JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned Standing Counsel and Shri Mohan Singh, learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha. 2. By means of this petition, the petitioners have assailed the order dated 25.04.2023 passed by opposite party No.1/Board of Revenue, U.P., Lucknow in Revision No.997/2023 as also the order dated 23.03.2023 passed by opposite party No.2/Tehsildar, Tehsil-Amethi, District-Amethi in Mutation Case No.T2021047101966. 3. Based upon the pleadings and material available on record, the counsel for the petitioners submitted that vide impugned order dated 25.03.2023, the final order dated 31.01.2023 passed in the mutation case was recalled by the opposite party No.2/Tehsildar, Tehsil-Amethi, District-Amethi, though, he was not having jurisdiction as he has no power to recall or review the final order. He further submitted that the petitioners, being aggrieved, approached the opposite party No.1/Board of Revenue, U.P., Lucknow by means of revision registered as Case No.997 of 2023, Computerized Case No.R2023047100997, (Qumar Jahan and Others) filed under Section 210 of U.P. Revenue Code of 2006 (in short "Code of 2006"), which was dismissed vide order dated 25.04.2023 on the ground that the remedy of appeal is available to the petitioners under Section 207 of the Code of 2006, whereas the appeal would not lie against the order dated 25.03.2023 and as such, the impugned order(s) dated 25.04.2023 and 23.03.2023 are liable to be interfered with. In support of his submission, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed on 11.07.2022 in the case of Nanda Dulal Pradhan and another vs Dibakar Pradhan and another; reported in 2023 (158) RD 452. 4. Considered the aforesaid including the final order dated 31.01.2023 passed in the 'Mutation Case' and perused the record. 5. Upon due consideration, this Court is of the view that the issue involved in the instant case is that as to "Whether an 'order' passed on an application for setting aside an 'order' (ex-parte or by default or treating it to be ex-parte) passed in 'Mutation Case' would be appellable". 6. In the context, it would be appropriate to refer Section(s) 207 and 209 of the Code of 2006, which on reproduction reads as under:- "Section 207. 6. In the context, it would be appropriate to refer Section(s) 207 and 209 of the Code of 2006, which on reproduction reads as under:- "Section 207. First appeal.-(1) Any party aggrieved by a final order or decree passed in any suit, application or proceeding specified in Column 2 of the Third Schedule, may prefer a first appeal to the Court or officer specified against it in Column 5, where such order or decree was passed by a Court or officer specified against it in Column 3 thereof. (2) A first appeal shall also lie against an order of the nature specified - (a) in Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; or (b) in Section 104 of the said Code; or (c) in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the First Schedule to the said Code. (3) The period of limitation for filing a first appeal under this section shall be thirty days from the date of the order or decree appealed against." "Section 209. Bar against certain appeals.-Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 207 and 208, no appeal shall lie against any order or decree- (a) made under Chapter XI of this Code; (b) granting or rejecting an application for condonation of delay under section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963; (c) rejecting an application for revision; (d) granting or rejecting an application for stay; (e) remanding the case to any subordinate Court; (f) where such order or decree is of an interim nature; (g) passed by Court or officer with the consent of parties; or (h) where has been passed ex-parte or by default: Provided that any party aggrieved by order passed ex-parte or by default, may move application for setting aside such order within a period of thirty days from the date of the order; Provided further that no such order shall be reversed or altered without previously summoning the party in whose favour order has been passed to appear and be heard in support of it." 7. The expression(s) used in the Section 207 quoted above are relevant and the same are "final order", "decree", "suit", "application" and "proceeding". 8. The expression(s) used in the Section 207 quoted above are relevant and the same are "final order", "decree", "suit", "application" and "proceeding". 8. Section 207 provides remedy of appeal to any party aggrieved by a 'final order' or 'decree' passed in any 'suit', 'application' or 'proceeding' specified in Column 3 of the Third Schedule to the Court or officer specified against it in Column 5 when such 'order' or 'decree' was passed by a court or officer specified against it in column 4 thereof. 9. According to Third Schedule of Code of 2006, for 'mutation cases' the 'Tehsildar' concerned is the court/officer of original jurisdiction and first appeal would lie before 'Sub-Divisional Officer' concerned. 10. As per Section 209(h), no appeal shall lie where order has been passed ex-parte or by default. First proviso of this section says that any party aggrieved by order passed ex-parte or by default may move an application for setting aside order within thirty days from the date of order. 