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2023 DIGILAW 1363 (RAJ)

Lali Meena v. Ajmer Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited

2023-07-12

REKHA BORANA

body2023
ORDER : 1. The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 04.03.2017 passed by Additional District Judge, Salumbar, District Udaipur, in Civil Suit No. 05/2014 whereby the application/suit of the plaintiffs claimants under the Fatal Accident Act, 1855 has been dismissed. 2. The learned Trial Court on basis of the pleadings as made by the parties, framed as many as six issues. Although issue No. 1 pertaining to the factum of accident/incident due to electric shock was decided in favour of the plaintiffs/claimants, issue Nos.2, 4 and 4A having been decided against them, the suit was dismissed. 3. Although no specific issue regarding limitation had been framed, the learned Court below, while deciding issue nos.2, 4 and 4A considered the same and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs on the ground of the same being time barred in terms of Article 82 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1963'). 4. It is admitted on record that the accident/incident in question occurred on 15.07.2003 which resulted into death of the husband of plaintiff no. 1, father of plaintiff No. 2 and maternal grandfather of plaintiff No. 3. 5. The limitation as provided under Article 82 of the Act of 1963 is two years whereas the suit was preferred in the year 2014. 6. The defence taken by the plaintiffs for the delay in filing the suit was that plaintiff No. 3 was a minor at the time of the accident/incident and therefore, in terms of Section 6 of the Act of 1963, he was under a legal disability. Hence, he was entitled to institute the suit after the said legal disability had ceased. 7. Learned Court below while deciding issue nos.2, 4 and 4A specifically reached to the following conclusions: (i) Plaintiff No. 3 being the son of a daughter, does not fall in the category of 'dependent' in terms of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1855') and therefore, Section 6 of the Act of 1963 would not even apply. (ii) In terms of Section 1A of the Act of 1855, a suit under the Act could be brought only for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child if any. (ii) In terms of Section 1A of the Act of 1855, a suit under the Act could be brought only for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child if any. The interpretation of the said provision provided in Section 4 of the Act of 1855 states that the word 'child' shall include son and daughter; grand son and grand daughter; step son and step daughter. The said interpretation does not include a maternal grand son and therefore, a suit by him or on his behalf could not even be instituted under the Act of 1855. (iii) So far as plaintiff Nos.1 & 2 are concerned, they were not suffering from any legal disability and therefore, the limitation started running against them from the date of accident/incident. Admittedly, the suit had been filed in the year 2014 qua the accident/incident of the year 2003 and therefore, the same was clearly barred by law of limitation. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the above findings of the learned Court below are not in consonance with law as limitation in the present matter would be saved by Section 7 of the Act of 1963. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that Section 6 of the Act of 1963 would not even apply in the present matter as plaintiff-claimant No. 3 was a minor on the date of the incident as well as on the date of the institution of the suit. 10. Heard the parties and perused the material available on record. 11. So far as the ground raised by counsel for the appellants that the suit was not barred in terms of Section 7 of the Act of 1963 is concerned, even if it is assumed that plaintiff claimant No. 3 was a minor on the date of incident and therefore, suffered with a legal disability, it is evident on record that plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 were not suffering from any legal disability. In terms of Section 7 of the Act of 1963, plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 were very much capable of giving discharge without the concurrence of the minor i.e. plaintiff No. 3. Therefore, in terms of Section 7 of the Act of 1963, limitation would definitely start running against all of the plaintiffs from the date of accident/ incident. 12. In terms of Section 7 of the Act of 1963, plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 were very much capable of giving discharge without the concurrence of the minor i.e. plaintiff No. 3. Therefore, in terms of Section 7 of the Act of 1963, limitation would definitely start running against all of the plaintiffs from the date of accident/ incident. 12. Secondly, it is not the case of the plaintiffs that on the date of the institution of the suit, the legal disability of plaintiff No. 3 had even otherwise, ceased. A perusal of the record makes it clear that even on the date of institution of the suit plaintiff No. 3 was a minor i.e. 11 years of age meaning thereby, admittedly, a discharge was given by plaintiff Nos.1 & 2. Therefore, in the specific opinion of this Court, the argument of counsel for the appellants regarding the exclusion of limitation in terms of Section 7 of the Act of 1963 is wholly misplaced. 13. Further, as held by the Court below, a maternal grand son does not fall in the category of 'dependent' in terms of the Act of 1855 and therefore also, the finding of the Court below that the provision of Section 6 of the Act of 1963 would not even apply being totally in consonance with law does not deserve any interference. 14. No other ground has been raised by counsel for the appellants. 15. In view of the above analysis and observations, the findings as arrived by the Court below on all the issues does not deserve any interference and the same are hereby affirmed. 16. The impugned judgment and decree is therefore affirmed and the present appeal is dismissed. Decree be drawn accordingly. 17. All pending applications also stand dismissed.