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2023 DIGILAW 1403 (PNJ)

Satwant Singh v. Ram Kumar Sharma

2023-04-20

NIDHI GUPTA

body2023
JUDGMENT Nidhi Gupta, J. - CM-23327-CII-2017 This is an application under Section 151 CPC seeking exemption from filing certified copy of Annexure A1 and placing on record typed copies of the same. After going through the contents of the application, the same is allowed subject to all just exceptions. MAIN CASE 1. Present Revision Petition has been filed by the landlord challenging order dated 15.10.2012 passed by learned Rent Controller, Jalandhar whereby ejectment application No.10500099/2007 filed by the petitioner/landlord under Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for ejectment of respondent/tenant from 'Shop No.1 situated in abadi village Kingra, Tehsil and district Jalandhar, Bagri Complex, Main Road, Mithapur, Jalandhar' (hereinafter referred to as 'the demised shop'), has been dismissed. 2. It is inter alia, submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner: a) that the petitioner is a Non-Resident Indian and had come to India to settle his son. The petitioner is owner of the demised shop. The building where the demised shop is situated is a non-residential-cum-commercial building. The demised shop was let out to the respondent/tenant vide Rent Note dated 10.3.2006 (Ex.R-2/Annexure A-1/T) at a monthly rent of Rs.2,500/-. However, as the respondent failed to make payment of rent since March, 2007, and as the petitioner required the demised shop for settling his son who wanted to run his own business from the demised shop, the petitioner filed present ejectment petition against the respondent on grounds of arrears of rent, as also personal necessity; b) that as per Sale Deed dated 27.02.1991 (Mark A), it is clear that petitioner was owner of the demised shop for more than five years prior to filing of the ejectment petition. Upon issuance of notice of motion, respondent/tenant appeared and filed written statement contesting ejectment petition on various grounds, to which the petitioner duly filed rejoinder. c) that on the basis of pleadings of the parties, learned Rent Controller framed following issues on 06.01.2010:- 1. Whether petitioner is NRI and is owner of property for the last more than five years? OPP 2. Whether shop in dispute is required by petitioner for his use and occupation? OPP 3. Whether respondent is in arrears of rent at the rate of Rs.2,500/- per month since March, 2007. If so, its effect? OPP 4. Whether correct site plan has not been produced by the petitioner? OPP 2. Whether shop in dispute is required by petitioner for his use and occupation? OPP 3. Whether respondent is in arrears of rent at the rate of Rs.2,500/- per month since March, 2007. If so, its effect? OPP 4. Whether correct site plan has not been produced by the petitioner? OPR 5. Whether petitioner has no locus standi to file the present petition? OPR 6. Relief. d) that vide the impugned order the learned Rent Controller has dismissed ejectment petition of the landlord/petitioner primarily on following grounds:- i) that the petitioner has failed to prove his ownership of the demised shop for more than five years before filing the present petition and that is fatal blow to the case set up by the petitioner in the petition regarding ejectment of respondent from demised shop; ii) that petitioner had failed to prove bona fide requirement of the premises in question as, son of the petitioner was already working with him in the shop at Germany; and iii) that petitioner was owner of other shops in the vicinity. e) that above said findings of the learned Rent Controller are contrary to the record and therefore, liable to be rejected. It is submitted that from the Sale Deed dated 27.02.1991 (Mark A), it is evident that the petitioner had been owner of the premises since 1991. Learned Rent Controller has totally misread the evidence on record to hold that property mentioned in the jamabandi (Mark B), sale deed dated 27.02.1991 (Mark A), and the one mentioned in the rent note, in the head note and in para 1 of the ejectment petition, are different and are not one and the same property. It is submitted that relationship of landlord-tenant between the petitioner and respondent has been candidly admitted by the respondent and therefore, there can be no dispute regarding ownership of petitioner over the demised shop; f) that as regards bona fide requirement of the petitioner, it is submitted that the need of the petitioner is very much genuine as he wants to settle his son(s) in India who is currently working with him in Germany. It is submitted that the learned Rent Controller has rejected his claim in this respect on the purely spurious reasoning that the petitioner had failed to place on record any application made by the petitioner to the Authorities in Germany regarding settling his son in India; g) that the above said reasoning of the learned Rent Controller is erroneous as under Section 13-B of the Act, there is no such requirement which mandates the petitioner to produce such record as sought by the learned Rent Controller. In support, learned counsel relies upon judgment of this Court in CR-348 of 2016 titled as 'Harjit Singh Vs. Harcharan Singh' Law Finder Doc ID # 1916127; h) that as regards finding of learned Tribunal