JUDGMENT : This is a defendant's second appeal, arising out of a suit for cancellation of sale deed. 2. Original Suit No.168 of 1983 was instituted by Smt. Jinnat against Munni Lal, seeking a decree for cancellation of a registered sale deed dated 11.10.1982. The suit aforesaid was instituted in the ex-Court of Munsif, Mauranipur, Jhansi, now redesignated as the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.). 3. Smt. Jinnat was the original plaintiff and died pending suit. She was substituted by her heirs and L.Rs. before the Trial Court, who are the plaintiff-respondents here. According to the original plaintiff, Smt. Jinnat, she was an old and illiterate woman, a poor widow, and a native of Village Ranipur, Tehsil Mauranipur, District Jhansi. She was, at the relevant time, living in Village Ladwari, Tehsil Niwari, District Teekamgarh (Madhya Pradesh), where she was employed in the Public Works Department. She was bhumidhar in the possession of Plot Nos.1238/1/1-52, 1238/2/0-09, 1239/0-11, 1237/1/0-25, 1237/2/0-02 and 1247/1/0-14, all situate at Village Bamhaura Sohagi, Tehsil Mauranipur, District Jhansi. Smt. Jinnat, represented by her heirs and LRs, shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the plaintiff' unless the context requires individual or a different reference. According to the plaintiff, she entered into a bargain with the defendant to sell her bhumidhari land above described (for short, 'the suit property'). The bargain was made between the plaintiff and Munni Lal son of Ghanshyam, the sole defendant, for a total sale consideration of Rs.7000/-. 4. It is the plaintiff's case that parties agreed that the entire sale consideration of Rs.7000/-would be paid at the time of registration of the sale deed before the Sub-Registrar in his office, situate at Mauranipur. It is the plaintiff's case that Munni Lal, who is now represented on record of this appeal by his heirs and LRs, respondent Nos.1/1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4 and 1/5, and referred hereinafter, for the sake of convenience, as 'the defendant', was a headstrong, vicious and deceitful man. He took the plaintiff along to Tehsil Mauranipur on 11.10.1982 in connection with the execution and registration of the covenanted sale deed. The defendant purchased the requisite stamp papers. The defendant colluded with the scribe, Laxmi Prasad, instructing him to scribe the deed of sale. However, despite demand by the plaintiff, at that time to pay the agreed sale consideration of Rs.7000/-, the defendant did not pay anything. The defendant purchased the requisite stamp papers. The defendant colluded with the scribe, Laxmi Prasad, instructing him to scribe the deed of sale. However, despite demand by the plaintiff, at that time to pay the agreed sale consideration of Rs.7000/-, the defendant did not pay anything. He said that the entire sale consideration would be paid to her before the Sub-Registrar. On the said pretext, the defendant along with scribe and the witnesses, all of whom were in collusion with the defendant, took along the plaintiff to the Sub-Registrar's office. When the plaintiff, the defendant, the scribe and witnesses entered the Sub-Registrar's office, the Sub-Registrar, the scribe and the witnesses, with whom the defendant was in collusion, put pressure on the plaintiff to thumb mark the deed. Thereupon, the plaintiff told the Sub-Registrar that she had agreed to sell her property for a sum of Rs.7000/-, which she should be paid. Upon this, the Sub-Registrar assured the plaintiff that the defendant would be shortly paying her the due sale consideration. It is pleaded that to give effect to the contemplated fraud, the defendant kept counting currency in the Sub-Registrar's presence, but paid her a sum of Rs.1000/- alone. 5. It is the plaintiff's case that she repeatedly said that until she received the entire sale consideration of Rs.7000/-, she would not thumb mark the document. But, no one paid heed to the plaintiff and deliberately ignoring it, the scribe, the witnesses, the defendant and a colluding Sub-Registrar, forcibly made her thumb mark the document. Despite the plaintiff beseeching the defendant to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.6000/-, she was not paid anything. It is averred in the plaint that the plaintiff repeatedly requested the defendant, the witnesses and the Sub-Registrar, including the scribe to give her, her due, but all of them, who were in collusion, laughed it off saying that the registration of the document was complete and nothing was due. The plaintiff did not receive a single rupee beyond Rs.1000/-. The plaintiff did not, thus, receive the agreed sale consideration and by defrauding her, she was made to execute and get registered the impugned sale deed. Therefore, on the same day and immediately, the plaintiff proceeded to Police Station Mauranipur and lodged a First Information Report, giving rise to Crime No.158 of 1982, under Sections 420, 218, 167 IPC, Police Station Mauranipur, District Jhansi. Therefore, on the same day and immediately, the plaintiff proceeded to Police Station Mauranipur and lodged a First Information Report, giving rise to Crime No.158 of 1982, under Sections 420, 218, 167 IPC, Police Station Mauranipur, District Jhansi. Soon after registration of the crime, the Police, on the basis of the FIR, held inquiry and finding substance therein, arrested the defendant. The defendant was produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Mau Garautha, where the case is pending. The sale deed was impugned as one secured by the defendant capitalizing on the plaintiff's helplessness and practicing fraud, which is not binding upon her. 6. The plaintiff asserted that she continues to be in cultivatory possession of the suit property and the defendant has no connection therewith. The plaintiff never delivered possession of the suit property pursuant to the impugned sale deed. The sale deed was sham and would not affect the plaintiff's rights in future. It was also averred that the cause of action had arisen so that in future, the bogus sale deed may not be misutilized by the defendant to adversely affect the plaintiff's rights to the suit property. It is on the foundation of the aforesaid facts that the suit was instituted, seeking cancellation of the impugned sale deed dated 11.10.1982. 7. A written statement was filed on behalf of the defendant generally denying the plaint allegation. In the additional pleas, it was averred that the suit has been brought on incorrect facts to harass the defendant. According to the defendant, the plaintiff's case, that it had been compacted between parties that the entire agreed sale consideration of Rs.7000/-would be paid at the time of registration of the deed before the Sub-Registrar, is incorrect. Instead, the parties had bargained a sale of the suit property comprising the plaintiff's share in the plots, admeasuring a total of 2.13 acres for a sum of Rs.7000/-. At the time when the parties bargained, the defendant paid the plaintiff a sum of Rs.6000/-in earnest, leaving the balance of the agreed sale consideration in the sum of Rs.1000/-to be paid before the Sub-Registrar, when the document duly executed was presented for registration. 8. At the time when the parties bargained, the defendant paid the plaintiff a sum of Rs.6000/-in earnest, leaving the balance of the agreed sale consideration in the sum of Rs.1000/-to be paid before the Sub-Registrar, when the document duly executed was presented for registration. 8. It is also averred that since the sale deed was to be executed within two days of the aforesaid bargain, neither the bargain was reduced to writing in the form of a contract nor the payment of earnest made through a written document/ receipt. The scribe, Laxmi Prasad was chosen by the plaintiff herself and it was upon her instructions that he scribed the sale deed. It was denied that she demanded, at the time of execution of the sale deed, the sum of Rs.7000/-, or that the defendant said in answer to her demand that he would pay the entire sum before the Sub-Registrar. No question arose of paying the sum of Rs.7000/-before the Sub-Registrar, because the plaintiff had already received, out of the agreed sale consideration, a sum of Rs.6000/-as earnest with a balance of Rs.1000/-only to be paid before the Sub-Registrar at the time of registration of the document. It is for the said reason that before the Sub-Registrar, Mauranipur, the plaintiff accepted the sum of Rs.1000/-willingly and got the sale deed dated 11.10.1982 registered, followed by delivery of possession of the suit property to the defendant. 9. The plaintiff's case that she is still in bhumidhari possession of the suit property on the spot is based on falsehood and concoction. Since the date of the sale deed, it is the defendant, who is in cultivatory possession of the suit property. He has given the suit property on a crop sharing basis and irrigating the fields, utilizing the Kachner Minor Canal. The defendant has irrigation slips indicating payment of the irrigation charges. Further in the defendant's written statement, the plaintiff's case of a collusion between the plaintiff's deed writer, the witnesses and the Sub-Registrar has been denied as also the case that they forced the plaintiff to thumb mark the document. It is also pleaded that the plaintiff's case that when she asked the Sub-Registrar that the defendant be required to pay the sale consideration of Rs.7000/-, the Sub-Registrar assured that the defendant is shortly paying her, is incorrect. It is also pleaded that the plaintiff's case that when she asked the Sub-Registrar that the defendant be required to pay the sale consideration of Rs.7000/-, the Sub-Registrar assured that the defendant is shortly paying her, is incorrect. There was no occasion for the payment of a sum of Rs.7000/-before the Sub-Registrar, because the plaintiff had already received a sum of Rs.6000/-in earnest, leaving a balance of Rs.1000/-alone to be paid. It is the balance that was paid before the Sub-Registrar, which the plaintiff accepted willingly. 