JUDGMENT : RAKESH MOHAN PANDEY, J. 1. This writ appeal has been preferred by the legal representatives of Jiyaram Kushwaha (original petitioner) challenging the order dated 20.06.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 4645 of 2007, whereby the writ petition has been dismissed. 2. The brief facts of the present case are that, originally, the writ petition before the learned Single Judge was filed by Jiya Ram Kushwaha, who died during the pendency of the writ petition and his legal representatives were brought on record. Late Jiya Ram Kushwaha was working as Sanitary Inspector in Nagar Palika Parisad, Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. Article of charge was framed by the respondent No. 5 on 26.06.2003 and a departmental enquiry was commenced. The specific charges framed against the deceased employee are reproduced herein-below: “(i) On 20.02.2002, he got uploaded seven bags of cement on a tractor, which was noticed by the employees and seven bags of cement were unloaded. (ii) On account of negligence in cleaning work, a notice was issued on 25.01.2003, but same was not replied. (iii) On 23.06.2003, during inspection, he was found absent from his duties, and in response to notice issued in this regard, he had stated the authority that in future, do not make this type of correspondence. (iv) On 26.06.2003, at about 4.30 p.m. he threw the keys over the superior authority and used unparliamentary language. (v) The deceased employee demanded and accepted bribe to engage the labourers.” 3. The deceased employee replied to the charges on 22.08.2023 and denied the allegations made against him. A full-fledged enquiry was held and Enquiry Officer found charges No. 1 and 4 proved, charge No. 3 partly proved, and charges No. 2 and 5 not proved. The Disciplinary Authority, on the basis of enquiry report, imposed punishment of dismissal from the service vide order dated 10.06.2004. The deceased employee preferred an appeal before the Collector and vide order dated 07.08.2006, same was allowed and matter was remitted back to the Disciplinary Authority for passing appropriate order afresh. Aggrieved by the order of the Collector dated 07.08.2006, the employer preferred an appeal before the Commissioner and same was allowed vide order 14.02.2007 by setting-aside the order passed by the Collector and restoring the order of Disciplinary Authority. 4. Aggrieved by the order of the Collector dated 07.08.2006, the employer preferred an appeal before the Commissioner and same was allowed vide order 14.02.2007 by setting-aside the order passed by the Collector and restoring the order of Disciplinary Authority. 4. Before the learned Single Judge, grounds were raised on behalf of the deceased employee that the order passed by the Commissioner holding the charges proved, is illegal and perverse. It was also submitted that there was contradiction in evidence with regard to the charge No. 1, which has been found proved. His next submission was that the punishment of dismissal from service is shockingly disproportionate looking to the gravity of the misconduct. Charge No. 4 which pertains to misbehavior and using un-parliamentary language is not so serious so as to warrant imposition of punishment of dismissal from service. His next submission before the learned Single Judge was that as charge No. 3 has partly been found proved, taking a lenient view, the Commissioner ought to have dismissed the appeal, preferred by the employer. 5. The learned Single Judge considered the fact that charge No. 1 was found proved and the evidence recorded in this regard could not be rebutted. Charge No. 4 was also found proved which relates to use of un-parliamentary language and throwing key on the table of superior authority. Charge No. 3 was found partly proved. The learned Single Judge, after considering the legal position with regard to interference in the matter of the departmental enquiry, dismissed the writ petition. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants in the instant appeal has raised ground that the reply to the article of charges, filed on 22.08.2003 by the deceased employee, was not considered by the Disciplinary Authority. Next ground raised by learned counsel for the appellants is that, the learned Single Judge has not considered Rule 51 of the Municipal Employee Appointment and Service Rules, 1968. The appellants have challenged the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer with regard to charges, which were found proved, on the ground that the charges were not proved . His next ground is that there was a mala-fide intention of the employer to remove the deceased employee from the service, and the order of dismissal is disproportionate to the misconduct proved. His next ground is that there was a mala-fide intention of the employer to remove the deceased employee from the service, and the order of dismissal is disproportionate to the misconduct proved. He would also submit that the deceased employee had served the department for long 20 years and same has not been considered and thus, the order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be set-aside. 7. Learned counsel for the State would submit that departmental enquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with law after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the deceased employee. It is also submitted that the deceased employee has not challenged violation of rule or procedure meant for imposition of major penalties and the appellants have challenged the finding of fact recorded by the Departmental Enquiry Officer and affirmed by the Commissioner. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. 9. In the matter of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) and Another vs. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 in Para 19, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as Under: “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1 When charges of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in Para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in Para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 10. Likewise, in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others, (1995) 6 SCC 749 in Para 18, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellant authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” 11. The scope of interference by the High Court by exercising powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is confined to the applicability of one or the other of the well known principle known as Wednesbury Principle and the doctrine of proportionality. The High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence while dealing with such a case. 12. Considering the facts of the present appeal, in the light of the above ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it emerges that the appellants have not challenged the procedure adopted in the departmental enquiry. They have not alleged any procedural infirmity. The High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence while dealing with such a case. 12. Considering the facts of the present appeal, in the light of the above ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it emerges that the appellants have not challenged the procedure adopted in the departmental enquiry. They have not alleged any procedural infirmity. The appellants have challenged the order only on the ground of perversity and violation of the principles of natural justice, but there is no pleading as to how the principles of natural justice has been violated or order passed by the Disciplinary Authority in departmental enquiry, conducted by the Enquiry Officer, and the order of dismissal from service which was affirmed by the Commissioner, are perverse. The Enquiry Officer, in its enquiry report, has found charges No. 1 and 4 proved and charge No. 3 partly proved, but the deceased employee could not rebut the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer. The finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer has been found proved by the Disciplinary Authority too, and further, the Commissioner, in appeal preferred by the employer, has affirmed the order of imposition of punishment of dismissal from service. Thus, the punishment does not appear to be shockingly disproportionate looking to the misconduct of the deceased employee and appellants could not plead and prove violation of any of the applicable Rules. 13. Considering the above facts of the matter and law with regard to it, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition preferred by the deceased employee. Consequently, this writ appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost.