JUDGMENT : Ajay Bhanot, J. The judgment is being structured in the following conceptual framework to facilitate the discussion: I Introduction II Findings in the impugned award III Submissions of learned counsels IV Substantial questions of law V Consideration and analysis VI Conclusions & Directions VII Appendix 2. The instant appeal arises out of an award made by the learned Workmen's Compensation Commissioner & Assistant Labour Commissioner, U.P. Ghaziabad Region, Ghaziabad in Case No. W.C. 239/2009 (Sri Yamin v. M/s. Saini @ Private Ltd. and another) on 19.6.2013 under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 ((hereinafter referred to as W.C. Act). 3. By Section 4 of the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, 2009 (45 of 2009) nomenclature of the Act has been amended by substituting the word ''Employee's'' for the word ''Workmen's'' (w.e.f. 18.1.2010). Now the Act stands as THE EMPLOYEE'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1923 (8 of 1923) (Came into force on 1.7.1924). In this view the Workmen's Compensation Act shall be referred to as Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as ''E.C. Act.''). 4. The appeal has been filed by the insurance company. Cross objections have been raised on behalf of the claimants-respondents. II. Findings in the impugned award 5. The learned Workmen's Compensation Commissioner found these facts in the impugned award. The deceased worked as a helper and tasked to clean the truck. The deceased received his wages from the truck owner and worked under his orders. The employer did not contest the employer employee relationship between former and the deceased. The deceased died of injuries sustained in an accident while he was travelling in the truck on 27/28.6.2006. The death happened during the course of employment and arose out of employment of the deceased with the insured. The income of the deceased determined by the Workmen's Commissioner is Rs. 2714.56/- per month. 6. On the fateful day the truck stood duly insured by the appellant insurance company which was found liable to pay the compensation. The learned Workmen's Commissioner awarded compensation depicted in tabulated form hereunder: Sr. No. Heads Amount (in Rupees) 1. Annual Income 32774.72 2. Factor-219.95 as per Schedule IV to the Workmen’s Compensation Act 3. Income-Rs. 2714.56 wages per month as per Minimum Wages Act, 1948 4. Compensation-2714.56 x 219.95 x 50% 2,98,534/- 5. Non pecuniary (funeral expenses) 2500 6. Total compensation 3,01,034/- 7. Interest 1 III. Submissions of learned counsels 7. No. Heads Amount (in Rupees) 1. Annual Income 32774.72 2. Factor-219.95 as per Schedule IV to the Workmen’s Compensation Act 3. Income-Rs. 2714.56 wages per month as per Minimum Wages Act, 1948 4. Compensation-2714.56 x 219.95 x 50% 2,98,534/- 5. Non pecuniary (funeral expenses) 2500 6. Total compensation 3,01,034/- 7. Interest 1 III. Submissions of learned counsels 7. Sri B.C. Naik, learned counsel for the appellant insurance company contends that employee-employer relationship was not established and is a substantial question of law. 8. This Court finds that impugned order reflects full application of mind to the material and impeccable appraisal of evidences in the record which show that the deceased was in the employ of the insured. He drew his salary from the employer and worked directly under the orders of the latter. All ingredients of employer employee relationship are matters of fact which were established before Tribunal by credible evidence. There is no infirmity in these findings nor any perversity could be pointed out. No substantial question of law arises from these findings of facts as regards employer employee relationship. 9. Sri Nigamendra Shukla, learned counsel for the claimants-respondents presses the cross objections. It is contended that the compensation was not granted in adherence to the statutory provisions. 10. Initial objections of the appellant to the maintainability of cross objections were fairly waived by the appellant insurance company after arguments. The cross objections are held to be maintainable since they disclose fault lines in the award which go to the root. The grounds in the objections raise substantial questions of law. IV. Substantial questions of law 11. Sri Nigamendra Shukla, learned counsel for the respondents submits that provisions of Employee's Compensation Act and Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as M.V. Act) sometimes overlap, and in such common areas of operation the provisions/judicial authorities under the M.V. Act can be applied to award just compensation under E.C. Act. Future prospects and funeral expenses payable under the M.V. Act, can be claimed by claimants under the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923. 12. Sri B.C. Naik, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the E.C. Act and the M.V. Act cover separate fields and provisions of one Act cannot be applied to proceedings under the other enactment. Future prospects and funeral expenses payable under the M.V. Act, can be claimed by claimants under the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923. 