11. It would be apt to refer here that this Court in the judgment passed in the case of Pratibha Devi vs. Additional Commissioner (Administration), Varanasi Division and Ors.; reported in 2007 SCC OnLine All 2355, considered the similar issue in the light of provisions of U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 particularly Section(s) 200, 201, 210 and 211 and after considering the same, dismissed the petition. One plea in this case was to the effect that the order passed by the Deputy Collector in appeal filed by contesting respondent, was an order passed without jurisdiction since no appeal lay under U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 against the order passed by Nayab Tehsildar allowing the restoration application and on this aspect of the case, this Court after considering the provisions indicated above, observed as under:- "7. As noticed above, the Naib Tahsildar passed the order dated 30.5.2000, allowing the mutation application filed by the contesting respondents. A restoration application was filed by the petitioner for recall of the said order on 4.11.2000, which application was allowed on 22.7.2002 by setting aside the order dated 30.5.2000. The appeal before the Sub Divisional Officer was filed against the order dated 22.7.2002. Sections 200 and 201 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act in this context is relevant to note. “200. The appeal before the Sub Divisional Officer was filed against the order dated 22.7.2002. Sections 200 and 201 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act in this context is relevant to note. “200. Hearing in absence of party.— Whenever any party to such proceeding neglects to attend on the day specified in the summons or on any day to which the case may have been postponed, the Court may dismiss the case for default or may hear and determine it ex parte. 201. No appeal from orders passed ex parte or by default. -No appeal shall lie from an order passed under section 200 ex parte or by default. Re-hearing on proof of good cause for non-appearance.— But in all such cases, if the party against whom judgment has been given appears either in person or by agent (if a plaintiff within fifteen days from the date of such order, and if a defendant, within fifteen days after such order has been communicated to him, or after any process for enforcing the judgment has been executed or at any earlier period), and shows good cause for his non-appearance, and satisfies the officer making the order that there has been a failure of justice, such officer may, upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as he thinks proper, revive the case and alter or rescind the order according to the justice of the case: Order not to be altered without summons to adverse party.—Provided that no such order shall reversed or altered without previously summoning the party in whose favour judgment has been given to appear and be heard in support of it.” 8. Section 201 of U.P. Land Revenue Act provides that no appeal shall lie from an order passed under section 200 ex-parte or by default. The order dated 30.5.2000 of the Naib Tahsildar allowing the mutation of the respondents, was an order allowing the mutation ex-parte. Against the order dated 30.5.2000, thus, appeal was not maintainable by virtue of section 201. In the present case, appeal was not filed against the order dated 30.5.2000, rather the appeal was filed against an order by which the application of the petitioner for setting aside the ex-parte order was allowed. Section 201 itself provides that if, party against whom judgment has been given ex-parte satisfy that there was good cause for his non-appearance, the order can be set aside. Section 201 itself provides that if, party against whom judgment has been given ex-parte satisfy that there was good cause for his non-appearance, the order can be set aside. Present is a case where the application under section 201 was made by the petitioner for recall of the order and the order dated 22.7.2002 was an order passed under section 201 allowing the restoration application. 9. Sections 210 and 211 provides for appeal. Sections 210 and 211 is quoted herein below. “210. Courts to which appeals lie.—(1) Appeal shall lie under this Act as follows: (a) to the Record Officer from orders passed by any Assistant Record Officer; (b)(i) to the Commissioner from orders passed by a Collector or an Assistant Collector first class or Assistant Collector in charge of sub-division, (ii) to the Collector from orders passed by an Assistant Collector second class or Tahsildar. (6) No appeal shall lie against an order passed under sections 28, 33, 39 or 40.” 211. First Appeal.—Unless an order is expressly made final by this Act, an appeal shall lie to the Court authorised under section 210 to hear the same from every original order under section 210 to hear the same from every original order passed in any proceedings held under the provisions of this Act.” 10. According to section 210(1)(b)(ii) an appeal shall lie to the Collector from an order passed by the Tahsildar. Section 211 provides that unless an order is specifically made final by the Act, the appeal shall lie to the Court authorized under section 210 to hear from every original order passed in any proceedings held under the provisions of this Act. The proceeding for recall of an ex-parte order under section 201 is a proceeding contemplated under section 211. The order passed under section 201 allowing an application setting aside ex-parte order has not been made final by any provisions of the Act hence, the said order is appealable under section 211 of the Act." 12. The 'order' passed in 'Mutation Case' on an application for setting aside an ex-parte order has not been made final by any provisions of the Code of 2006. 13. In regard to issue involved in this case, a reference can also be made to the judgment passed by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kiran Bala Srivastava vs. Jai Prakash Srivastava; reported MANU/UP/2771/2004. 13. In regard to issue involved in this case, a reference can also be made to the judgment passed by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kiran Bala Srivastava vs. Jai Prakash Srivastava; reported MANU/UP/2771/2004. The question before the Full Bench of this Court is as to "Whether an appeal under Section 19 of the Family Court Act, 1984 would lie against an order passed under Section 24 of Hindu Marriage Act for grant of interim maintenance". While considering the question, referred above, the Full Bench of this Court considered the relevant provision(s)/expression(s) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, i.e. 