JUDGMENT 1. The Civil Revision Petition is filed under Sec. 115 of Code of Civil Procedure against the order dtd. 11/2/2020 dismissing E.A.No.448 of 2019 in E.P.No.72 of 2019 in O.S.No.286 of 1993 on the file of the Court of Principal Senior Civi l Judge, Kakinada, filed under Sec. 47 of CPC by the J.Dr. to hold that the decree dtd. 20/7/2000 in O.S.No.286 of 1993 on its file is illegal and unconscionable and has become inoperative and un-executable and thus, discharged. 2. Heard Sri Akurathi Rama Krishna, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri V.V.Ravi Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents. 3. Case of the petitioner is briefly as follows:- The petitioner/J.Dr is the absolute owner of Ac.1-75 cents land in survey No.99(P), 30th revenue ward, 70th block, Ramanayyapeta, Kakinada municipality by virtue of a registered gift deed dtd. 21/6/1978. The petitioner mortgaged the property to Chigurupati Veera Venkata Satyanarayana for Rs.5000.00 under a registered mortgage deed dtd. 15/9/1983. The respondents/D.Hrs filed O.S.No.286 of 1993 for permanent injunction against the petitioner/D1 from executing any gift deed in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 - Kakinada municipality in respect of the said property contending that the petitioner agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to them under a possessory agreement of sale dtd. 2/9/1985 for Rs.2, 60, 000.00, out which they paid advance of Rs.1, 60, 000.00 and further agreed to discharge the mortgage debt due under deed dtd. 15/9/1983. The suit in O.S.No.286 of 1993 ended in compromise with D1 and accordingly, a decree was passed on 20/7/2000 against D1 and whereas the suit against D.2 and D3 was dismissed as not pressed. As the petitioner admitted that the respondents were in possession of the suit schedule property pursuant to the possessory agreement of sale dtd. 2/9/1985, the petitioner consented for grant of injunction against her in respect of Ac.0-87 1/2 cents of land and that the respondents and the petitioner agreed to discharge the mortgage debt due under the deed dtd. 15/9/1983. Though the decree was passed long back, the respondents/D.Hr did not choose to discharge the debt under the mortgage deed as agreed, but the petitioner anyhow discharged the same and received the original mortgage deed from him as a voucher. The decree becomes executable on compliance of its terms, but failure to comply with the terms would make the decree unexecutable. The decree becomes executable on compliance of its terms, but failure to comply with the terms would make the decree unexecutable. As such, since the respondents did not fulfill the terms of the contract (compromise), they have no right to get the decree executed. The suit is filed for permanent injunction against the petitioners restraining from making a gift on part of suit schedule property to D2 and D3. The compromise decree is that the petitioner agreed for grant of permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of 87 1/2 cents of land shown in the decree schedule. Twisting the terms of the decree, the respondents/D.Hrs filed E.P. for arrest of the petitioner/J.Dr with the aid of police alleging that she is interfering with their possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. There is no clause in the compromise decree that the petitioner is restrained by way of permanent injunction from interfering with the alleged possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. The terms of the decree cannot be interpreted to mean that the petitioner is restrained by way of permanent injunction from interfering with their alleged possession of the schedule property perennially, particularly as the suit was not filed for permanent injunction restraining the petitioner from interfering with the alleged possession. Thus, the execution petition for arrest of the petitioner with or without police aid is not maintainable. Since the mortgage debt agreed to be discharged was not discharged, the transfer of property under the alleged possessory agreement of sale cannot be deemed to be one for consideration as required under Sec. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act (herein after referred as Act). The respondents did not come forward for obtaining any sale deed from the petitioner pursuant to the agreement of sale. The compromise decree is silent regarding the right of the respondents to seek specific performance of the agreement of sale within a specified time. The respondents have to seek specific performance within a reasonable time not beyond three years from the date of compromise decree. The respondents did not act in furtherance of the agreement by issuing notice or in any other manner required under Sec. 53-A of Act or filing a suit for specific performance. As such, they are not entitled to any benefit under Sec. 53-A of the Act. The respondents did not act in furtherance of the agreement by issuing notice or in any other manner required under Sec. 53-A of Act or filing a suit for specific performance. As such, they are not entitled to any benefit under Sec. 53-A of the Act. The compromise decree is void on the ground of public policy and also is unenforceable, since there is no time stipulated for specific performance of the agreement. As there being no such clause and as no title vested on the respondents under the agreement of sale, whereas the title of the petitioner is absolute, the decree cannot be allowed to hold for the petitioner. Consequently, the respondents cannot be allowed to take unfair advantage of the decree to serious detriment of the petitioner. 