12. Sri B.C. Naik, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the E.C. Act and the M.V. Act cover separate fields and provisions of one Act cannot be applied to proceedings under the other enactment. Particularly funeral expenses are duly provided for under the E.C. Act and applying said provisions/judicial authorities under the M.V. Act would be contrary to the scheme of former Act. 13. After the arguments learned counsel for the parties agree that the following substantial questions of law arise in the facts of the case: (a) Whether future prospects are liable to be granted to claimants in the instant proceedings under the Employee's Compensation Act? If yes, the prerequisites to be established for grant of said benefits and the manner of computation of the same? (b) Whether the claimants under the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 are entitled to funeral expenses in line with compensation granted under the same head in proceedings taken out under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988? V. Consideration and analysis: 14. In these dear times welfare legislation often holds the only security for workmen and their dependents against vagaries of fate. ''Just compensation'' flowing from law and awarded by Courts provides succour to claimants from privations imposed by misfortune. 15. The beneficent intent of the legislature while enacting the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 is disclosed in the object of the legislation which is to provide for payment of compensation for injury/death by accident by certain class of employers to their employees. The settled cannons of statutory interpretation require that the E.C. Act, 1923 being a welfare legislation is liable to be interpreted liberally to ensure that just compensation is provided to the class of workmen who are targeted beneficiaries of the E.C.Act, 1923. At the same time caution has to be exercised to ensure that no illegal benefit accrues to an unentitled person. At the same time caution has to be exercised to ensure that no illegal benefit accrues to an unentitled person. [Ref: A & F Overseas Trade Ltd. v. Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act and others, 2020 SCC Online Mad 24532; Divisional Manager, TATA AIG General Insurance Company Limited v. A.C. Jagadeesann and another, 2022 SCC Online Mad 4566 Paras 28, 29, 30; Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Hooghly Mills Company Limited and others; Brahampal alias Sammay and another v. National Insurance Company, 2021 (6) SCC 512 Para 7; Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation and others, 2022 SCC Online SC 1116 Paras 21, 22]. 16. The concept of ''stretched construction'' propounded by the Calcutta High Court in Chillu Kahar v. Burn & Co. Ltd., AIR 1953 Cal 516 (DB), holds true today and will apply to this case: ''16. Reading the reports in the books, it is impossible to avoid the feeling that a desire to assist a workman in distress, who has undoubtedly suffered from causes arising out of his employment, has often led to a stretching of the language of the statute. Even in the cases where the decision was in favour of the workman, the observations of the learned Judges make it perfectly clear that they felt the pressure of reason on the other side and perhaps decided in favour of the workman in pursuance of what they conceived to be the policy of the Act. Mr. Sanyal pointed out, and in my opinion rightly, that with the progress of the times, the conception of the circumstances in which the workman is entitled to compensation has widened and become more and more liberal. Even if, therefore, the view taken by the highest Courts in recent times, on facts which are more or less similar to the facts one has to deal with, be a view which only a stretched construction of the Act can bear, it will not be wrong to follow it so long as it is not something violently opposed to fundamental principles.'' 17. It would also be apposite to refer to the holdings of the Jharkhand High Court in Sunita Devi v. Autar Singh and others, 2005 ACJ 1175 . While interpreting the scheme of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923: ''12. It would also be apposite to refer to the holdings of the Jharkhand High Court in Sunita Devi v. Autar Singh and others, 2005 ACJ 1175 . While interpreting the scheme of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923: ''12. It is well-settled that the Act is a piece of social security and welfare legislation, Its dominant purpose is to protect the workman and, therefore, the provisions of the Act should not be interpreted too narrowly so as to debar the workman from compensation which the Parliament thought they ought to have. The intention of the legislature was to make the employer an insurer of the workman responsible against the loss caused by the injuries or death, which ought have happened, while the workman was engaged in his work.'' 18. A birds eye view of the legislative scheme for grant of compensation will preface the discussion. Section 2 (m) of the E.C. Act, 1923 defines wages while Section 3 of the enactment imposes the liability on the employer for compensation. The method of calculating the compensation is stated in Section 4 read with the Schedule, and the manner of computing wages is provided in Section 5 of the E.C. Act. 19. Section 2(m) of the E.C. Act, 1923 defines wages in the following manner : ''(m) ''wages'', includes any privilege or benefit which is capable of being estimated in money, other than a travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession or a contribution paid by the employer of a *[employee] towards any pension or provident fund or a sum paid to a *[employee] to cover any special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his employment; '' 