JUDGMENT : (Duppala Venkata Ramana, J.) This is an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) by the appellant/Insurance Company against the Judgment dated 15.07.2010 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-III Additional District Judge, Tirupati in M.V.O.P.No.641 of 2005 whereby the learned Tribunal has directed the Respondents 1 and 2, in the claim petition, to pay an amount of Rs.2,95,000/- (Rupees Two lakhs and Ninety Five thousand only) with interest @ 6% per annum with proportionate costs from the date of the petition till deposit, which includes no fault liability. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as they are arrayed before the Tribunal. 3. The brief facts of the case are that on 22.04.2004 at about 3.45 a.m., while the 1st petitioner, who was working as a cleaner in a lorry bearing No.AP 26 U 9157 (hereinafter referred to as “the offending vehicle”) belongs to the 1st respondent proceeding to Vayalpadu from Nellore, the driver of the offending vehicle drove the same in a rash and negligent manner, lost control over the same and dashed against a tree on the right side of the road due to which, the left leg of the 1st petitioner was fractured below the knee and sustained grievous injuries on chin, right forehead, right leg and all over the body and while taking treatment, his left leg was amputated below the knee. He was shifted to SVRRGG Hospital, Tirupati for treatment. The 1st petitioner was working as a cleaner under the 1st respondent and earning Rs.4,000/- per month and contributed to his family members. Due to the accident, he sustained permanent disability and he was unable to walk. (ii) The matter was reported to the Station House Officer, Chandragiri Police Station by the 1st petitioner based on which, a case in Crime No.123 of 2004 was registered against the driver of the offending vehicle for the offence under Section 338 IPC. After investigation of the case, a charge sheet was submitted against the accused-driver for having committed the offence punishable under Section 338 IPC. (iii) The 1st petitioner/injured filed an application claiming compensation of a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- before the Tribunal on account of the amputation to his left leg and the injuries sustained by him in the said accident. After investigation of the case, a charge sheet was submitted against the accused-driver for having committed the offence punishable under Section 338 IPC. (iii) The 1st petitioner/injured filed an application claiming compensation of a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- before the Tribunal on account of the amputation to his left leg and the injuries sustained by him in the said accident. (iv) The 1st respondent/owner of the offending vehicle filed a counter denying all the material allegations and contended inter alia that he is the owner of the offending vehicle and that at the time of the accident, the injured was inside the vehicle as a cleaner while the driver Babu was driving the offending vehicle. Further contended that the insurance policy was in force from 03.02.2004 to 02.02.2005, as such the 2nd respondent/Insurance Company is liable to pay the compensation. (v) The 2nd respondent/Insurance Company filed a counter denying the age, occupation and income of the 1st petitioner and the petitioners are put to strict proof of the same. The injuries sustained by the 1st petitioner are not grievous in nature and he did not sustain any permanent disability. Further contended that the 1st petitioner is a cleaner of the offending vehicle and drove the same without having valid and effective driving licence and dashed against the tree due to which the accident occurred and the 1st petitioner sustained fracture to his left leg and due to the said accident the right front portion of the lorry was badly damaged and it clearly establishes that the 1st petitioner drove the offendign vehicle at the time of the alleged accident and sustained multiple fractures to his leg and no damage was caused on the left side of the cabin. Therefore, this respondent is not liable to pay the compensation. It is further averred that the compensation claimed by the 1st petitioner is highly excessive and exorbitant and prays to dismiss the petition. (vi) No additional counters were filed by the petitioners 2 and 3 and respondents 3 to 6. (vii) On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues: (i) Whether the pleaded accident occurred and if so, was it due to the fault of the driver of the 1st respondent bearing No.AP 26 U 9157? (vi) No additional counters were filed by the petitioners 2 and 3 and respondents 3 to 6. (vii) On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues: (i) Whether the pleaded accident occurred and if so, was it due to the fault of the driver of the 1st respondent bearing No.AP 26 U 9157? (ii) Whether the lorry in question belongs to R.1 and stood insured with R.2 by the date of the accident and if so whether the policy covers the risks of the petitioner? (iii) Whether the petitioner suffered injuries and entitled to compensation and if so to what amount