JUDGMENT : ARAVIND KUMAR, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 04.01.2023 whereunder the learned Single Judge has refused to entertain the petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, whereby petitioners had challenged the order dated 08.12.2022 passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, in I.A. No. 257 of 2022 in Appeal Diary No. 552 of 2022 directing petitioners to deposit an amount of Rs. 1.70 Crores as a pre-condition to maintain the appeal in the teeth of second proviso to Section 18 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “SARFAESI Act” for short). 2. The facts in detail has been dealt with by the learned Single Judge to arrive at a conclusion that there is no error committed by the Tribunal. Finding recorded by learned Single Judge reads as under: “11. It was submitted that the respondent bank has to recover Rs. 6,78,71,314.45 as of 30.06.2022 considering the rate of interest at 14% as admitted by the petitioner in the letter dated 26.09.2019. Learned advocate Mr. Shah therefore submitted that as per the respondent-bank, the claim of the respondent Bank is Rs. 6,78,71,314.45 when the petitioner preferred the appeal before the DRAT and therefore, order of the DRAT is in consonance with the provisions of section 18 and no interference is required to be made by this Court while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 12. Having heard learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record the only short question which is arising for adjudication before this Court is with regard to interpretation of second proviso to section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. It could be therefore germane to refer the provision of section 18 of the SARFAESI Act which reads as under: “18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal: (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal [under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed] to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal: (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal [under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed] to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal. Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent. of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less: Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent. of debt referred to in the second proviso. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder.” 13. On perusal of the above provision of section 18 more particularly, second proviso which clearly provides that no appeal shall be entertained by the DRAT unless the borrower has deposited 50% of the amount of debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditor or determined by the Debt Recover Tribunal whichever is less. 14. Therefore, the question arises, what would be the amount of debt due by the borrower as claimed by the secured creditor as whether the same would be the amount claimed as stated in the notice under section 13(2) of the Act or as the claim of the secured creditor for amount due when the petitioner filed appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. 15. The claim of the secured creditor is not defined under the provisions of SARFAESI Act. Therefore, it would be necessary to consider the claim of the secured creditor as and when the appeal is preferred before the Appellate Tribunal. Admittedly, the claim of the respondent-Bank to the tune of Rs. 6,78,71,314.45 is not disputed by the petitioner considering the admitted rate of interest at 14% per annum. Therefore, it would be necessary to consider the claim of the secured creditor as and when the appeal is preferred before the Appellate Tribunal. Admittedly, the claim of the respondent-Bank to the tune of Rs. 6,78,71,314.45 is not disputed by the petitioner considering the admitted rate of interest at 14% per annum. Therefore, the DRAT has rightly passed the impugned order invoking third proviso reducing the amount of pre-deposit to 25% of the claim of the secured creditor made by the respondent-bank.” 3. A perusal of the finding recorded in paragraph 15 herein supra would leave no manner of doubt in the mind of this Court that on account of admission on the part of Debtor that claim of the respondent bank is to the tune of Rs. 6,78,71,314.45ps. and the rate of interest being at 14% per annum, learned Single Judge has found that the DRAT was right in invoking third proviso to Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act and as such has called upon the appellant to pre-deposit the amount of 25% of the claim of the secured creditor-respondent Bank. We do not find any error committed by the learned Single Judge calling for interference at the hands of this Court. 4. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon and Others, (2010) 8 SCC 110 , has clearly held that a writ petition or Special Civil Application under Article 226 would not be maintainable in such matters. It has been further held as under: “55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.” 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sidha Neelkanth Paper Industries Private Limited and Another vs. Prudent ARC Limited and Others, 2023 SCC Online SC 12. He has relied upon paragraph 34 of the judgment, which reads as under: “34. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sidha Neelkanth Paper Industries Private Limited and Another vs. Prudent ARC Limited and Others, 2023 SCC Online SC 12. He has relied upon paragraph 34 of the judgment, which reads as under: “34. As per Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, any person aggrieved, by any order made by the DRT under section 17, may prefer an appeal within thirty days to an appellate Tribunal (DRAT) from the date of receipt of the order of DRT. Second proviso to section 18 provides that no appeal shall be entertained unless the “borrower” has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty percent of the amount of “debt due” from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the DRT, whichever is less and only and only then, an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is permissible against the order passed by the DRT under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Under Section 17, the scope of enquiry is limited to the steps taken under Section 13(4) against the secured assets. Therefore, whatever amount is mentioned in the notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, in case steps taken under Section 13(2)/13(4) against the secured assets are under challenge before the DRT will be the ‘debt due’ within the meaning of proviso to Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. In case of challenge to the sale of the secured assets, the amount mentioned in the sale certificate will have to be considered while determining the amount of pre-deposit under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. However, in a case where both are under challenge, namely, steps taken under Section 13(4) against the secured assets and also the auction sale of the secured assets, in that case, the “debt due” shall mean any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed as due from any person, whichever is higher.” 6. In fact, this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1002 of 2022 decided on 04.01.2023 has followed the said judgment and has held as to how Section 18 has to be interpreted in the teeth of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In fact, this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1002 of 2022 decided on 04.01.2023 has followed the said judgment and has held as to how Section 18 has to be interpreted in the teeth of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. However, in the facts obtained in the present case, the principle enunciated therein would not be applicable in its entirety in view of finding recorded at paragraph 15 of the learned Single Judge which is based on admitted fact. Hence, said judgment would not come to the rescue of the appellants in the instant case. 7. In the light of above, we do not find any error committed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the petition even on merits which ought not to have been gone into. Be that as it may. Appeal is dismissed by affirming the order dated 04.01.2023 passed in Special Civil Application No. 26678 of 2022. Civil Application No. 1 of 2023 does not survive for consideration and it stands dismissed.