JUDGMENT : Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the order of punishment as contained in Memo NO. 5/AAROP-1-32/2015-5660 (HRMS), Dated 05.06.2020 [Annexure-11], whereby the disciplinary authority, by differing with the findings of the inquiry report, has inflicted punishment of withholding of two increments without cumulative effect. Petitioner has further prayed for quashing the order as contained in Memo No. 5/AAROP – 1-32/2015-2390 (HRMS)/Ranchi, Dated 12.03.2021 [Annexure-12], passed by the appellate authority confirming the order passed by the disciplinary authority. 3. According to the petitioner, after his appointment, he was posted and working to as a Block Development Officer, Pakuria, District Pakur and he discharged his duties as a diligent public servant without any complaint. In the year 2010, a complaint was lodged by one Suresh Tudu before the Deputy Commissioner, Pakur, alleging therein illegality and corruption by the officials with regard to carrying out works under Scheme No. 43/09-10 and 44/2009-10 for construction of road in Salgapara being implemented in the district of Pakur. The Deputy Commissioner, Pakur vide his letter no. 75/Go. Dated 06.08.2010, directed the Sub-divisional Officer, Pakur to investigate the matter. After inquiry, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pakur, furnished its report before the Deputy Commissioner, Pakur vide letter no. 314/Go. Dated 23.08.2010 wherein several irregularities pertaining to implementation/ execution of works under the concerned scheme were found but no evidence at all was found regarding taking of bribes/commission in executing works at the concerned site. On the basis of report of the Sub-Divisional officer, Pakur, the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Pakur issued directions to suspend Md. Zakir Hussain, Panchayat Sewak, Pakuria and to start departmental proceeding against him vide order as contained in Memo No.l 925/Go. Dated 27.08.2010. Thereafter, vide Memo No. 1269/Ji.P., dated 30.12.2010, said Panchayat Sewak was transferred and posted to Block Office, Amrapara after revocation of his suspension. After conclusion of departmental proceeding against the said Panchayat Sewak, order of punishment as contained in Memo NO. 326/P. Dated 20.07.2012 was passed by the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Pakur whereby his salary for the periods 27.08.2010 – 30.12.2010 was withheld along with withholding of three increments. The advance amount of Rs.57,500/- pertaining to both the schemes i.e. Scheme No. 43/2009-10 for construction of road in Salgapara, Pakur had been recovered from the said Panchayat Sewak and deposited in treasury vide order as contained in Letter no. The advance amount of Rs.57,500/- pertaining to both the schemes i.e. Scheme No. 43/2009-10 for construction of road in Salgapara, Pakur had been recovered from the said Panchayat Sewak and deposited in treasury vide order as contained in Letter no. 484/P., dated 25.09.2010 and works under both the Schemes were closed. 4. It is further case of the petitioner that after five years, a recommendation to initiate departmental proceeding against the petitioner was received from the office of the Commissioner, MNREGA vide Letter No. 4-20135/AAROP (Pakur)/2010/ Gr. Vi-(N) 683 (Anu) dated 10.04.2015 (Annexure-6). Consequently, a show-cause notice along with memo of charges was issued to him vide Letter No. 5/Aarop-1-32/2-15 Ka. 6329 (Anu), Dated 16.07.2015 (Annexure-7) from the office of the Deputy Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand which was duly replied by the petitioner vide his letter no. 90/Go. Dated 27.08.2016 (Annexure-8). After recommendations from the Deputy Commissioner, Pakur, the departmental proceeding under Rule 17 of the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 2016 was instituted/initiated against the petitioner vide Notification no. 977, Dated 31.01.2019 (Annexure-9). Thereafter, vide his letter dated 11.04.2019 (Annexure-10), petitioner also filed supplementary show-cause reply against the memo of charges. Thereafter, enquiry report was prepared and submitted by the conducting authority vide letter no. 102, dated 24.04.2019, whereby and whereunder it was opined by the conducting authority that the Charge Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were not made out and thus not found to be true whereas charge nos. 4 and 5 were only partially found to be true but it was meaningless as the alleged money was recovered from the concerned and deposited in the treasury. However, without issuing second show-cause notice and without providing inquiry report and while differing from the inquiry report, a decision as contained in Memo No. 5/Aarop-1-32/ 2015 – 5660 (HRMS) Dated 05.06.2020 (Annexure-11) was passed withholding two increments with cumulative effect under Rule 14(iv) of the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2016. Being aggrieved, petitioner preferred an appeal under Rule 25 of the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2016 vide letter no. 2100396, dated 19.10.2020 which was rejected vide order as contained in Memo No. 5/Aarop – 1 – 32/2015 – 2390 (HRMS)/Ranchi, dated 12.03.2021 (Annexure-12). Being aggrieved petitioner has knocked door of this Court. 5. Mr. Shresth Gautam, assisted by Mr. 2100396, dated 19.10.2020 which was rejected vide order as contained in Memo No. 5/Aarop – 1 – 32/2015 – 2390 (HRMS)/Ranchi, dated 12.03.2021 (Annexure-12). Being aggrieved petitioner has knocked door of this Court. 