and from which of the respondents? (iv) To what relief? (viii) During the trial, in order to establish the claim, the wife of the 1st petitioner was examined as P.W.1, the driver of the offending vehicle P.Babu was examined as P.W.2 and Dr.Hari Kiran, who treated the injured was examined as P.W.3 and got marked Exs.A.1 to A.16. The 3rd respondent was examined as R.W.1, one Ramana Kumar, who is the third party to the proceedings, was examined as R.W.2 and one Kasi Viswanadh, who is the Legal Executive of the 2nd respondent/Insurance Company was examined as R.W.3 and Exs.B.1 to B.12 were marked on behalf of the respondents. (ix) The Tribunal, after analyzing the entire oral and documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that the alleged accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by its driver and dashed against the tree on the right side of the road, due to which the 1st petitioner, who was a cleaner, sustained multiple fractures and his left leg was amputated. Considering the above aspect, the learned Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.2,95,000/- with interest @ 6% per annum and with proportionate costs against the 1st and 2nd respondents, from the date of the petition till the date of deposit which includes No Fault Liability. (x) The learned Tribunal has discussed the manner in which the said compensation was arrived at, in Para No.13 of its Order and the corresponding amount is set out herein below in a tabular form for ready reference. S.No. Heads of compensation Amount of compensation awarded in Rs. (x) The learned Tribunal has discussed the manner in which the said compensation was arrived at, in Para No.13 of its Order and the corresponding amount is set out herein below in a tabular form for ready reference. S.No. Heads of compensation Amount of compensation awarded in Rs. 1 Pain and Suffering 30,000/- 2 Transportation 2,000/- 3 Attendant Charges 10,000/- 4 Loss of earnings during the period of treatment 5,000/- 5 Extra Nourishment 8,000/- 6 Loss of future income 2,40,000/- Total 2,95,000/- (xi) Questioning the aforesaid Judgment, Respondent No.2/Insurance Company had preferred the present appeal before this Court. 4. Heard Sri Kota Subbarao, learned standing counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company and Sri S.V.Muni Reddy, learned counsel for the 2nd and 3rd respondents and Sri T.Janardhana Rao, learned counsel for the 5th and 6th respondents. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company would submit the learned Tribunal erred in directing the appellant/Insurance Company to pay the compensation. It was pointed out that the 1st petitioner was working as a cleaner and he drove the offending vehicle, lost his control and dashed against the tree due to which the front portion of the offending vehicle was damaged and he sustained multiple fractures. He would further submit that if the 1st petitioner did not drive the vehicle, he would not have sustained injuries and generally the cleaner would always sit on the left side of the vehicle and the front portion on the left side of the offending vehicle had not damaged. Therefore, the 1st petitioner is not entitled to claim compensation and he did not possess a valid and effective driving licence by the date of the accident and the Insurance Company is not liable to pay the compensation and prays to exonerate the appellant/Insurance Company from its liability by allowing the appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents/claimants would submit that the 1st petitioner was engaged as a cleaner of the offending vehicle at the time of the accident and he suffered with injuries and his left leg was amputated. Further he would submit that the learned Tribunal is grossly erred while granting compensation without following the principles of law and the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Further he would submit that the learned Tribunal is grossly erred while granting compensation without following the principles of law and the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court. He would further submit that the injured used to earn Rs.4,500/- per month by the date of accident, but the learned Tribunal without assessing the monthly earnings of the 1st petitioner/injured, has taken notional income of Rs.16,000/- per annum, which is not appropriate. As per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramachandrappa Vs. The Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Limited, (2011) 13 SCC 236 , has fixed the notional income of a coolie in the year 2004 @ Rs.4,500/- per month. He would further submit that the left leg of the injured was amputated below the knee, the loss of earning capacity has to be assessed @ 90% due to the permanent disability suffered by the injured on account of the amputation of his left leg below the knee and the Hon’ble Apex Court has also provided certain guidelines for calculating the just compensation under the Act. Further, he would submit that the learned Tribunal has committed an error in awarding compensation under various conventional heads by violating the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Therefore, he urged that the amount of compensation may be re-determined and just and reasonable compensation may be awarded. Further, he would submit that the award passed by the Tribunal suffers from infirmity and illegality which calls interference of this Court and therefore, prayed to enhance the compensation. 