JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Narendra Kumar Singh, learned Counsel for the applicant, Ms. Fatima Anjum, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Syed Ahmed Faizan and Mr. D.K. Srivastava, learned A.G.A. for the State. 2. This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘Code' for short) is directed against an order of the Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 5, Farrukhabad dated 10.11.2022 passed in Complaint Case No 59 of 2022, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, dismissing the complaint under Section 256 of the Code. 3. A preliminary objection has been raised by Ms. Fatima Anjum that this application under Section 482 of the Code is not maintainable, because the impugned order has been passed by the Magistrate under Section 256 of the Code, which amounts to a judgment of acquittal, the remedy whereagainst is an appeal under Section 378(4) of the Code by special leave of this Court. She submits, therefore, that this application under Section 482 of the Code is not maintainable. 4. Shorn of unnecessary detail, the facts giving rise to this application under Section 482 of the Code are that the applicant instituted a complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Farrukhabad on 15.03.2018, giving rise to the Complaint Case No. 59 of 2022, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 5. The complaint was about the dishonour of a cheque dated 20.01.2018 worth Rs. 2,00,000/-, bearing no. 183239, issued by the opposite party no. 2, drawn on the Axis Bank, Hewett Road, Lucknow dated 20.01.2016. The cheque when presented by the applicant was allegedly dishonoured. After service of the necessary statutory notice which remained uncomplied with for the period of time specified by law, the impugned complaint was instituted. 6. The second opposite party was summoned to stand his trial by the learned Magistrate vide order dated 04.05.2022. There is an averment to this effect in paragraph no. 9 of the affidavit. Later on, by the order impugned dated 10.11.2022, the complaint was dismissed in the absence of the complainant under Section 256 of the Code. 7. 6. The second opposite party was summoned to stand his trial by the learned Magistrate vide order dated 04.05.2022. There is an averment to this effect in paragraph no. 9 of the affidavit. Later on, by the order impugned dated 10.11.2022, the complaint was dismissed in the absence of the complainant under Section 256 of the Code. 7. It is urged by learned Counsel for the second opposite party in support of the preliminary objection that this petition under Section 482 of the Code is not maintainable because an order dismissing a complaint under Section 256 of the Code is a judgment of acquittal against which the remedy of an appeal is envisaged under Section 378 of the Code. 8. In support of her submissions, Ms. Fatima Anjum, learned Counsel for opposite party no. 2 has placed reliance upon a decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in H.P. Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. v. M.P.S. Chawla, 1996 SCC OnLine HP 54. In H.P. Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. (supra) it has been held: 11. There is no denying that the dismissal of the complaint in default under section 256 of the Criminal Procedure Code, entails the acquittal of the accused. Once an accused has been acquitted of the offence, the law provides a remedy by way of an appeal against the order of acquittal. Once a remedy by way of appeal is available to the petitioner under section 378(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, on the failure of the petitioner to avail of such a remedy, this court is not to exercise the inherent powers for interfering with the impugned order. 9. Mr. Narendra Kumar Singh, learned Counsel for the applicant in rebuttal of the preliminary objections has placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in Sunil Mishra v. State of U.P. and another, 2015 (90) ACC 169 to submit that an application under Section 482 of the Code is maintainable, where the order dismissing the complaint under Section 256(1) of the Code is passed without recording reasons for not adjourning proceedings in the complainant's absence. 10. Mr. Narendra Kumar Singh, Advocate has emphasized that the decision of this Court in Sunil Mishra (supra) is a binding precedent whereas the Himachal Pradesh High Court's decision is nothing more than persuasive. 11. 10. Mr. Narendra Kumar Singh, Advocate has emphasized that the decision of this Court in Sunil Mishra (supra) is a binding precedent whereas the Himachal Pradesh High Court's decision is nothing more than persuasive. 11. A perusal of the decision of this Court in Sunil Mishra shows that no doubt the case was one, where a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 had been dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant on 19.02.2014 in exercise of powers under Section 256(1) of the Code and the manner of exercise of the power to dismiss under Section 256 of the Code was disapproved by this Court in an application under Section 482, which was allowed and the order dismissing the complaint quashed, but, this Court is of opinion that the decision in Sunil Mishra is no precedent. The reason is that though the point whether an order under Section 256(1) of the Code can be assailed in an application under Section 482 in the face of a clear remedy of appeal under Section 378(4) of the Code was involved, it is evident from a reading of the judgment of Pratyush Kumar, J., that it was “not perceived by the Court or present to its mind” to borrow the classical words employed by Salmond in Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., p. 153. The decision of Pratyush Kumar, J. in Sunil Mishra, so far as the point in hand is involved, is not a binding precedent and must be held to pass sub silentio. 