5. Mr. Shresth Gautam, assisted by Mr. Arun Kumar and Ms. Anupama Kumari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, assailing the impugned order vociferously argues that the impugned orders are not tenable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel further argues that in the first inquiry, petitioner has been exonerated from the charge nos. 1, 2 and 3 whereas charge nos. 4 and 5 were although partially found to be true but rendered meaningless after realization of alleged money from the concerned person and deposited in the treasury. The conducting authority had the opportunity to peruse all the documents, evidence and clarification furnished by the petitioner and consequently, after due consideration of the same, the conducting authority reached to the conclusion that the Charge Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were not at all made out whereas charge nos. 4 and 5 could also not be substantially proved against him. While differing with the finding of the inquiry officer, no reason has been assigned by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority nor any opportunity of submitting representation has been given to the petitioner which is in violation of the statutory rules, principles of natural justice and in specific contravention of law. Learned counsel further argues that the reasons for such disagreement and to record its own findings on the concerned charges on which it has disagreed, is required to be specifically mentioned by the concerned authority before passing an order of punishment. Quoting the provisions of Rule 18(2) of the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2016, learned counsel submits that it is necessary for the disciplinary authority to record reasons for disagreement from the inquiry report and it is mandated to record its own findings on the charges. As per law laid down, the respondents would have proceeded for further inquiry but without assigning any reasons, it was impermissible for the disciplinary authority to proceed for fresh inquiry. Nothing has been reflected from the inquiry report as to what was the reason for disagreement. As per law laid down, the respondents would have proceeded for further inquiry but without assigning any reasons, it was impermissible for the disciplinary authority to proceed for fresh inquiry. Nothing has been reflected from the inquiry report as to what was the reason for disagreement. The order of the disciplinary authority is not based on evidence on record and as such the same has been passed in complete contravention to Rule 18(2), (3) and (4) of the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2016 and thus cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. Rule 18 clearly stipulates that a copy of the inquiry report along with findings of the departmental authority shall be provided to the government servant and provide him with an opportunity to file written representation against the same before proceeding with issuance of final order. Further, Rule 19 of the said Rule specifically provides that before passing final order imposing punishment provided under Rules 14(i) to (iv), the departmental authority has to inform the concerned government servant regarding the proposal for levying such punishment and given him reasonable opportunity to file a representation against the same, which has not been followed in the instant case. Petitioner had already been exonerated after following the procedure of law and as such the impugned orders are not tenable in the eyes of law. Any punishment or loss caused to the petitioner based on the said premise are fit to be quashed and set aside and as such the punishment as well as the appellate orders are not tenable and are fit to be quashed and set aside. The petitioner is entitled for the relief claimed for including consequential benefits. 6. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel places heavy reliance upon the Judgments, which are mentioned as under: (i) Judgment passed by this Court in the case of Murari Bhagat in W.P.(S) No. 1054 of 2019; (ii) Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and others reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 ; (iii) Union of India and others Vs. K.V. Jankiraman and others reported in (1991) 4 SCC 109 ; (iv) Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 ; (v) Chief Engineer, Hydel Project and others Vs. Ravindra Nath and others reported in (2008) 2 SCC 350 . 7. Mr. K.V. Jankiraman and others reported in (1991) 4 SCC 109 ; (iv) Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 ; (v) Chief Engineer, Hydel Project and others Vs. Ravindra Nath and others reported in (2008) 2 SCC 350 . 7. Mr. Shubham Mishra, AC to learned SC (M)-II opposes the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that petitioner was held guilty of charges and, therefore, it was open for the disciplinary authority to slap the petitioner with punishment. The lenient view was taken by the authorities and petitioner was inflicted with punishment of withholding of two increments without cumulative effect. Learned counsel further argues that vide letter no. 683, dated 10.04.2015 of the Rural Development Department, Government of Jharkhand, the memo of charge was framed against the petitioner wherein allegations pertaining to avoiding supervision and inspection of records relating to development work of MNREGA Scheme, dereliction of supervisory duties in contravention of provisions of Rule 127 of the Bihar Board Miscellaneous Rules as well as of MNREGA Act, misleading the inspection team and misappropriation in maintaining records, were levelled against the petitioner. Taking note of the said recommendations and looking into the gravity of charges levelled against the petitioner, the disciplinary authority issued the preliminary show-cause to the petitioner, which was replied by him. However, the Deputy Commissioner, Pakur, opined that the said reply of the petitioner was beyond the facts and thus the same was not satisfactory. Thereafter, a regular departmental proceeding was contemplated against the petitioner and a charge memo along with resolution was served upon him. Petitioner was held guilty of charge nos. 4 and 5 and petitioner was awarded minor punishment which was upheld by the appellate authority. Against