10. It is also denied that the defendant got the plaintiff to thumb mark the sale deed forcibly in collusion with the Sub-Registrar. The Sub-Registrar, according to the defendant, read out the contents of the sale deed, in the presence of the witnesses, to the plaintiff and also made her understand it. After understanding the contents of the document, she put her mark to it for the purpose of registration. It is averred that the Sub-Registrar asked the plaintiff if she had received a sum of Rs.6000/-as earnest, to which the plaintiff said that she had received Rs.6000/-and now Rs.1000/-were due. The defendant paid before the Sub-Registrar a sum of Rs.1000/-to the plaintiff. After receiving the balance of Rs.1000/-, the plaintiff put her mark to the document. It has been denied that the plaintiff ever demanded a sum of Rs.7000/-before the Sub-Registrar or that all of them laughed off the demand, the fraud being perfected through registration of the deed. 11. It is pleaded in Paragraph No.19 of the written statement that the plaintiff has reported the defendant to the Police on account of some men hostile to the defendant prompting her to do so. It is also averred that it is incorrect to say that a case on the basis of the FIR is pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Mau Garautha under Sections 420, 218, 167 of the Penal Code. No prosecution was ever launched against the defendant on the basis of the plaintiff's report, because the defendant never defrauded the plaintiff. It is also the defendant's case that the plaintiff's assertion that she is in possession of the suit property is incorrect. Rather, the defendant is in possession thereof since the date the sale deed was executed in his favour. The defendant employs labourers to carry on farming on the suit property. It is also the defendant's case that the plaintiff's assertion that she is in possession of the suit property is incorrect. Rather, the defendant is in possession thereof since the date the sale deed was executed in his favour. The defendant employs labourers to carry on farming on the suit property. The plaintiff has no connection with the suit property any longer. The defendant also said that the suit is undervalued and the court-fee paid insufficient, because the suit is one for cancellation, where the suit should have been valued at the market value of the suit property and the court-fee paid ad valorem. 12. The defendant applied for mutation on the basis of the sale deed, but the plaintiff, out of ill-motive, objected to the mutation and the matter is currently pending before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, Jhansi. There is a specific plea in Paragraph No.23 of the written statement to the effect that before the sale deed was executed, the plaintiff took permission of the Consolidation Officer and then proceeded to execute the sale deed, accepting the settled sale consideration. It is on these pleas that the defendant said that the suit ought to be dismissed with special cost. 13. Based on the pleadings of parties, the following issues were struck (translated from Hindi to English): “1. Whether the defendant got the sale deed, relating to the land in dispute, executed by the plaintiff on the basis of deceit, without paying her the agreed sale consideration? If yes, its effect? 2. Whether the sale deed executed in favour of the defendant is valid? 3. Whether the plaintiff is in possession over the land in dispute? 4. Whether the plaintiff has undervalued the suit and the court-fee paid is insufficient? 5. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled?” 14. Issue No.4 was decided as a preliminary in terms of the order dated 02.07.1985, which was made part of the judgment. Apparently, there is no issue about undervaluation or insufficiency of court-fee decided against the plaintiff. The Trial Court took up Issues Nos.1 and 2 together and upon an appraisal of the entire evidence on record, meticulously considering the testimony of witnesses and the documentary evidence, including the sale deed and the Registrar's endorsement thereon, held on both issues against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant. The Trial Court took up Issues Nos.1 and 2 together and upon an appraisal of the entire evidence on record, meticulously considering the testimony of witnesses and the documentary evidence, including the sale deed and the Registrar's endorsement thereon, held on both issues against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant. Issue No.3 was also answered in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff. In consequence of the findings on Issues Nos.1, 2 and 3, Issue No.5 was answered in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff. The result was that the suit was ordered to be dismissed with costs by the learned Trial Judge vide judgment and decree dated 02.09.1994. 15. The plaintiff appealed the decree to the District Judge of Jhansi vide Civil Appeal No.134 of 1994. The appeal upon assignment came up for hearing before the Second Additional District Judge, Jhansi on 18.12.1997. The learned Judge allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the Trial Court, which he reversed and decreed the suit, ordering cancellation of the impugned sale deed. An intimation of the cancellation was directed to be sent to the Sub-Registrar for necessary action. 16. Aggrieved, the defendant has appealed to this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 17. The appeal was entertained by this Court vide order dated 19.03.1998. It was not admitted to hearing, but notice pending admission was issued and the lower court records summoned. An interim injunction was granted, directing parties to maintain status quo with regard to possession, condition and nature of the suit property. Much later, when the appeal came up for admission on 21.04.2022, it was admitted to hearing on the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether on a case that the price set forth in a registered sale deed has not been paid to the vendor by the vendee, a decree for cancellation can be passed? (2) Whether a case for cancellation, not being made out on account of unpaid price stated to be paid in the sale deed, but proved not to be paid, entitles the Court to pass a decree for recovery of the unpaid price? 18. The appeal was heard on 27.04.2022 and judgment reserved. 19. This Court felt that there was some clarification required with regard to the testimony of DW-3 that the Lower Appellate Court had omitted to consider as non-existent. 18. The appeal was heard on 27.04.2022 and judgment reserved. 19. This Court felt that there was some clarification required with regard to the testimony of DW-3 that the Lower Appellate Court had omitted to consider as non-existent. The appeal was, therefore, posted for further hearing and the following substantial question of law considered imperative was formulated vide order dated 24.11.2022: (3) Whether the Appellate Court has set aside the findings recorded by the Trial Court upon consideration of the evidence on record, while writing a judgment of reversal? 20. The appeal was again heard on 24.11.2022 and judgment reserved. 21. Heard Mr. M.S. Pipersenia, learned Counsel for the defendant and Mr. A.D. Saundars, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff. 22. It would be convenient to answer Substantial Questions of Law Nos.1 and 2 together, as the proposition involved in the first, if answered one way, would lead to the other not requiring consideration at all. 23. Mr. M.S. Pipersenia, learned Counsel for the defendant submits that the effect of non-payment of consideration set out in the sale deed does not render the transaction void, but, if proven to be indeed not paid to the vendor, would at best entitle him to recovery of price – the whole if unpaid, or a part thereof, that remains unpaid. In support of his submission, Mr. Pipersenia has placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and another, (1999) 3 SCC 573 and Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead through Legal Representatives and others, (2020) 7 SCC 366 . He has invited the attention of the Court to the provisions of Sections 54, 55 and 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, 'the Act of 1882') to advance his submission that non-payment of price, even if proved, does not lead to avoidance of the conveyance. It may entitle the plaintiff to sue for price and recover it. 24. Mr. A.D. Saundars, learned Counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand, says that the price set forth in the sale deed constitutes the consideration for the underlying contract, to which the sale deed is a super-added conveyance. It may entitle the plaintiff to sue for price and recover it. 24. Mr. A.D. Saundars, learned Counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand, says that the price set forth in the sale deed constitutes the consideration for the underlying contract, to which the sale deed is a super-added conveyance. He submits that if payment of price is postponed to a future date, the sale deed would be valid, but if it is shown in the deed to be paid in presenti but not actually paid, the deed would be void. In support of this submission, Mr. Saundars placed reliance upon the authority of the Supreme Court in Kewal Krishan v. Rajesh Kumar, AIR 2022 SC 564 . 25. This Court has keenly considered the submissions advanced by learned Counsel on both sides and perused the record. 26. For the purpose of answering the first substantial question of law, this Court assumes that the finding of fact returned by the Lower Appellate Court to the effect that out of the agreed sale consideration of Rs.7000/-, Rs.1000/-alone was paid by the defendant is correct. Section 54 of the Act of 1882, which occurs in Chapter III providing for sales of immovable property, defines 'Sale' as follows: "54. “Sale” defined.—“Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made.—Such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immovable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale.—A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.” 27. Section 55 of the Act of 1882 lays down the rights and liabilities of the buyers and the sellers. In that context, Section 55(4)(b) is relevant. Quoted meaningfully, Section 55(4)(b) provides: "55. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.” 27. Section 55 of the Act of 1882 lays down the rights and liabilities of the buyers and the sellers. In that context, Section 55(4)(b) is relevant. Quoted meaningfully, Section 55(4)(b) provides: "55. Rights and liabilities of buyer and seller.— In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the buyer and the seller of immovable property respectively are subject to the liabilities, and have the rights, mentioned in the rules next following, or such of them as are applicable to the property sold: (1) x x x (2) x x x (3) x x x (4) The seller is entitled— (a) x x x (b) where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer before payment of the whole of the purchase-money, to a charge upon the property in the hands of the buyer, any transferee without consideration or any transferee with notice of the non-payment, for the amount of the purchase-money, or any part thereof remaining unpaid, and for interest on such amount or part from the date on which possession has been delivered. (5) x x x (6) x x x” 28. This question fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Vidhyadhar (supra). It arose out of a suit for redemption of mortgage by conditional sale or in the alternate, a decree for specific performance of contract for repurchase. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court and the decree was upheld by the Lower Appellate Court. The High Court, however, set aside the decree. The issue in the case appeared to be between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 to the suit, the said defendant contesting the suit with a case that the document in his favour was not a mortgage by conditional sale, but a sale and since the amount of consideration had not been tendered within time stipulated, the plaintiff could not claim reconveyance of the property. On facts, the suit property, that was land, appeared to have been mortgaged by defendant No.2 with defendant No.1 for Rs.1500/-. Defendant No.2 had transferred the property in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.5000/-by a registered sale deed, entitling the plaintiff to exercise his equity of redemption against defendant No.1. On facts, the suit property, that was land, appeared to have been mortgaged by defendant No.2 with defendant No.1 for Rs.1500/-. Defendant No.2 had transferred the property in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.5000/-by a registered sale deed, entitling the plaintiff to exercise his equity of redemption against defendant No.1. The suit for redemption was decreed in favour of the plaintiff upon payment in Court of the sum of Rs.1500/-together with all interest accrued. The decree carried all necessary directions, such as the defendant being required to bring into Court all documents in his possession or power relating to the suit property and delivering those documents to the plaintiff. There were other directions for re-conveyance of the suit property issued to defendant No.1 and delivery of possession etc. The decree aforesaid was affirmed in appeal. In second appeal, the High Court was, however, of opinion that out of the sum of Rs.5000/-, for which the sale deed was executed, a sum of Rs.500/-alone was paid by the plaintiff, apparently to defendant No.2 before the Sub-Registrar and the rest was not paid. The High Court also held that the document that was executed by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 was a 'kararkharedi'. It was executed for the sum of Rs.1500/-by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1. But in fact, it was a sum of Rs.800/-, that was paid before the Sub-Registrar. The High Court, therefore, interfered with the decree directing that the land in suit shall be restored to defendant No.2, who shall pay back a sum of Rs.800/-in installments to defendant No.1 and a sum of Rs.500/-in installments to the plaintiff. On appeal by special leave carried by the plaintiff to their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it was held: “35. Even if the findings recorded by the High Court that the plaintiff had paid only Rs 500 to Defendant 2 as sale consideration and the remaining amount of Rs 4500 which was shown to have been paid before the execution of the deed was, in fact, not paid, the sale deed would not, for that reason, become invalid on account of the provisions contained in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which provide as under: “54. ‘Sale’ is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part- paid and part-promised. ‘Sale’ is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part- paid and part-promised. Such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immovable property, of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.” 36. The definition indicates that in order to constitute a sale, there must be a transfer of ownership from one person to another, i.e., transfer of all rights and interests in the properties which are possessed by that person are transferred by him to another person. The transferor cannot retain any part of his interest or right in that property or else it would not be a sale. The definition further says that the transfer of ownership has to be for a “price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised”. Price thus constitutes an essential ingredient of the transaction of sale. The words “price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised” indicate that actual payment of the whole of the price at the time of the execution of sale deed is not a sine qua non to the completion of the sale. Even if the whole of the price is not paid but the document is executed and thereafter registered, if the property is of the value of more than Rs 100, the sale would be complete. 37. There is a catena of decisions of various High Courts in which it has been held that even if the whole of the price is not paid, the transaction of sale will take effect and the title would pass under that transaction. 37. There is a catena of decisions of various High Courts in which it has been held that even if the whole of the price is not paid, the transaction of sale will take effect and the title would pass under that transaction. To cite only a few, in Gayatri Prasad v. Board of Revenue [1973 All LJ 412] it was held that non payment of a portion of the sale price would not affect validity of sale. It was observed that part-payment of consideration by the vendee itself proved the intention to pay the remaining amount of the sale price. To the same effect is the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sukaloo v. Punau [ AIR 1961 MP 176 : ILR 1960 MP 614]. 38. The real test is the intention of the parties. In order to constitute a “sale”, the parties must intend to transfer the ownership of the property and they must also intend that the price would be paid either in praesenti or in future. The intention is to be gathered from the recital in the sale deed, the conduct of the parties and the evidence on record. 39. Applying these principles to the instant case, it will be seen that Defendant 2 executed a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, presented it for registration, admitted its execution before the Sub-Registrar before whom the remaining part of the sale consideration was paid and, thereafter, the document was registered. The additional circumstances are that when the plaintiff instituted a suit on the basis of his title based on the aforesaid sale deed, Defendant 2, who was the vendor, admitted in his written statement, the whole case set out by the plaintiff and further admitted in the witness-box that he had executed a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and had also received the full amount of consideration. These facts clearly establish that a complete and formidable sale deed was executed by Defendant 2 in favour of the plaintiff and the title in the property passed to the plaintiff. The findings recorded by the High Court on this question cannot, therefore, be upheld. 40. The judgment of the High Court on this point is also erroneous for the reason that it totally ignored the provisions contained in Section 55(4) (b) of the Transfer of Property Act which are set out below: “55. The findings recorded by the High Court on this question cannot, therefore, be upheld. 40. The judgment of the High Court on this point is also erroneous for the reason that it totally ignored the provisions contained in Section 55(4) (b) of the Transfer of Property Act which are set out below: “55. In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the buyer and seller of immovable property respectively are subject to the liabilities, and have the rights, mentioned in the rules next following, or such of them as are applicable to the property sold: (1)-(3)*** (4) The seller is entitled— (a)*** (b) where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer before payment of the whole of the purchase money, to a charge upon the property in the hands of the buyer, any transferee without consideration or any transferee with notice of the non-payment, for the amount of the purchase money, or any part thereof remaining unpaid, and for interest on such amount or part from the date on which possession has been delivered. (5)-(6)***” 41. Clause (b) extracted above provides that where the ownership of the property is transferred to the buyer before payment of the whole of the sale price, the vendor is entitled to a charge on that property for the amount of the sale price as also for interest thereon from the date of delivery of possession. Originally, there was no provision with regard to the date from which interest would be payable on the amount of unpaid purchase money. The Special Committee which suggested an amendment in this section gave the following reason: “This clause is also silent as to the date from which the interest on the unpaid purchase money should run. It seems fair that it should run from the date when the buyer is put in possession.” It was on the recommendation of the Special Committee that the words “from the date on which possession has been delivered” were inserted into this clause by Section 17 of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929 (20 of 1929). 42. This clause obviously applies to a situation where the ownership in the property has passed to the buyer before the whole of the purchase money was paid to the seller or the vendor. 42. This clause obviously applies to a situation where the ownership in the property has passed to the buyer before the whole of the purchase money was paid to the seller or the vendor. What is contained in this clause is based on the English doctrine of equitable lien as propounded by Baron Rolfe in Goode v. Burton [(1847) 74 RR 633 : 1 Ex 189] . This clause confers statutory recognition on the English doctrine of equitable lien. As pointed out by the Privy Council in Webb v. Macpherson [(1903) 30 IA 238] the statutory charge under this paragraph is inflexible. The charge does not entitle the seller to retain possession of the property as against the buyer but it positively gives him a right to enforce the charge by suit. (See : Venkataperumal Naidu v. M. Rathnasabhapathi Chettiar [ AIR 1953 Mad 821 ] ; Shobhalal Shyamlal Kurmi v. Sidhelal Halkelal Bania [AIR 1939 Nag 210 : ILR 1939 Nag 636] and Basalingaya Revanshiddappa v. Chinnava Karibasappa [AIR 1932 Bom 247 : 34 Bom LR 427] .) 43. In view of the above, the High Court was wholly in error in coming to the conclusion that there was no sale as only a sum of Rs 500 was paid to Defendant 2 and the balance amount of Rs 4500 was not paid. Since the title in the property had already passed, even if the balance amount of sale price was not paid, the sale would not become invalid. The property sold would stand transferred to the buyer subject to the statutory charge for the unpaid part of the sale price.” 29. The issue again fell for consideration in Dahiben (supra) before the Supreme Court, where their Lordships taking note of earlier decision in Vidhyadhar held: “29.8. In [Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao, (1999) 3 SCC 573 ] this Court held that the words “price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised” indicates that actual payment of the whole of the price at the time of the execution of the sale deed is not a sine qua non for completion of the sale. Even if the whole of the price is not paid, but the document is executed, and thereafter registered, the sale would be complete, and the title would pass on to the transferee under the transaction. Even if the whole of the price is not paid, but the document is executed, and thereafter registered, the sale would be complete, and the title would pass on to the transferee under the transaction. The non payment of a part of the sale price would not affect the validity of the sale. Once the title in the property has already passed, even if the balance sale consideration is not paid, the sale could not be invalidated on this ground. In order to constitute a “sale”, the parties must intend to transfer the ownership of the property, on the agreement to pay the price either in praesenti, or in future. The intention is to be gathered from the recitals of the sale deed, the conduct of the parties, and the evidence on record. 