JUDGMENT : ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed against an order dated 5th July 2023 passed in W.P. (S) No. 7214 of 2017 whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner has been dismissed. 2. The writ petition was filed challenging the following orders: (a) The punishment order dated 18.02.2015 passed by respondent no. 5, inter-alia, on the ground that punishment has been passed without considering Rule 557A of Jharkhand Police Manual. (b) The appellate order dated 27.05.2016 passed by respondent no. 4 dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant. (c) The order dated 09.11.2016 passed by respondent no. 3 dismissing the memorial on the point of limitation. 3. The appellant was imposed punishment of three black marks (equivalent to forfeiture of two annual increments) by observing that the same would not affect the future increment with a further direction to forfeit the salary and allowance payable to the appellant for the dismissal period (9th January 2004 to 19th August 2009) on the basis of ‘no work no pay’ and the said period has been directed to be adjusted against extraordinary leave making further observation that during the suspension period, nothing would be payable to the petitioner except the subsistence allowance already paid to him. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant while challenging the writ Court’s order has submitted that the writ Court has not taken into consideration the fact that there has been violation of the statutory provision of Rule 557A of the Jharkhand Police Manual inasmuch as for escorting two prisoners only one constable, that is, the appellant was deputed although two constables were required to be deputed. The learned counsel has further submitted that only one prisoner out of two escaped and the appellant was helpless as the appellant had to take care of the other prisoner. The learned counsel has submitted that if the appellant was to run to get hold of the escaping prisoner the other one would have also escaped. The learned counsel has further submitted that it has come during the inquiry that the prisoner who escaped had sprinkled chili powder in the eyes of the appellant and the situation was absolutely out of control. 5. The learned counsel has further submitted that it has come during the inquiry that the prisoner who escaped had sprinkled chili powder in the eyes of the appellant and the situation was absolutely out of control. 5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has opposed the prayer of the appellant and submitted that the appellant was subjected to disciplinary proceedings and the same was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice and in accordance with law and the inquiry officer has found that the charges relating negligence, dereliction of duty etc. were proved. The learned counsel has also submitted that at earlier stage the revisional authority has remanded the matter for fresh inquiry and after conducting the same, inquiry report was submitted against the appellant and there was no perversity or illegality in the matter of the departmental proceedings calling for any interference under writ jurisdiction and, accordingly, the writ petition has been rightly dismissed. The learned counsel has further submitted that on account of the negligence on the part of the appellant one dreaded criminal had escaped and, therefore, the punishment imposed upon the appellant also does not call for any interference. 6. The foundational facts are not in dispute. 7. The appellant while working as a constable was served with a charge-sheet dated 13th March 2003 alleging that when he was posted at Sadar Court, Dhanbad, he had helped a dreaded criminal namely, Md. Rinku in escaping from Court Hazat, Dhanbad on 11th March 2003 by deliberately conniving with him and untying his handcuffs, which showed his gross negligence, dereliction of duty, indiscipline and dubious conduct. Departmental Proceeding was initiated and the appellant was dismissed with effect from 9th January 2004 and the appeal was also dismissed. 8. However, the order of dismissal was set aside vide order dated 5th March 2008 passed by the respondent no. 2 remanding the matter to the disciplinary authority i.e. the respondent no. 5 with a direction to reinitiate the said departmental proceeding against the appellant and to pass a fresh order after affording an opportunity to him to cross-examine the departmental witnesses as well as to produce his own witnesses. 2 remanding the matter to the disciplinary authority i.e. the respondent no. 5 with a direction to reinitiate the said departmental proceeding against the appellant and to pass a fresh order after affording an opportunity to him to cross-examine the departmental witnesses as well as to produce his own witnesses. It was further directed that the appellant would be deemed to be under suspension for the period he remained dismissed from service and a final decision in that regard would be taken on the basis of the final order to be passed in the said departmental proceeding. The appellant filed a writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 1982 of 2009 which was allowed vide order dated 6th August 2009 by directing that the appellant would be reinstated for the limited purpose of facing a fresh inquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice upon his reporting for duty before the relevant officer along with a certified copy of the said order. 