12. I had occasion to consider the principle of sub silentio and that earlier decisions would not be binding precedent on account of the principle of sub silentio in Ruksar Khan v. State of U.P. and others, 2020 (7) ADJ 525 , where is was held: 41. It must be said, about the various decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, where after a short statement of facts giving rise to the cause, directions have been issued, that these decisions do not carry the force of precedent. A decision has the value of precedent, where it lays down a principle governing a point that arises for consideration in a subsequent decision. A decision has the value of precedent, where it lays down a principle governing a point that arises for consideration in a subsequent decision. A fortiori a decision that does not enunciate a principle of law in the context of facts involved after consideration of arguments must be regarded not binding on a Court before which the relevant point subsequently arises. The decision is regarded to pass sub silentio. The principle of sub silentio is a well acknowledged principle that relieves a Court of the obligation of precedent, where the decision relied does not indicate a consideration of the kind. A classical statement about the law relating to the principle of sub silentio is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and another v. Synthetics and Chemicals Limited and another, (1991) 4 SCC 139 . In State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (supra), the principle is enunciated in the concurring judgment of R.M. Sahai, J. thus: ''41. Does this principle extend and apply to a conclusion of law, which was neither raised nor preceded by any consideration. In other words can such conclusions be considered as declaration of law? Here again the English Courts and jurists have carved out an exception to the rule of precedents. It has been explained as rule of sub-silentio. ''A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the Court or present to its mind.'' (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn., p. 153). In Lancaster Motor Company (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. [(1941) 1 KB 675, 677 : (1941) 2 All ER 11] the Court did not feel bound by earlier decision as it was rendered 'without any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of the authority'. It was approved by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur. [ (1989) 1 SCC 101 ] The bench held that, 'precedents sub-silentio and without argument are of no moment'. The Courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. It was approved by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur. [ (1989) 1 SCC 101 ] The bench held that, 'precedents sub-silentio and without argument are of no moment'. The Courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi. In B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry [ AIR 1967 SC 1480 : (1967) 2 SCR 650 : 20 STC 215] it was observed, 'it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles, laid down therein'. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law.'' 42. The principle was again explained by the Supreme Court in Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty and another, (2003) 7 SCC 197 . It was held in Divisional Controller, KSRTC (supra): ''23. So far as Nagesha case [ (1997) 8 SCC 349 ] relied upon by the claimant is concerned, it is only to be noted that the decision does not indicate the basis for fixing of the quantum as a lump sum was fixed by the Court. The decision ordinarily is a decision on the case before the Court, while the principle underlying the decision would be binding as a precedent in a case which comes up for decision subsequently. Therefore, while applying the decision to a later case, the Court dealing with it should carefully try to ascertain the principle laid down by the previous decision. A decision often takes its colour from the question involved in the case in which it is rendered. The scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation. A decision often takes its colour from the question involved in the case in which it is rendered. The scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation. The only thing binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty as without an investigation into the facts, it cannot be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all, nor every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement having the weight of authority.'' ” 13. The issue whether an order passed under Section 256 (1) of the Code can be challenged in an application under Section 482 of the Code, or for that matter, a revision under Section 401 of the Code fell for consideration before the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Dinesh Chander Sharma v. Deputy Commissioner Office Employees’ Union and another, 2020 SCC OnLine HP 1677. In Dinesh Chander Sharma (supra) it was held: 27. The appeal against an order of acquittal lies under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C., to the High Court, by seeking special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal. Instead of filing the petition under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C., in the High Court of HP, the petitioner preferred to present the revision petition under Section 397 of the CrPC before Sessions Court, Una, HP. 28. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, dismissed the revision petition, by holding that when the remedy to challenge the order of dismissal of complaint was by filing an appeal under Section 401 of the Cr.P.C., in the High Court, then he had no jurisdiction to entertain a revision petition by invoking revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. 378. 28. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, dismissed the revision petition, by holding that when the remedy to challenge the order of dismissal of complaint was by filing an appeal under Section 401 of the Cr.P.C., in the High Court, then he had no jurisdiction to entertain a revision petition by invoking revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. 378. Appeal in case of acquittal.- (4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of the acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. 29. An appeal is a continuation of a trial and is a statutory right to get the judgment tested by a superior Court, for its correctness, legality and appreciation of evidence. An Appeal, being a creature of statute, only exists where expressly provided. 32. In H.P. Financial Corporation v. Ms. Continental Spinners Ltd., ILR (2016) 2 HP 442, a single bench of this Court holds:— 7. Since the case was instituted on a complaint and the dismissal of the complaint has the effect of acquittal, therefore, in view of the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 378 of the Code, the remedy of the complainant was to make an application seeking special leave to appeal against the impugned order and present an appeal, which course the complaint had not adopted. 33. In my considered view, this approach of the Sessions Judge was legally correct and justified. Therefore, I do not find any error in the impugned order dated Oct 17, 2017, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Una, and affirm it. However, the order passed by Ld. Judicial Magistrate does not pass the test of law, but the remedy to seek its reversal, is not this petition. 35. The remedy available to the complainant was by filing an appeal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C., by seeking leave of this Court. Instead, the complainant filed a Criminal Revision, that too before Sessions Court. He chose a wrong remedy, and he has all the right to rectify the mistake by filing an appeal, as stated above, if he so feels and desires.” (emphasis by Court) 14. The issue also engaged the attention of the Bombay High Court in Om Gayatri & Co. Instead, the complainant filed a Criminal Revision, that too before Sessions Court. He chose a wrong remedy, and he has all the right to rectify the mistake by filing an appeal, as stated above, if he so feels and desires.” (emphasis by Court) 14. The issue also engaged the attention of the Bombay High Court in Om Gayatri & Co. & others v. State of Maharashtra & another, 2005 SCC OnLine Bom 1622, where it was observed: 11. Section 256(1) mandates that if the absence of the complainant is not justified, the Magistrate shall acquit the accused. In a summons case, instituted on a complaint, if the complainant is absent on the date of hearing, the Magistrate has to follow either of the three courses, namely. (1) Acquit the accused; (2) to adjourn the case and (3) to dispense with the attendance of the complainant and to proceed with the case. In the present case, the Magistrate found that the complainant was avoiding to lead evidence, therefore, relying on the ruling of this Court reported in 1998 Mah LJ 576 : (1998 Cri LJ 3754) the Magistrate proceeded to pass an order acquitting the accused. Once this order has been passed, the remedy of the complainant is to prefer an appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after obtaining leave of the Court as required by Section 378(4) of Cr. P.C. This view is consistently taken by this Court. The earliest decision is that of Justice Vaidya, reported in AIR 1959 Bombay 94. This point then, arose in the matter of Dharamaji Gangaram Gholam v. Vithoba Soma Khade, reported in 1992 Mah LJ 118 : (1992 Cri LJ 870). In that case, the accused came to be acquitted in a complaint case by the learned Magistrate for the offences punishable under Sections 417 and 420 read with 34 of the Penal Code, 1860, The point whether an appeal lies against the order of acquittal or whether a revision can be maintained arose for the consideration of the Court. Referring to earlier decision of this Court and to the provisions of Section 401(4) which provides that where an appeal lies under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of a revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. Referring to earlier decision of this Court and to the provisions of Section 401(4) which provides that where an appeal lies under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of a revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. Daud, J. came to the conclusion that only an appeal can be preferred against the order of acquittal in consonance with provisions of Section 378, Cr. P.C. In this behalf, reference can also be made to another judgment of this Court, reported in 1999 (3) Mah LJ 397 in the matter of Raja s/o Dr. S.P. Upadhyay v. State or Maharashtra. In taht case also prosecution was for offence punishable under Section. 