7. In the light of the above rival arguments, the points for determination in this appeal are: 1. Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is not in accordance with the principles of law and requires enhancement? 2. Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and reasonable or needs interference of this Court? POINT Nos.1 and 2: 8. 7. In the light of the above rival arguments, the points for determination in this appeal are: 1. Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is not in accordance with the principles of law and requires enhancement? 2. Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and reasonable or needs interference of this Court? POINT Nos.1 and 2: 8. A perusal of the impugned judgment would show that the Tribunal has framed Issue No.1 as to whether the pleaded accident occurred and if so, was it due to the fault of the driver of the 1st respondent bearing No.AP 26 U 9157, to which the Tribunal after considering the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3, coupled with the documentary evidence, has categorically observed at Para 9 of the Judgment that the report was given by the injured himself as a cleaner of the lorry on the date of accident and P.Babu was driver of the lorry drove the same in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the tree on the right side of the road and he received injures on his left leg, right leg etc., and driver Babu received injuries on his head and the negligence in driving caused the accident. Therefore, the 2nd respondent/Insurance Company cannot escape from its liability. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle. 9. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the accident occurred on 22.04.2004. It is also not in dispute that the offending vehicle was having valid insurance policy from 02.03.2004 to 02.02.2005. By the date of the accident, as stated above, the insurance policy was in force. Further, the learned Tribunal observed that there is no dispute that the driver of the offending vehicle was having valid driving licence and it is not in dispute that P.W.2 was engaged by the 1st respondent as its driver and caused the accident. After thorough investigation, the Police laid charge sheet under Ex.A.4 wherein, it was mentioned that the accused (driver of the offending vehicle) drove the same in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the tree as a result, both the driver and the cleaner of the offending vehicle sustained injuries. After thorough investigation, the Police laid charge sheet under Ex.A.4 wherein, it was mentioned that the accused (driver of the offending vehicle) drove the same in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the tree as a result, both the driver and the cleaner of the offending vehicle sustained injuries. While taking treatment, the cleaner of the offending vehicle i.e., 1st petitioner(injured) the left leg of the 1st petitioner was amputated below the knee. Though the appellant/Insurance Company has taken several pleas, R.W.3, who was the Legal Executive of the Insurance Company, deposed that he was not an eye witness to the accident and that Ex.B.8/Policy was in force by the date of the accident. P.W.2, who is the driver of the offending vehicle, deposed that on 22.04.2004, he was driving the offending vehicle and met with an accident and the 1st petitioner/injured was the cleaner of the said lorry on the date of the accident. It clearly establishes that P.W.2 was the driver of the offending vehicle as on the date of the accident. Therefore, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company has no force. The accident occurred in the year 2004, the 1st petitioner died during pendency of the petition on 09.05.2007 and the L.Rs were brought on record and they were shown as 2nd and 3rd petitioners and Respondents 3 to 6 in the claim petition. 10. It is a well settled principle that while determining the compensation payable to the injured in the claim filed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Lord Denning, while speaking for the Court of Appeal in Ward v. James, (1965) 2 WLR 455 , (1966) 1 QB 273 , (1965) 1 All ER 563 (CA), laid down the following three basic principles to be followed in such like cases and held as follows: “When compensation is to be awarded for pain and suffering and loss of amenity of life, the special circumstances of the claimant have to be taken into account including his age, the unusual deprivation he has suffered, the effect thereof on his future life. The amount of compensation for non-pecuniary loss is not easy to determine but the award must reflect that different circumstances have been taken into consideration. The amount of compensation for non-pecuniary loss is not easy to determine but the