that petitioner is owner of other shops in the vicinity and is therefore, not entitled to ejectment as sought for, it is submitted that as evident from site plan (Exhibit R1), all the said other shops are situated in one and the same building. It is submitted that as per three-Judge Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 2010 (9) SC 452 Swami Nath Vs. Nirmal Singh it has been held that geffing one unit vacated in a building would not amount to exhausting right granted under Section 13-B of the Act, and that such an interpretation 'to the proviso to Section 13-B(1) of the 1949 Act would lead to an absurd situation which was not contemplated by the legislature while introducing the provisions of Section 13-B by way of amendment in 2001.' i) that accordingly, learned Rent Controller was in error on all the three counts in rejecting the ejectment petition filed by the petitioner/landlord. 3. No other argument is raised on behalf of the petitioner. 4. Upon perusal of the record of the case order sheets show that on last two dates i.e. 19.02.2020 and 24.01.2023, matter was adjourned at request of learned counsel/proxy counsel appearing for the respondent. On 24.01.2023, it was made clear to the proxy counsel appearing on behalf of learned counsel for the respondent, that as this is a Revision Petition of the year 2013, no further adjournment shall be granted. However, even today, even in the second round, there is no representation on behalf of the respondent. Accordingly, respondent is being proceeded against ex-parte. 5. However, even today, even in the second round, there is no representation on behalf of the respondent. Accordingly, respondent is being proceeded against ex-parte. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and with his able assistance perused the file as also lower Court record in detail. 6. In the present case, it is not disputed that petitioner is an NRI as defined under Section 2(dd) of the Act and was therefore, competent to file ejectment petition under Section 13-B of the Act. Requirements under Section 13-B are as follows:- '13-B. Right to recover immediate possession of residential building or scheduled building and/or non-residential building to accrue to Non-resident Indian. (1) Where an owner is a NonResident Indian and returns to India and the residential building or scheduled building and/or non-residential building, as the case may be, let out by him or her, is required for his or her use, or for the use of any one ordinarily living with and dependent on him or her, he or she, may apply to the Controller for immediate possession of such building or buildings, as the case may be: Provided that a right to apply in respect of such a building under this section, shall be available only after a period of five years from the date of becoming the owner of such a building and shall be available only once during the life time of such an owner. (2) Where the owner referred to in sub-section (1), has let out more than one residential building or scheduled building and/or non-residential building, it shall be open to him or her to make an application under that sub-section in respect of only one residential building or one scheduled building and/or one non-residential building, each chosen by him or her. (3) Where an owner recovers possession of a building under this section, he or she shall not transfer it through sale or any other means or let it out before the expiry of a period of five years from the date of taking possession of the said building, failing which, the evicted tenant may apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be restored the possession of the said building and the Controller shall make an order accordingly." 7. The above provision confers right to recover immediate possession to NRI landlords under special mechanism of Section 13-B and Section 18-A of the Act. However, in the present case, the landlord has been languishing which makes a mockery of legislative right granted to him under Section 13-B of the Act. It is accordingly, in these extenuating circumstances that respondent is being proceeded against ex-parte in the present case as the record/order sheets reveal that a somewhat casual and cavalier approach has been adopted on part of the respondent in pursuing this present petition. 8. A perusal of impugned order shows that learned Rent Controller has dismissed the petitioner's ejectment petition on the ground that: 8( A) Ownership of the petitioner over the demised shop for the last more than five years before filing of the present petition, is not proven as 'petitioner has miserably failed to connect the property mentioned in the head note of the petition with the sale deed as well as jamabandi Mark-A and Mark-B respectively". Finding of the learned Rent Controller in this respect is contained in Para 16 of the impugned order and the same is reproduced hereinbelow:- '16. In order to prove his ownership over property in question, petitioner has placed on file copy of jamabandi Mark-B. He has also placed on file photocopy of sale deed dated 27.02.1991 Mark-A. Perusal of both these documents shows that these documents i.e. sale deed Mark A and jamabandi Mark-B pertains to property situated at Vill. Khingra, Tehsil and District Jalandhar, bearing Khasra No.5122/3839 (11-3) whereas, perusal of