138 of N.I. Act. In the absence of complainant, the learned Magistrate passed an order of discharge. A revision was filed against that order. It was entertained by the Sessions Judge. The order of Sessions Judge was appealed against. In this context, Patel, J. observed in para 9 of the report that: “It can not be gainsaid that merely because the Magistrate committed an error in recording the order of discharge, that would invest the complainant with a right to prefer a revision and he was justified in doing so. As the order itself is very clear that it has been passed under Section 256(1) of Cr. P.C., 1973, it will necessarily have to be construed an order of acquittal under section 256(1) and not that of discharge. There is one more distinction which will have to be kept in mind and that is, that once an order of acquittal under section 256(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is passed, then the complainant is debarred from filing a second complaint on the same facts so long as the order of acquittal is not set aside. Therefore, the only course open to the complainant was to prefer an appeal in the High Court against the said order of the learned Magistrate by special leave of the Court under section 378(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.” 12. It may also be worthwhile to refer to the views of other High Courts on the point. Therefore, the only course open to the complainant was to prefer an appeal in the High Court against the said order of the learned Magistrate by special leave of the Court under section 378(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.” 12. It may also be worthwhile to refer to the views of other High Courts on the point. In the matter of Krishna Kumar Gupta v. Mohammed Jaros, reported in 2003 Cri LJ 149, while dealing with this point, Mahmood Ali, J. referred to the submissions made on behalf of appellant in para 4 of the report. Its observed : “He had cited Guest Kleen Williams Ltd. v. Murarilal, 1984 Rajdhani LR 32 (1983 Cri LJ 554), where a Division Bench of this Court held that against an order of dismissal of a complaint under section 256 of the Cr. P.C. only an appeal lies. He also referred to the judgment of Shri M.M.S. Bedi v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, (1986) 89 Pun LR 687; Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab, (1999) 4 Rec Cri Refers 469 and a judgment of Himachal High Court in H.P. Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. v. M.P.S. Chawla, (1997) 2 Crimes 591 in support of his argument that the dismissal of the complaint under section 256 of the Cr. P.C. resulted in acquittal of the accused and an appeal and not the revision will be the remedy to challenge it.” This submissions were accepted by the learned Judge. Dealing with these arguments, the learned Judge observed in para 5: “Counsel for respondent initially justified the order of the Additional Sessions Judge impugned in this petition on the ground that it was not in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshavanand, (1998) 1 SCC 687 : AIR 1998 SC 596 : (1998 Cr LJ 856) and a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Shiv Kumar v. Mond, Saghir, 1997 JCC 149 : (1997 Cri LJ 1264) but finally conceded that technically speaking revision did not lie against the order of dismissal of a complaint under Section 256, Cr. P.C. in view of the consistence view held by the courts that dismissal resulted in acquittal of the accused and against the acquittal only an appeal would be the appropriate legal remedy to challenge it, “In H.P.Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. v. M.P.S. Chawla, reported in 1997 (2) Crimes 591, petition under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. was filed challenging the order of dismissal passed under section 256 of Cr. P.C. After referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh, and Maj. Genl. A.S. Gauraya v. S.N. Thakur. Learned Judge observed in para 12 of the report: “There is no denying that the dismissal of the complaint in default under Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure entails the acquittal of the accused. Once an accused has been acquitted of the offence, the law provides a remedy by way of an appeal against the order of acquittal. Once a remedy by way of appeal is available to the petitioner under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the failure of the petitioner to avail such a remedy, this Court is not to exercise the inherent powers for interfering with the impugned order. 13. It can be seen that earlier decisions of this Court and other High Courts have consistently laid down law that only an appeal lies against order of dismissal of the complaint which amounts to acquittal of the accused and in case of acquittal remedy of revision is not available to the aggrieved party. Not only that under Section 401 of Cr. P.C. there is express bar for entertaining a revision at the instance of the party who could have appealed. 14. …..The point whether an appeal or revision lies against the order of acquittal passed under Section 256(1) Cr. P.C. was not be fore the Court and was not decided by the Court in this ruling. This judgment there fore is not an authority on the point whether a revision or appeal lies against an order of acquittal passed under Section 256(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Be that, as it may, similar situation arose in the past before this Court in the matter of Dharamji Gangaram v. Vithoba Khade, where, Baud, J. was faced similar dilemma. Be that, as it may, similar situation arose in the past before this Court in the matter of Dharamji Gangaram v. Vithoba Khade, where, Baud, J. was faced similar dilemma. In that case also, reference was made to the judgment of Sharad Manohar J. in Kokilabai Ramchandre Mahajan v. Gangadhar Shivram Mahajan, reported in 1986 (2) Bom CR 289, wherein it was held that the revision against the order of acquittal is maintainable. After referring to the relevant observations and the legal provisions, Daud J., distinguished the judgment on facts and observed in para 5 page 1217 that: “Had his attention been drawn to Badakas is decision, perhaps learned Judge may not have chosen to express himself in the broad terms he has done. In the present case, we are also faced with the similar situation. However, in view of the judgments of the Apex Court that the long standing precedents are to be followed, and in view of the fact that while deciding the controversy in the matter of Mahendra Indermal Borana v. Anil Shankar Joshi, (supra) the attention of the, Court was not drawn to the earlier decisions of this Court as well as of other High Courts holding that in case of order being passed under Section 256(1), Cr. P.C. acquitting the accused, the only remedy is to file an appeal and not a revision.....” 