JUDGMENT SUBBA REDDY SATTI, J. - The above writ petition is filed to declare the e-Tender Notification in FILE/NIT No.G2/3772/2023, dtd. 12/10/2023 issued by the Executive Officer of 2nd respondent for procurement of pure cotton Khanduvas and Dhoties for the period from 1/11/2023 to 31/10/2024, incorporating condition No.2 prohibiting non-Hindu religious persons from participating in e-Tender, as illegal and arbitrary. 2. Heard Sri Vidya Sagar, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Endowments appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 3 and Sri G.Ramana Rao, learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 3. Government issued G.O.Ms.No.426 Revenue (Endowments-I) Department, dtd. 9/11/2015 making amendments to Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Immovable Properties and Other Right (Other than Agricultural Lands) Leases and Licenses Rules, 2003. Rule No.4 of the original Rules was substituted. Rule 4(2)(K) of the substituted Rules reads as under: "(K) No person professing other than Hinduism as his religion is entitled to obtain lease or license either through tender - cum-public auction or otherwise." 4. Challenging Rule 4(2)(K) and Rule 18, W.P.No.40252 of 2015 and Batch were filed. The Division Bench of this Court by common order dtd. 1/11/2019 dismissed those writ petitions. The operative portion of the order reads as follows: "Considering the principles laid down in the above judgments including the judgments of Apex Court in M.P.Gopalakrishnan Nair v. State of Kerala ( AIR 2005 SC 3053 ) where non-Hindus are debarred for being elected as member of Trust Board and the Madras High Court judgment in Force 1 Guarding Services Pvt.Ltd. v. The State of Tamilnadu (W.P.No.20024 of 2011), wherein non-Hindus debarred from participating in tender process for providing security guards to the temple. Similarly, Act 30 of 1987 itself provides certain provisions debarring non-Hindus for being appointed as members of Trust Board, employees or Commissioner etc., under Ss. 19 and 20 of the Act. When Ss. 153 of the Act 30 of 1987 permits the Government to frame rules and regulations with regard to any matters covered by the Act, the rules framed by the Government, which are impugned in the writ petition debarring non-Hindus from participating in auction is not violative of Articles 14, 15, 26 and 26 of the Constitution of India. When Ss. 153 of the Act 30 of 1987 permits the Government to frame rules and regulations with regard to any matters covered by the Act, the rules framed by the Government, which are impugned in the writ petition debarring non-Hindus from participating in auction is not violative of Articles 14, 15, 26 and 26 of the Constitution of India. Based on the principles laid down by the Apex Court in M.P.Gopalakrishnanan Nair v. State of Kerala (referred above) and the Madras High Court judgment in "Force 1 Guarding Services Pvt. Ltd. v. the State of Tamilnadu (W.P.No.20024 of 2011), Muraleedharan Nair v. State of Kerala ( 1990 (1) KLT 874 ) and Narayanan Namboodiri v. State of Kerala ( AIR 2005 SC 3053 ), we hold that the amended rules are not violative of any fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution of India or any statutory right and the amended rules are valid. Consequently, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed." 5. Aggrieved by the order, writ petitioner in W.P.No.40252 of 2015 filed SLP (C) 1989 of 2020. The Hon'ble Apex Court on 27/1/2020 passed the following order: "Issue notice, returnable in six weeks. In the meantime, the operation of the impugned judgment and order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dtd. 27/9/2019 in W.P.No.40252 of 2015, shall remain stayed." 6. Be it as it may, the Executive Officer of the 2nd respondent issued e-Tender for procurement of pure cotton Kanduvas and Dhothies. As per the Tender schedule, downloading of bid documents starts from 12/10/2023 at 10.00 AM and ends by 19/10/2023 at 1.00 PM. Last date and time for receipt is 19/10/2023 at 3.00 PM. Opening date and time of technical bid is on 19/10/2023 at 4.00 PM and price bid opening is on 19/10/2023 at 4.30 PM. Second condition in the Tender is that non-Hindu religion persons are not permitted to participate in the Tender. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that in view of the interim order passed by the Apex Court in SLP (C) No.1989 of 2020 dtd. 27/1/2020 incorporating Clause No.2 in the Tender is illegal and unsustainable. 8. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Temple would contend that stay of operation of the order in W.P.No.40252 of 2015 will not be wiped out operation of the order. The dicta laid down in the judgment cannot be ignored. 9. 27/1/2020 incorporating Clause No.2 in the Tender is illegal and unsustainable. 8. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Temple would contend that stay of operation of the order in W.P.No.40252 of 2015 will not be wiped out operation of the order. The dicta laid down in the judgment cannot be ignored. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner in reply would submit that a Contempt Petition No.955 of 2021 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.5908 of 2020 was filed when the petitioner therein was denied opportunity to participate in the Tender process on the ground that he is non-Hindu. However, the Apex Court, in view of the undertaking given by the State, closed the Contempt Petition. Thus, incorporating of Clause No.2 is violative of order of the Apex Court. 