'Decree', 'Judgment' and 'Order' as indicated under Section(s) 2(2), (9) and (14) and also Section 19 of Family Court Act, 1984 and the Section 28 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 as also various pronouncements related to expression(s) namely 'Final Judgment', 'Preliminary Judgment', 'Intermediary Judgment', 'Interlocutory Judgment', 'Interlocutory Order' and 'Order'. 14. The findings of the Full Bench of this Court, being relevant, are as under:- "18. A plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 1984 makes it clear that there is a provision for appeal against "judgment" or "order" of a family court, but not against its "interlocutory orders". The words "judgment" "order" and "interlocutory orders" used in sub-section (1) of Section 19 have not been defined in that Act. Although the words "judgment" and "order" are defined under Section 2(9) (14) of the Code of Civil Procedure and by virtue of Section 2(e) of the Act of 1984, can be looked into for understanding the meaning of those words, but the expression "interlocutory order" is not defined even in that Code of 1908, though that expression has been used in Order XXXIX of that Code. So with a view to decide whether appeal lies under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 1984 against the order of family court granting pendent lite maintenance under Section 24, we have to first see as to whether the same falls within the definition of a "judgment". 19. So with a view to decide whether appeal lies under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 1984 against the order of family court granting pendent lite maintenance under Section 24, we have to first see as to whether the same falls within the definition of a "judgment". 19. Interpreting the word "judgment" appearing in clause 15 of Letters Patent "Bombay" in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben, MANU/SC/0036/1981 : AIR 1981 SC 1786 , their lordships of the Apex Court held that those orders which decided matters of moment or which affected vital and valuable rights of the party or which tended to work serious injustice to the party concerned, fell within he expression "judgment" appearing in relevant clause of Letters Patent. Their lordships said that there could be following three kinds of judgments: 1. "A final Judgment: A judgment which decides all the questions or issues in controversy so far as the trial Judge is concerned and leaves, nothing else to be decided. This would mean that by virtue of the judgment, the suit or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed in part or in full. Such an order passed by the trial Judge indisputably and unquestionably is a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent and even amounts to a decree so that an appeal would lie from such a judgment to a Division Bench. 2. A preliminary judgment: this kind of a judgment may take two forms (a) where the trial Judge by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of the suit but only on a preliminary objection raised by the defendant or the party opposing on the ground that the suit is not maintainable. 2. A preliminary judgment: this kind of a judgment may take two forms (a) where the trial Judge by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of the suit but only on a preliminary objection raised by the defendant or the party opposing on the ground that the suit is not maintainable. Here also, as the suit is finally decided one way or the other, the order passed by the trial Judge would be a judgment finally deciding the cause so far as the trial Judge is concerned and, therefore, appealable to the larger Bench, (b) Another shape which a preliminary judgment may take is that where the trial Judge passes an order after hearing the preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to maintainability of the suit, e.g. bar of jurisdiction, res-judicata, a manifest defect in the suit, absence of notice under Section 80 and the like, and these objections are decided by the trial Judge against the defendant, the suit is not terminated but continues and has to be tried on merits but the order of the trial Judge rejecting the objections doubtless adversely affects a valuable right of the defendant who, if his objections are valid, is entitled to get the suit dismissed on preliminary grounds. Thus, such an order even though it keeps the suit alive, undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial' which affects a vital right of the defendant and must, therefore, be construed to be a judgment so as to be appealable to a larger Bench. 3. Intermediary or interlocutory judgment: Most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and, therefore, appealable. There may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43, Rule 1 but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. Before such an order can be a Judgment the adverse effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote " 20. Before such an order can be a Judgment the adverse effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote " 20. In other words, the Apex Court ruled that order or interlocutory orders possessing the characteristics and trappings of finality or affecting valuable rights of the party or deciding important aspects of the trial in main or in a ancillary proceedings, will be "judgment". 