15. The question that is involved here also arose before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K.L. Venkateswar Rao v. The State of A.P. & Another, 2003 (3) A.P.L.J. 398 (HC), in the context of challenging an order of acquittal under Section 256 (1) of the Code, where the limitation to file an appeal under Section 378 (4) of the Code had expired. 16. Apart from the question that was involved regarding the maintainability of an application before the Magistrate to recall his order under Section 256 (1) of the Code, the other question was formulated by the Court in the following words : “(ii) When once the appeal lies to the High Court against the order of acquittal with special leave, petition filed under Sec. 482 Cr. P.C., to set-aside the dismissal order acquitting the accused can be entertained even after 4 years 3 months?” 17. The question was answered by the Court speaking through A. Gopal Reddy, J. thus: 13. P.C., to set-aside the dismissal order acquitting the accused can be entertained even after 4 years 3 months?” 17. The question was answered by the Court speaking through A. Gopal Reddy, J. thus: 13. Point No. 2: Learned Senior Counsel Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy contends that if the dismissal order allowed to stand would result injustice to the complainant and will yield no remedy and this court can convert the petition as appeal and can set-aside the order passed by the Magistrate dt. 21-8-1997 to meet the ends of Justice. 14. It is not in dispute that against any order passed by the Magistrate acquitting the accused, the complainant can file an appeal with special leave to file an appeal from the order of acquittal. Sub-section (5) of section 378 clearly mandates that no such application under sub-section (4) for grant of special leave to appeal against order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after expiry of six months where the complainant is a public servant and 60 days in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal. Since the present petitions filed by the complainant nearly after 4 years 3 months if entertained and converted into appeals on acquittal in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Sec. 482 Cr. P.C., the same will result in taking away the valuable right accrued to the accused. 15. It is fairly well settled that the main factor which would influence the court in extending the benefit of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to a litigant is whether the prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and ‘good faith’. The expression ‘good faith’ as used in Section 14 means ‘exercise of due care and attention’. In the context of Section 14, the expression ‘good faith’ qualifies prosecuting the proceedings in the court which ultimately found to have no jurisdiction. 16. In view of the above, the present criminal petitions filed by the complainant beyond the period prescribed for filing the appeals, i.e., nearly after 4 years 3 months, if treated as appeals, a question may arise his filing of criminal petitions for restoring the CCs by setting aside the dismissal order are with due diligence and ‘good faith’. Even if the answer is in the affirmative, further question may arise, once the order passed by the Magistrate is challenged as nullity in Crl. Even if the answer is in the affirmative, further question may arise, once the order passed by the Magistrate is challenged as nullity in Crl. P. Nos. 821 and 822 of 1999 what made the petitioner to wait for nearly 2 years 5 months in challenging the dismissal order under Sec. 482 Cr. P.C., after his entering appearance in the above petitions is not forthcoming. The complainant did not choose to act promptly to exercise his right of appeal, thereby abandoned that right. In such view of the matter, this court is of the considered view the right accrued to the accused on extinguishment of complainant's right cannot be taken away by converting the criminal petitions into appeals. 18. The authority, therefore, is pre-ponderant, may be of persuasive, that an order under Section 256(1) of the Code is appealable under Section 378 (4) of the Code, and, therefore, an application under Section 482 of the Code would not lie against that order. It has to be challenged by way of an appeal against acquittal subject to all requirements of the law as to leave, limitation et cetera. 19. This Court is of opinion that where a specific remedy of appeal is provided by the Code against a particular kind of order, fair and square, it would be a most anomalous exercise of the inherent powers of the Court to permit the litigant to forsake his statutory remedy envisaged under the law and fall back upon Section 482 of the Code to seek relief. 20. In the circumstances, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of opposite party no. 2 by learned Counsel is upheld and this application under Section 482 of the Code is rejected on the ground of maintainability. 21. The applicant will have liberty to prefer an appeal under Section 378(4) of the Code, if so advised.