JUDGMENT : Ananda Sen, J. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 22.12.2021 passed in WP(S) No. 1532 of 2020, whereby the writ petition has been allowed and the order of termination of the writ petitioner has been set aside, directing the respondents-appellants to reinstate the writ petitioner-respondent herein forthwith with all consequential benefits. 2. Counsel for the appellant-Central University of Jharkhand argues that the impugned order is bad as it failed to take into consideration that the petitioner had only nine years nine months experience on the date of advertisement whereas the criteria was of 10 years, thus his appointment itself is void ab initio. As the qualification of ten years experience was an essential qualification and the same was not relaxable, the only consequence of non-fulfillment of the aforesaid qualification, was removal of the petitioner from service. He further contended that on the facts of the case, it was not necessary to hold a regular departmental enquiry as there was lack of basic qualification of the petitioner, thus any departmental proceeding would have been an empty formality. As per him, this aspect has been lost sight of by the learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order. He further contended that admittedly the petitioner's experience was nine years nine months on the date of advertisement, thus the only consequence would be removal from service, which was effected in this case. Alternatively the counsel for the appellants-respondents argued that once the learned Single Judge has held that the procedure as laid down was not followed, then he should not have allowed the entire writ petition directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner, rather the respondents-appellants should have been directed to initiate a proceeding as per the Statute and take a fresh decision. On these grounds, the impugned order has been challenged. 3. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that the order of dismissal was passed without initiating any departmental proceeding against the petitioner. He further submitted that admittedly the petitioner was appointed as regular employee and the respondents are seeking to remove the petitioner from his service alleging that his appointment is void ab initio and illegal. He argued that there should have been an appropriate departmental proceeding before passing the order of dismissal. Thus in violation of the norms, the petitioner has been removed. He argued that there should have been an appropriate departmental proceeding before passing the order of dismissal. Thus in violation of the norms, the petitioner has been removed. As per him, there cannot be an allegation of fraud as the Board selecting the petitioner knowing fully well about his years of experience, has selected him for the post. He further submitted that admittedly the necessary qualification was the experience qualification of ten years, but in the advertisement, there is a clause reserving discretion of relaxing the experience and age limit at any stage in case of candidates having exceptional merit. He also submitted that when the petitioner was appointed after following due process of law, that too on the recommendation of the Committee, who scrutinized all the documents of the petitioner even if there was short of three months (though denied) it will be presumed that the University has exercised the discretionary power, relaxing the requisite qualification. Once the petitioner has been appointed by the competent authority, after eight and half years of service this issue could not have been wrecked up. Counsel for the writ petitioner further raised the point that the University had levelled several charges against the writ petitioner -respondent including the allegation of mis-management, misappropriation etc and the said charge was issued in contemplation of departmental enquiry and over all there were five charges levelled against him and the imputations have also been served upon the writ petitioner. He also submitted that though the Enquiry Officer was appointed to inquire the charges, no opportunity of personal hearing was given to him, thereafter keeping the departmental enquiry pending, a show cause was issued to the petitioner alleging that his requisite experience at the time of entering into his service was of nine years nine months in place of required experience of ten years, thus why not his appointment be cancelled. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that the aforesaid allegation in the show cause dated 22.5.2020 was also part of the charge and was charge No. 2 in the Article of Charge; the respondent on receipt of reply to the said show cause notice took the impugned decision to cancel the appointment of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that the aforesaid allegation in the show cause dated 22.5.2020 was also part of the charge and was charge No. 2 in the Article of Charge; the respondent on receipt of reply to the said show cause notice took the impugned decision to cancel the appointment of the petitioner. He also argued that the procedure adopted by the respondent-appellant by taking a shortcut method is illegal, unwarranted and shows malice and this fact has been taken note of and dealt with by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order, thus the learned Single Judge has rightly allowed the writ petition by setting aside the impugned order, which is not only illegal but is mala fide. He further submitted that it cannot be said that the writ petitioner has obtained appointment by fraud as because the experience of the writ petitioner, which was nine years and nine months has already been mentioned in details in his application form. He lastly submitted that the writ petition prayed to hand over all original documents, which was being referred to, but the same has not been supplied to the writ petitioner. 