29.9. In view of the law laid down by this Court, even if the averments of the plaintiffs are taken to be true, that the entire sale consideration had not in fact been paid, it could not be a ground for cancellation of the sale deed. The plaintiffs may have other remedies in law for recovery of the balance consideration, but could not be granted the relief of cancellation of the registered sale deed. We find that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is vexatious, meritless, and does not disclose a right to sue. The plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(a).” 30. Following the line of reasoning in Dahiben and referring to an old decision of our Court in Baijnath Singh v. Paltu, (1908) ILR 30, Allahbad 125, besides the authority of the Bombay High Court in Chandrashankar Manishankar v. Abhla Mathura and others, AIR 1952 Bombay 56, the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sukaloo and another v. Punau, AIR 1961 MP 176 and the decision of the Supreme Court in Kaliaperumal v. Rajagopal and another, (2009) 4 SCC 193 , it was held by this Court in Raj Dutt and others v. Nageshwar and others, 2019 (9) ADJ 252 : “38. In the case of 'Baijnath Singh v. Paltu and others', (1908) ILR 30 Allahabad 125, Division Bench of this Court observed that if the sale- deed recites that the sale consideration was paid but it is found by the Court that no sale consideration passed, the non-payment of purchase money does not prevent the passing of the ownership of purchased property from the vendor to the purchaser and the purchaser, notwithstanding such non-payment, can maintain a suit for possession of the property. 39. In another case 'Chandrashankar Manishankar v. Abhla Mathur and others', AIR (39) 1952 Bombay 56, it was held that it may be that the recital in the document stating payment of the consideration is not true. But that does not invalidate the document. To support a sale it is not necessary that the whole of the price should be paid. The price may be paid or promised wholly or in part. it was also held that if according to the tenor of the document, the consideration was not actually paid, but the document shows that there was an intention to pay, then in that case the document is not rendered invalid on account of the non-payment of the consideration. If, on the other hand, the intention was not to pay any consideration, then the document is of no effect. 40. In another case 'Sukaloo and another v. Punau', AIR 1961 MP 176 , it was held that it is the intention of the parties which has to be looked into to decide whether the sale-deed operated as a transfer of interest from the vendor to the vendee on the date of its execution. If this was the intention, then it does not matter whether the whole of the consideration or part of it remained unpaid. Further, where a registered deed of sale purporting to operate as a conveyance on the face of it exists, the burden of proving that it was not so intended is on the party who asserts this fact. 41. A similar question came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of 'Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and another', (1999) 3 SCC 573 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act observed that actual payment of full price at the time of execution of sale-deed is not a sine-qua-non for completion of sale. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act observed that actual payment of full price at the time of execution of sale-deed is not a sine-qua-non for completion of sale. The real test of sale is intention of the parties. It was held as under : ''36. The definition indicates that in order to constitute a sale, there must be a transfer of ownership from one person to another, i.e., transfer of all rights and interests in the properties which are possessed by that person are transferred by him to another person. The transferor cannot retain any part of his interest or right in that property or else it would not be a sale. The definition further says that the transfer of ownership has to be for a ''price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised''. Price thus constitutes an essential ingredient of the transaction of sale. The words ''price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised'' indicate that actual payment of the whole of the price at the time of the execution of sale-deed is not a sine qua non to the completion of the sale. Even if the whole of the price is not paid but the document is executed and thereafter registered, if the property is of the value of more than Rs 100, the sale would be complete. 38. The real test is the intention of the parties. In order to constitute a ''sale'', the parties must intend to transfer the ownership of the property and they must also intend that the price would be paid either in praesenti or in future. The intention is to be gathered from the recital in the sale-deed, the conduct of the parties and the evidence on record.'' 42. In another case 'Kaliaperumal v. Rajagopal and another', (2009) 4 SCC 193 , it was held as follows : ''17. It is now well-settled that payment of entire price is not a condition precedent for completion of the sale by passing of title, as Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (''The Act'', for short) defines ''sale'' as ''a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part- promised''. It is now well-settled that payment of entire price is not a condition precedent for completion of the sale by passing of title, as Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (''The Act'', for short) defines ''sale'' as ''a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part- promised''. If the intention of parties was that title should pass on execution and registration, title would pass to the purchaser even if the sale price or part thereof is not paid. In the event of non-payment of price (or balance price as the case may be) thereafter, the remedy of the vendor is only to sue for the balance price. He cannot avoid the sale. He is, however, entitled to a charge upon the property for the unpaid part of the sale price where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer before payment of the entire price, under Section 55(4)(b) of the Act.'' 43. Thus, what can be culled out from the aforesaid decisions that the mere fact that a sale-deed recites the payment of consideration which is not true cannot render the document invalid. To support a sale, it is not necessary that the whole of the price should be paid. The price may be paid or promised wholly or in part. If according to the tenor of the document the consideration was not actually paid, but the document shows that there was an intention to pay, then in that case the document is not rendered invalid on account of the non-payment of the consideration. On the other hand, if the intention was not to pay any consideration or the document is without any consideration, the document is of no effect. There is a distinction between a sale where the consideration is intended to be paid and is not paid, and where the consideration is not intended to be paid at all by both the parties. In the former case, the title passes to the purchaser, and in the later case though the vendor is tricked into going through the form of execution and registration of the document, the sale-deed is void as a colourable transaction. It is not necessary that the whole of the price should be paid. The price may be paid or promised to be paid wholly or in part.” 31. It is not necessary that the whole of the price should be paid. The price may be paid or promised to be paid wholly or in part.” 31. Though there is no wholesome exception to the rule adumbrated in the above line of decisions to the effect that non payment of price set forth in the sale deed does not ipso facto invalidate it, but entitles the vendor to a charge on the transferred property in terms of Section 55(4)(b) of the Act of 1882, yet there is some exception to this thumb rule explained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kaliaperumal (supra), to which this Court has made a fleeting reference in Raj Dutt (supra). A fuller exposition of the rule in Kaliaperumal can be better understood upon what their Lordships held in the entirety of it. The holding in Kaliaperumal reads: “17. It is now well settled that payment of entire price is not a condition precedent for completion of the sale by passing of title, as Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“the Act”, for short) defines “sale” as “a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised”. If the intention of parties was that title should pass on execution and registration, title would pass to the purchaser even if the sale price or part thereof is not paid. In the event of non payment of price (or balance price as the case may be) thereafter, the remedy of the vendor is only to sue for the balance price. He cannot avoid the sale. He is, however, entitled to a charge upon the property for the unpaid part of the sale price where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer before payment of the entire price, under Section 55(4)(b) of the Act. 18. Normally, ownership and title to the property will pass to the purchaser on registration of the sale deed with effect from the date of execution of the sale deed. But this is not an invariable rule, as the true test of passing of property is the intention of parties. Though registration is prima facie proof of an intention to transfer the property, it is not proof of operative transfer if payment of consideration (price) is a condition precedent for passing of the property. 19. But this is not an invariable rule, as the true test of passing of property is the intention of parties. Though registration is prima facie proof of an intention to transfer the property, it is not proof of operative transfer if payment of consideration (price) is a condition precedent for passing of the property. 