award must reflect that different circumstances have been taken into consideration. “First, assessibility : In cases of grave injury, where the body is wrecked or the brain destroyed, it is very difficult to assess a fair compensation in money, so difficult that the award must basically be a conventional figure, derived from experience or from awards in comparable cases. Secondly, uniformity : There should be some measure of uniformity in awards so that similar decisions are given in similar cases; otherwise there will be great dissatisfaction in the community, and much criticism of the administration of justice. Thirdly, predictability : Parties should be able to predict with some measure of accuracy the sum which is likely to be awarded in a particular case, for by this means cases can be settled peaceably and not brought to court, a thing very much to the public good.” 11. Further, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rekha Jain Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2013 ACJ 2161 (SC) wherein, it was held as follows: “It is well settled principle that in granting compensation for personal injury, in injured has to be compensated (1) for pain and suffering (2) for loss of amenities, (3) shortened expectation of life, if any, (4) loss of earnings or loss of earning capacity or in some cases for both, and (5) medical treatment and other special damages”. 12. If the above judgments are read together, the intention of the Hon’ble Apex Court, though under different contexts, is crystal clear that the impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal is not in accordance with the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and the said award is not just and reasonable. 13. In the present case, looking into the beneficial purpose of the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act and having regard to the principles laid down in the aforementioned judgments, this Court is of the view that the award passed by the Tribunal is not in accordance with law. 14. In Kajal Vs. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4 SCC 413 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has quoted pertinent observations from a very old case in Phillips Vs. 14. In Kajal Vs. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4 SCC 413 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has quoted pertinent observations from a very old case in Phillips Vs. London & South Western Railway Co., (1879) LR 5 QBD 78 as under: “You cannot put the plaintiff back again into his original position, but you must bring your reasonable common sense to bear, and you must always recollect that this is the only occasion on which compensation can be given. The plaintiff can never sue again for it. You have, therefore, now to give him compensation once and for all. He has done no wrong, he has suffered a wrong at the hands of the defendants and you must take care to give him full fair compensation for that which he has suffered.” 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further quoted pertinent observations from the case titled H.West & Son Ltd. vs. Shephard, 1963 2 WLR 1359 which reads as under: “Money may be awarded so that something tangible may be procured to replace something else of the like nature which has been destroyed or lost. But money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All that Judges and Courts can do is to award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In the process there must be endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Futhermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards. 16. In the present case, the accident occurred in the year 2004 and there is no dispute that the 1st petitioner/injured suffered 55% permanent disability as per Ex.A.5/Permanent Disability Certificate issued by the Medical Board. As per the evidence of P.W.3(Doctor), who treated the injured, the injured was disabled and suffers from 60% disability. As per the findings of the learned Tribunal, the annual income of the 1st petitioner/injured @ Rs.16,000/-, is not at all justified and not a proper way of assessing loss of future income. 17. In Susy Vs. Suma Lalu Pareparambil House and Others, 2021 SCC Online Ker 12658, High Court of Kerala, at Para No.15, held as follows: “15. As per the findings of the learned Tribunal, the annual income of the 1st petitioner/injured @ Rs.16,000/-, is not at all justified and not a proper way of assessing loss of future income. 17. In Susy Vs. Suma Lalu Pareparambil House and Others, 2021 SCC Online Ker 12658, High Court of Kerala, at Para No.15, held as follows: “15. In Ramachandrappa v. Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance [ (2011) 13 SCC 236 ] and in Syed Sadiq v. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [ (2014) 2 SCC 735 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has fixed the notional income of a coolie worker in year 2004 at the rate of Rs. 4,500/- per month and that of a vegetable vendor at the rate of Rs. 6,500/- per month in the year 2006, respectively. Recently, this Court in Soman v. Jinesh James [ILR (2020) 3 Ker 1003] has fixed the notional income of a coolie worker in the year 2010 at Rs. 7,500/- per month”. 