20. The provision contains an inclusive definition of 'wages' and confers a wide ambit to the said term. There is an implicit legislative acknowledgment that the term wages has several components. Monthly salary which is a principal ingredient has to be aggregated with other components to determine ''wages'' for grant of compensation under the E.C. Act. The provision contains an inclusive definition of 'wages' and confers a wide ambit to the said term. There is an implicit legislative acknowledgment that the term wages has several components. Monthly salary which is a principal ingredient has to be aggregated with other components to determine ''wages'' for grant of compensation under the E.C. Act. Enlarged scope of the word ''wages'' created by inclusive definition is supported by the holding of Supreme Court in Ramanlal Bhailal Patel and others v. State of Gujarat, 2008 (5) SCC 449 , which explained the scope inclusive definition in statutes in these terms: ''Where the definition is an inclusive definition, the use of the word 'includes' indicates an intention to enlarge the meaning of the word used in the Statute. Consequently, the word must be construed as comprehending not only such things which they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. Thus, where a definition uses the word 'includes', as contrasted from 'means', the word defined not only bears its ordinary popular and natural meaning, but in addition also bear the extended statutory meaning.'' (Also see Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. Saldanha and Sons and others, 1991 (3) SCC 617 ; S.K. Gupta and others v. K.P. Jain and others, 1979 (3) SCC 54 ). 21. Just wages of labour cannot be denied. Future rise in income is a given in economics and law. Criteria for fixing wages for example (consumer price index, inflation etc.) witness a constant rise thus creating the need for corresponding increase in wages. This inexorable economic reality has received statutory recognition. Regular notifications hiking wages are taken out by appropriate Governments from time to time under the Minimum Wages Act acknowledging the imperative of timely raise in wages. In this regard Section 4 (IB) of the E.C. Act, 1923 may also be referenced (quoted below): ''[(1B) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify, for the purposes of sub-section (I), such monthly wages in relation to an employee as it may consider necessary.]'' 22. Enhanced wages in future is a legislative safeguard for the worker class against uncertainties arising from escalating costs of living. Assurance of hike in future wages is the bulwark of industrial peace, and the engine of industrial growth. Enhanced wages in future is a legislative safeguard for the worker class against uncertainties arising from escalating costs of living. Assurance of hike in future wages is the bulwark of industrial peace, and the engine of industrial growth. The legislative intent to provide just compensation to a worker and the preambled constitutional goal of securing social and economic justice to all citizens are achieved by this measure. Rise in future wages comes within the meaning of ''wages'' as defined in the E.C. Act, 1923. 23. The computation of the amount of compensation is described in Sections 4 and 5 of the E.C. Act, 1923. The relevant paras of Section 4 are extracted below : "4 (1) (a) where death results from the injury : an amount equal to fifty per cent. of the monthly wages of the deceased [employee] multiplied by the relevant factor; or an amount of [one lakh and twenty thousand rupees], whichever is more; 24. Section 5 (insofar as it is applicable here) states as under : ''Section 5. of the monthly wages of the deceased [employee] multiplied by the relevant factor; or an amount of [one lakh and twenty thousand rupees], whichever is more; 24. Section 5 (insofar as it is applicable here) states as under : ''Section 5. Method of calculating wages.-In this Act and for the purposes thereof the expression ''monthly wages'' means the amount of wages deemed to be payable for a month's service (whether the wages are payable by the month or by whatever other period or at piece rates), and calculated as follows, namely:- (emphasis supplied) (a) where the *[employee] has, during a continuous period of not less than twelve months immediately preceding the accident, been in the service of the employer who is liable to pay compensation, the monthly wages of the *[employee] shall be one-twelfth of the total wages which have fallen due for payment to him by the employer in the last twelve months of that period; (b) where the whole of the continuous period of service immediately preceding the accident during which the *[employee] was in the service of the employer who is liable to pay the compensation was less than one month, the monthly wages of the *[employee] shall be the average monthly amount which, during the twelve months immediately preceding the accident, was being earned by a *[employee] employed on the same work by the same employer, or, if there was no *[employee] so employed, by a *[employee] employed on similar work in the same locality; (c) in other cases [including cases in which it is not possible for want of necessary information to calculate the monthly wages under clause (b)], the monthly wages shall be thirty times the total wages earned in respect of the last continuous period of service immediately preceding the accident from the employer who is liable to pay compensation, divided by the number of days comprising such period.'' 