19. The answer to the question whether the parties intended that transfer of the ownership should be merely by execution and registration of the deed or whether they intended the transfer of the property to take place, only after receipt of the entire consideration, would depend on the intention of the parties. Such intention is primarily to be gathered and determined from the recitals of the sale deed. When the recitals are insufficient or ambiguous the surrounding circumstances and conduct of parties can be looked into for ascertaining the intention, subject to the limitations placed by Section 92 of the Evidence Act.” 32. The way this subtle exception to the general rule would work in a given case and how it would be applied, has also been spelt out in Kaliaperumal, where it is observed: “20. In this case, the execution of the sale deed on 26-6-1983 is not in dispute. The said instrument was presented for registration on 21- 10-1983 and registered on 26-10-1983, as the first respondent vendor appeared before the Sub- Registrar and admitted that the vendors had executed the documents, but refused to make an endorsement to that effect on the deed as the vendors had not received the balance consideration of Rs 40,000. 21. Applying the abovementioned principles to the facts of this case, we find that the parties intended that ownership of the property would be transferred to the appellant only after receipt of the entire consideration by the vendors, as a condition precedent. The operative portion of the sale deed clearly states that the vendors have agreed to receive Rs 40,000 in the presence of the Sub-Registrar on the date of the registration of the sale deed and that in consideration of payment to be so made, the property was being conveyed to the purchaser. This makes it clear that the title was intended to pass only on the payment of balance consideration of Rs 40,000 in the presence of the Sub-Registrar. This is also supported by the evidence of DW 1 to DW 4. This makes it clear that the title was intended to pass only on the payment of balance consideration of Rs 40,000 in the presence of the Sub-Registrar. This is also supported by the evidence of DW 1 to DW 4. The Sub-Registrar has also clearly recorded that no amount was tendered or paid by the purchaser to the vendors in his presence. Therefore title in fact did not pass either on execution or registration of the sale deed. 22. There is yet another circumstance to show that title was intended to pass only after payment of full price. Though the sale deed recites that the purchaser is entitled to hold, possess and enjoy the scheduled properties from the date of sale, neither the possession of the properties nor the title deeds were delivered to the purchaser either on the date of sale or thereafter. It is admitted that possession of the suit properties purported to have been sold under the sale deed was never delivered to the appellant and continued to be with the respondents. In fact, the appellant, therefore, sought a decree for possession of the suit properties from the respondents with mesne profits. If really the intention of the parties was that the title to the properties should pass to the appellant on execution of the deed and its registration, the possession of the suit properties would have been delivered to the appellant. 23. All the three courts have also concurrently found that the appellant had pleaded a false case that he had paid a part of the balance consideration, that is, Rs 25,000 on 21-7-2003 to the respondents to enable them to purchase lorry. This case of the appellant was disbelieved by the trial court as well as the first appellate court which is the final court of facts. That finding was not challenged by the appellant before the High Court. 24. From the averments made in the plaint it is evident that the appellant was ready and willing to make payment of only Rs 15,000 and not Rs 40,000. He had never shown his readiness or willingness to make payment of Rs 40,000 which was the balance of the consideration and which had to be paid only in the presence of the Sub- Registrar, as mentioned in the deed. He had never shown his readiness or willingness to make payment of Rs 40,000 which was the balance of the consideration and which had to be paid only in the presence of the Sub- Registrar, as mentioned in the deed. Therefore, the first respondent who was present before the Sub-Registrar on behalf of the respondents on 26- 10-1983, was justified in not signing or affixing his thumb mark in the endorsement of registration to be made on the deed by the Sub-Registrar. 25. Therefore, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that the parties really intended that title of ownership to the suit properties would pass to the purchaser, only after payment of full consideration by the purchaser to the vendor as a condition precedent. Parties did not intend that there should be transfer of ownership merely on execution and registration of the deed.” 33. The rule in Kaliaperumal appears to be that generally ownership and title to the property would stand transferred to the vendee upon the registration of a sale deed with effect from the date of execution thereof, but as remarked there, the rule is not invariable. The true test propounded there is the intention of parties as to when title in the property would pass. Registration is prima facie proof of the vendor's intention to transfer the property, but it does not perfect the transfer if payment of consideration is intended by the parties to be essential to the passage of property from the vendor to the vendee. How that intention is to be gathered, has been explained in Paragraph No.19 of the report in Kaliaperumal. 34. It has been laid down that the intention is to be gathered for a first from the recitals in the sale deed. In the event the recitals are insufficient or ambiguous, the surrounding circumstances and conduct of parties can be looked into for ascertaining the intention, of course bearing in mind the restrictions, that Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 places upon admission of parole evidence contrary to a written document. In the event the recitals are insufficient or ambiguous, the surrounding circumstances and conduct of parties can be looked into for ascertaining the intention, of course bearing in mind the restrictions, that Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 places upon admission of parole evidence contrary to a written document. The rule, therefore, appears to be that if the recitals in the sale deed are clear and unambiguous, indicating an immediate intention to transfer property to the vendee, though saying that it is upon receipt of the entire sale consideration, the actual non-receipt of it, would not invalidate the sale, but entitle the vendor to recover the price, the whole or part, remaining unpaid, that is admitted or proved. However, if recitals in the sale deed do not disclose an unqualified, clear and unambiguous immediate intention by the conveyance to transfer property, but subject it to some kind of a reservation or restriction, dependent upon payment of price, or otherwise the recitals do not make it a case of the parties' intention to unconditionally and immediately transfer the property to the vendee, the conduct of parties can be looked into to gather the true intention. 35. The remarks in Kaliaperumal about applying the principle, where the general rule of immediate passage of title to the property conveyed would follow upon registration of the deed executed and where on a different intention discernible from the recitals in the deed, passage of title can be held dependent upon payment of consideration, are illuminating. In the said decision, the facts so far relevant, as these appear from the report, are that the sale deed carried a recital in the disposition clause that the vendors have agreed to receive Rs.40,000/-in the presence of the Sub-Registrar on the date of registration of the sale deed and in consideration of the payment to be so made, the property was being conveyed to the purchaser. Their Lordships, therefore, remarked that the recitals made it clear that “the title was intended to pass only on the payment of balance consideration of Rs.40,000/-in the presence of the Sub-Registrar”. Before the Sub-Registrar, when the sale deed was presented for registration, the vendor appeared and admitted execution of the instrument, but refused to make an endorsement about receipt of the balance consideration of Rs.40,000/-, which the vendor said he had not received. Before the Sub-Registrar, when the sale deed was presented for registration, the vendor appeared and admitted execution of the instrument, but refused to make an endorsement about receipt of the balance consideration of Rs.40,000/-, which the vendor said he had not received. The Sub-Registrar clearly recorded that no amount was tendered or paid by the purchasers to the vendor in his presence. It was, therefore, held that title did not pass either on execution or registration of the sale deed. Some other circumstances were also noticed that are mentioned in Paragraph No.22 of the report. 36. The rule about an unqualified passage of title upon execution and registration of the sale deed and when it would not apply, that is to say, if the parties have intended differently from the express recitals in the sale deed or on account of ambiguous or insufficient recitals can, therefore, be held to be well established until the decision in Kaliaperumal. 37. The principle was considered further shortly after Kaliaperumal by the Supreme Court in Janak Dulari Devi and another v. Kapildeo Rai and another, (2011) 6 SCC 555 . In Janak Dulari Devi (supra), which was a case that arose from the State of Bihar, the Court answered the questions: (i) Whether title to the property passed to the vendee on execution of the sale deed? and, (ii) Whether the vendor, on facts there, was justified in cancelling/ repudiating the sale on ground that the sale consideration was not paid? Their Lordships answered the questions bearing in mind the prevalent practice in Bihar known as “ta khubzul badlain”, translated in the report to mean 'title to the property passing to the purchaser only when there is exchange of equivalents’. It was in that context that in Paragraph No.13 of the report in Janak Dulari Devi (supra), the exception to the rule laid down in Kaliaperual appears to be stated in rather unqualified terms, which in fact it is not. That there is no departure on principle in Janak Dulari Devi from what the law is, is evident upon a conjoint reading of Paragraphs Nos.11, 12 and 13 of the report. It would suffice to quote the observations of their Lordships in Paragraph Nos.11 and 13 of the report in Janak Dulari Devi, that read: “11. That there is no departure on principle in Janak Dulari Devi from what the law is, is evident upon a conjoint reading of Paragraphs Nos.11, 12 and 13 of the report. It would suffice to quote the observations of their Lordships in Paragraph Nos.11 and 13 of the report in Janak Dulari Devi, that read: “11. Where the intention of the parties is that passing of title would depend upon the passing of consideration, evidence is admissible for the purpose of contradicting the recital in the deed acknowledging the receipt of consideration. In Bishundeo Narain Rai v. Anmol Devi [ (1998) 7 SCC 498 ] this Court had occasion to consider the question as to when the ownership and title in a property will pass to the transferee, under a deed of conveyance. This Court observed: (SCC p. 503, para 11) “11. … Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act declares that on a transfer of property, all the interests which the transferor has or is having at that time, capable of passing in the property and in the legal incidence thereof, pass on such a transfer unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied. A combined reading of Section 8 and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act suggests that though on execution and registration of a sale deed, the ownership and all interests in the property pass to the transferee, yet that would be on terms and conditions embodied in the deed indicating the intention of the parties. It follows that on execution and registration of a sale deed, the ownership title and all interests in the property pass to the purchaser unless a different intention is either expressed or necessarily implied which has to be proved by the party asserting that title has not passed on registration of the sale deed. Such intention can be gathered by intrinsic evidence, namely, from the averments in the sale deed itself or by other attending circumstances subject, of course, to the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872.” 