9. Pursuant to the said order of this Court dated 6th August 2009 as well as the order of the respondent no. 2, the respondent no. 5 issued order dated 26th August 2009, reinstating the appellant with immediate effect and directing to re-start the departmental inquiry against him. Thereafter fresh inquiry was conducted and vide Dhanbad District Order No. 4940 of 2010, the appellant was compulsorily retired from service with effect from 17th November 2010. 10. The said order of punishment was set aside in appeal by the respondent no. 4 vide memo dated 7th May 2011 directing the respondent no. 5 to re-conduct the departmental proceeding afresh. The appellant was again taken back in service with effect from 17th November 2010 vide Dhanbad District Order No. 1497/11 dated 8th June 2011 and a departmental proceeding was again initiated against him. 11. The respondent no. 6 was appointed as the inquiry officer who conducted an inquiry and provided an opportunity for the parties to examine and cross-examine the witnesses and submitted the inquiry report dated 31st October 2013 to the respondent no. 5 observing that the appellant could not evade his responsibility of discharging the assigned duty to produce the prisoner safely in the Court and held him guilty. Thereafter, the respondent no. 5 vide memo no. 5 observing that the appellant could not evade his responsibility of discharging the assigned duty to produce the prisoner safely in the Court and held him guilty. Thereafter, the respondent no. 5 vide memo no. 5479 dated 30th August 2014 asked the appellant to submit his explanation within 15 days which he submitted on 15th September 2014 along with the relevant documents. However, the respondent no. 5 vide Dhanbad District Order No. 558/15 dated 19th February 2015 passed the order of punishment of three black marks being equivalent to forfeiture of two annual increments with a further direction to forfeit the salary and allowance for the period he remained out of service (i.e. from 9th January 2004 to 19th August 2009) due to order of dismissal and the said period was ordered to be adjusted against extraordinary leave with further observation that during the suspension period, the appellant would not be paid any amount except already paid subsistence allowance. 12. As per the charge leveled against the appellant one of the two under-trial prisoners ran away on account of his connivance, negligence, and dereliction of duty. It was alleged in the charge-sheet itself that the prisoner, namely, Md. Rinku met with his brothers, namely, Raja and Babu, and the appellant allowed them to give food and one small packet and it came to light that his brothers had some conversation with Md. Rinku and thereafter the appellant opened the handcuff of Md. Rinku to enable him to eat food and Md. Rinku sprinkled chili powder in his eyes and ran away. 13. Rinku and thereafter the appellant opened the handcuff of Md. Rinku to enable him to eat food and Md. Rinku sprinkled chili powder in his eyes and ran away. 13. The disciplinary authority after issuing second show-cause notice agreed with the findings of the inquiry officer and passed the order against the appellant observing as under: ^^eSaus bl foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh lafpdk dk xgjkbZ ls voyksdu fd;kA mijksDr foosfpr lk{;ksa] cpko ,oa rF;ksa ds vkyksd esa vkjksfir ds fo:) yxk;s x;s vkjksi lkfcr gq;s gSaA iqfyl&116 ds'oj flag ds feyhHkxr] lafnX/k vkpj.k rFkk vius LokFkZ dh iwfrZ esa vkdj [kkl ÁyksHku ds rgr dq[;kr vijk/kh dSnh fjadq dks gFkdM+h [kksydj canh dks Hkxkdj vijk/k dks c ढ+kok fn;s gSa] tks buds ?kksj ykijokgh] dÙkZO;ghurk] vuq'kklughurk] lafnX/k vkpj.k ,oa v;ksX; iqfyldehZ gksus dk mtkxj djrk gSA lapkyu inkf/kdkjh ds earO; ls lger gksrs gq, buls bl dk;kZy; dk Kkikad&5479@xksŒ fnukad 02-09-2014 ds }kjk lapkyu inkf/kdkjh ds earO; dh Áfr miyC/k djkrs gq, buls lsok ls c[kkZLrxh ds fo:) Li"Vhdj.k dh ekax dh x;hA buds }kjk Li"Vhdj.k lefiZr fd;k x;k gS] ftlesa eq[; :i ls mYys[k fd;s gSa fd ,d iqfyl dks nks canh LdksVZ dks iqfyl gLrd fu;e ds Áko/kku dks vuns[kk dj nsus] ekaxus ij Hkh vU; iqfyl LdksVZ ds fy, ugha nsus] U;k;ky; esa HkhM+&HkkM+ gksus] gFkdM+h fMQsDVho gksus] vka[k esa fepkZ xq.Mh iM+s gksus ds dkj.k ihNk ugha dj ikus] canh ds iyk;u ij gYyk djus rFkk canh ds iqu% ljs.Mj dj nsus dk ftØ fd;s gSaA vkjksfir us vius cpko Li"Vhdj.k esa dqN ,sls rF;ksa dks ÁLrqr ugha fd;k gS] ftls fd bu ij yxk;s x;s vkjksi [kafMr gks ldsA vr% lapkyu inkf/kdkjh ds earO; ls lger gksrs gq, vkjksfir iqfyl&116 ds'oj flag dks rhu dkyk nkx dh ltk nh tkrh gS] tks nks o"kZ ds osruo`f) ij jksd ds cjkcj gksxh] ftldk ÁHkko Hkfo"; ds osruo`f) ij ugha iM+sxkA Hkfo"; esa bl rjg ds iqujko`fr gksus ij buds fo:) dBksj vuq'kklfud dkjZokbZ dh tk;sxhA c[kkZLrxh vof/k fnuakd 09-01-2004 ls 19-08-2009 rd dh vof/k dk osru HkRrk dks ^^dk;Z ugha rks osru ugh** ds vk/kkj ij tIr fd;k tkrk gSA bl vof/k dks vlk/kkj.k vodk'k esa lkeaftr fd;k tkrk gSA fuyacu vof/k esa tks dqN Hkh fey pqdk gS] mlds vfrfjDr dqN Hkh ns; ugha gsxkA** 14. Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal before the respondent no. Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal before the respondent no. 4, however, the same was dismissed upholding the order of punishment passed by the respondent no. 5. Aggrieved with the appellate order the appellant filed a Memorial Appeal in the office of the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, however, the same was also dismissed vide Memo No. 410/D dated 9th November 2016 issued under the signature of the Inspector General of Police (Training), Jharkhand, Ranchi being time barred. 15. The order of the disciplinary authority, appellate authority, and the authority dismissing the memorial were challenged in the writ petition which has been dismissed by the impugned order of the learned writ Court. 