25. Section 4 and Section 5 are reproduced in their entirety in the appendixi. 26. Most established practices in industrial jurisprudence make wages payable on a monthly basis. Future rise in wages is based on past service and last wages drawn. The claim for future wages matures with each day of service of a workman. The amount and period when future wages are payable cannot be determined ex-ante with exactitude. 26. Most established practices in industrial jurisprudence make wages payable on a monthly basis. Future rise in wages is based on past service and last wages drawn. The claim for future wages matures with each day of service of a workman. The amount and period when future wages are payable cannot be determined ex-ante with exactitude. The phrase ''whatever other period'' in Section 5 of the E.C. Act brings in its fold future prospects which comprise enhanced wages payable at a yet undefined future date. 27. In summation, wages is the foundational basis and future prospects is an essential component of ''wages'' under the E.C. Act, 1923. The monthly wages will be determined strictly in accordance with the E.C. Act, 1923. Method of calculating future prospects is not provided under the E.C. Act. Body of judicial precedents under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and statutory rules (Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998) framed thereunder can enable determination of compensation under that head. 28. The discussion shall be taken forward by making a comparative and parallel evaluation of provisions of E.C. Act and M.V. Act. 29. Section 2(e) of the E.C. Act, 1923 defines 'employer'' as follows: 2. Definitions.-(e) ''employer'' includes any body of persons whether incorporated or not and any managing agent of an employer and the legal representative of a deceased employer, and, when the services of a workman are temporarily lent or let on hire to another person by the person with whom the workman has entered into a contract of service or apprenticeship, means such other person while the workman is working for him; 30. Section 2 (30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, defines 'owner' as follows: ''(30) ''owner'' means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement.'' 31. The definition of ''employer'' under the EC Act and of ''owner'' under the M.V. Act establishes that any owner of a vehicle can be the employer under the E.C. Act too. Obligation cast by the M.V. Act on the owner for the compulsory insurance of the vehicle may also bind an employer. 32. The definition of ''employer'' under the EC Act and of ''owner'' under the M.V. Act establishes that any owner of a vehicle can be the employer under the E.C. Act too. Obligation cast by the M.V. Act on the owner for the compulsory insurance of the vehicle may also bind an employer. 32. Similarly, the workman under the E.C. Act who is plying the owner's vehicle can be entitled to third party cover under the M.V. Act. If entitlement to third party benefits under M.V. Act is established, it will be difficult to justify denial of the same. 33. The entitlements of third party under the M.V. Act is provided in Section 146 which is extracted hereunder: ''146. Necessity for insurance against third party risk.-(1) No person shall use, except as a passenger, or cause or allow any other person to use, a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of this Chapter: 1 [Provided that in the case of a vehicle carrying, or meant to carry, dangerous or hazardous goods, there shall also be a policy of insurance under the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (6 of 1991).] Explanation.-A person driving a motor vehicle merely as a paid employee, while there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle no such policy as is required by this sub-section, shall not be deemed to act in contravention of the sub-section unless he knows or has reason to believe that there is no such policy in force. (2) Sub-section (1) shall not apply to any vehicle owned by the Central Government or a State Government and used for Government purposes unconnected with any commercial enterprise. (2) Sub-section (1) shall not apply to any vehicle owned by the Central Government or a State Government and used for Government purposes unconnected with any commercial enterprise. (3) The appropriate Government may, by order, exempt from the operation of sub-section (1) any vehicle owned by any of the following authorities, namely:- (a) the Central Government or a State Government, if the vehicle is used for Government purposes connected with any commercial enterprise; (b) any local authority; (c) any State transport undertaking: Provided that no such order shall be made in relation to any such authority unless a fund has been established and is maintained by that authority in accordance with the rules made in that behalf under this Act for meeting any liability arising out of the use of any vehicle of that authority which that authority or any person in its employment may incur to third parties. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, ''appropriate Government'' means the Central Government or a State Government, as the case may be, and- (i) in relation to any corporation or company owned by the Central Government or any State Government, means the Central Government or that State Government; (ii) in relation to any corporation or company owned by the Central Government and one or more State Governments, means the Central Government; (iii) in relation to any other State transport undertaking or any local authority, means that Government which has control over that undertaking or authority.'' 