13. Where the sale deed recites that on receipt of the total consideration by the vendor, the property was conveyed and possession was delivered, the clear intention is that title would pass and possession would be delivered only on payment of the entire sale consideration. Where the sale deed recites that on receipt of the total consideration by the vendor, the property was conveyed and possession was delivered, the clear intention is that title would pass and possession would be delivered only on payment of the entire sale consideration. Therefore, where the sale deed recited that on receipt of the entire consideration, the vendor was conveying the property, but the purchaser admits that he has not paid the entire consideration (or if the vendor proves that the entire sale consideration was not paid to him), title in the property would not pass to the purchaser.” 38. Mr. Saundars has drawn the attention of this Court to the very recent decision in Kewal Krishan (supra), in particular to the remarks in Paragraph No.15 of the report, that read: “15. …......... Hence, a sale of an immovable property has to be for a price. The price may be payable in future. It may be partly paid and the remaining part can be made payable in future. The payment of price is an essential part of a sale covered by section 54 of the TP Act. If a sale deed in respect of an immovable property is executed without payment of price and if it does not provide for the payment of price at a future date, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law. It is of no legal effect. Therefore, such a sale will be void. It will not effect the transfer of the immovable property.” 39. He submits that the Rule stated in Kewal Krishan, which is a much later decision, is stated in unqualified terms and does not acknowledge the general principle that unpaid price after execution and registration of the sale deed does not invalidate the transaction, but merely creates a lien or a charge on the property sold. He submits that unless the price is made payable in future, the rule in Kewal Krishan would show that a sale deed relating to an immovable property, executed without payment of price is not at all a sale in the eyes of law. Indeed, that is the rule laid down in Kewal Krishan, which appears to be the last decision on the point by the last Judge, that is to say, the Supreme Court. No decision to the contrary has been brought to this Court's notice. 40. Mr. Indeed, that is the rule laid down in Kewal Krishan, which appears to be the last decision on the point by the last Judge, that is to say, the Supreme Court. No decision to the contrary has been brought to this Court's notice. 40. Mr. Pipersenia, learned Counsel for the defendant has argued that the decision in Kewal Krishan does not take notice of the provisions of Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act, which creates the unpaid price a charge on the property sold, but does not invalidate the transaction. It is further argued that the decision in Kewal Krishan does not take note of the earlier authorities of the Supreme Court in Vidhyadhar, Kaliaperumal, Janak Dulari Devi, and above all, the relatively recent decision in Dahiben, which express a contrary view, some qualified and others unqualified. 41. Mr. Pipersenia submits that if there are conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court comprising Benches of the same strength, the decision, which appears to the High Court to have elaborately and accurately laid down the law, ought to be followed. The point of time when the decision was rendered is not decisive about its binding effect. 42. The question fell for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge, Hapur, Ghaziabad and other, AIR 1991 All 114 , where it was held: “6. With respect to the first question the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Qamaruddin which is later decision on one hand and decisions in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad (Supra) and Vishnu Awatar v. Shiv Awatar (Supra) which affirm the decision of this Court in Jupiter Chit Fund (Pvt) Limited v. Dwarka Diesh (Supra) would show that there is a direct conflict on the question of maintainability of revision in High Court u/ S. 115, C.P.C. Both the judgments of the Supreme Court are by a bench consisting of two Hon'ble Judges. In such a situation the questions which arise for consideration are namely: When there is a direct conflict between the two decisions of Supreme Court rendered by Judges of equal strength, which of them should be followed by the High Court and whether later decision of the Supreme Court has effect of overruling the earlier decision of the Supreme Court? 7. 7. One line of decision is that if there is a conflict in two Supreme Court decisions, the decision which is later in point of time would be binding on the High Courts. The second line of decisions is that in case there is a conflict between the judgments of Supreme Court consisting of equal authorities, incidence of time is not a relevant factor and the High Court must follow the judgment which appears it to lay down law elaborately and accurately. 8. Similar situation arose before a Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of M/s Indo Swiss Time Limited, Dundahera v. Umrao, AIR 1981 Punj and Har 213. What the Full Bench in the said case held is extracted below (at pp. 219-220 of AIR) : "Now the contention that the latest judgment of a co-ordinate Bench is to be mechanically followed and must have pre-eminence irrespective of any other consideration does not commend itself to me. When judgments of the superior Court are of co-equal Benches and therefore, of matching authority then their weight inevitably must be considered by the rationale and the logic thereof and not by the mere fortutious circumstances of the time and date on which they were rendered. It is manifest that when two directly conflicting judgments of the superior Court and of equal authority are extant then both of them cannot be binding on the courts below. Inevitably a choice, though a difficult one, has to be made in such a situation. On principle it appears to me that the High Court must follow the judgment which appears to it to lay down the law more elaborately and accurately. The mere incidence of time whether the judgments of coequal Benches of the Superior Court are earlier later is a consideration which appears to me as hardly relevant." This decision was followed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Municipal Corporation, AIR 1988 Bombay 9. The majority of Judges in the Full Bench held that if there was a conflict between the two decisions of equal benches which cannot possibly reconcile, the courts must follow the judgment which appear to them to state the law accurately and elaborately. The majority of Judges in the Full Bench held that if there was a conflict between the two decisions of equal benches which cannot possibly reconcile, the courts must follow the judgment which appear to them to state the law accurately and elaborately. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of M/s Indo Swiss Time Limited v. Umrao, (AIR 1981 Punj and Har 213) (Supra) especially when the Supreme Court while deciding Qamaruddin's case (1990 All WC 308) (Supra) did not notice the U. P. amendment to S. 115, C.P.C. and earlier decision of the Supreme Court. In the light of the view expressed in this case it is to be examined as to which of the case decided by the Supreme Court lays down the law accurately. As noticed earlier the U.P. Amendment Act No. XXXI of 1978 amended S. 115 of Code of Civil Procedure. By virtue of this amendment, revision u/S. 115, S.P.C. did not lie to the High Court against the appellate or revisional order passed by the District Court where the valuation of the suit is less than Rs. 20,000/-. This amendment came up for consideration in M/s Jupiter Chit Fund (Pvt) Ltd. v. Dwarka Diesh, ( AIR 1979 All 218 ) (FB) (Supra) and it was held that S. 115, C.P.C. as amended by U.P. Amendment Act assigns mutually exclusive jurisdiction to the High Court and district Court. This full bench decision was affirmed by Supreme Court in its two decisions namely in the cases of Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, ( AIR 1980 SC 892 ) and Vishnu Awatar v. Shiv Awatar ( AIR 1980 SC 1575 ) (supra). A perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Qamaruddin's case (1990 All WC 309) (Supra) indicates that it was not brought to the notice of the bench deciding the case that it was a case from U.P. and that S. 115, C.P.C. amended by U.P. Amendment Act No. XXXI of 1978 governed the matter. The matter was disposed of as if S. 115, C.P.C. as originally enacted applied. 9. x x x x 10. The matter was disposed of as if S. 115, C.P.C. as originally enacted applied. 9. x x x x 10. For the above reasons it must be held that the decision of Supreme Court in Qamaruddin's case (1990 All WC 308) (Supra) to the extent it holds that revision against an appellate or revisional order passed by the district court is maintainable u/ S. 115, C.P.C. (as amended by U.P. Act 31/78) to the High Court does not state the law accurately or overrule the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Jupiter Chit Fund (Pvt) Ltd. v. Dwarka Diesh ( AIR 1979 All 218 ) (Supra) particularly when it has specifically been approved by the two earlier decisions of the Supreme Court.” (emphasis by Court) 43. A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court considered the question in Raman Gopi and another v. Kunju Raman Uthaman, 2011 SCC OnLine Ker 4028, where it was held: “77. The legal position, which therefore emerges on a discussion and analysis of the principles stated in various decisions of the Apex Court and other High Courts including this Court, so as to act as guidance to the High Courts and Subordinate Courts, when faced with a conflicting decisions, are summarised below:— (i) In case of conflicting views taken in the decisions of two Benches of equal strength of the Apex Court, the decision later in point of time, will prevail over the earlier one; (ii) What is binding is the ratio decidendi. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. (iii) A decision which is not expressed and is not found on reasons nor proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Art. 141 of the Constitution. Similarly, any declaration made or conclusion arrived at without application of mind or preceded without a reason, cannot be a declaration of law, or authority as a binding precedent; (iv) It is well settled that what is the essence of a decision is the ratio and not every observation, nor what logically follows from various observations made in it. (v) The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (v) The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. (vi) A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind. (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn. p. 153). (vii) A Division Bench, in case of conflict between the decision of a Division Bench of two Judges and the decision of a larger Bench and in particular, a Constitution Bench, would be bound by the latter decision. (viii) Per incuriam means a decision rendered by ignorance of a previous binding decision such as a decision of its own or of a court of coordinate or higher jurisdiction or in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of law. A ruling making a specific reference to an earlier binding precedent may or may not be correct, but cannot be said to be per incuriam.” (emphasis by Court) 44. The issue also engaged the attention of the Karnataka High Court in D.V. Lakshmana Rao v. State of Karnataka and others, 2000 SCC OnLine Kar 775, where it was observed: “14. It is now well settled that if there are two conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court, of benches with equal number of Judges, then the latter will prevail over the earlier. But where the earlier judgment is of a larger bench and the latter judgment is of a smaller bench, then the decision of the larger bench will be binding. It is now well settled that if there are two conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court, of benches with equal number of Judges, then the latter will prevail over the earlier. But where the earlier judgment is of a larger bench and the latter judgment is of a smaller bench, then the decision of the larger bench will be binding. In State of U.P. v. Ramchandra [AIR 1976 SC 2574.] the Supreme Court held that where the High Court finds a conflict between the views expressed by a larger bench and a smaller bench, the proper course for the High Court is to find out the ratio decidendi of the decision of the Larger Bench and follow the same in preference to the opinion expressed by the Smaller Bench. Hence I am bound to follow the decisions in Satendra Prasad Jain and Pratap which are of Larger Benches, instead of following the decision in Mariyappa which is of a smaller Bench.” 45. Here, the Court finds that all the decisions that have been rendered are by two Judge Benches of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. There is no decision by a Bench of larger strength. The other decisions keep the principle intact, as already stated, though there is some exception carved out in the decisions in Kaliaperumal and Janak Dulari Devi, that are not there in Vidhyadhar and Dahiben. But, the holding of their Lordships in Kewal Krishan is absolutely unqualified and lays down the rule that except for cases where the payment of price, whole or in part, is postponed, non-payment of the sale consideration would render the sale not a sale at all in the eyes of law. It is of no legal effect and void. That being the latest holding of the Supreme Court, it is not open to this Court to go behind the reasoning in the decision and choose the earlier decisions as laying down the correct law, evaluating the relative merits of decisions of the highest Court, as if it were. 46. It must be noticed here that the issue, that has confronted this Court, has engaged the attention of a Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court in a very recent decision rendered in Ramkumar Rajak v. Smt. Geetadevi Gupta and others, F.A. No.345 of 2019, decided on 20.03.2023. 46. It must be noticed here that the issue, that has confronted this Court, has engaged the attention of a Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court in a very recent decision rendered in Ramkumar Rajak v. Smt. Geetadevi Gupta and others, F.A. No.345 of 2019, decided on 20.03.2023. Their Lordships of the Division Bench in Ramkumar Rajak (supra), noticing the conflict of opinion between Kewal Krishan and Dahiben, observed: “9. In so far as the principles laid down in the matter of Kewal Krishan (supra), as relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is concerned, in order to show that if a sale deed in respect of an immovable property is executed without payment of price, then it would not be a sale at all and will not effect the transfer of the immovable property. But, the same would, however, be of no use in view of the decision rendered earlier by the equal strength of the Supreme Court in the said matter of Dahiben's case (supra), wherein, it was held that non-payment of sale consideration would not be a ground for cancellation of the sale deed as in the said event, as observed herein above, the plaintiff may have other remedy to recover the same. Since, this view taken earlier was not brought to the knowledge of the equal strength of the Supreme Court in the said matter of Kewal Krishan (supra) therefore, this would not be of any use for the plaintiff.” (emphasis by Court) 47. With utmost respect, this Court is unable to agree with the view expressed on the point by their Lordships of the Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court. To the understanding of this Court, what has been held by the Division Bench in Ramkumar Rajak (supra) is that their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the later decision in Kewal Krishan having decided the point one way without noticing the earlier authority in Dahiben, which was rendered by a Bench of their Lordships of the same strength as Kewal Krishan (the subsequent decision) would not bind the High Court. Virtually, the decision in Kewal Krishan has been ignored as per incuriam. Virtually, the decision in Kewal Krishan has been ignored as per incuriam. To the understanding of this Court, a decision of the Supreme Court cannot be ignored by the High Court recording it as per incuriam, unless it be a case which is clearly against the ratio of a Bench of higher strength of their Lordships. That is not the case here. 48. This Court, as already said, assumes that out of the agreed sale consideration of Rs.7000/-, Rs.1000/-alone that were paid before the Registrar is all that has been paid. Whether in fact that is the correct position, would be considered while answering Substantial Question of Law No.3. This is an assumption for the purpose of answering Questions Nos.1 and 2. 49. Substantial Question of Law No.1 is answered in the affirmative and it is held that if the price set forth in the registered sale deed has not been paid to the vendor by the vendee, a decree for cancellation may be passed on this ground. So far as Substantial Question of Law No.2 is concerned, once it is held that non-payment of the price set forth in the registered sale deed to the vendor by the vendee would entail cancellation of the conveyance, the question need not be answered. 50. Substantial Question of Law No.3 is to the effect whether the Lower Appellate Court has set aside the findings recorded by the Trial Court upon consideration of evidence on record while writing a judgment of reversal. The most crucial finding, upon which event would turn in this appeal and one where two Courts have opined divergently is the payment of the whole of the sale consideration set forth in the registered sale deed. That is the only issue to which question of an effective reversal of the Trial Court's finding by the Lower Appellate Court upon consideration of the evidence on record would attach. The Trial Court, in returning its findings on Issues Nos.1 and 2, to either of which the central fact is payment of the entire sale consideration, has proceeded to narrow down the issue by recording what is common ground between parties. The Trial Court, in returning its findings on Issues Nos.1 and 2, to either of which the central fact is payment of the entire sale consideration, has proceeded to narrow down the issue by recording what is common ground between parties. It has been recorded by the Trial Court that the parties are not at issue about the following facts: (1) That there was a negotiation* between parties regarding sale of the suit property in favour of the defendant; (2) That on the basis of negotiation*, it was agreed that the plaintiff would sell the suit property in favour of the defendant for a sum of Rs.7000/-; (3) That after the contract or the conversation, the plaintiff did execute a registered sale deed relating to the suit property in favour of the defendant; and, (4) That at the time of registration of the sale deed, the defendant paid to the plaintiff a sum of Rs.1000/-only. (* Note: The word employed in the Trial Court’s judgment is ‘vartalap’, which would literally translate to ‘conversation’ but in the context would really mean ‘negotiation’.) 51. The Trial Court has, therefore, proceeded that out of the agreed sale consideration, according to the plaintiff, she was paid Rs.1000/-only, whereas according to the defendant, Rs.6000/-were paid at the time of the agreement with Rs.1000/-being payable at the time of registration of the deed, which were paid at that time. The Trial Court has considered as part of the oral testimony, the testimonies of PW-1 i.e. the plaintiff herself, PW-2 Bhagwat Singh and PW-3 Khalak Singh. The Trial Court also looked into the recitals in the sale deed, which show that Rs.6000/-had been received earlier and Rs.1000/-alone were payable at the time of registration. The Trial Court has remarked that in the circumstances when a sum of Rs.1000/-, according to the deed, was all that was left to be paid at the time of registration, there was no occasion for the balance to be paid at the time of execution of the deed or when the deed writer was scribing it. The Trial Court has also noticed the fact that a sum of Rs.1000/-was paid to the plaintiff before the Sub-Registrar. 52. The Trial Court has also noticed the fact that a sum of Rs.1000/-was paid to the plaintiff before the Sub-Registrar. 