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2023 DIGILAW 1384 (JHR)

Mahendra Singh, son of Late Teja Singh v. State of Jharkhand

2023-11-28

ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard the parties. 2. Though notice has been served upon the opposite party no.2, yet no one appears on behalf of the opposite party no.2 in-spite of repeated calls. 3. This criminal miscellaneous petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a prayer to quash the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Adityapur P.S. Case No. 42 of 2022 registered for the offences punishable under Section 406/419/420/120B/34 of the Indian Penal Code consequent upon the complaint case being P.C. Case No. 685 of 2021 filed by the complainant being forwarded to police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seraikella. 4. The allegation against the petitioners is that the petitioners entered into an agreement for sale of their land with the mother of the complainant in writing on 17.12.1994 after receiving the advance amount of Rs.30,000/- but the petitioner no.1 in connivance with the petitioner no.2 did not execute the sale deed in respect of the land. The mother of the complainant filed Title Suit No. 21 of 1996 against the petitioner no.1. The Munsif, Seraikella decreed the suit directing the petitioner no.1 to execute a registered sale deed. The petitioner no.1 preferred Title Appeal No. 2 of 1999 before the District Judge, Singhbhum West, Chaibasa. The learned District Judge dismissed the appeal. The petitioner no.1 at the instance of petitioner no.2 preferred Second Appeal No. 24 of 2001 which was also dismissed. After that, the mother of the complainant approached the petitioners to execute the registered sale deed but they are not executing the registered sale deed. After the demise of the mother of the complainant, the complainant also approached the petitioners to execute the sale deed but they are not executing the sale deed even though the complainant issued a notice. The complainant filed the complaint case which upon being referred to police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the F.I.R. of this Case has been registered. 5. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the dispute between the parties is out and out a civil dispute. It is next submitted that decree has been passed in favour of the mother of the complainant but the learned Munsiff, Seraikella dropped the execution case no.6 of 1999 filed by the mother of the complainant by holding that the decree was a nullity. It is next submitted that decree has been passed in favour of the mother of the complainant but the learned Munsiff, Seraikella dropped the execution case no.6 of 1999 filed by the mother of the complainant by holding that the decree was a nullity. It is then submitted that the dispute between the parties is purely a civil dispute and as an afterthought, filing this criminal proceeding, 28 years after the alleged occurrence is nothing but abuse of process of law. It is further submitted that there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioners of having any intention to deceive the informant or his mother at the time of alleged entering into the agreement for sale with her and except for the allegation of being in criminal conspiracy, there is no specific allegation against the petitioner no.2. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Vinod Natesan v. State of Kerala, reported in (2019) 2 SCC 401 in para -11 of which the Hon’ble Court interalia has held as under: “11. Insofar as the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-party in person that initially the learned Judge dismissed the application and, thereafter when the judgment was dictated and pronounced, the learned Judge has allowed the application and, therefore, the impugned judgment [Tomy Mathew v. State of Kerala, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 33330] and order passed by High Court is required to be quashed and set aside is concerned, the aforesaid has no substance. What is produced as P-45 is the docket of the file, which does not bear the signature of the learned Judge. Therefore, it cannot be said that initially the learned Judge dismissed the petition and, thereafter, when the judgment was pronounced the order was changed and the application was allowed. Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, we are more than satisfied that there was no criminality on part of the accused and a civil dispute is tried to be converted into a criminal dispute. Thus to continue the criminal proceedings against the accused would be an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, the High Court has rightly exercised the powers under Section 482 CrPC and has rightly quashed the criminal proceedings. Thus to continue the criminal proceedings against the accused would be an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, the High Court has rightly exercised the powers under Section 482 CrPC and has rightly quashed the criminal proceedings. In view of the aforesaid and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal fails and deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.” 7. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that this is a classic case where a civil dispute has been given a cloak as a civil dispute. In this respect the petitioner relies upon the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Mohammad Ibrahim and Others Vs. State of Bihar & Another, reported in (2009) 8 SCC 751 para -8 of which reads as under:- “8. This Court has time and again drawn attention to the growing tendency of the complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure on the accused, or out of enmity towards the accused, or to subject the accused to harassment. Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurise parties to settle civil disputes. But at the same time, it should be noted that several disputes of a civil nature may also contain the ingredients of criminal offences and if so, will have to be tried as criminal offences, even if they also amount to civil disputes. (See G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [ (2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513] and Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. [ (2006) 6 SCC 736 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188] ) Let us examine the matter keeping the said principles in mind.” 8. Hence, it is submitted that the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Adityapur P.S. Case No. 42 of 2022 registered for the offences punishable under Section 406/419/420/120B/34 of the Indian Penal Code consequent upon the complaint case being P.C. Case No. 685 of 2021 filed by the complainant being forwarded to police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seraikella be quashed and set aside. 