head note of the petition shows that premises in question are situated at Bagri Complex, Main Road, Mithapur, Jalandhar. Similar is the position in para No.1 of the petition, where it has been pleaded that property in question is situated in the abadi of Mithapur, Jalandhar. Perusal of documentary evidence led by petitioner shows that no document has been placed on file by the petitioner from which it could be presumed that property in question, as fully detailed in the head note of the petition, is owned by petitioner, which is situated within the abadi of Mithapur, Jalandhar. Otherwise also, petitioner has miserably failed to connect the property mentioned in the head note of the petition with the sale deed as well as jamabandi Mark-A and Mark-B respectively. Otherwise also, petitioner has miserably failed to connect the property mentioned in the head note of the petition with the sale deed as well as jamabandi Mark-A and Mark-B respectively. So, one of the most essential ingredient of Section 13-B of the Act goes un-proved on the file regarding ownership of premises in question for the last more than 5 years before the filing of present petition and that is fatal blow to the case set up by the petitioner in the petition regarding ejectment of respondent from demised shop.' (Emphasis supplied) 8(A)(i) In my view, above said findings of learned Rent Controller are wholly misconceived and based on a piecemeal misreading of evidence on record; inasmuch in this regard the learned Rent Controller has totally ignored the writing in the Rent Note dated 10.3.2006 Ex.R-2/Annexure A-1, and has thus, arrived at the above incorrect conclusion. In the sale deed dated 27.02.1991 (Mark-A) as also in the Jamabandi (Mark B), the property in question is described as ' Village Kingra, Tehsil Jalandhar bearing khasra No.5122/3839 (11-3)"; In Rent Note (Ex.R-2) demised shop has been described therein as 'Shop No.1 situated in abadi Village Kingra, Tehsil and District Jalandhar, Bagri Complex, Main Road, Mithapur, Jalandhar'; The Head note of the petition shows that demised shop has been described therein as 'Shop No.1 situated in Bagri Complex at Main Road, Mithapur, Jalandhar'. Thus, a harmonious reading of all of the above three recitations, shows that the common connecting address contained in the 3 documents in respect of the demised shop is 'Village Kingra, Bagri Complex, Main Mithapur Road, Tehsil & District Jalandhar'. In arriving at the impugned conclusion that 'petitioner has miserably failed to connect the property mentioned in the head note of the petition with the sale deed as well as jamabandi Mark-A and Mark-B respectively", the learned Rent Controller has ignored the inter-linking writing contained in the Rent Note dated 10.03.2006 (Ex.R-2/Annexure A-1) wherein demised premises is shown situate at both Village Kingra and Bagri Complex. Thus, abovesaid conclusion of the learned Rent Controller is factually incorrect, being based on a piecemeal reading of the evidence on record. Thus, abovesaid conclusion of the learned Rent Controller is factually incorrect, being based on a piecemeal reading of the evidence on record. 8(A)(ii) It therefore follows, that the conclusion of the learned Rent Controller that the petitioner did not own the demised shop for five years prior to filing of present petition is also contrary to the record as, admittedly, registered Sale Deed dated 28.02.1991; document No.10638 (Mark A), pertaining to the land where the demised premises is situate, is of the year 1991. Therefore, the petitioner was clearly owner of the demised premises since 1991. 8(A)(iii) Furthermore, in this regard vital piece of evidence is contained in the evidence led by the petitioner, in particular the cross-examination of the petitioner as PW2 available at page 73 of the LCR which shows that it is the categoric assertion of the petitioner therein that 'The property in dispute was constructed in the year 1991/92. There are 23 shops. I have sold the two shops out of the total shops. ...' From the above evidence, in fact, as put to the petitioner by the respondent himself, the petitioner had specifically explained that he had constructed the property in dispute in the year 1991-92. Thus, to my mind the only rational conclusion that follows is that the on the land situated in village Kingra bought by the petitioner vide Sale Deed dated 27.02.1991, the petitioner had constructed the 23 shops/developed Bagri Complex in 1991 itself, of which Shop No.1 was let out to the respondent in 2006. In my view, when the evidence is considered together in a coherent manner, the conclusions of the learned Rent Controller cannot be sustained. In fact, it has not been disputed by the respondent-tenant himself that the sale deed Mark A does not pertain to the demised premises. It is also important to note that perusal of the evidence shows that not even a suggestion was put to the petitioner that the registered Sale Deed dated 28.02.1991; Document No.10638 (Mark A), does not pertain to the demised premises. Thus, petitioner was granted no opportunity to explain/refute the abovesaid conclusion drawn by the Rent Controller. 