21. What noticeable in sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 1984, is that deviating from Section 96 of the Code of 1908 or from sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the Act of 1955, it provides for appeals against "judgment". The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, does not provide for appeal against judgments. It provides for appeals against decrees and orders. Likewise Section 28 of the Act of 1955 also does not provide for appeals against judgments. It provides for appeals only against decrees [see: sub-section (1)] and against certain orders [see: sub-section (2)]. The question arises as to why the legislature made a departure by providing appeal against judgments also, under subsection (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 1984. Not that the legislature was not aware of the established practise or did not know the meaning of the word judgment, as given by the Apex Court in Khimji's case (supra)., 22. If we glance at matters enumerated in explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 7, of the Act of 1984, we find matters, hitherto dealt with and decided by different courts and different levels of civil courts, under different enactments, were placed within the jurisdiction of a family court. The legislature was aware of the legal position, that orders and decrees of civil court of inferior grade, could be subjected to not only one appeal but to more than one. Declaration in the Bill, that only one right of appeal is being provided, should be read in the same context. 23. Before we consider whether orders under Section 24 granting pendent lite maintenance to the party to the matrimonial dispute, possesses characteristics and trappings of a "judgment", we would like to refer to two Supreme Court cases, namely Amar Nath v. State of Haryana. MANU/SC/0068/1977 : AIR 1977 SC 2185 and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra. MANU/SC/0103/1977 : AIR 1978 SC 47 . MANU/SC/0068/1977 : AIR 1977 SC 2185 and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra. MANU/SC/0103/1977 : AIR 1978 SC 47 . The controversy in Amar path's case centred around the meaning of the expression "interlocutory order" appearing in sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Relying on earlier view in Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thakkar v. State of Gujarat. MANU/SC/0071/1967 : AIR 1968 SC 733 the Apex Court said: "The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the right? and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court." 24. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court." 24. It was pointed out that the finality of an order could not be judged by co-relating that order with the controversy in the complaint and the fact that the controversy still remained alive was irrelevant. The said view was reiterated in Madhu Limaye's case with the observation that some kinds of order may fall in between "final order" and "interlocutory order" and the bar in subsection (2) of Section 397 was not meant to be attracted to such kind of "intermediary I orders". In other words, according to their lordships, what was not final, was not necessarily interlocutory for purposes of sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 25. The object behind Section 24 of the Act of 1955 is undoubtedly to provide necessary funds to the needy spouse to prosecute the proceedings as well as to maintain himself or herself during the pendency of the proceedings. The consideration that weigh in granting or refusing pendent lite maintenance under Section 24 have no connection with the questions or issues that may crop up in the main proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or divorce or annulment of marriage etc. Thus, the ambit and nature of the proceedings for divorce or judicial separation etc. are wholly different from the ambit and nature of proceedings under Section 24. We cannot lose sight of the fact that in more than ninety per cent of the cases under the Act of 1955. it is the wife who comes under Section 24 for pendent lite maintenance or expenses of the litigation. In a male dominated society, in majority of cases, the wife has no independent source of income to maintain herself and is solely dependent on her husband. It would be profitable to refer to the following observations of Kerala High Court in Balan Nair v. Bhavani Amma Valsalamma and others, MANU/KE/0027/1987 : AIR 1987 Kerala 110 (FB): "Though Section 125 benefits a distressed father also, main thrust of the provision is to assist women and children distress. It would be profitable to refer to the following observations of Kerala High Court in Balan Nair v. Bhavani Amma Valsalamma and others, MANU/KE/0027/1987 : AIR 1987 Kerala 110 (FB): "Though Section 125 benefits a distressed father also, main thrust of the provision is to assist women and children distress. That is fully consistent with Article 15(3) of the Constitution which states that the prohibition contained in the Article shall not prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. We take note of Article 39 of the Constitution which states inter alia, that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means to livelihood, that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment....... The provision is a measure of social justice and specially enacted to protect women and children. As the Supreme Court observed in Ramesh Chander v. Veena Kaushal, MANU/SC/0067/1978 : AIR 1978 SC 1807 : (1979 Cri.L.J. 3), the brooding presence of the constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women and children must inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance." 26. What we want to say is that although Section 24 of the Act of 1955 does not distinguish between husband and wife, for purposes of having pendent lite maintenance or expenses from other, but in practise the provision is invoked by wife. So, provision contained under Section 24 of the Act of 1955 is important one from the point of view of the wife. Not only her survival during the pendency of the proceedings under that Act but her right to prosecute or defend the proceedings also depends on the outcome of the proceedings under Section 24. Thus a refusal of such maintenance under Section 24 is serious to the wife, so much so she may even give up the idea of defending herself, for want of sufficient means. 