JUDGMENT : (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) 1. The writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed for quashing the order dated 28.03.2023 passed by the revisional authority, Mines Commissioner in Revision Case No. 65 of 2022, whereby and whereunder, the decision of the competent authority of termination of the lease of mining of stone in Mouza-Lodhiya, P.O. Pratappur, under khata No.21, plot no. 118(P), has been refused to be interfered with. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition which requires to be enumerated, read as under: A mining lease deed was executed vide order dated 04.03.2016 by the Deputy Commissioner, Chatra which was duly registered on 29.03.2016 by taking all the required clearances from the concerned departments. The District Mining Officer, Chatra vide memo no.356 date 29.03.2022 issued an order asking the writ petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.6,73,031/- as additional royalty with respect to the mining lease. A reminder was also given by the District Mining Officer, Chatra regarding the payment of the said additional royalty vide letter date 21.04.2022. Thereafter, again another reminder was given vide letter dated 18.06.2022 to make payment of the additional royalty. It is the case of the writ petitioner that at the relevant time, the writ petitioner was seriously ill and had met with an accident, therefore, requested the Deputy Mining Officer to grant time to make payment of the additional royalty vide letter dated 06.08.2022. Thereafter, vide letter dated 22.10.2022, the writ petitioner again requested for time from the Deputy Mining Officer, Chatra that the amount of additional royalty will be paid by 10.11.2022. The District Mining Officer, Chatra vide letter no.1076 dated 02.11.2022 informed the petitioner that the lease has been cancelled prematurely and directed the writ petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.9,28,039/-. The writ petitioner, after due date, deposited the amount of additional royalty along with interest as demanded by the Deputy Mining Officer, Chatra. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the termination of the lease, preferred a revision being Revision Case No. 65 of 2022 before the respondent no.2 which was dismissed vide order dated 28.03.2023, which has been challenged by filing instant writ petition. 3. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the termination of the lease, preferred a revision being Revision Case No. 65 of 2022 before the respondent no.2 which was dismissed vide order dated 28.03.2023, which has been challenged by filing instant writ petition. 3. It is the admitted case of the writ petitioner as would appear from the impugned order that due to financial stringent, the terms and conditions of the lease licence has not been complied with and as such, show cause notices have been issued to him as to why the lease licence be not terminated. 4. It is the contention of the writ petitioner that admittedly the terms and conditions of the lease deed/licence has not been complied with as also the mining dues has not been paid which has been demanded by way of additional royalty for the reason that the petitioner met with an accident and was not in a position to deposit the same, however, the same has been deposited after the due date along with interest. But, in the meanwhile, lease licence was terminated, hence, the writ petitioner has filed revision before the revisional authority questioning the decision of the authority of terminating the lease licence but the revisional authority has refused to interfere with the said decision on the ground that admittedly the terms and conditions of the lease deed/licence has been flouted as also the dues has not been paid. 5. The writ petition has been filed on the ground that since the condition of the writ petitioner was not good due to that reason, the dues was not paid which was demanded by way of additional royalty along with the interest, however, the same has been paid but without taking into consideration the aforesaid fact, the revisional authority has declined to interfere with the decision taken by the competent authority on the termination of the lease licence, as such, the said order cannot be said to be just and proper. 6. Further submission has been made that the lease was operative from 04.03.2016 up to 04.03.2026. 7. The ground has been taken that the said decision was taken by the competent authority terminating the lease licence without providing an opportunity of hearing as required to be provided as stipulated under Rule 27(2) of the Rules, 2004. 8. While, on the other hand, Ms. 7. The ground has been taken that the said decision was taken by the competent authority terminating the lease licence without providing an opportunity of hearing as required to be provided as stipulated under Rule 27(2) of the Rules, 2004. 8. While, on the other hand, Ms. Surabhi, learned AC to AAG-II has defended the order passed by the revisional authority. It has been submitted that there is no error on the part of the revisional authority while declining to interfere with the decision of terminating the lease licence since the terms and conditions of the lease deed/agreement has been flouted along with the dues which the petitioner is legally liable to pay. 9. It has been contended by replying to the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that opportunity was not given. Submission has been made that the show cause notices were issued to the writ petitioner twice and the response was also given wherein it has been admitted by the writ petitioner by disclosing the reason of non-payment of the dues, i.e., the writ petitioner since has met with an accident, as such, he was not in a position to make payment. 