Research › Search › Judgment

Jharkhand High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 1393 (JHR)

Ghosh Stone Works v. State of Jharkhand

2023-11-29

NAVNEET KUMAR, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2023
ORDER : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking therein quashing of the order dated 28.11.2017 passed by the Respondent No.2 in Revision Case No.84/2016 by which while dismissing the revision, the claim of the writ petitioner to grant the lease for a period subject to maximum of 10 years has been declined. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition which are required to be enumerated, read hereunder as :- 3. The fact of the writ petition is that a mining lease over the area in question was granted in favour of the writ petitioner for 10 years with effect from 11.10.2000 to 10.10.2010. Thereafter, the said lease was renewed in favour of the petitioner for further 05 years with effect from 11.10.2010 to 10.10.2015. 4. The writ petitioner, subsequent thereto, had made an application on 02.06.2015 for renewal of the aforesaid stone mining lease for a period of 10 years with effect from 11.10.2015 to 10.10.2025. 5. It is the contention of the writ petitioner that the said renewal application was made after getting the environmental clearance certificate by the SEIAA, Jharkhand which is valid for 10 years. However, the Deputy Commissioner has granted approval for renewal of the stone mining lease in favour of the writ petitioner for a period of 05 years. 6. The grievance of the writ petitioner is that the said renewal for a period of 10 years having been denied while the similar benefits have been granted to the other licensees. As such, the writ petitioner preferred revision before the Revisional Authority being Revision Case No.84/2016. But, the Revisional Authority has dismissed the revision application on the ground of amended Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 (hereinafter to be referred as JMMC Rules) which contains a rule as under Rule 9(1) whereby and whereunder the provision has been made that all the existing/pending renewal lease will be deemed to be extended till 31st March, 2020 or for a greater period for which it is granted/renewed. 7. The Revisional Authority, by taking into consideration the statutory command as provided under Rule 9(1) of the JMMC Rules, has taken as one of the grounds in rejecting the revision application. The said order is under challenge in this writ petition. 8. 7. The Revisional Authority, by taking into consideration the statutory command as provided under Rule 9(1) of the JMMC Rules, has taken as one of the grounds in rejecting the revision application. The said order is under challenge in this writ petition. 8. Learned counsel has submitted by assailing the order passed by the Revisional Authority that the same is absolutely mechanical and without application of mind, since, the consideration has been given regarding the application submitted by the writ petitioner for renewal of the lease for a period of 10 years which was made on 02.06.2015. 9. The contention has been made that the same has been renewed but not for the period of 10 years, rather, it is only for the period with effect from 11.10.2015 to 10.10.2020 instead of up to 10.10.2025 and hence the gross illegality has been committed by the competent authority who was to renew the lease. 10. The further contention has been made that since the application was dated 02.06.2015, hence the subsequent rule as contained under Rule 9(1) of the JMMC Rules will not be applicable. 11. Per contra, Mr. Gaurav Raj, learned A.C. to A.A.G.-II, has defended the order passed by the Revisional Authority on the basis of the averment made in the counter affidavit. In addition to that, the ground has been taken that issuance of lease is not a vested right of the party concerned, rather, it is up to the licensing authority to issue license for the specific period and the applicant cannot claim that the license be issued for a particular period. 12. It has been contended that based upon the application dated 02.06.2015, which was made for 10 years, the lease was extended up to 10.10.2020, but, thereafter there was amendment in the JMMC Rules by insertion of provision under Rule 9 wherein the provision has been made that all the existing/pending renewal lease will be deemed to be extended till 31st March, 2020 or for a greater period for which it is granted/renewed, whichever is later. 13. 13. It has been submitted that since the lease was renewed up to 10.10.2020 and as per the provision of Rule 9(1) of the JMMC Rules, the lease was to be operative till 31.03.2020 but taking into consideration the condition stipulated in the aforesaid rule, the writ petitioner was allowed to carry out the mining operation even after 31.03.2020, since the validity of the lease was up to 10.10.2020. 14. The further contention has been made that the revisional authority, if has rejected the said claim of the writ petitioner by placing reliance on Rule 9(1) of the JMMC Rules, the same cannot be said to suffer from an error coupled with the fact that at the time when the lease was renewed, the same was accepted without any demur. 