8(A)(iv) Even otherwise, in this regard learned Rent Controller has erred in ignoring the fact that in the Rent Note dated 10.03.2006/Ex. R-2/Annexure A-1/T, the respondent-tenant has admitted the ownership of the petitioner in respect of the demised premises. Thus, petitioner was granted no opportunity to explain/refute the abovesaid conclusion drawn by the Rent Controller. 8(A)(iv) Even otherwise, in this regard learned Rent Controller has erred in ignoring the fact that in the Rent Note dated 10.03.2006/Ex. R-2/Annexure A-1/T, the respondent-tenant has admitted the ownership of the petitioner in respect of the demised premises. Even the factum of tenancy in respect of the demised premises has not been denied by the respondent-tenant. Learned Rent Controller has noted in Para 17 of the impugned order that relationship of landlord-tenant is admitted by respondent. Thus, when the documentary evidence, including the Sale Deed Mark A and Rent Note Ex.R-2, are read together, the unassailable conclusion that follows is that the petitioner was owner of the demised premises since 1991 i.e. for more than 5 years prior to filing of the Rent Petition. 8(A)(v) In this regard, judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in 2014 (16) SCC 472 Kamaljit Singh Vs. Sarabjit Singh is relevant, wherein it has been held that where jural relationship of tenant and landlord admittedly existed between the parties, and respondent-tenant did not surrender possession of demised premises in his occupation, in such cases, tenant could not question title of the landlord to that property, and Courts below had erred in holding that landlord was obliged to prove his title to the property. In the present case also, it is not the respondent's case that petitioner was not owner of demised shop. 8(B) The second ground on which the Learned Rent Controller has rejected the petitioner's ejectment application is that the petitioner has not been able to prove his bona fide requirement of demised shop. Findings in this regard are recorded in para 17 of the impugned order:- "17. He further admitted that he is having two sons and same are of the age of 18 years and 15 years. His elder son namely Manjinder Singh studied upto 10th class and has now left the study. He further admitted that his son Manjinder Singh is also siffing and working in the shop alongwith him and he is doing cloth business in Germany. He further admitted that he has not moved any applicatton before Government of Germany regarding the fact that he wants to settle his son in India in order to start the business of cloth in demised premises. He further admitted that he has not moved any applicatton before Government of Germany regarding the fact that he wants to settle his son in India in order to start the business of cloth in demised premises. All these admissions made by P.W.2 Satwant Singh goes a long way in order to disprove the case of pettttoner and in order to support the contentton of respondent that premises in questton are neither bonafide required by pettttoner for his own use and occupatton nor for the use of his son, because as per above menttoned admissions of P.W.2, his son is already working with him in the shop at Germany.' In my view, the fact that the son of the petitioner is presently working with him in Germany, does not preclude the petitioner from wanting to settle his sons in India in the long-term, and cannot be made a ground to disbelieve the bona fide requirement of the petitioner. Moreover, even the reasoning of the learned Rent Controller that petitioner 'has not moved any applicatton before Government of Germany regarding the fact that he wants to settle his son in India in order to start the business of cloth in demised premises' is misplaced as, under the law there is no such requirement for such record to be produced. In my view, above said reasoning of learned Rent Controller is prima facie erroneous in view of the fact that there is no requirement under Section 13-B of the Act for the petitioner to move an application before the Government of Germany to seek permission to settle his son in India. Petitioner has pleaded his bona fide requirement which is duly supported by an affidavit and therefore, petitioner was not required to bring or produce any record from Germany in this respect. In this regard, following observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in 2005 (12) SCC 778 Baldev Singh Bajwa Vs. Monish Saini are relevant: '18. From the aforesaid decisions the requirement of the landlord of the suit accommodation is to be established as a genuine need and not a pretext to get the accommodation vacated. The provisions of Sections 18-A (4) and (5) concede to the tenant's right to defend the proceedings initiated under Section 13-B showing that the requirement of the landlord is not genuine or bona fide. The provisions of Sections 18-A (4) and (5) concede to the tenant's right to defend the proceedings initiated under Section 13-B showing that the requirement of the landlord is not genuine or bona fide. The legislative intent for seffing up of a special procedure for NRI landlords is obvious from the legislative text which has been deliberately designed making distinction between the ordinary landlords and special category of landlords. The Controller's power to give leave to contest the application filed under Section 13-B is restricted by the condition that the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such fact as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession. It