10. It has been submitted that when it is the admitted case of the writ petitioner that the terms and conditions of the lease deed/agreement has not been followed and only on the ground of sympathy, the decision of termination of the lease licence has been sought to be quashed by filing revision before the revisional authority which cannot be a ground since when the writ petitioner has entered into an agreement which was having terms and conditions, it was incumbent upon the writ petitioner to strictly follow the same. 11. It has been contended that since it is the admitted case of the writ petitioner that terms and conditions of the lease deed/agreement has not been followed, hence, the authority if in such circumstances has terminated the lease deed, it cannot be said to be unjust decision. 12. So far as the applicability of rule 27(2) of the Rules, 2004 is concerned, it has been submitted that the same has strictly been followed. 13. 12. So far as the applicability of rule 27(2) of the Rules, 2004 is concerned, it has been submitted that the same has strictly been followed. 13. Learned counsel for the State based upon the aforesaid submissions, has submitted that since the prayer for issuance of writ of certiorari has been sought for and the writ petitioner has failed to point out any error on the face of the order, hence, it is not a case where the writ petition is to be entertained by showing interference with the impugned order for issuance of writ of certiorari. 14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the revisional authority in the impugned order. 15. It requires to refer herein that the case has been listed under the heading for fresh filing. 16. Learned counsel for the State has not sought for time to file counter affidavit, as such, with the consent of the parties, the instant writ petition is being disposed of on the basis of the material available on record. 17. It is the admitted case of the writ petitioner that the terms and conditions which was agreed in between the writ petitioner and the competent authority has not been followed since the dues by way of additional royalty along with the interest has not bee paid by the writ petitioner within time. 18. The reason has been disclosed by the writ petitioner to the authority concerned that the writ petitioner met with an accident, as such, he was not in a position to pay the same within time. However, the dues was paid after the due date along with the interest. 19. The writ petitioner making payment of the dues along with the interest but the authority without taking into consideration the aforesaid fact has terminated the lease licence, hence, the revision was preferred before the statutory revisional authority, i.e., Mines Commissioner, Ranchi. 20. The revisional authority has declined to interfere with the decision terminating the lease holding therein that the terms and conditions of the lease has not been followed as also on the ground that the decision to terminate the lease was taken after following legal procedure and after giving proper opportunity to the writ petitioner to defend himself. 21. 20. The revisional authority has declined to interfere with the decision terminating the lease holding therein that the terms and conditions of the lease has not been followed as also on the ground that the decision to terminate the lease was taken after following legal procedure and after giving proper opportunity to the writ petitioner to defend himself. 21. The ground has also been taken that there is no observance of rule 27(2) of the Rules, 2004. 22. We have gone through the said rule and has found therefrom that the provision has been made that the opportunity of hearing is required to be given to the lessee before taking any decision. 23. We have also gone through the document appended therein that the show cause notice was issued to the writ petitioner twice and the same was also responded by taking the ground/reason of non-payment of the dues within time. 24. The moment the show cause notice was responded and the fact about the non-compliance of the terms and conditions of the lease agreement has been accepted by the writ petitioner, then the issue of non-observance of the principles of natural justice or non-observance of the stipulation made under rule 27(2) of the Rules, according to our considered view, will be meaningless for the reason that such response is admission on the part of the writ petitioner regarding non-compliance of the terms and conditions of the lease agreement. 25. The law is well-settled that the issue of providing opportunity by show cause notice so as to follow the principles of natural justice is only in a case where the facts is to be disputed by the concerned party against which the adverse decision is to be taken. If the fact is not in dispute and even if the matter will be decided on the ground of non-observance of principles of natural justice by remanding the matter before the authority concerned, the same will be nothing but an empty formality and futile exercise. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Escorts Farms Ltd. vs. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, U.P. & others, (2004) 4 SCC 281 , wherein at paragraph no.64 it has been held which reads as under: “64. Right of hearing to a necessary party is a valuable right. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Escorts Farms Ltd. vs. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, U.P. & others, (2004) 4 SCC 281 , wherein at paragraph no.64 it has been held which reads as under: “64. Right of hearing to a necessary party is a valuable right. Denial of such right is serious breach of statutory procedure prescribed and violation of rules of natural justice. In these appeals preferred by the holder of lands and some other transferees, we have found that the terms of government grant did not permit transfers of land without permission of the State as grantor. Remand of cases of a group of transferees who were not heard, would, therefore, be of no legal consequence, more so, when on this legal question all affected parties have got full opportunity of hearing before the High Court and in this appeal before this Court. Rules of natural justice are to be followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of the case on merits. In view of the legal position explained by us above, we therefore, refrain from remanding these cases in exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.” Further, in Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati and Ors., (2015) 8 SCC 519 their Lordships have held at paragraph-39 which is being reproduced as under: “39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the present case as the issue relates to giving of notice before taking action. While emphasizing that the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in straitjacket formula, the aforesaid instances are given. We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis of adhering to the principles of natural justice which are grounded on the doctrine of procedural fairness, accuracy of outcome leading to general social goals, etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for some reason- perhaps because the evidence against the individual is thought to be utterly compelling- it is felt that a fair hearing “would make no difference”- meaning that a hearing would not change the ultimate conclusion reached by the decision-maker.” 26. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for some reason- perhaps because the evidence against the individual is thought to be utterly compelling- it is felt that a fair hearing “would make no difference”- meaning that a hearing would not change the ultimate conclusion reached by the decision-maker.” 26. We have considered the case in hand on the basis of the settled position of law as settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove and by taking into consideration the response of the writ petitioner wherein he has admitted that he has flouted the terms and conditions of the lease. 27. However, the reason has been taken that he was not in a position to make payment of the dues. 28. This Court is of the view that whatever may be the reason if the statutory authority has taken decision by taking into consideration the terms and conditions of the lease, the reason based upon sympathy/mercy will be meaningless reason being that by virtue of entering into the lease, the terms and conditions contained therein binds the parties. 29. If the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will relax the same, the same will be nothing but will amount to re-writing the terms and conditions of the agreement which is impermissible as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union Territory of Pondicherry and Ors Vs. P.V. Suresh and Ors., reported in (1994) 2 SCC 70 . At paragraph 11 of the aforesaid decision, it has been held that the Court has no jurisdiction to alter the terms or re-write the contract between the parties. Paragraph 11 is quoted hereunder : “11. In the circumstances of this case, our inquiry is limited to the question whether the contract was so constructed that loss was inherent and implicit in it; if so, it ought to be modified. Otherwise, the Court has no jurisdiction to alter the terms or rewrite the contract between the parties. 30. This Court based upon the aforesaid facts and circumstances, is of the view that if the revisional authority has declined to interfere with the decision taken by the competent authority while terminating the mining lease licence, the same according to our considered view, cannot be said to suffer from any error. 31. 30. This Court based upon the aforesaid facts and circumstances, is of the view that if the revisional authority has declined to interfere with the decision taken by the competent authority while terminating the mining lease licence, the same according to our considered view, cannot be said to suffer from any error. 31. Accordingly, this Court is of the vide that it is not a case where the writ of certiorari is to be issued since there is no error apparent on the face of record which is paramount to be considered by the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue writ of certiorari as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, A.I.R. 1964 SC 477. Paragraph no.7 of the said judgment is being reproduced as under: “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph no.21 as under: “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as hereunder: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In Heinz India (P) Ltd. and Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.66 and 67 as hereunder: “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In Thansingh vs. Supdt. of Taxes, A.I.R. 1964 1419 Supreme Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships, while discussing the scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference into the finding of the Tribunal, has been pleased to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para-17 as under: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” In General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others vs. Giridhari Sahu and Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 695 the Hon'ble Apex Court has delved upon the issue about scope of issuance of writ of certiorari by the High Court and has laid down that, if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the order is fit to be quashed/set aside. 32. This Court, after having discussed the factual aspect along with the legal position, is of the view that it is not a case where any interference is required to be shown with the impugned order. 33. Accordingly, the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed. 34. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.