with the question as to what extent the two Amending Acts, viz. Central Acts 44 of 1964 and 68 of 1976 have enabled the defaulting spouse to seek relief under S. 13 (1-A) of the act, without being tested by S. 23 (1) (a) of the Act, even though, it is claimed by the counsel for respondent that there is no restriction imposed on the rights now conferred on a wrong-doer to ask for divorce. The points which have come up for consideration before the High Courts of Punjab and Haryana, and Delhi in the decisions above referred to, can be resolved by holding that the two amending Acts have now enabled defaulting spouses to seek for the relief of divorce, provided he or she satisfies the court, that S.23 of the Act is not attracted since non-compliance of a decree for judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights is not a ‘wrong’ within the meaning S.23 (1) (a) of the Act. Thus, in all those instances in which S.23 is not attracted, the two amending Acts have enabled even defaulting spouses to get relief under S.13 (1-A) of the Act. The amending Acts have not enabled wrong doers, who would come within the ambit of S.23 (1) (a) of the Act to get the relief of divorce, on the plea that liberalisation had been brought about towards divorce to such an unlimited extent. In my view the amending Acts 44 of 1964 and 68 of 1976 have not enabled all sorts of defaulting spouses to get relief for divorce, which was not at all available earlier, but it would be available only in such of those instances, wherein S.23 of the Act cannot be applied. Hence, I hold that the respondent herein, a continuing wrongdoer, cannot plead that, after the said two Amending Acts, S. 23 (1) (a) cannot be invoked against him, and therefore the decision of the lower appellate court is hereby set aside.” (Emphasis supplied) 23. Reading of the above judgment clearly shows that two amending Acts have not enabled wrong doing spouse who comes within the ambit of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act to get the relief of divorce, on the plea that liberalization had been brought about towards divorce to such an unlimited extent. Therefore it is clear that, the Amending Acts 44 of 1964 and 68 of 1976 have not enabled all sorts of defaulting spouses to get relief of divorce, which was not at all available earlier, but it would be available only in such of those instances wherein Section 23(1)(a) of the Act cannot be applied. 24. The judgment in Dharmendra Kumar’s case referred to supra was further clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhattacharjee’s case referred to supra. 24. The judgment in Dharmendra Kumar’s case referred to supra was further clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhattacharjee’s case referred to supra. In Paras 19 and 20 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court referring to its earlier judgment in Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar’s case referred to supra held that after decree for judicial separation was passed, it was the duty of both spouses to do their part for cohabitation. It was further held that the husband was expected to act as a dutiful husband towards the wife and the wife was to act as a devoted wife towards the husband. If a spouse did not make any sincere effort, then that amounts to wrong within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act and in such cases the prayer for dissolution of marriage can be declined. 25. Sri Dhyan Chinnappa, learned Senior Counsel strenuously argued that facts of all the aforesaid judgments are different, therefore, they are not applicable. However, in those judgments itself it is clearly stated that apart from the criteria laid down while deciding whether the act of the party amounts to wrong under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act, the matter has to be considered on the facts of each case. The judgment in Martin Sujay’s case referred to supra was rendered relying on the judgment in Dharmendra Kumar’s case referred to supra. Firstly, the judgment in Dharmendra Kumar’s case was clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently viz. in Para 15 of the judgment in Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar’s case referred to supra stating that Dharmendra Kumar’s judgment is being misquoted often. Further, the larger bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.Srinivasan’s case held that after the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, on wife demanding for restitution, if husband refuses her entry into the house, that amounts to positive wrong/misconduct, uncondonable for the purpose of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act. Therefore, the Court has to follow those judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 26. The evidence on record clearly shows that the petitioner husband made resumption of marital life impossible and did not behave like a dutiful husband to enable the wife for resumption of matrimonial relationship. Therefore, his act clearly falls within the term ‘wrong’ contemplated under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act. 26. The evidence on record clearly shows that the petitioner husband made resumption of marital life impossible and did not behave like a dutiful husband to enable the wife for resumption of matrimonial relationship. Therefore, his act clearly falls within the term ‘wrong’ contemplated under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act. Since, the petitioner himself is guilty of wrong within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act, he is not entitled to the advantage of decree under Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Act. Suffice it to say that the judgments relied on by learned Senior Counsel cannot be justifiably applied to the facts of the present case. Anyway the judgment in T.Srinivasan’s case referred to supra rendered by the larger Bench takes precedence over the other judgments relied on by Sri Dhyan Chinnappa, learned Senior Counsel. 