4. After hearing the counsel for the parties, we find that the appellant University issued an Advertisement dated 15.4.2011 for recruiting several persons in different posts and one of such posts was of Executive Engineer. The writ petitioner applied for the post of Executive Engineer pursuant to the said Advertisement. From the Advertisement, we find that the qualification, which was necessary for the post of Executive Engineer was of a Bachelor Degree in Civil Engineering with ten years experience in design and systems and construction of buildings, roads, sanitary and water supply systems including maintenance of the same. As per the general information, the experience and qualification was to be reckoned as on the last date of submission of the application form. As per clause (xvi) of general information the University had option to relax the qualification/experience and age limit at its discretion at any stage in case of candidates with exceptional merit. The writ petitioner had undergone the rigors of the selection process and thereafter was appointed vide letter dated 18.11.2011, which was issued by the Registrar of the University. The petitioner joined the said post on 3.2.2012. The writ petitioner had undergone the rigors of the selection process and thereafter was appointed vide letter dated 18.11.2011, which was issued by the Registrar of the University. The petitioner joined the said post on 3.2.2012. Vide letter dated 16.09.2013, the University informed the petitioner that he has been discharged from his service as the University has decided to dispense with his services. The writ petition challenged the aforesaid order by way of filing writ petition alongwith other employees and all those writ petitions being WP(S) Nos. 6127, 6160, 6163 and 6186 of 2013 were allowed and pursuant to the order of this Court, the petitioner was reinstated in service vide letter dated 23.02.2016. The University thereafter decided to proceed against the petitioner by initiating disciplinary proceeding by exercising power conferred under the Statute read with the Central Universities Act, 2009 and the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 and thereafter the petitioner was suspended. The petitioner challenged the suspension order before this Court in WP(S) No. 3641 of 2019, which was stayed. The University thereafter revoked the suspension of the petitioner and place the matter before the Executive Council. On 04th October, 2019, in contemplation of the departmental proceeding, the petitioner was served with Memorandum of Charges along with statement of imputations of misconduct. From the statement of imputation of misconduct, we find that the charges, levelled against the writ petitioner were under five heads. From the chargesheet, we find that the allegations are of dereliction of duty in respect of construction of buildings, appointment of petitioner is bad, has he did not possess the requisite experience of ten years, irregularities in purchasing of plastic Speed Breakers to be installed in various locations of the University, the expression of interest of the University in respect of empanelment of Architect for development of Master Plan and some irregularities in respect of organizing tribal festivals. 5. The writ petitioner represented before the authority and sought for personal hearing but vide order dated 22.11.2019 the appellant-University rejected the prayer of the writ petitioner on the ground that the Enquiry Officer has already been appointed to inquire into the charges, thus the petitioner should appear before the Enquiry Officer and represent accordingly. 5. The writ petitioner represented before the authority and sought for personal hearing but vide order dated 22.11.2019 the appellant-University rejected the prayer of the writ petitioner on the ground that the Enquiry Officer has already been appointed to inquire into the charges, thus the petitioner should appear before the Enquiry Officer and represent accordingly. In stead of proceeding with the departmental proceeding, the Department issued show cause on 22.5.2020 directing the writ petitioner to give a reply as to why not his appointed be treated as obtained by fraud and/or void ab initio and be not cancelled. The ground mentioned in the notice is that the petitioner did not possess requisite experience of ten yeas on the date of submission of application form, rather he had experience of nine years and nine months. Be it noted that this contents of the notice dated 22.5.2020 is exactly same and similar as charge No. 2 of the chargehseet along with imputations issued to the writ petitioner, which the respondent-appellant did not proceed with. 6. The petitioner gave a detailed reply stating therein that he has not committed any fraud as all the documents were along with the application form and considering all the documents, the University had taken a conscious decision to appoint the writ petitioner and after more than eight years, the appointment of the petitioner cannot be challenged. The writ petitioner also alleged in the reply that the person who had issued the show cause notice had personal bias and the reasons thereafter has also been mentioned in the reply. He further alleged that after receipt of the said reply, vide order dated 30.5.2020, the appellant-University cancelled the appointment of the petitioner considering it being illegal and void ab initio since inception. 