is needless to say that in the summary proceedings the tenant's right to contest the application would be restricted to the parameters of Section 13-B of the Act. He cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying on any other fact which does not fall within the parameters of Section 13-B. The tenant's defence is restricted and cannot go beyond the scope of the provisions of the Act applicable to the NRI landlord. Under Section 13-B the landlord is entitled to eviction if he requires the suit accommodation for his or her use or the use of the dependent, who ordinarily lives with him or her. The requirement would necessarily have to be genuine or bona fide requirement and it cannot be said that although the requirement is not genuine or bona fide, he would be entitled to the ejectment of the tenant nor can it be said that in no circumstances will the tenant not be allowed to prove that the requirement of the landlord is not genuine or bona fide. A tenant's right to defend the claim of the landlord under Section 13-B for ejectment would arise if the tenant could be able to show that the landlord in the proceedings is not an NRI landlord; that he is not the owner thereof or that his ownership is not for the required period of five years before the institution of proceedings and that the landlord's requirement is not bona fide.' 8(C) The third ground on which the learned Rent Controller has rejected the petitioner's eviction petition is that it has been proven on record that petitioner owns other shops. From the discussion hereinabove, it is established that demised shop is situated in the same building where other 23/25 shops are situated. In this regard, the site plan (Exhibit R1) produced by the tenant himself, is very relevant, which is available at page 181 of the LCR which shows that demised shop, along with several other/25 other shops, is part of one building namely 'Bagri Shopping Complex'. 8(C)(i) The provision, specifically sub-section 2 of Section 13-B is very clear, whereby it is open to the landlord to 'to make an application under that sub-section in respect of only one residential building or one scheduled building and/or one non-residential building, each chosen by him or her." Thus, it is open to the petitioner to seek eviction of the respondent from the demised premises, even though he is owner of other shops in the same building. 8(C)(ii) Reliance may be placed on judgment of this Court in CR-348 of 2016 titled as 'Harjit Singh VS. Harcharan Singh' Law Finder Doc ID # 1916127 wherein it has been held as follows:- 'A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, Section 13B - Non - Resident Indian - Order of eviction - Bonafide necessity - Proof of - Tenant already protected under other related provisions of Act, if NRI landlord gets property vacated for malafide reasons -Provisions to ensure bona-fides in action by NRI landlord against tenant, as were considered appropriate b legislation, are contained in Section 13-B of Act itself which entitles tenant to get possession of property back in case of landlord lets out property to anybody else within period of 5 years - Hence, plea the NRI landlord required to prove bona-fides in action against tenant misconceived. B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, Section 13B - Non Resident Indian- Order of eviction - Plea of non disclosure of other properties - Held, fact that NRI owns other properties, no bar for NRI to file eviction petition - Therefore, even in exercise of any inherent powers, Court or as statutory authority Rent Controller; cannot dismiss petition merely on ground that landlord not filed petition with clean hands - Hence, order of eviction upheld." (Emphasis supplied) 8(C)(iii) Reliance may also be placed on judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of 2010 (9) SCC 452 Swami Nath Vs. Nirmal Singh wherein it has been held as follows:- '6. Nirmal Singh wherein it has been held as follows:- '6. Similar submissions were advanced by the petitioner in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.8317 of 2006 before the High Court. In addition, it was urged that under the provisions of Section 13-B, the landlord was entitled to exercise his right of option for immediate possession only once and that having obtained vacant possession of a shop room in the building in question, such right had been exhausted and the landlord was no longer entitled to immediate possession as contemplated in Section 13-B of the 1949 Act. It was sought to be urged that a shop room in a building would have to be treated as a separate unit or building for the purposes of Section 13-B of the above Act as otherwise the very object of Section 13-B would be frustrated as the landlord would have to approach the court repeatedly for obtaining possession of different parts of the building, which was not contemplated in the said section." 