the minor punishment, it was not mandatory on part of disciplinary authority to issue second show cause notice rather same is required in case of awarding major punishment. The Judgment relied upon by the petitioner in the case of Kunj Behari Mishra (Supra) is a case where major punishment was awarded without issuance of show cause and as such the same was held to be illegal. Punishment awarded to the petitioner is minor and as such the ratio of said case is not applicable in the instant case. 8. Punishment awarded to the petitioner is minor and as such the ratio of said case is not applicable in the instant case. 8. Having heard rival submissions of the parties across the bar, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order is not tenable in the eyes of law in view of following facts and reasons: (i) Petitioner was exonerated by the inquiry officer. There was no occasion to proceed afresh without assigning any reasons and to pass punishment order without providing opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. (ii) The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Managing Director, ECIL & Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors., reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 has held that: “26. The reason why the right to receive the report of the inquiry officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the inquiry officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the inquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the inquiry officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the inquiry officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. In the circumstances, the findings of the inquiry officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the inquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the inquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the inquiry officer’s findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the inquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it.” Further in case of Ram Kishan v. Union of India, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 157 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under : “10. …………. The purpose of the show-cause notice, in case of disagreement with the findings of the inquiry officer, is to enable the delinquent to show that the disciplinary authority is persuaded not to disagree with the conclusions reached by the inquiry officer for the reasons given in the inquiry report or he may offer additional reasons in support of the finding by the inquiry officer. In that situation, unless the disciplinary authority gives specific reasons in the show cause on the basis of which the findings of the inquiry officer in that behalf is based, it would be difficult for the delinquent to satisfactorily give reasons to persuade the disciplinary authority to agree with the conclusions reached by the inquiry officer. In the absence of any ground or reason in the show-cause notice it amounts to an empty formality which would cause grave prejudice to the delinquent officer and would result in injustice to him. In the absence of any ground or reason in the show-cause notice it amounts to an empty formality which would cause grave prejudice to the delinquent officer and would result in injustice to him. The mere fact that in the final order some reasons have been given to disagree with the conclusions reached by the disciplinary authority cannot cure the defect.” The same view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. v. Kunj Behari Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 , relevant paras of which is reproduced herein below: “17. These observations are clearly in tune with the observations in Bimal Kumar Pandit case quoted earlier and would be applicable at the first stage itself. The aforesaid passages clearly bring out the necessity of the authority which is to finally record an adverse finding to give a hearing to the delinquent officer. If the inquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar case the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the inquiry officer. It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the inquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the inquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions, then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings, what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority. ……… 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). In departmental proceedings, what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority. ……… 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the inquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the inquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the inquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.” (iii) While dealing with similar matter in the case of Madhurendra Kumar Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand and others in W.P.(S) No. 2053 of 2018 reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Jhar 2964, this Court has clearly observed that there was no occasion for conducting a de novo and second inquiry as without assigning any reasons for deferring with the first inquiry report, the disciplinary authority had ordered for second inquiry, which is impermissible in the eyes of law, as after deferring with the inquiry report and following the principles of natural justice, a further inquiry could have been initiated and not a fresh inquiry. There has been complete violation of principles of audi alteram partem. (iv) The Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Krishna Kanhaiya Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar, reported in 2014(4) P-LJR 576, was of the view that even for imposing minor punishment, if procedure for imposing major punishment is followed then it has to be followed in its entirety and violation of such