34. The scope of limitations of the insurance contracts are described in Section 147 of the M.V. Act which states thus: ''147. The scope of limitations of the insurance contracts are described in Section 147 of the M.V. Act which states thus: ''147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.-(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which- (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)- (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily 1 [injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle]or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place: Provided that a policy shall not be required- (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee - (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability.'' 1[Requirement of policies and limits of liability.-(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which- (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)- (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the motor vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a transport vehicle, except gratuitous passengers of a goods vehicle, caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle in a public place. Explanation.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place, notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained under any other law for the time being in force, for the purposes of third party insurance related to either death of a person or grievous hurt to a person, the Central Government shall prescribe a base premium and the liability of an insurer in relation to such premium for an insurance policy under sub-section (1) in consultation with the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority. (3) A policy shall be of no effect for the purposes of this Chapter unless and until there is issued by the insurer in favour of the person by whom the policy is effected, a certificate of insurance in the prescribed form and containing the prescribed particulars of any condition subject to which the policy is issued and of any other prescribed matters; and different forms, particulars and matters may be prescribed in different cases. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a policy of Insurance issued before the commencement of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 shall be continued on the existing terms under the contract and the provisions of this Act shall apply as if this Act had not been amended by the said Act. (5) Where a cover note issued by the insurer under the provisions of this Chapter or the rules or regulations made thereunder is not followed by a policy of insurance within the specified time, the insurer shall, within seven days of the expiry of the period of the validity of the cover note, notify the fact to the registering authority or to such other authority as the State Government may prescribe. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an insurer issuing a policy of insurance under this section shall be liable to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons.]'' 35. The liability incurred under the E.C. Act may also be covered by a contract executed under the M.V. Act. The insurance policy in this case pertains to the period prior to the Motor Vehicles. (Amendment) Act, 2019. However, even as per the unamended provisions of the M.V. Act and the insurance contract executed between the insurer and the insured in the instant case cover the liability of an employer/insured under the E.C. Act. 36. There is another aspect of the controversy. The cause of action for claim petition under the M.V. Act arises when the death is caused by negligent driving of the insured vehicle. 37. Liability to pay compensation arises under the E.C. Act only if death by accident occurs in course of the employment of the workman-deceased. 38. Negligent driving happens when there is failure to drive prudently and non adherence to the norms of safe driving. In other words, failure of the driver of the offending vehicle to take ''reasonable care''. 39. Similarly, an employee under the E.C. Act is expected to observe reasonable care while performing the chores of his employment. The case of a claimant is weakened when death of an employee is caused by sheer negligence or imprudence of the deceased. 40. The discussion can be fortified by authority in point. The Supreme Court in Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommed Issak, 1969 (2) SCC 607 , while considering the impact of a workman's imprudence on grant of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act held: ''5. To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. The Supreme Court in Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommed Issak, 1969 (2) SCC 607 , while considering the impact of a workman's imprudence on grant of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act held: ''5. To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. The words ''in the course of the employment'' mean ''in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to it.'' The words ''arising out of employment'' are understood to mean that ''during the course of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, which, unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered.'' In