10. The point for consideration is: Whether stay of operation of order by appellate court would wipe out dicta laid down in the judgment? The answer to the point is no longer res integra. 11. In Koduru Venka Reddy vs. The Land Acquisition Officer & Revenue Divisional Officer, Kavali, (1994) 1 ALT 227 Division Bench of the Composite High Court observed as follows: "2. When the matter came up before our learned brother Kodandaramayya, J., he felt a doubt whether, having regard to the fact that the judgment of the Full Bench is the subject-matter of an appeal before the Supreme Court and the operation of the said judgment is suspended, the dicta laid down by the Full Bench would be binding on this Court and has to be followed, and referred the matter to the Bench. 3. We are of the view that when a judgment of the High Court is the subject-matter of an appeal and the said judgment is suspended, the only effect of such suspension is that the judgment cannot be executed or implemented. But so long as the Full bench judgment stands, the dicta laid down therein is binding on all Courts including therein cannot be ignored unless the Court after hearing a particular case doubts the correctness of the dicta and thinks it appropriate that it should be reconsidered. We, however, do not feel any such doubt that insofar as the acquisition of the land of a person, whose holding is less than the ceiling area and is personally cultivating the same, is concerned, he is entitled to the payment of market value in lumpsum." 12. We, however, do not feel any such doubt that insofar as the acquisition of the land of a person, whose holding is less than the ceiling area and is personally cultivating the same, is concerned, he is entitled to the payment of market value in lumpsum." 12. In Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. V. Church of South India Trust Association CSI Cinod Secretariat, Madras, (1992) 3 Supreme Court Cases 1 the Apex Court observed as under: "10. ........ While considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. This means that if an order passed by the Appellate Authority is quashed and the matter is remanded, the result would be that the appeal which had been disposed of by the said order of the Appellate Authority would be restored and it can be said to be pending before the Appellate Authority after the quashing of the order of the Appellate Authority. The same cannot be said with regard to an order staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority because in spite of the said order, the order of the Appellate Authority continues to exist in law and so long as it exists, it cannot be said that the appeal which has been disposed of by the said order has not been disposed of an is still pending..." 13. In Govt. of A.P. and others v. N.Rami Reddy and others, (2001) 1 ALD 443 the Division Bench of Composite High Court held as under: "11. It is now a well settled principles of law that the ratio of a judgment is the reasons assigned in support thereof. In Govt. of A.P. and others v. N.Rami Reddy and others, (2001) 1 ALD 443 the Division Bench of Composite High Court held as under: "11. It is now a well settled principles of law that the ratio of a judgment is the reasons assigned in support thereof. While a Court of appeal stays the operation of the Judgment, it stays the further implementation, as between the parties, of the operative portion thereof, and thereby the ratio of the decision cannot be said to be wiped off. Furthermore, a distinction must be borne in mind that the appeal Court may, in a given situation, also suspend the operation of the said decision. Suspension of operation of a judgment and staying the operation of the order, in our view, connotes two different situations. In K. Yella Reddy v. Registrar, A.P.A.T. (1996 (3) Andh. LT 1047) (supra), a Division Bench of this Court considered the decision of the Apex Court in Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain ( AIR 1975 SC 1590 ) holding: "It is admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court has been stayed and the operation of the judgment had been suspended by the Supreme Court. But the argument is advanced placing reliance on the decision in K. Venkata Reddy v. L.A.O. (1994) 1 Andh. LT 227 that the effect of suspension of the judgment of the High Court is only that the judgment shall not be implemented but the dicta decided in the judgment remains operative and is binding on the single Judges and Division Benches until the judgment is set aside by the Supreme Court. Though we do not agree with the statement of law and feel the principle to have been very widely stated yet ordinarily the matter to have been placed before a Larger Bench in giving the judgment has not taken into consideration the decision in Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 1590 ." 12. A bare perusal of the aforementioned decision would clearly show that in Indira Gandhi ( AIR 1975 SC 1590 ) (supra), the operation of the Judgment and Order of the High Court was suspended. In that case, the election of Smt. Indira Gandhi was set aside. A bare perusal of the aforementioned decision would clearly show that in Indira Gandhi ( AIR 1975 SC 1590 ) (supra), the operation of the Judgment and Order of the High Court was suspended. In that case, the election of Smt. Indira Gandhi was set aside. The Apex Court suspended the operation of the said Judgment; as a result whereof, the status of the appellant as an elected Member of Parliament and consequently her right to hold the office of the Prime Minister of India stood revived. But when a question of law is decided, as indicated hereinbefore, its ratio thereof cannot be said to be wiped out only because the operation of the said order is stayed. 