18. Following the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, I am of the considered opinion that the 1st petitioner is the cleaner of the offending vehicle and the accident occurred in the year 2004, the notional income of the 1st petitioner/injured can safely be refixed @ Rs.4,500/- per month. Accordingly, refixed the notional income of the 1st petitioner/injured @ Rs.4,500/- per month and the annual income of the 1st petitioner would be @ Rs.54,000/- (Rs.4,500 x 12). Accordingly, to assess the loss of future earnings and percentage of disability sustained by the 1st petitioner/injured should assess for awarding compensation. 19. In Sanjay Kumar Vs. Ashok Kumar & Another, (2014) 5 SCC 330 , the Hon’ble Apex Court at Para No.11 held as follows: 11. “Loss of future prospects” should be added to this amount as it cannot be accepted that an embroiderer will not have a future increment in income. As per the case of Sarla Verma v. DTC, keeping in mind the young age of the appellant, he is entitled to 50% of his income as future increase in income (Rs 4500 + 2250 = Rs 6750). We will apply a multiplier of 18 as taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment and as per Sarla Verma case. We will apply a multiplier of 18 as taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment and as per Sarla Verma case. The appellant's permanent disability and loss of earning capacity was assessed at 70% and we will not interfere with that. Hence, the total amount of compensation due to loss of earning capacity along with future prospects in income will come to Rs 10,20,600 (Rs 6750 × 70/100 × 12 × 18).” 20. In Mohan Soni Vs. Ram Avtar Tomar & Others, (2012) 2 SCC 267 , the Hon’ble Apex Court at Para Nos.11 & 14, it was held as follows: “11. In a more recent decision in Raj Kumar v. Ajay this Court considered in great detail the correlation between the physical disability suffered in an accident and the loss of earning capacity resulting from it. In paras 10, 11 and 13 of the judgment in Raj Kumar this Court made the following observations: (SCC pp. 349-50) “10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. 11. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. 11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation. (See for example, the decisions of this Court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Yadava Kumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities the claimant could carry on in spite of the permanent disability and what he could not do as a result of the permanent disability (this is also relevant for awarding compensation under the head of loss of amenities of life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the accident, as also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on the activities and functions, which he was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or restricted from discharging his previous activities and functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale of activities and functions so that he continues to earn or can continue to earn his livelihood.” 14. The loss of earning capacity of the appellant, according to us, may be as high as 100% but in no case it would be less than 90%. The loss of earning capacity of the appellant, according to us, may be as high as 100% but in no case it would be less than 90%. We, accordingly, find and hold that the compensation for the loss of the appellant's future earnings must be computed on that basis. On calculation on that basis, the amount of compensation would come to Rs 3,56,400 and after addition of a sum of Rs 30,000 and Rs 15,000 the total amount would be Rs 4,01,400. The additional compensation amount would carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till the date of payment. The additional amount of compensation along with interest should be paid to the appellant without delay and not later than three months from today.” 21. In K.Janardhan Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited and Another, (2008) 8 SCC 518 , the Hon’ble Apex Court at Para Nos.3, 4, 6 and 7 held as follows: “3. The Commissioner in his order dated 18-11-1999 observed that the claimant was 30 years of age and the salary as claimed by him was on the higher side and accordingly determined the same at Rs 2000 per month. The Commissioner also found that as the claimant had suffered an amputation of his right leg up to the knee, he was said to have suffered a loss of 100% of his earning capacity as a driver and accordingly determined the compensation payable to him at Rs 2,49,576 and interest @ 12% p.a. thereon from the date of the accident. 4. An appeal was thereafter taken to the High Court by the Insurance Company, respondent. The High Court accepted the plea raised in appeal that as per the Schedule to the Workmen's Compensation Act, the loss of a leg on amputation amounted to a 60% reduction in the earning capacity and as the doctor had opined to a 65% disability, this figure was to be accepted and accordingly reduced the compensation as already mentioned above. It is in this circumstance, that the aggrieved claimant has come up to this Court. 