16. The writ Court dismissed the writ petition observing that if a detenu escapes from the custody of any police personnel, he has to be held liable for dereliction of duty even though the other charges have not been proved against him. It has also been held that dereliction of duty as alleged in the charge-sheet was proved against the appellant since it was his duty to produce the detenu before the Court, but he failed to discharge his assigned duty. So far as the quantum of punishment is concerned, it has been held that the punishment imposed against the appellant is the lowest in the category of major punishments, the imposition of which does not appear to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges leveled against him. Moreover, the appellant is a member of a disciplined force and there is no scope for any such negligence or dereliction of duty that too while taking the detenu to and from the Court. While considering the scope of interference under Article 226 of the constitution of India it has been held that no case for interference has been made out by the appellant considering the scope for interference by referring to the judgment dated 24th April 2023 rendered by this Court in the Mahendra Prasad Choudhary vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, W.P. (S) No. 678 of 2015 following the judgment passed in the case of Union of India and Others vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 wherein it has been held that under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence. (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law. (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence. (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence. (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be. (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 17. Findings of the learned writ Court are as under: “13. During the fresh enquiry conducted by the respondent no. 6, the witnesses were examined and cross-examined by the parties and finally, it was observed by the said respondent that the allegation against the petitioner was found proved including the fact of putting chilly powder in the eyes of the petitioner by the detenue Md. Rinku. It was also observed by the said respondent that the petitioner cannot escape his responsibility of safely producing the detenue before the court. The disciplinary authority, on receipt of the enquiry report, sought explanation from the petitioner, who also filed reply and thereafter, the impugned order of punishment was passed. Thus, I am of the view that sufficient opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner before passing the impugned order of punishment and his contention of violation of the principles of natural justice is not tenable. 14. Another argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the charges against the petitioner were not proved as it did not come in the enquiry report that he had taken money from the said detenue, rather it was specifically proved by the witnesses that the detenue namely, Md. Rinku fled away by putting chilly powder in the eyes of the petitioner. 15. I am of the view that dereliction of duty as alleged in the charge-sheet was proved against the petitioner since it was his duty to produce the detenue before the court, but he failed to discharge his assigned duty. When any police personnel is entrusted with the duty to take a detenue to and from the court, he/she is supposed to show extra alertness to handle any incidental situation. The said police personnel cannot be absolved from his responsibility by merely saying that the detenue has fled away using deceitful means. When any police personnel is entrusted with the duty to take a detenue to and from the court, he/she is supposed to show extra alertness to handle any incidental situation. The said police personnel cannot be absolved from his responsibility by merely saying that the detenue has fled away using deceitful means. Thus, if a detenue escapes from the custody of any police personnel, he/she has to be held liable for dereliction of duty though the other charges have not been proved against him/her. 16. So far as the quantum of punishment is concerned, the punishment imposed against the petitioner is the lowest in the category of major punishments, imposition of which does not appear to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges levelled against him. Moreover, the petitioner is a member of a disciplined force and there is no scope for any such negligence or dereliction of duty that too while taking the detenue to and from the court. 17. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstance, I am of the view that the requirements for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India explained in the case of P. Gunasekaran as referred in the case of Mahendra Prasad Choudhary (supra) is not made out in the case in hand. 18. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.” 18. The judgment passed in the case of P. Gunasekaran has been again referred in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka and Another vs. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 to hold that the Courts will not act as an appellate Court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental inquiries. 19. 