15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, gone across the finding recorded by the Revisional Authority and the pleading made on behalf of the parties. 16. The undisputed fact in this case is that the writ petitioner is aggrieved with the decision of the competent authority pertaining to the third renewal of the lease which was up to 10.10.2020. The reason of such grievance is that at the time of filing application for renewal, vide application dated 02.06.2015, the renewal of the lease was sought for a period of 10 years but it was granted for a period of 05 years. 17. Further admitted fact is that at the time when the lease was granted for the first time for a period of 05 years, the said decision was never questioned and the writ petitioner, on acceptance of the terms and conditions and the validity period, has carried out the mining operation and the said lease was never questioned. 18. 17. Further admitted fact is that at the time when the lease was granted for the first time for a period of 05 years, the said decision was never questioned and the writ petitioner, on acceptance of the terms and conditions and the validity period, has carried out the mining operation and the said lease was never questioned. 18. It requires to refer herein that after the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Goa Foundation v. Union of India [(2011) 15 SCC 793, Common Cause v. Union of India & Others [ (2014) 14 SCC 155 and Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary & Others [ (2014) 9 SCC 516 , the decision was taken by the legislature to insert a provision by making amendment in the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules and accordingly, Rule 9(1) has been inserted by way of amendment whereby and whereunder following provision has been made :- ^^9¼1½ ¼p½ ljdkjh {ks= ,oa 05-00 gs0 {ks= ls vf/kd ds jS;rh {ks= ij ÁkIr oSls [kuu iV~Vs] tks uohdj.k varxZr Fks ,oa i;kZoj.kh; Lohd`fr@[kuu ;kstuk ÁkIr ugha jgus ds dkj.k dkyfrjksfgr gks x;s gks] muds iV~Vs dh vof/k iV~Vk Lohd`fr@uohuhdj.k dh frfFk ls 31 ekpZ] 2020 rd ds fy, vof/k foLrkfjr ekuh tk,xh] c'krsZ fd vf/klwpuk dh frfFk ds iwoZ [kuu iV~Vk dh vLohd`fr@j|@O;;xr gksus dk vkns'k] ugha ikfjr fd;k x;k gS] ijUrq oSls [kuu iV~Vs ij dksbZ [kuu rc rd ugha fd;k tk ldsxk] tc rd fd [kuu gsrq vko';d i;kZoj.kh; Lohd`fr@ou ,oa i;kZoj.k foHkkx dh Lohd`fr@[kuu ;kstuk Lohd`fr ÁkIr ugha gks tkrk gSA vkosnd dks lHkh okafNr vukiRrh 180 fnuksa ds vanj lefiZr djuk gksxkA ¼N½ ljdkjh {ks= ,oa 05-00 gs0 {ks= ls vf/kd ds jS;rh {ks= ij Lohd`r@uohd`r [kuu iV~Vs dh vof/k ;fn mudh Lohd`fr@uohdj.k dh vof/k 31 ekpZ 2020 ds ckn dh frfFk gks] rks mudh vof/k mudh Lohd`fr@uohdj.k dh vof/k rd fof/kekU; jgsxhA** 19. It is evident from the said provisions that all the lease which were valid as on the date of insertion of the provision of Rule 9(1) of the JMMC Rules have been held to be operative till 31.03.2020 or till the period the license is valid, whichever is later. 20. It is evident from the said provisions that all the lease which were valid as on the date of insertion of the provision of Rule 9(1) of the JMMC Rules have been held to be operative till 31.03.2020 or till the period the license is valid, whichever is later. 20. The lease of the writ petitioner was valid up to 10.10.2020 and, as such, due to the effect of the provision of Rule 9(1) of the JMMC Rules, the writ petitioner has carried out the mining operation up to 10.10.2020 but in the midst of the subsistence period of the aforesaid lease, the writ petitioner has filed the writ petition questioning the decision of the authority in renewing the lease for a period of 05 years that why it was not renewed for 10 years. 21. Further, in the meanwhile, the provision of Rule 9(1) of the JMMC Rules has been inserted in the statute with effect from 02.03.2017. The statute provides that there will be no renewal and the renewal will be only valid up to 31.03.2020 or if the lease has already been granted for the period beyond 31.03.2020, the said period will be applicable. 22. The admitted position herein is that Rule 9(1) came into being on 02.03.2017 and the writ petition has been filed on 23.03.2018. 23. The question which requires consideration herein is that– (i) Whether the terms and conditions of the lease agreement once accepted, can it be allowed to be challenged by the lease holder? (ii) Whether after coming into effect of the Rule 9(1) in the JMMC Rules the lease can be renewed? 24. Both the questions are interlinked and, as such, they are being answered simultaneously. 25. It is settled position of law that once the parties have accepted the terms and conditions of lease or any agreement, it binds and there cannot be any breach of terms and conditions. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Another v. N. Raju Reddiar and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 551 wherein at paragraph 7 it has been held which is being quoted hereunder as :- “7. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Another v. N. Raju Reddiar and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 551 wherein at paragraph 7 it has been held which is being quoted hereunder as :- “7. At the outset it must be borne in mind that the agreement between the parties was a written agreement and therefore the parties are bound by the terms and conditions of the agreement. Once a contract is reduced to writing, by operation of Section 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872 it is not open to any of the parties to seek to prove the terms of the contract with reference to some oral or other documentary evidence to find out the intention of the parties. … … … … …” 26. Herein, it is admitted fact as has been admitted by the writ petitioner that the lease was renewed up to 10.10.2020 and after acting upon the terms and conditions of the lease, in the midst of the lease period, the issue has been raised before the revisional authority that why the lease was granted for 05 years and why not for 10 years. 27. Since the law is well settled that once the terms and conditions have been accepted by the parties to an agreement, it is not available to them to assail the same, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Panna Lal and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others reported in (1975) 2 SCC 633 wherein at paragraph 21 it has been held that the licensee having voluntarily accepted the contract and after having fully exploited to its advantage the contract to the exclusion of other, cannot resile from the contract and cannot challenge the terms either on the ground of inconvenient. For ready reference, para 21 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereunder as :- “21. The licenses in the present case are contracts between the parties. The licensees voluntarily accepted the contracts. “They fully exploited to their advantage the contracts to the exclusion of others. The High Court rightly said that it was not open to the appellants to resile from the contracts on the ground that the terms of payment were onerous. The licenses in the present case are contracts between the parties. The licensees voluntarily accepted the contracts. “They fully exploited to their advantage the contracts to the exclusion of others. The High Court rightly said that it was not open to the appellants to resile from the contracts on the ground that the terms of payment were onerous. The reasons given by the High Court were that the licensees accepted the license by excluding their competitors and it would not be open to the licensees to challenge the terms either on the ground of inconvenient consequence of terms or of harshness of terms.” 28. Here the fact of the case is exactly similar and hence, in view of the aforesaid settled position of law, it is not available for the writ petitioner to question the decision of the competent authority that why the lease was not issued for 10 years and it is for 05 years. 29. Further, in the meanwhile, a new provision has been inserted in the JMMC Rules by way of insertion of Rule 9(1) which provides deemed renewal of lease till 31.03.2020 but the caution has been given therein that if the lease is valid beyond the period of 31.03.2020, then the validity of the lease will be accepted. 30. Herein, the lease was up to 10.10.2020 and hence, in view of the stipulation made under Rule 9(1) of the JMMC Rules, the validity of the lease was allowed to be there till 10.10.2020. 31. But, the question is that when the rule has put a restriction for all existing lease to end by 31.03.2020 or for a greater period for which it was renewed, then there cannot be any decision contrary to the statutory provision, otherwise, the very provision will be said to be redundant and the decision will be in the teeth of the statutory provision. 32. The Revisional Authority, by taking note of these two reasons, has rejected the revision application. 33. 32. The Revisional Authority, by taking note of these two reasons, has rejected the revision application. 33. We, therefore, are of the view that since the writ petition has been filed for issuance of writ of certiorari which can only be exercised if there is any error apparent on record or there is gross miscarriage of justice, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477, wherein at paragraph 7 it has been held as under: “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” 34. In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as hereunder in paragraph no.21: “21. With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” 35. In Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 , their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as hereunder: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 36. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 36. This Court, having discussed the factual aspect as also the legal position hereinabove, is of the view that the writ petitioner has failed to make out a case for issuance of writ of certiorari by showing interference in the impugned order. 37. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.