6. It is in this circumstance, that the aggrieved claimant has come up to this Court. 6. Applying the ratio of the cited judgment to the facts of the present case we are of the opinion that the appellant herein has also suffered a 100% disability and incapacity in earning his keep as a tanker driver as his right leg had been amputated from the knee. Additionally, a perusal of Sections 8 and 9 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 would show that the appellant would now be disqualified from even getting a driving licence. 7. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the Commissioner but with no order as to costs.” 22. In the above-cited decisions, the injured person suffered an amputation of his lower limb (above knee/below knee). Applying the ratio of the above cited judgments, to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the opinion that the 1st petitioner/injured has suffered 60% permanent disability in view of the evidence of P.W.3(Doctor) coupled with Ex.A.5/Permanent Disability Certificate issued by the medical board. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the amount of Rs.2,40,000/- awarded by the learned Tribunal under the head of loss of future earnings, is very meager and is not in accordance with the principles of law. The 1st petitioner sustained permanent disability due to amputation of his left leg and P.W.3(Doctor), who treated the injured deposed that the injured sustained permanent disability of 60%. In Sanjay Kumar’s case (supra), the loss of earning capacity was assessed at 70% due to permanent disability suffered by the victim on account of amputation of his right leg above knee, in Mohan Soni’s case (supra), the left leg of the victim was crushed and amputated below the knee and the disability assessed would not be less than 90% and in Janardhan’s case (supra), the injured has suffered 100% disability and incapacity in earning as his right leg had been amputated from the knee. In all the three cases, the lower limb (above/below knee) of the injured was amputated. Considering the above factual aspects, this Court is of the view that as per Ex.A.5/Disability Certificate coupled with the evidence of P.W.3(Doctor) the 1st petitioner/injured sustained permanent disability @ 60%. In all the three cases, the lower limb (above/below knee) of the injured was amputated. Considering the above factual aspects, this Court is of the view that as per Ex.A.5/Disability Certificate coupled with the evidence of P.W.3(Doctor) the 1st petitioner/injured sustained permanent disability @ 60%. Accordingly, the loss of future earnings can be arrived at, by applying the multiplier ‘15’ since the 1st petitioner/injured was aged about 38 years 5 months and 16 days by the date of the accident as per Ex.A.10/Transfer Certificate of the 1st petitioner/injured. 23. In Sarla Verma Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation, 2009 ACJ 1298 (SC), the loss of dependency was re-assessed at Para-42 wherein the appropriate multiplier would be ‘15’, which reads as under: “42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.” 24. As far as the quantum of compensation is concerned, it is observed that the monthly income of the petitioner, after adding 60% for future prospects, would be Rs.7,200/- (Rs.4,500 + Rs.2,700). The annual income would be worked out to Rs.86,400/- (Rs.7,200 x 12). By applying the multiplier of ‘15’ as per Sarla Verma’s case (supra) the loss of future earnings works out to Rs.12,96,000/- (Rs.86,400 x 15). 25. In the facts of this case, looking into the beneficial purpose of the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and having regard to the principles laid down in the aforementioned judgments, the compensation under other conventional heads has to be awarded to the 1st petitioner/injured. The learned Tribunal has committed an error in awarding amount under the conventional heads in accordance with the judgments referred to supra. 26. The learned Tribunal has committed an error in awarding amount under the conventional heads in accordance with the judgments referred to supra. 26. The learned Tribunal has not awarded any amount towards medical expenses, which were incurred by the 1st petitioner/injured. Since the 1st petitioner has enclosed medical bills (60 in number) under Ex.A.6 for Rs.16,131/-, it can be fathomed that the amount has to be awarded by the Tribunal under the head of medical expenses. The family members of the 1st petitioner/injured, who are illiterates and labourers, might have spent huge amount towards medical expenses, and they are not supposed to be that much meticulous so as to maintain the bills for any future use. One must remember that amongst the people, who are not Government employees and belong to the poorer strata of society, the bills are not retained by them and some of the bills even if produced have been excluded by the Courts below only on the ground that the name of the petitioner was not written on the bills. The learned Tribunal has not given any reason for not considering the medical bills for an amount of Rs.16,131/- under Ex.A.6. The Tribunal committed an error in not awarding the compensation under the head of medical expenses and he might have spent huge amount from the date of accident in the year 2004 till his death in the year 2007. Therefore, an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- has to be awarded to the 1st petitioner/injured towards medical expenses, which would be just and reasonable. 