7. On the admitted facts, we find that on the same charge, the Departmental Proceeding was initiated against the writ petitioner by appointing an Enquiry Officer but for the reasons best known, the respondent-University did not proceed with the same. Once a Departmental Proceeding has been initiated after issuance of charge-sheet, the same should have reached to its logical conclusion, but the respondent-University circumvented the said procedure and issued a show cause notice only on one allegation, and thereafter dismissed the writ petitioner. 8. The Central Universities Act, 2009 provides for framing of Statute. Once a Departmental Proceeding has been initiated after issuance of charge-sheet, the same should have reached to its logical conclusion, but the respondent-University circumvented the said procedure and issued a show cause notice only on one allegation, and thereafter dismissed the writ petitioner. 8. The Central Universities Act, 2009 provides for framing of Statute. Section 26 of the Central Universities Act, 2009 confers the power to make Statute and its relevant clauses read as under; “26. Subject to the provision of this Act, the Statutes may provide for all or any of the following matters namely; (a) …............. (b) …............. (c) …................ (d) the appointment of teachers, academic staff and other employees of the University, their emoluments and conditions of service; (e) …............ (f) the conditions of service of employees including provisions for pension, insurance, provident fund, the manner of termination of service and disciplinary action: ….......................... ….......................... (p) the maintenance of discipline among the employees and students. (q) …................................. 9. Thus from the aforesaid provision of the Central Universities Act, 2009, specially Section 26(f) of the Act, a provision has been made as to how the services of an employee would be terminated and also provides for a disciplinary action. Section 33 of the Act provides for conditions of services of employee, which reads as under : 33. Conditions of service of employees— (1) Every employee of the University shall be appointed under a written contract, which shall be lodged with the University and a copy of which shall be furnished to the employee concerned. If there is any dispute arising out of contract between the University and any employee, there is a provision of referring the dispute to the Arbitration tribunal. Reference of such dispute and constitution of Arbitration Tribunal is provided in Section 33(2) of the Act, which reads as under; 33 (2) Any dispute arising out of the contract between the University and any employee shall, at the request of the employee, be referred to a Tribunal of Arbitration consisting of one member appointed by the Executive Council, one member nominated by the employee concerned and an umpire appointed by the Visitor. Section 35 of the Act gives a right to appeal to every employee, which is quoted here-in-below. 35. Right to appeal. Section 35 of the Act gives a right to appeal to every employee, which is quoted here-in-below. 35. Right to appeal. —Every employee or student of the University or of a College or Institution maintained by the University shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, have a right to appeal within such time as may be prescribed by the Statutes, to the Executive Council against the decision of any officer or authority of the University, or, the Principal or the management of any College or an Institution, as the case may be, and thereupon the Executive Council may confirm, modify or reverse the decision appealed against. 10. In terms of Section 27 of the Act, statute has been framed, which reads as under; 27. Statutes, how to be made. — (1) The first Statutes are those set out in the Second Schedule to this Act. (2) The Executive Council may, from time to time, make new or additional Statutes or may amend or repeal the Statutes referred to in sub-section (1): Provided that the Executive Council shall not make, amend or repeal any Statutes affecting the status, powers or constitution of any authority of the University until such authority has been given an opportunity of expressing an opinion in writing on the proposed changes, and any opinion so expressed shall be considered by the Executive Council. (3) Every new Statute or addition to the Statutes or any amendment or repeal of a Statute shall require the assent of the Visitor who may assent thereto or withhold assent or remit to the Executive Council for re-consideration. (4) A new Statute or a Statute amending or repealing an existing Statute shall have no validity unless it has been assented to by the Visitor. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing subsections, the Visitor may make new or additional Statutes or amend or repeal the Statutes referred to in sub-section (1) during the period of three years immediately after the commencement of this Act: Provided that the Visitor may, on the expiry of the said period of three years, make, within one year from the date of such expiry, such detailed Statutes as he may consider necessary and such detailed Statutes shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the Visitor may direct the University to make provisions in the Statutes in respect of any matter specified by him and if the Executive Council is unable to implement such direction within sixty days of its receipt, the Visitor may, after considering the reasons, if any, communicated by the Executive Council for its inability to comply with such direction, make or amend the Statutes suitably. 11. Statute 25 of the Second Schedule of the Act provides for procedure to be adopted for removal of an employee of the University. It is necessary to quote Section 25 of the Act, which runs as under; 25. Removal of employees of University.