9. It was also urged that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 13-B would have to be read in a manner so as not to defeat the main purpose and object of the Act. It was submitted that recourse could, therefore, be had to the provisions of Section 13-B only once which would support the theory that each shop room or other premises in the building would have to be treated as a separate unit and the landlord would be entitled to make a choice as to which of the units he wished to take possession of immediately. It was submitted that in these cases, since the landlord had already obtained possession of a portion of the building, it must be deemed that he had exhausted his option as given under Section 13-B and in order to evict the other tenants from the premises in question, he would have to file regular eviction petitions before the Rent Controller concerned, who would have to deal with the same in the regular manner without resorting to the emergency provisions of Section 13-B of the 1949 Act. 13. 13. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini where the same question had come up for consideration and it was observed that on a plain reading of the provisions of Section 13-B, it would be obvious that once in a lifetime possession is given to an NRI to get one building vacated in a summary manner. It was also submitted that the ownership of the respondent landlord in respect of only one building had not been disputed by the petitioners and the only contention that was raised on their behalf was that each separate tenancy in a building would amount to a separate unit and after exhausting the right of summary possession once, it was no longer available to the NRI landlord to exercise such an option for the second time to a particular building, which contention had been negated by the courts below. 14. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and we are unable to agree with the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners. The interpretation sought to be given to the proviso to Section 13-B(1) of the 1949 Act would lead to an absurd situation which was not contemplated by the legislature while introducing the provisions of Section 13-B by way of amendment in 2001. The very object of the amendment would be frustrated if the narrow and constricted meaning being canvassed on behalf of the petitioners is to be accepted. 15. The provisions of Section 13-B of the 1949 Act have been correctly interpreted and dealt with in Baldev Singh Bajwa case and in that view of the matter, the special leave petitions must fail and are dismissed. IA No.2 of 2006 filed in SLP © No.11719 of 2006 by Gurdeep Ram to be impleaded as party in his personal capacity, is also disposed of accordingly. There will, however, be no order as to costs.' (Emphasis supplied) 8(C)(iv) Moreover, it is well-settled proposition of law that it is not open to the tenant to dictate terms and conditions to the landlord, and the landlord is the best judge of his own needs. There will, however, be no order as to costs.' (Emphasis supplied) 8(C)(iv) Moreover, it is well-settled proposition of law that it is not open to the tenant to dictate terms and conditions to the landlord, and the landlord is the best judge of his own needs. In this regard, reference may be made to judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of 2021 (2) Scale 333 Law Finder Doc id # 1800986 Balwant Singh @ Bant Singh & Another wherein it has been held that tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord. Head note of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:- 'East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, Section 2(dd) and Section 13B read with Section 18A - Eviction - Bona fide requirement of NRI landlord - Leave to contest - Genuine need of appellants to secure vacant possession of premises for proposed business found to be established - Adequacy or otherwise of space available with landlord for business not for tenant to dictate -Special procedure for NRI landlord deliberately designed by Legislature to speedily secure possession of tenanted premises for bona fide need of NRI landlords and such legislative intent to confer right of summary eviction, as a one time measure cannot be frustrated without strong reason - Held, tenants failed to provide adequate reason to secure right to contest summary proceedings and they should not be allowed to widen scope of limited defense under Section 13B - Hence, rejection of leave to contest application upheld." 9. It has also been stated by respondent in his written statement to the ejectment petition that need of the petitioner is not genuine. It has been further stated therein that, 'the petitioner does not require the demised property for his personal use and occupation; rather the petitioner wants to re-let the same at higher rate after geWng the same vacated from the respondent.' In my view, said defense of the respondent is misconceived as sub-section 3 of Section 13B imposes a restriction on the landlord that he shall not transfer through sale or any other means or lease out the ejected premises before the expiry of period of five years from the date of taking possession of the said building. In the event of breach of any of the conditions of sub-section 3 of Section 13-B of the Act, the tenant is given right of restoration of possession of the said building. It is thus, clear that landlord is prohibited from transferring or leffing out the demised shop for a period of five years after geffing the same vacated from present tenant. 10. Accordingly, in view of the discussion hereinabove, the present Revision Petition is allowed, and the impugned order dated 15.10.2012 is set aside. 11. Pending application(s) if any also stand(s) disposed of.