27. Further, the learned Tribunal committed an error while awarding a meager amount of Rs.8,000/- under the head of extra nourishment and Rs.10,000/- towards attendant charges. Since the 1st petitioner/injured was hospitalized for a period of two months and his left leg was amputated, at least, two persons are required to attend to the injured even to lift him from the bed for attending calls of nature and needs all time attendance for his daily routine work and he cannot move without the attendants. Therefore, at least Rs.200/- for each attendant has to be awarded, which comes to Rs.200 x 2 x 60 = Rs.24,000/-. Hence, an amount of Rs.24,000/- towards attendant charges deserves to be granted to the claimant. The compensation for extra nourishment needs to be awarded separately. Hence, an amount of Rs.15,000/- can be awarded to the petitioner for extra nourishment. Therefore, at least Rs.200/- for each attendant has to be awarded, which comes to Rs.200 x 2 x 60 = Rs.24,000/-. Hence, an amount of Rs.24,000/- towards attendant charges deserves to be granted to the claimant. The compensation for extra nourishment needs to be awarded separately. Hence, an amount of Rs.15,000/- can be awarded to the petitioner for extra nourishment. 28. Coming to the non-pecuniary damages, under the head of pain and suffering, a meager amount Rs.30,000/- was awarded by the Tribunal and no amount was awarded for loss of amenities. Since the 1st petitioner suffered from severe injuries and amputation of his left leg below the knee was done and he sustained physical disability of 60% as stated above, the pain and suffering suffered by him is such that no amount of compensation can compensate him. The 1st petitioner/injured cannot come back to the Court for enhancement of award at a later stage praying something for grant of amount under the head. Therefore, this Court is of the view that in case of 60% disability, the petitioner cannot enjoy the pleasure of life. This is a case where the departure has to be made from the normal rule and pain and suffering suffered by the injured is such that a reasonable amount of compensation can be compensated for pain and suffering from the date of accident in April, 2004 till his death May, 2007. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, by taking a very conservative view of the matter, the learned Tribunal has gravely erred in not awarding adequate compensation under the head of pain and suffering, wherein, the injured suffered amputation of leg and awarded a meager amount of Rs.30,000/. Therefore, this Court is of the view to award a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- towards pain and suffering, as the injured has suffered tremendously due to the accident in terms of pain and suffering involved in the amputation. Loss of a limb causes a profusion of distress till his death and this Court is of the view that it is justified to award the aforesaid amount under this head. 29. The Tribunal has awarded a meager amount of Rs.5,000/- towards loss of earnings during the period of treatment though he was hospitalized for nearly two months. Loss of a limb causes a profusion of distress till his death and this Court is of the view that it is justified to award the aforesaid amount under this head. 29. The Tribunal has awarded a meager amount of Rs.5,000/- towards loss of earnings during the period of treatment though he was hospitalized for nearly two months. As per his monthly earnings atleast Rs.9,000/- has to be awarded under this head. Therefore, it needs to enhance from Rs.5,000/- to Rs.15,000/-. Further, the Tribunal has awarded a meager amount of Rs.2,000/- for transportation. Since the petitioner lost his left leg below the knee, certainly, he should move from his residence to the hospital by engaging vehicle. Definitely, the expenditure towards transportation incurred would be more than Rs.2,000/. Therefore, it needs to enhance from Rs.2,000/- to Rs.5,000/-. 30. In Sarla Verma’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court, while elaborating the concept of ‘just compensation’ observed as under: “Just compensation is adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as money can do so, by applying the well settled principles relating to award of compensation. It is not intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source of profit.” 31. On an overall re-appreciation of the pleadings, material on record and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the afore-cited decisions, I am of the definite opinion that the appellant/petitioner is entitled to enhancement of compensation as modified and recalculated above and given in the table below for easy reference. S.No. Head of Compensation Amount awarded by the Tribunal Enhanced Amount 1 Loss of future earnings (As permanent disability is 60% total loss of future earnings) 2,40,000/- Rs.12,96,000/- (Rs.4,500 + 2700 = Rs.7,200 x 12 x 15.) 