– (1) Where there is an allegation of misconduct against a teacher, a member of the academic staff or other employee of the University, the Vice-Chancellor, in the case of the teacher or a member of the academic staff, and the authority competent to appoint (hereinafter referred to as the appointing authority) in the case of other employee may, by order in writing, place such teacher, member of the academic staff or other employee, as the case may be, under suspension and shall forthwith report to the Executive Council the circumstances in which the order was made: Provided that the Executive Council may, if it is of the opinion, that the circumstances of the case do not warrant the suspension of the teacher or a member of the academic staff, revoke such order. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the terms of the contract of appointment or of any other terms and conditions of service of the employees, the Executive Council in respect of teachers and other academic staff, and the appointing authority in respect of other employees, shall have the power to remove a teacher or a member of the academic staff or other employee, as the case may be, on grounds of misconduct. (3) Save as aforesaid, the Executive Council, or as the case may be, the appointing authority, shall not be entitled to remove any teacher, member of the academic staff or other employee except for a good cause and after giving three months’ notice or on payment of three months’ salary in lieu thereof. (3) Save as aforesaid, the Executive Council, or as the case may be, the appointing authority, shall not be entitled to remove any teacher, member of the academic staff or other employee except for a good cause and after giving three months’ notice or on payment of three months’ salary in lieu thereof. (4) No teacher, member of the academic staff or other employee shall be removed under clause (2) or clause (3) unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. (5) The removal of a teacher, member of the academic staff or other employee shall take effect from the date on which the order of removal is made: Provided that where the teacher, member of the academic staff or other employee is under suspension at the time of his removal, such removal shall take effect from the date on which he was placed under suspension. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Statute, a teacher, member of the academic staff or other employee may resign– (a) if he is permanent employee, only after giving three months’ notice in writing to the Executive Council or the appointing authority, as the case may be, or by paying three months’ salary in lieu thereof; (b) if he is not a permanent employee, only after giving one month’s notice in writing to the Executive Council or, as the case may be, the appointing authority or by paying one month’s salary in lieu thereof: Provided that such resignation shall take effect only on the date on which the resignation is accepted by the Executive Council or the appointing authority, as the case may be. 12. Thus from the aforesaid provisions and Statute, it is quite clear that there is a specific mechanism which provides as to when and how an employee who has committed a misconduct has to be removed. In this case, admittedly chargesheet was issued to the petitioner alleging and citing several misconducts including financial as well as allegation that the petitioner did not have the requisite experience of ten years, which was necessary. In this case, admittedly chargesheet was issued to the petitioner alleging and citing several misconducts including financial as well as allegation that the petitioner did not have the requisite experience of ten years, which was necessary. Admittedly the University did not proceed with the Departmental Proceeding inspite of appointing an Enquiry Officer, rather issued a separate notice only confining to the allegation of not having minimum experience criteria at the time of entry in service, and asked the petitioner for a reply to the show cause. On receipt of the same, he was dismissed by the appellant. Thus the University did not follow the law, as prescribed, for removal of the employee. 13. The counsel for the petitioner argued that there was clause in the Advertisement which provides for relaxing the eligibility criteria. Clause (xvi) of the Advertisement reads as under; (xvi) University reserves the right not to fill up any of the vacancies advertised, if the circumstances so warrant. The University reserves the rights to withdraw and advertised post(s) at any time without giving any reason. Any consequential vacancies arising at the time of interviews may also be filled up from the available candidates. The number of position is thus open to change. The University may relax the qualification/experience and age limit at its discretion at any stage in case of candidates with exceptional merit.” 14. The petitioner in reply to the show cause also referred to the said clause and had pleaded that the petitioner has been appointed by the appropriate competent authority and has been working for petty long period i.e. from 18.11.2011 and it will be presumed that the said clause has been invoked by the appointing authority and only thereafter the petitioner was appointed. This defence was not at all considered by the Authority in the impugned order by which, the petitioner was dismissed from service. The petitioner claims that his experience to be ten years eleven months, but as per calculation, it was nine years nine months from the date of obtaining the qualification certificate, thus as there shortage was of three months. 15. Admittedly, the Appointing Authority also considered this fact and has appointed the petitioner, thus it cannot be said that the petitioner has played any fraud while obtaining his appointment. It is the Appointing Authority who has considered all documents, submitted by the petitioner and thereafter issued the appointment letter. 