27. The judgments in Samar Ghosh’s case Naveen Kohli’s case, K. Srinivas Rao’s case and Kavita’s case referred to supra were relied to contend that, when there is no cohabitation for long time and the marriage is irretrievably broken down, the Courts have to exercise the power to grant decree for dissolution of marriage. Reading of the said judgments show that in those cases the Courts were satisfied that both the parties were not ready for resumption of cohabitation. In the present case, the respondent wife is unwilling for dissolution of marriage and she is ready for resumption of cohabitation. She does not want to carry the stigma of divorce. Under the circumstances, those judgments cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. 28. Conjoint reading of Sections 13(1A) and 23(1)(a) of the Act makes it clear that the legislature did not intend that on non-resumption of cohabitation after decree for restitution of conjugal rights there should be an automatic decree for dissolution of marriage. If such interpretation is permitted, that gives handle to unscrupulous parties to abuse the process of the Court and secure a decree for dissolution. In such cases to circumvent the rigorous provisions of Section 13(1) of the Act, spouse intending to part the way may file the petition for restitution of conjugal rights and the other willing spouse without smelling the mala-fides behind such petition may concede for the decree. Later such decree holder making the resumption of conjugal life impossible, can capture a decree for dissolution of marriage. Later such decree holder making the resumption of conjugal life impossible, can capture a decree for dissolution of marriage. Similarly a spouse who is keen to continue the conjugal life may file a petition for restitution of conjugal rights, on he or she getting such decree, the other spouse on making the resumption impossible may capture a decree for dissolution of marriage. In such cases the spouse who filed the petition/conceded for restitution of conjugal rights with the earnest interest of resumption of cohabitation has to later lament that he/she committed a sin in seeking decree for conjugal rights. That ruins his/her life by such automatic decree for dissolution of marriage. 29. In other cases, if a party does not comply the Court’s order willfully, he or she will be hauled for contempt of Court under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, but in these kinds of cases defaulting party gets bonus by his own wrong. Therefore, the interpretation that the willful non-compliance of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not amount to wrong within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act defeats the scheme and purpose of Sections 23(1)(a) and 13(1A) of the Act. The purpose of the Act is to protect the institution of marriage/family which in the tradition and culture of India is considered as the invaluable foundation of the society. If such interpretation is permitted, that amounts to giving incentive to a party of his own wrong. Therefore, the contention that willful non compliance of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not amount to a wrong within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act, is bereft of any merit. 30. So far as the documents sought to be produced under I.A. No. 2/2023 as additional evidence, first of all they are not primary evidence. Section 65B of the Evidence Act bars receipt of any such documents. Secondly, the respondent wife denies genuineness of those documents. Thirdly, the documents are sought to be produced under the application after addressing substantial arguments on merits of the matter, apparently to drag on the proceedings. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the appeal deserves to be allowed with heavy costs and I.A. No. 2/2023 is liable to be dismissed. Hence the following: ORDER I.A. No. 2/2023 is dismissed. The appeal is allowed with costs of Rs. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the appeal deserves to be allowed with heavy costs and I.A. No. 2/2023 is liable to be dismissed. Hence the following: ORDER I.A. No. 2/2023 is dismissed. The appeal is allowed with costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- payable by the respondent to the appellant within two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. The impugned judgment and decree dated 25.01.2022 in M.C. No. 53/2021 passed by I Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Mysuru is hereby set aside. The petition in M.C. No. 53/2021 is dismissed with costs. In view of disposal of the appeal, other pending I.A. stood disposed of.