procedure cannot be defended by claiming that because the punishment was minor therefore violation of such procedure will not vitiate minor punishment. The same has not been done in the instant case. The impugned orders are bereft of any finding by the disciplinary authority. The same has not been done in the instant case. The impugned orders are bereft of any finding by the disciplinary authority. In absence of any reasons and the order in complete violation of the Rule, the petitioner cannot be held guilty of the allegations, which, in turn, vitiates the impugned order of punishment as being a non-speaking and non-reasoned order and the same is in complete violation of principles of natural justice. (v) It is settled legal propositions that issuance of 2nd show-cause notice along with copy of inquiry report is sine qua non and inflicting the punishment without seeking reply by way of 2nd show-cause notice is not tenable in the eyes of law. (vi) Rule 18(2) of the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2016 clearly stipulates that it shall be necessary for the disciplinary authority to record reasons for its disagreement from the inquiry report and it is mandated to record its own findings on the charges. The said Rule also clearly stipulates that a copy of inquiry report, along with findings of the departmental authority, shall be provided to the government servant and provide him an opportunity to file written representation against the same before proceeding with issuance of final order. Said Rule 18(2), (3) and (4) reads as under: “18(2) The Disciplinary Authority, after receipt of the enquiry report as per rule 17(23)(ii) or as per sub rule (1), shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own finding on such charge, if the evidences on record is sufficient for the purpose. (3) The Disciplinary Authority shall forward or cause to be forwarded a copy of the inquiry report, together with its own findings, if any, as provided in sub rule (2) to the Government Servant who may submit, if he or she so desire, his or her written representation or submission to the Disciplinary Authority within fifteen days, (4) The Disciplinary Authority, if it is different from the inquiry authority, shall before making a final order in the case, forward a copy of the inquiry report to the Government servant concerned who may submit, if he or she so desires, his or her written representation or submission to the Disciplinary authority within fifteen days. The Disciplinary Authority shall consider the representation or submission, if any, submitted by the Government Servant before proceeding further in the manner specified in sub rule (5) and (6).” The order of the disciplinary authority is not based on evidence on record and as such the same has been passed in complete contravention to Rule 18(2) of the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2016 and thus cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. In the instant case, the departmental authority has not provided the petitioner with the inquiry report along with its own findings and thus no opportunity of being heard has been granted to him in complete contravention of law. The procedure under Rule 18 of the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2016 has not been complied with and thus impugned orders are fit to be quashed and set aside. (vii) The specific provision of Rule 19 of the said Rule which clearly states that before passing final order imposing punishment provided under Rules 14(i) to (iv), the departmental authority has to inform the concerned government servant regarding the proposal for levying such punishment and given him reasonable opportunity to file a representation against the same, has also not been followed by the respondents before inflicting punishment to the petitioner. The said Rule 19 reads as under: “19. Procedure for imposing minor penalties – (1) Subject to the provisions of sub rule (3) of rule 18, no order imposing on a Government Servant any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of rule 14 shall be made except after- (a) informing the Government Servant in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavior on which it is proposed to be taken, and giving him reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against the proposal; (b) considering the representation, if any, submitted by the Government Servant under Clause (a); “(c) Recording a finding on each imputation of misconduct or misbehavior. (viii) This is clear case wherein impugned order has been passed without issuing second show-cause notice to the petitioner and without affording him an opportunity of hearing against the inquiry report. (viii) This is clear case wherein impugned order has been passed without issuing second show-cause notice to the petitioner and without affording him an opportunity of hearing against the inquiry report. Without assigning any reasons in support of differences, the disciplinary authority has differed from the findings of the inquiry report and has passed impugned order unilaterally without appreciating evidence on record and as such the same is fit to be quashed and set aside. 9. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that petitioner has a good case and the impugned orders are fit to be quashed and set aside. As a sequitur to the aforesaid discussions and considering facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned orders as contained in Memo NO. 5/AAROP-1-32/2015-5660 (HRMS), Dated 05.06.2020 [Annexure-11] and Memo No. 5/AAROP – 1-32/2015-2390 (HRMS)/Ranchi, Dated 12.03.2021 [Annexure-12], are hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to grant consequential benefits to the petitioner. Let it be made clear that entire exercise be completed within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt/ production of a copy of this order. 10. Resultantly, the writ petition stands allowed.