27. The argument that appeal against any such order, will delay the disposal of main petition does not appeal to us, so as to give a limited meaning to the word "judgment". 27. The argument that appeal against any such order, will delay the disposal of main petition does not appeal to us, so as to give a limited meaning to the word "judgment". In an appeal against any order under Section 24 of the Act of 1955, granting pendent lite maintenance, main proceedings need not necessarily be stayed or held up. The reason-is that grant of such maintenance is not to affect the merits of the main petition. 28. The learned counsel for the respondents has referred to the definition of "interlocutory orders" in Vol. 22 of the third edition of Halsbury's Law of England and also to Central Bank of India v. Gokul Chand, MANU/SC/0053/1966 : AIR 1967 SC 799 and also to Amar Nath's case and Madhu Limaye's case (supra), so as to say that order under Section 24 of the Act of 1955 are just steps in aid of the main proceedings and have no existence independent of the main proceedings, so will not fall within the definition of the judgment and will be only an interlocutory order. We are of the view that in view of the discussion made above order of pendent lite maintenance has all the characteristics and trappings of the judgment as it decides the valuable rights and liabilities of the parties to the proceedings. In so far as those rights and liabilities are concerned the order is final. The fact that the considerations that matter in granting or refusing pendent lite maintenance under Section 24, have no connection with issues in the main proceedings or the question that even after disposal of application under Section 24, the main petition remains alive for disposal, do not prevent the order under Section 24 from falling within the definition of the "judgment". We are also of the view that the expression "interlocutory order" appearing in subsection (1) of Section 19 of the Act 1984 qualify the word "order" only and does not qualify the word "judgment" appearing before the word "order". In other words, if order of pendent lite maintenance is a "judgment" for all legal and practical purposes, it matters, little whether the same is interlocutory or final." 15. Following can be summarized from the observations made by the Full Bench of this Court in the judgment, referred above:- (i) An 'order', which affects the valuable rights of party, would be a 'final order'. Following can be summarized from the observations made by the Full Bench of this Court in the judgment, referred above:- (i) An 'order', which affects the valuable rights of party, would be a 'final order'. (ii) An 'order' which decided the matter of moment or which affected valuable rights of the party or which tended to work serious injustice to the party concerned would fall within the expression 'judgment'. (iii) An 'order' or 'interlocutory order' possessing the characteristics and trappings of finality or affecting valuable rights of the party or deciding the important aspect of the case/trial in main or ancillary proceeding will be 'judgment'. (iv) Any 'order', which substantially affects the rights of the party or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an 'interlocutory order'. 16. Having considered the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that an order passed under first proviso to Section 209 (g) affecting the valuable rights of the party would fall under the expression 'final order' (a term used under Section 207) and, as such, the aggrieved party can prefer an appeal under Section 207 challenging the said order. 17. Thus, the appeal, challenging the order passed on an application preferred by the party aggrieved by an order (ex-parte or by default or treating to be ex-parte) passed in 'Mutation Case/proceedings' would be maintainable under Section 207 of the Code of 2006 for the reason that the 'Mutation Case/proceeding', is specified in Third Schedule of Code of 2006 and the same also provides the remedy of 'appeal' before 'Sub-Divisional Officer' against the order passed in 'Mutation Case'. 18. In the instant case, the mutation case was finally decided vide order dated 31.01.2023 and thereafter, an application for recall of order dated 31.01.2023 was preferred by the private opposite parties, which was finally allowed vide order dated 25.04.2023. The order dated 25.04.2023 affects the valuable right of the present petitioners as by this order the final order dated 31.01.2023, which was favourable to the petitioners, has been recalled. 19. The order dated 25.04.2023 affects the valuable right of the present petitioners as by this order the final order dated 31.01.2023, which was favourable to the petitioners, has been recalled. 19. Having considered the aforesaid including relevant facts, which are necessary to decide the issue involved, this Court is of the view that the order dated 25.04.2023 affected the valuable rights of the petitioners and accordingly, it can be termed as "final order" (a term used under Section 207) passed on the application preferred by the private opposite parties for recall of order dated 31.01.2023 passed in 'mutation case/proceeding', which finds place in Third Schedule of Code of 2006 and the same also provides the remedy of 'appeal' before 'Sub-Divisional Officer' against the order passed in 'Mutation Case' and accordingly, is appealable. 20. Before concluding, it would be relevant to mention here that in the aforesaid background of the instant case including the issue involved, this Court is of the view that the judgment, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, would not help the petitioners. 21. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present petition. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to approach the concerned Appellate authority under Section 207 of the Code of 2006.