2 Medical Expenses ---- 1,50,000/- 3 Attendant Charges & Extra Nourishment 18,000/- 39,000/- (Rs.24,000 + 15,000) 4 Pain & Suffering 30,000/- 1,50,000/- 5 Loss of earnings during treatment 5,000/- 15,000/- 6 Transportation 2,000/- 5,000/- Total 2,95,000/- 16,55,000/- 32. In the present case, though the claimant did not file any cross-objections, it is well-settled that Order XLI Rule 33 CPC empowers the Appellate Court to grant relief to a person, who is neither appealed nor filed any cross-objections. The object of this provision is to do complete justice between the parties. In the present case, though the claimant did not file any cross-objections, it is well-settled that Order XLI Rule 33 CPC empowers the Appellate Court to grant relief to a person, who is neither appealed nor filed any cross-objections. The object of this provision is to do complete justice between the parties. In National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Komal and others, 2012 SCC Online Del 2442 = 2014 ACJ 1540 it is crystal clear that under Order XLI Rule 33 CPC, the Appellate Court has the power to enhance the compensation even in the absence of any appeal/Cross Objections. Para No.12 of the decision reads as follows: “12. Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 empowers the Court to award such compensation as appears to be just which has been interpreted to mean just in accordance with law and it can be more than the amount claimed by the claimants. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are clearly a beneficial legislation and hence should be interpreted in a way to enable the Court to assess just compensation. The scope of Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the power of the High Court to enhance the award amount in accident cases in the absence of cross-objections has been discussed by the Supreme Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, AIR 2003 SC 674 where the Apex Court has held that the Court is required to determine just compensation and there is no other limitation or restriction for awarding such compensation and in appropriate cases wherefrom the evidence brought on record if the Tribunal/Court considers that the claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award and would empower the Court to enhance the compensation at the appellate stage even without the injured filing an appeal or cross-objections.” 33. Under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there is no restriction that the compensation could be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the claimants. In an appropriate case, where from the evidence brought on record, if the Tribunal/Court considers, the claimant is entitled to get more compensation than the claimed. Following the guidelines in the decision supra, this Court is of the view that the claimant is entitled to enhance the compensation at the appellate stage even without the filing an appeal or cross-objections. 34. Following the guidelines in the decision supra, this Court is of the view that the claimant is entitled to enhance the compensation at the appellate stage even without the filing an appeal or cross-objections. 34. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is of the opinion that the award passed by the Tribunal warrants interference and the amount of compensation needs to be enhanced and thereby, enhanced the compensation from Rs.2,95,000/- to Rs.16,55,000/-. 35. Resultantly, the appeal preferred by the appellant/Insurance Company is hereby dismissed, and the compensation amount is enhanced from Rs.2,95,000/- to Rs.16,55,000/- with costs and interest at 6% per annum from the date of the petition till realization against the appellant and the 4th respondent(Insurance Company Limited and Owner of the offending vehicle) jointly and severally. (ii) The appellant and the 4th respondent are directed to deposit the compensation amount within two months from the date of this judgment, failing which execution can be taken out against them. (iii) The Legal Representatives of the 1st petitioner/injured are directed to pay the requisite Court-fee in respect of the enhanced amount awarded over and above the compensation claimed by them (As per the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramla Vs. National Insurance Company Limited, 2019 ACJ 559 (SC)). (iv) On such deposit, the Legal Representatives of the 1st petitioner/injured are permitted to withdraw the amount with accrued interest and costs, as apportioned by the Tribunal, by filing proper application before the Tribunal. (v) The impugned award of the learned Tribunal stands modified to the aforesaid extent and in the terms and directions as above. (vi) The record be sent back to the Tribunal within three weeks from this day. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending for consideration, if any, shall stand closed.