15. Admittedly, the Appointing Authority also considered this fact and has appointed the petitioner, thus it cannot be said that the petitioner has played any fraud while obtaining his appointment. It is the Appointing Authority who has considered all documents, submitted by the petitioner and thereafter issued the appointment letter. There is no allegation against the petitioner that he had furnished any forged experience certificate or educational certificate. If there is any error, it was on the part of the Executive Council who had issued the appointment letter to the petitioner in the year 2011. This fact has also been held by the learned Single Judge in paragraph 11 of the order and we do not find any material to differ with the aforesaid finding. 16. Further, the learned Single Judge also held that the action of the respondent in removing the petitioner is malicious and the petitioner has been victimized and punished by the respondent, which is evident from the circumstances. We also concur with the aforesaid finding considering the circumstances in which the petitioner was removed from service. 17. Admittedly on the same charge along with other additional charges, the petitioner was charge-sheeted and a Departmental Proceeding was initiated. Enquiry Officer was appointed, but the respondent did not proceed with the said enquiry rather adopted a circuitous method and issued show cause to the petitioner cherry picking only one allegation i.e. less experience at the time of appointment, and thereafter issued show cause to the petitioner as to why not he be removed. The petitioner took his defence and filed his reply and thereafter the petitioner was terminated. This action clearly suggests the intention on the part of the respondents to victimize the petitioner. Be it noted that there is no allegation that the petitioner had connived with the Appointing Authority i.e. the Executive Council who admittedly after following the procedure appointed the petitioner in the year 2011. In absence of any allegation or charge that there was connivance (as the Executive Council was the Appointing Authority), the petitioner could not have been punished. 18. Now the question falls for consideration is what would be the consequences when the petitioner has worked from 03.02.2012 to 30.05.2020 (though his services were temporarily dispensed with sometime in the year 2013 along with others but by virtue of order of the Court, the petitioner was reinstated in February-2016) 19. 18. Now the question falls for consideration is what would be the consequences when the petitioner has worked from 03.02.2012 to 30.05.2020 (though his services were temporarily dispensed with sometime in the year 2013 along with others but by virtue of order of the Court, the petitioner was reinstated in February-2016) 19. In the case of Vikas Pratap Singh V. State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2013) 14 SCC 494 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that though there is no legal right in respect of appointment to a post vests in a candidate who has obtained the employment by fraud, mischief, misrepresentation or mala fide. However, in cases where a wrongful or irregular appointment is made without any mistake on the part of the appointee, the Court has taken a sympathetic view in the light of various factors including bona fide of the candidate in such appointment and length of service after such appointment. It is necessary to quote para 22 of the aforesaid judgment, which runs as under; “20. The pristine maxim of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant (fraud and justice never dwell together) has never lost its temper over the centuries and it continues to dwell in spirit and body of service law jurisprudence. It is settled law that no legal right in respect of appointment to a said post vests in a candidate who has obtained the employment by fraud, mischief, misrepresentation or malafide. (See: District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram and another v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 655 , P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath and others, (1994) 1 SCC 1 and Union of India and others v. M. Bhaskaran, 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 100). It is also settled law that a person appointed erroneously on a post must not reap the benefits of wrongful appointment jeopardizing the interests of the meritorious and worthy candidates. However, in cases where a wrongful or irregular appointment is made without any mistake on the part of the appointee and upon discovery of such error or irregularity the appointee is terminated, this Court has taken a sympathetic view in the light of various factors including bonafide of the candidate in such appointment and length of service of the candidate after such appointment. (See: Vinodan T. and Ors. (See: Vinodan T. and Ors. v. University of Calicut and Ors., (2002) 4 SCC 726 ; State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi and Ors. 20. In another case i.e. Anmol Kumar Tiwari V. State of Jharkhand, reported in (2021) 5 SCC 424 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also considered the situation whether there was no fraud played by the candidate, rather was appointed irregularly by the authority while preparing the merit list. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also considered the length of service of the employee. The Hon’ble Supreme Court concurred with the findings of the High Court who directed reinstatement of dismissed employee. Paragraph 11 of the judgment reads as under; 11. Two issues arise for our consideration. The first relates to the correctness of the direction given by the High Court to reinstate the Writ Petitioners. The High Court directed reinstatement of the Writ Petitioners after taking into account the fact that they were beneficiaries of the select list that was prepared in an irregular manner. However, the High Court found that the Writ Petitioners were not responsible for the irregularities committed by the authorities in preparation of the select list. Moreover, the Writ Petitioners were appointed after completion of training and worked for some time. The High Court was of the opinion that the Writ Petitioners ought to be considered for reinstatement without affecting the rights of other candidates who were already selected. A similar situation arose in Vikas Pratap Singh’s case (supra), where this Court considered that the Appellants-therein were appointed due to an error committed by the Respondents in the matter of valuation of answer scripts. As there was no allegation of fraud or misrepresentation committed by the Appellants therein, the termination of their services was set aside as it would adversely affect their careers. That the Appellants-therein had successfully undergone training and were serving the State for more than 3 years was another reason that was given by this Court for setting aside the orders passed by the High Court. As the Writ Petitioners are similarly situated to the Appellants in Vikas Pratap Singh’s case (supra), we are in agreement with the High Court that the Writ Petitioners are entitled to the relief granted. Moreover, though on pain of Contempt, the Writ Petitioners have been reinstated and are working at present. 21. As the Writ Petitioners are similarly situated to the Appellants in Vikas Pratap Singh’s case (supra), we are in agreement with the High Court that the Writ Petitioners are entitled to the relief granted. Moreover, though on pain of Contempt, the Writ Petitioners have been reinstated and are working at present. 21. In the instant case, admittedly, there was no fraud played by the petitioner. The Executive Council, who was the Appointing Authority, appointed the petitioner and the petitioner has worked for more than eight years. In the case of Anmol Kumar Tiwari (Supra), the employee worked for only three years. Thus, in our view, the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Case of Vikas Pratap Singh (Supra) and Anmol Kumar Tiwari(Supra) fit in this case. 22. In a recent judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the case of Judicial Officers in the case of Sivanandan C.T. and Others V. High Court of Kerala and Others, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 994, in paragraph 58 has held that at the lapse of time, it may be difficult to direct either the unseating of the candidates who have performed their duties. Unseating them at this stage would be contrary to public interest since they have gained experience as judicial officers in the service of the State of Kerala. In concluding paragraph-60, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 60(vi) has held as under; 60 (i) ………………….. (ii) …………………… (iii) ………………….. (iv) …………………… (v) ……………………. (vi) In terms of relief, we hold that it would be contrary to the public interest to direct the induction of the petitioners into the Higher Judicial Service after the lapse of more than six years. Candidates who have been selected nearly six years ago cannot be unseated. They were all qualified and have been serving the district judiciary of the State. Unseating them at this stage would be contrary to public interest. To induct the petitioners would be to bring in new candidates in preference to those who are holding judicial office for a length of time. To deprive the state and its citizens of the benefit of these experienced judicial officers at a senior position would not be in public interest. 23. To induct the petitioners would be to bring in new candidates in preference to those who are holding judicial office for a length of time. To deprive the state and its citizens of the benefit of these experienced judicial officers at a senior position would not be in public interest. 23. Though the aforesaid case relates to the Judicial Officers who are working and the instant case is of an Engineer, working under the Central Universities Act, but the aforesaid principles can be applied in this case also, specially when there is no fraud committed by the writ petitioner. 24. Be it noted that even if we accept the ground put forthwith by the respondent-University, the writ petitioner had lack experience only for three months and it is not the case where the petitioner did not possess necessary educational qualification or other qualifications. However, as held earlier, the learned Single Judge has also found that there was element of biasness against the petitioner while dismissing him from service and the procedure adopted by the respondent is bad. 25. Considering what has been held above, we find no merit in this appeal. The learned Single Judge has passed a reasoned order, which needs no interference on the issue. 26. Before parting we would like to mention that since other allegations leveled against the writ petitioner, which find mentioned in the charge-sheet was not proceeded by the respondent, it will be open to the respondents if they want to proceed with other allegations, they will proceed afresh by following the procedure as laid down in the Statute as well as in the Central Universities Act. Be it also noted that the issue in respect of experience at the time of appointment of the writ petitioner is concerned has come to rest by the order of the learned Single Judge and this Court, thus the same should not be reopened. 27. With the aforesaid observation and direction, this appeal stands dismissed. 28. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand closed. 29. There shall be no orders as to costs. 30. Urgent certified copy as per rules. I agree.- Sanjaya Kumar Mishra, C.J.