52. The Trial Court has also observed that there does not appear to be any illegality vitiating the impugned sale deed, because the plaintiff has not said in her examination-in-chief that after the deed was scribed, it was not read out to her by the scribe/ deed writer Laxmi Prasad or by the Sub-Registrar before he admitted it to registration. It has been remarked that if the document had not been read out to the plaintiff, either by the scribe or the Sub-Registrar, she would surely have mentioned the fact in her examination-in-chief. From non-mention of the fact, the Trial Court has drawn an inference that it is an omission, which goes against the plaintiff. 53. It has then been noticed by the Trial Court that in her cross-examination, the plaintiff has stated that before the Sub-Registrar admitted the document to registration, he read it out to her. The relevant part of the cross-examination has been quoted by the Trial Court, which ought to be reproduced: ^^lcjftLVªkj us mls cryk;k Fkk fd 6 gtkj #i;k mlus is'kxh esa fy;s gSa o ,d gtkj #i;k 'ks"k vkt feyus gSa rks mlus dgk Fkk fd mls is'kxh esa 6 gtkj #i;s ugha feysA 54. The Trial Court has gone on to observe that given the fact that the Sub-Registrar had read out the sale deed to the plaintiff before registration, which mentioned that Rs.6000/-have already been paid to her (a fact she did deny in her cross-examination and said that she denied it before the Sub-Registrar too), it was open to her not to have appended her mark to the document. She could have refused to sign or append her mark, but she did not do so. The Trial Court has then put a specific question to her, which reads: ^^Á'u& D;k lc&jftLVªkj us vkils tcjnLrh fu'kkuh vaxwBk yxok;k Fkk\ mRrj& lc&jftLVªkj eÅ us Lo;a fu'kkuh vaxwBk ugha yxok;kA 55. She could have refused to sign or append her mark, but she did not do so. The Trial Court has then put a specific question to her, which reads: ^^Á'u& D;k lc&jftLVªkj us vkils tcjnLrh fu'kkuh vaxwBk yxok;k Fkk\ mRrj& lc&jftLVªkj eÅ us Lo;a fu'kkuh vaxwBk ugha yxok;kA 55. The Trial Court from all this evidence has concluded that once it was admitted to the plaintiff that the Sub-Registrar before registering the document had read it out to her and the Sub-Registrar had not pressurized her into thumb marking it or make her mark it forcibly, if there was an unpaid sale consideration of Rs.6000/-by the defendant, the plaintiff could have refused to thumb mark the document. The Trial Court has also noticed that PW-2 Bhagwat Singh has also acknowledged the fact that the Sub-Registrar read out the document before registering it and also the fact that it said that Rs.6000/-were received by the plaintiff as an advance, but the witness still appended his signatures to the document. 56. The witnesses on the defendant side have been noticed to be the defendant himself, who testified as DW-1, the scribe Laxmi Prasad, DW-2 and Dashrath @ Majhle, DW-3. DW-1's testimony has been noticed by the Trial Court, where he has said that he had spoken to the plaintiff 2 or 4 days before the sale deed was executed. The transaction was settled for a total sum of Rs.7000/-, out of which a sum of Rs.6000/-was paid in earnest to the plaintiff. The sum of Rs.6000/-was paid at the house of one Sitaram Maharaj in the presence of Majhle. Admittedly, there is no written record of all this transaction, to wit, the contract that was entered into 2-4 days before the sale deed or the earnest of Rs.6000/-that was paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. There are only two witnesses to the transaction. One is Sitaram Maharaj and the other is Majhle, DW-3. Therefore, the testimony of Dashrath @ Majhle, DW-3 is crucial. 57. There are only two witnesses to the transaction. One is Sitaram Maharaj and the other is Majhle, DW-3. Therefore, the testimony of Dashrath @ Majhle, DW-3 is crucial. 57. About the testimony of the lone man, who witnessed the payment of Rs.6000/-by the defendant to the plaintiff, DW-3 Dashrath @ Majhle, the Trial Court has recorded the following finding: ^^Mh0 MCyw&3 ds #i esa n'kjFk mQZ e>ys us Hkh ftUur o eqUuhyky dh tehu cspus ds ckor gq;h rFkk&dfFkr ckrphu dks fl) fd;k gS tcfd mlus vfHkdfFkr fd;k gS fd ftUur o eqUuhyky dh tehu cspus ds ckor ckrphr esjs lkeus gq;h FkhA ;g ckrphr lhrkjke ds ?kj ij gq;h FkhA ml le; lhrkjke ds ?kj ij eSa] eqUuhyky o lhrkjke o ftUur csxe ekStwn FksA tehu 7 gtkj #i;s esa cspus dk ckr r; gq;h FkhA 6 gtkj #i;s ftlesa ls ftUur dks ogha ij mlh le; ns fn;s x;s FksA ¼Mh0MCyw&3 i`"B ,d ÁFke iSjk½ bl Ádkj Áfroknh eqUuhyky us Mh0MCyw&1 ds #i esa rFkk n'kjFk mQZ e>ys us Mh0 MCyw&3 ds #i esa Á'uxr Hkwfe dks cspus ds lEcU/k esa gq;h ckrphr dks ,oa 6 gtkj #i;s is'kxh esa fn;s tkus lEcU/kh Áfroknh ds dFku dks fl) fd;k gSA** 58. The Trial Court has also noticed the testimony of DW-1, where he has said that the Sub-Registrar asked the plaintiff if she has received earnest of Rs.6000/-after he had read out it to her, to which the plaintiff said that she had received Rs.6000/-. The Sub-Registrar was also noticed to have asked the plaintiff whether she wanted to sell the entire chak, to which the plaintiff said that she wanted to sell the whole of it. The Trial Court has noticed that the witness has said that it was then that he paid the balance of Rs.1000/-, which was the balance sale consideration to be paid at the time of registration. 59. This Court must remark that apparently the sale deed describes the transaction in the manner accepted by the Trial Court, where Rs.6000/-was mentioned in the recitals to have been received by the plaintiff and the balance of Rs.1000/-payable before the Sub-Registrar, that was actually paid before him. A perusal of the Sub-Registrar's endorsement on the sale deed shows that the total sale consideration was Rs.7000/-, out of which Rs.1000/-was received before the Sub-Registrar and the balance as an advance. A perusal of the Sub-Registrar's endorsement on the sale deed shows that the total sale consideration was Rs.7000/-, out of which Rs.1000/-was received before the Sub-Registrar and the balance as an advance. The Sub-Registrar’s endorsement is one dated 16.10.1982. 60. The Lower Appellate Court has reversed the findings of the Trial Court regarding non-payment of the earnest of Rs.6000/-relying on the testimony of the plaintiff and her two witnesses, as also the fact that she promptly lodged an FIR soon after the registration of the sale deed. The Lower Appellate Court has also invoked the principle that uneducated women from the village as also men, who have grown old, have to be admitted to the privilege of a pardanashin woman in the matter of reversal of burden. Though that question does not arise in this appeal, inasmuch as no substantial question of law to that effect was urged by parties, this Court proceeds to see if indeed the finding of the Trial Court has been effectively reversed. As already remarked, the most crucial question is about the payment of Rs.6000/-. About this fact, the Lower Appellate Court has held: ^^Áfroknh xokg eqUuhyky us dgk gS fd mlus 6000@ lhrkjke egkjkt o eaxys ds lkeus fn;s FksA ;g is'kxh dk /ku 6000@ mlus lhrkjke egkjkr ds ?kj ij fn;k FkkA tehu cspus dh ckrphr Hkh lhrkjke egkjkt o eaxys ds lkeus gh gqbZ FkhA bl Ádkj ÁLrqr eqdnesa esa lhrkjke o eaxys vR;f/kd egRoiw.kZ xokg gSa ijUrq Áfroknh us bUgsa 'kgknr esa is'k ugha fd;k gSA bl Ádkj Áfroknh us 6000@ vnk;xh ds laca/k esa vius dkuwuh nkf;Roksa dk ogu ugha fd;k gS ,slh ifjfLFkfr esa /kkjk 114 Hkkjrh; lk{; vf/k0 ds varxZr ;g fu"d"kZ fudkyk tk ldrk gS fd ;fn lhrkjke o eaxys dks 'kgknr esa is'k fd;k tkrk rk og Áfroknh i{k ds foijhr 'kgknr nsrs** (emphasis by Court) 61. Further on, the Lower Appellate Court has observed: ^^xokg eqUuhyky us dgk gS fd ftu xokgksa ds lk{; mlus is'kxh esa 6000@& # fn, Fks mUgsa Hkh jftLVªh ds le; jftLVªh dk;kZy; esa fyokdj ugha ys x;k FkkA ,slh ifjfLFkfr esa tcfd is'kxh dk /ku fn;k tkuk fookfnr gS rks Áfroknh ds fy, ;g vko';d Fkk fd og mu xokgksa dks U;k;ky; esa is'k djrkA mu xokgksa dks iss'k u fd, tkus ls Áfroknhi{k ds Áfrdwy ;g fu"d"kZ fudkyk tk ldrk gS fd ;fn os xokg is'k fd, x, gksrs rks mUgksaus Áfroknhi{k ds foijhr 'kgknr nh gksrhA** (emphasis by Court) 62. The Lower Appellate Court has, therefore, proceeded on the assumption that out of the two witnesses referred to by the defendant, in whose presence the earnest of Rs.6000/-was paid, that is to say, Sitaram Maharaj and Majhle, no one was produced before the Court. It has also been opined by the Lower Appellate Court that in case Sitaram Maharaj or Majhle were produced in Court, the presumption on account of Section 114 of the Evidence Act is that their testimony would have gone against the defendant. It has been remarked twice in the findings of the Lower Appellate Court about the issue of payment of earnest that witnesses of the transaction, before whom the sum of Rs.6000/-is said to be paid in advance or as earnest by the defendant, have not been produced before the Court. The non-production of these witnesses would lead to an adverse inference against the defendant as regards the fact of payment of earnest of Rs.6000/-. 63. The finding of the Lower Appellate Court as aforesaid ignores from consideration the fact that DW-3, Dashrath @ Majhle, who is a witness of the transaction, was produced before the Court and testified to it. His testimony has been noticed by the Trial Court to return findings on the point of payment of Rs.6000/-by way of earnest. Those findings have been recorded based on DW-3's testimony in the defendant's favour. The Lower Appellate Court has not reversed that finding by the Trial Court in the defendant's favour. Rather, the Lower Appellate Court has ignored from consideration the testimony of Dashrath @ Majhle, DW-3 holding that this witness was never produced by the defendant. Those findings have been recorded based on DW-3's testimony in the defendant's favour. The Lower Appellate Court has not reversed that finding by the Trial Court in the defendant's favour. Rather, the Lower Appellate Court has ignored from consideration the testimony of Dashrath @ Majhle, DW-3 holding that this witness was never produced by the defendant. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, it has to be held that the findings recorded by the Lower Appellate Court are ones that set aside the findings recorded by the Trial Court upon the most crucial issue without consideration of the most material evidence on record. For the said reason alone, in the opinion of this Court, the judgment of reversal written by the Lower Appellate Court cannot be sustained. 64. Substantial Question of Law No.3 is answered in the negative holding that the Lower Appellate Court has not set aside the findings recorded by the Trial Court upon consideration of the evidence on record while reversing the Trial Court's judgment. 65. In view of the conclusions recorded above, this appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs throughout. The decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of the Trial Court restored. 66. Let a decree be drawn up, accordingly.