13. ...... 14. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court is binding upon another Division Bench. The decision of this Court in Rangaiah (AIR 1980 Andh.Pra. 165) (supra), as indicated hereinbefore, has been followed by this Court in many cases." 14. In Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. P.Gautham Kumar, 2012 (6) ALD 458 . Division Bench of composite high court observed as follows: The effect of grant of an interim order was considered by the Supreme Court in several other decisions including Kishor Kirtilal Mehta and ors. v. Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust and ors. ( (2007) 10 SCC 21 ); and State of Assam v. Barak Upatyaka D.U. Karmachari Sanstha ( (2009) 5 SCC 694 ). The distillate of the principles derived from curial authority on this aspect, we summarise: (i) mere grant of stay by the Supreme Court in an appeal would not per se require the High Court, in the matter pending before it to draw inferences on merits (of the judgment appealed), from the fact that a stay was granted; (ii) the High Court in the above circumstances must decide the matter on merits uninfluenced by the fact that an interim stay was granted by the Supreme Court; (iii) a precedent is the principle contained in a judicial decision, which forms the authoritative and binding element termed as the ratio decidendi. An interim order, which neither finally nor conclusively decides an issue, nor spells out reasons for the interim order, constitutes no precedent and affords no guidance to the lower court, on the further course of adjudication; and (iv) even where reasons are assigned (by the Supreme Court) in support of such non-final interim order containing prima facie findings, these are only tentative. Interim directions issued on the basis of such prima facie findings are temporary arrangements to preserve the status quo till the matter is finally decided, to ensure that the matter does not become either infructuous or fait accompli before the final hearing. It was further observed that: The other aspect of the contention, i.e., that on account of stay of operation of the judgment, the Prakash Singh's case (supra) directive is itself not binding, is a contention that is wholly misconceived. Acceptance of this contention would lead to utter chaos and a deconstruction of the principle of stare decisis, an essential integer of our system of law. To illustrate, if a judgment of the Supreme Court is referred to and relied upon for conclusions or grant of relief in a judgment by a High Court; and the High Court judgment is appealed against and a stay granted by the Supreme Court, according to the learned Advocate-General the binding authority of the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court is rendered inoperative and the earlier Supreme Court judgment ceases to have precedential value, during currency of the order of stay. Such a proposition is productive of universal and unmitigated mischief and therefore does not merit acceptance. From the guidance derived from the precedents referred to, we are of the view that stay of operation of the Yadav's case (supra), judgment only disables execution of the consequences of the judgment to the parties thereto. Grant of stay does not extinguish the norm(s) predicated in the judgment. 15. Thus, a conspectus of the expressions of the Hon'ble Apex Court and Division Benches of composite High Court, which binds this court, mere stay of operation of the judgment/order normally, will not wipe out of the ratio. In fact, the ratio declared need not be ignored. 16. The case at hand a fresh tender was published. One of the clauses is that non-Hindu religious persons cannot participate in the tender process. In fact, the ratio declared need not be ignored. 16. The case at hand a fresh tender was published. One of the clauses is that non-Hindu religious persons cannot participate in the tender process. As discussed supra, when the clause was challenged, Division Bench of this Court upheld the same. The order passed by Division Bench binds single judge. 17. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that granting stay of operation of the order in W.P.No.40252 of 2015 in SLP (Civil) No.1989 of 2020 does not wipe out the dicta laid down in the judgment. The Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.40252 of 2015 and Batch upheld the validity of clause restraining the non-Hindu religious persons from participating in Tender and the ratio in the said judgement binds this Court. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the Contempt Petition (Civil) No.881 of 2021 and would contend that based upon undertaking of the State counsel, the Hon'ble Apex Court recorded the same. However, as seen, contempt case was filed in SLP wherein interim order was granted. 19. Case at hand a fresh tender was published. Unless and until the law declared in W.P.No.40252 of 2015 is set aside, the order binds this court. In view of the same, this Court is of the opinion that writ petition lacks merit and the same is liable to be dismissed. 20. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand dismissed.