557A of the Jharkhand Police Manual reads as under: “557A. Strength of escorts for prisoners - Under ordinary circumstances, the strength of escorts for prisoners shall be as follows: for 1 to 3 prisoners - 2 constables. for 4 to 6 prisoners - 3 constables. Note - One of these, who shall be senior, shall act as in-charge. for 7 to 12 prisoners - 1 havildar and 4 constables. Strength of escorts for prisoners - Under ordinary circumstances, the strength of escorts for prisoners shall be as follows: for 1 to 3 prisoners - 2 constables. for 4 to 6 prisoners - 3 constables. Note - One of these, who shall be senior, shall act as in-charge. for 7 to 12 prisoners - 1 havildar and 4 constables. for 13 to 18 prisoners - 2 havildars and 6 constables. for 19 to 24 prisioners - 2 havildars and 8 constables. There shall be increase in this proportion in the number of constables on increase in the number of prisoners. In this way, there shall be one additional havildar on increase in strength of constables by six. Whenever there are two or three havildars in an escort party, there should be one Sub-Inspector with them. See Rule 539(a) if the escort is to be armed or not. The above scale is for general guidance. The Superintendent may use his own judgment as to the reduction or increase of the escort if he has sufficient reason for deviation from the general rules. If a prisoner is of superior class or is a member of Parliament or Legislature, the Superintendent shall take this decision as to who and of what rank shall be placed in charge of escort.” 20. There is no doubt that as per Rule 557A of the Jharkhand Police Manual under ordinary circumstances, the strength of escorts for prisoners shall be 2 constables for 1 to 3 prisoners but at the same time such provision has been made for general guidance and it is open for the Superintendent to decide as to the reduction or increase of the escort if he has sufficient reason for deviation from the general rules as is apparent from Rule 557A itself. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant attributing the entire incident to violation of Rule 557A is not correct. This Court finds that the charges of negligence and dereliction of duty against the appellant were duly proved. The charges as proved reflect that the appellant was reckless and negligent while dealing with the prisoner who escaped. The appellant not only allowed the prisoner to talk to his brothers, namely, Raja and Babu but also allowed them to provide him food and one small packet and further the appellant opened his handcuff which enabled Md. The charges as proved reflect that the appellant was reckless and negligent while dealing with the prisoner who escaped. The appellant not only allowed the prisoner to talk to his brothers, namely, Raja and Babu but also allowed them to provide him food and one small packet and further the appellant opened his handcuff which enabled Md. Rinku to run away by sprinkling chili powder in the eyes of the appellant. This Court finds that apparently, the prisoner, namely, Md. Rinku did not escape because the appellant was asked to escort two prisoners thereby violating the provisions of Rule 557A of the Jharkhand Police Manual but the prisoner had escaped on account of negligence and reckless acts of the appellant amounting to dereliction of duty. Therefore, the arguments of the appellant that the entire incident happened due to a violation of Rule 557A of the Jharkhand Police Manual is devoid of any merits, hence rejected. 21. We have considered the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties and taken into account the relevant materials borne from the pleadings on record, noted hereinabove. The scope of judicial review in a departmental proceeding is limited to the decision-making process. The Courts exercising the power of judicial review in a disciplinary matter are entitled to consider as to whether there is a violation of principles of natural justice; whether a relevant piece of evidence has been left out from consideration and whether the decision is based on extraneous materials. Inference on findings of facts must be based on evidence that meets the requirements of legal principles though strict rules of evidence are not applicable and the disciplinary proceedings are to be decided on the principles of preponderance of probabilities. In a decision of the Apex Court, rendered in State of Rajasthan and Others vs. Heem Singh [Civil Appeal No. 3340/2020 dated 29th October 2020] the Hon’ble Supreme Court at Para-33 has again summarized the principles that govern the exercise of the power of judicial review in disciplinary matters. The illuminating opinion of the Apex Court is quoted hereunder: “33. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The illuminating opinion of the Apex Court is quoted hereunder: “33. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy - deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact-finding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the judges' craft is in vain.” 22. It follows therefrom that the determination of whether misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judges do not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority nor do the judges wear the hat of an employer. Considering the limited scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and keeping in mind the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court finds that neither any procedural irregularity nor any perversity in the matter of disciplinary proceedings has been made out by the appellant. The learned writ Court has dismissed the writ petition by passing a well-reasoned order which does not call for any interference in this appeal. Accordingly, the present Letters Patent Appeal is hereby dismissed. 23. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is closed.