4. The 2nd respondent filed counter resisting the petition with the averments briefly as follows:- The petitioner has to specifically prove that she is absolute owner of Ac.1-75 cents of land in S.No.99(P), Ramanayyapeta under the said registered gift deed. She has to specifically prove that she executed the mortgage deed dtd. 15/9/1983 as she stated. It is true that the respondents filed O.S.No.286 of 1993 for the reliefs stated in the petition and that the same ended in compromise decree passed on 20/7/2000 and the suit against D2 and D3 was dismissed as not pressed. The compromise decree is not subject to discharge of the mortgage debt at all. It is incorrect that inspite of compromise decree passed long back, the petitioner alone discharged the mortgage debt. After taking money from the decree holder only, the amount was discharged. It is incorrect that the decree becomes unexecutable for failure to comply with its terms. It is true that the compromise decree is passed that the petitioner agreed for granting a permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiffs for the said 87 1/2 cents of land mentioned in the schedule attached to the compromise, but it is false that ignoring the same from the terms and the decree were twisted by D.Hrs in filing the E.P. It is false to say that there is no clause in the compromise decree that the petitioner is restrained by way of permanent injunction restraining from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the property. It is also incorrect that Sec. 53-A of Act would apply. It is also incorrect that Sec. 53-A of Act would apply. It is false that the compromise decree does not have any clause for enforcing specific performance of the agreement of sale and so it is unenforceable etc. Thus, the respondents denied the averments in the petition and prayed to dismiss the petition, further stating that it was filed only to drag on the proceedings. 5. No evidence has been lead by both parties. After hearing both sides, the execution Court dismissed the petition holding that the compromise decree is not subject to discharge of the mortgage debt at all and it is the burden of the petitioner to prove that the petitioner alone contributed and discharged the mortgage debt, in view of the denial of the same by the 1st respondent/D.Hr, but the petitioner failed to prove the same; and that the maintainability of the suit was argued, however the same cannot be appreciated since the suit ended in a compromise decree and further that execution Court can go beyond the decree, only if the decree sought to be executed is nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction, but there is no such infirmity to the decree under execution. 6. Having been aggrieved by the order, this revision petition is filed on the grounds that the execution Court failed to give proper and justifiable reasons to dismiss the petition and that it failed to see the settled principle of law where the execution court cannot go beyond the scope of the decree and further that it is settled law that there cannot be a permanent injunction against the true owner perennially keeping owner in possession of the property and also failed to consider the efficacy of the petition under Sec. 53-A of Act. It is further contended that the execution Court failed to see the compromise decree in a right perspective and that recording of compromise is contrary to law and that when a decree on its face is void and illegal, can never be executed and the execution Court has power to declare so under Sec. 47 of CPC. It is further contended that the execution Court failed to see the compromise decree in a right perspective and that recording of compromise is contrary to law and that when a decree on its face is void and illegal, can never be executed and the execution Court has power to declare so under Sec. 47 of CPC. It is further contended that the execution court ignored the presumption under Sec. 114 (i) of Evidence Act that when a document creating an obligation is in the hands of obligatory, the obligation has been discharged and thus, the observation of the execution Court that no evidence was adduced by the petitioner is incorrect. The revision petitioner reiterated the grounds taken in the petition filed in E.A.No.448 of 2019. 7. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner argued on the same lines as in the grounds of revision and in the petition. It is vehemently contended that the decree is inexecutable, since the permanent injunction is not expressive that it was granted restraining the petitioner herein from interfering with possession, because the relief claimed in the suit is permanent injunction not to execute the gift deed by D1 in favour of D2 and D3. It is further vehemently contended that since the terms of a compromise must be read as a whole, but not in piecemeal, if the conditions are not complied, the decree becomes inexecutable and therefore, as the D.Hr did not comply the term to pay the amount to discharge the mortgage debt, the decree is inexecutable. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents/D.Hrs contended that the execution Court cannot go beyond the decree except in case of nullity of a decree for lack of jurisdiction, whereas there is no such infirmity in this case. He further submitted that the decree on compromise need not be confined to the relief claimed in the suit and therefore, merely because the prayer in the suit is permanent injunction not to execute the gift deed, there can be a decree for permanent injunction not to interfere with the possession and such decree is legally viable in view of Order XXIII, Rule 1 CPC. He further submitted that the execution Court can examine the decree to give its fullest enforcement to see that the decree passed by a Court is honoured and executed and therefore, in the present case, since the terms of compromise and the contents of the decree indicate that the petitioner admitted the execution of decree, the receipt of whole amount of consideration for the entire extent Ac.1-72 cents and also the 1st respondent/D.Hr being in possession of the petition schedule property of 87 1/2 cents by virtue of the agreement, the decree granting permanent injunction should be read to mean that it was granted restraining the petitioner from interfering with the possession. Insofar as the discharge is concerned, he submitted that the discharge of mortgage debt is not connected to the decree in respect of permanent injunction and said term is connected to the rest of the property of 87 1/2 cents which is acquired by the municipality or developed by the parties, the D.Hr as well as the J.Dr will have rights as mentioned in the decree. He further submitted that unless there is an express mention in the decree that the enforcement of decree for permanent injunction is conditioned by the payment to be made to discharge the mortgage debt, the same cannot be tagged to the decree for permanent injunction. He further submitted that except stating that the petitioner alone discharged the entire mortgage debt, no evidence was lead and failure to lead such evidence would be fatal to the petitioner as the initial burden is on the party pleading the same. Thus, he contended that the execution court has rightly observed that the petitioner failed to discharge the initial burden placed on her to prove that the amount of mortgage decree debt was discharged by her. 9. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the terms of compromise which culminated into decree was not signed by all three plaintiffs on every page of it and therefore, there cannot be a compromise decree binding on all the parties. He also mentioned that the compromise petition was not signed by the counsel. 9. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the terms of compromise which culminated into decree was not signed by all three plaintiffs on every page of it and therefore, there cannot be a compromise decree binding on all the parties. He also mentioned that the compromise petition was not signed by the counsel. In reply, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent/D.Hr submitted that all the three plaintiffs and the 1st defendant signed on the last page of the compromise terms and there are two signatures above the signatures of plaintiffs 1 to 3 and therefore, it is incorrect to state that the advocates have not signed. Nextly, he contended that this ground has not been raised before the execution Court. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that on pointing out the glaring error to this Court, the same can be considered. Answering the same, the learned counsel for R1 submitted that it is not a ground taken in the revision either. 10. The execution petition is filed seeking enforcement of decree for perpetual injunction based on the Lok Adalat award which contained several terms. Insofar as the present execution petition is concerned, part of the award/decree is in relation to the perpetual injunction. For the enforcement of any decree, it must be executable. For enforcement, there must be a clear decree. When a decree is ambiguous, it is unenforceable. Insofar as the term agreed to pass decree for perpetual injunction, there is no clarity as to what kind of perpetual injunction is granted. However, the learned counsel for the DHr submitted that the perpetual injunction agreed between the parties resulting in award is for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession because it was admitted by the other party that the decree holder is in possession of the EP schedule property in pursuance of the agreement of sale, and therefore, it is clear that perpetual injunction granted is only for restraining the other party from interfering with the possession of the DHr. 11. 11. On the other hand, it is contended that the suit is filed for perpetual injunction not to alienate the property, and therefore, when the decree is not clear as to whether it is to restrain the other party from interfering with the possession or to restrain the other party from alienating the property, the execution Court cannot go beyond the decree and infer that it is for restraining the other party from interfering with the possession. This Court is of the view that the argument advanced by the revision petitioner is correct. Merely because, there is a decree, it does not become automatically enforceable. If the prayer in the suit is for perpetual injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff in the schedule property, even if the decree does not contain such expression, it can be understood that the perpetual injunction granted is on the same lines as prayed. But, when a different type of injunction is contemplated, unless it is expressly stated that the perpetual injunction granted is to restrain the other party from interfering with the possession, the same cannot be inferred. 12. In the present case, as the decree/award granting perpetual injunction is silent as to whether it is to restrain the other party from alienating the property as prayed in the plaint to the extent of the undisputed property which is only a portion of the plaint schedule property, it cannot, with all certainty, be treated that the perpetual injunction granted is for restraining the other party/JDr from interfering with the possession. 13. Though it is true as argued by the learned counsel for the DHr that a compromise decree need not be in accordance with the prayer in the suit and that different terms can be agreed between the parties and the same can be decreed, but in the present case, in view of the ambiguity, the decree became unenforceable. Therefore, the same can be adjudicated either under Sec. 47 CPC, or in the enquiry in the main execution petition after filing counter also. Anyhow, since the JDr filed petition under Sec. 47 CPC, in view of the reasons discussed above, there is no illegality in seeking the relief. 14. Therefore, the same can be adjudicated either under Sec. 47 CPC, or in the enquiry in the main execution petition after filing counter also. Anyhow, since the JDr filed petition under Sec. 47 CPC, in view of the reasons discussed above, there is no illegality in seeking the relief. 14. It is also pertinent to mention that even for enforcement of a contract, the law of contract says that there must be consensus ad idem and unless there is consensus ad idem and clarity in the contract between the parties, the same is unenforceable. On the same footing, the decree also becomes enforceable only when there is clarity and not when there is much ambiguity. The execution Court cannot exercise its authority to ascertain what the decree is, particularly, in the cases like the present one. As such, the order passed by the execution Court in E.A.No.448 of 2019 in E.P.No.72 of 2019 in O.S.No.286 of 1993 is liable to be set aside. 15. Insofar as the non-compliance of the condition to discharge the mortgage decree is concerned, it is not made a condition attached to the permanent injunction and moreover there is no evidence of discharge of the same, but it is not denied in the counter, nevertheless, the decree cannot be challenged on this ground insofar as the permanent injunction is concerned. 16. Insofar as the signature is concerned, the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents/DHr are tenable. 17. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside the order, dtd. 11/2/2020, passed in E.A.No.448 of 2019 in E.P.No72 of 2019 and the execution application is allowed holding that the decree to the extent of perpetual injunction granted vide paragraph No.4, sub-para (iv) is un-executable. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.