9. The learned Spl. 9. The learned Spl. P.P. on the other hand vehemently opposes the prayer for quashing the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Adityapur P.S. Case No. 42 of 2022 registered for the offences punishable under Section 406/419/420/120B/34 of the Indian Penal Code consequent upon the complaint case being P.C. Case No. 685 of 2021 filed by the complainant being forwarded to police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seraikella. The learned Spl. P.P. relied upon the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), reported in (2009) 5 SCC 528 , para -18 of which reads as under:- “18. We have noticed hereinbefore that the appellant filed an application for quashing of the FIR which was, however, dismissed by an order dated 29-7-2004 observing that the appellants would be at liberty to move the trial court by way of moving an application for stay of the criminal trial pending adjudication of the question of the genuineness of the will by the civil court.” And submits that the standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases. In this respect the learned Spl. P.P. also relied upon the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, reported in (2002) 8 SCC 87 , para -30(4) of which reads as under:- “30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is — (1) xxxxxxx; (2) xxxxxxxxxx; (3) xxxxxxxx; (4) if the criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same cause, judgment of the civil court would be relevant if conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein.” Hence, it is submitted that this criminal miscellaneous petition being without any merit be dismissed. 10. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after going through the materials in the record, it is pertinent to mention here that it is a settled principle of law as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Uma Shankar Gopalika vs. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in (2005) 10 SCC 336 , paragraph no. reported in (2005) 10 SCC 336 , paragraph no. 6 of which reads as under :- 6. Xxxx xxxx xxxx It is well settled that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In the present case it has nowhere been stated that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC.” (Emphasis supplied) That every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating; where there was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same will not amount to cheating. 11. It is also a settled principle of law that in order to establish the offence punishable under Section 406 of Indian Penal Code the following ingredients are to be established :- (i) Mens rea (ii) There must be dishonest misappropriation or conversion to one’s own use, or use in violation of a legal direction or of any legal contract (iii) The accused dishonestly used or disposed of the property. 12. Now coming to the facts of the case, admittedly the mother of the complainant succeeded in the Title Suit and a Decree was passed in her favour but the appeal and second appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed. So the decree passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division)/Munsiff was confirmed but the executing court dropped the execution proceeding by holding that the decree was not an executable one. The parties have fought the civil case for a period of more than two decades and after that this complaint has been filed without alleging that the petitioner has any intention of deceiving the complainant or his mother at the time of entering into the agreement in the year 1994 nor there is any allegation of any dishonest misappropriation of the property. Under such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that offence punishable under Section 406 or 420 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out in the facts of the case. 13. So far as the offence punishable under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the essential ingredients of the said offence are as follows:- (i) An agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence (ii) In doing so, either commit or caused to be done an illegal act or act which is not in itself illegal, by illegal means. As has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State vs. Nalini reported in (1995) 5 SCC 253 which has been reiterated in the case of Sudhir Shantilal Mehta vs. CBI reported in (2009) 8 SCC 1 as also in the case of Major E.G. Barsay vs. State reported in AIR 1961 SC 1762 as well as Ram Narayan vs. CBI reported in (2003) 3 SCC 641 . Further, the other essential ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code are that; (iii) such an act done or caused to be done; was an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code and (iv) If the act so done was not an offence then an overt act had been done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. 14. Now coming to the facts of the case, there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioners of having committed any of the acts, deeds and things to constitute the offence punishable under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Under such circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in holding that offence punishable under Section 120B of Indian Penal Code is also not made out in the facts of the case and basically this is a civil dispute cloaked as a criminal case. Under such circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in holding that offence punishable under Section 120B of Indian Penal Code is also not made out in the facts of the case and basically this is a civil dispute cloaked as a criminal case. Hence, even though the allegations made in the F.I.R. are treated to be true in its entirety, still the offences alleged are not made out and this is a fit case where the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Adityapur P.S. Case No. 42 of 2022 registered for the offences punishable under Section 406/419/420/120B/34 of the Indian Penal Code consequent upon the complaint case being P.C. Case No. 685 of 2021 filed by the complainant being forwarded to police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seraikella be quashed and set aside. 15. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Adityapur P.S. Case No. 42 of 2022 registered for the offences punishable under Section 406/419/420/120B/34 of the Indian Penal Code consequent upon the complaint case being P.C. Case No. 685 of 2021 filed by the complainant being forwarded to police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seraikella is quashed and set aside. 16. In the result, this criminal miscellaneous petition is allowed.