other words there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. The expression ''arising out of employment'' is again not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to employment as such - to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger the injury would be one which arises 'out of employment'. To put it differently if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act. In Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. v. Highley [(1917) AC 352] Lord Sumner laid down the following test for determining whether an accident ''arose out of the employment'': ''There is, however, in my opinion, one test which is always at any rate applicable, because it arises upon the very words of the statute, and it is generally of some real assistance. It is this: Was it part of the injured person's employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do that which caused his injury? If yes, the accident arose out of his employment. If nay, it did not, because, what it was not part of the employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do, cannot well be the cause of an accident arising out of the employment. If yes, the accident arose out of his employment. If nay, it did not, because, what it was not part of the employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do, cannot well be the cause of an accident arising out of the employment. To ask if the cause of the workman was within the sphere of the employment, or was one of the ordinary risks of the employment, or reasonably incidental to the employment, or conversely, was an added peril and outside the sphere of the employment, are all different ways of asking whether it was a part of his employment, that the workman should have acted as he was acting, or should have been in the position in which he was, whereby in the course of that employment he sustained injury.'' 41. The phrase ''just compensation'' in Section 168 of the M.V. Act, 1988 discloses the legislative intent of achieving a welfare measure through adjudication by Courts in accordance with evolved judicial standards. 42. The phrase ''just compensation'' has not been defined in the M.V. Act. Content and the scope of the expression of ''just compensation'' under the M.V. Act has been evolved by Courts in light of good authorities in law of torts. The compensation under the E.C. Act is liable to be a just compensation which has to be calculated in adherence to the scheme of the E.C. Act. 43. The Supreme Court in K. Suresh v. New India Assurance Company Ltd. and others, 2012 (12) SCC 274 , advocated the path of golden mean while granting ''just compensation'' by setting forth as under: ''2. … There cannot be actual compensation for anguish of the heart or for mental tribulations. The quintessentiality lies in the pragmatic computation of the loss sustained which has to be in the realm of realistic approximation. Therefore, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity ''the Act'') stipulates that there should be grant of ''just compensation''. Thus, it becomes a challenge for a Court of law to determine ''just compensation'' which is neither a bonanza nor a windfall, and simultaneously, should not be a pittance.'' 44. Therefore, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity ''the Act'') stipulates that there should be grant of ''just compensation''. Thus, it becomes a challenge for a Court of law to determine ''just compensation'' which is neither a bonanza nor a windfall, and simultaneously, should not be a pittance.'' 44. More recently in an injury case the Allahabad High Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Amit Kumar Yadav and another, First Appeal From Order No. 1285 of 2008, emphasized on foot of good authority that just compensation envisages that ''compensation should fully and adequately restore claimant to the position prior the accident'' by holding: ''It observed that scheme of Act, 1988 shows that award must be ''just'', which means that compensation should, to the extent possible, fully and adequately restore claimant to the position prior to the accident. The object of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered as a result of wrong done as far as money can do so, in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. A person is not only to be compensated for physical injury, but also for the loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. It means that he is to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned.'' 45. Concept of just compensation consistent with the scheme of the E.C. Act enables realisation of the legislative mandate. 46. In the facts of this case the appellant had the option to take out proceedings under M.V. Act and the E.C. Act for seeking compensation. He chose the latter. In this regard reference may be had to Section 167 of the M.V. Act, which is reproduced below: ''167. Option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) where the death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both.'' 47. The question is whether provisions of M.V. Act, Rules framed thereunder and cases in point can aid the computation of future prospects under the E.C. Act. 48. M.V. Act and E.C. Act are separate statutes which cover distinct fields and envisage proceedings in different tribunals. However, diversity of statutes does not necessarily depict disparate legislative intendments and multiplicity of forums cannot cause denial of legal entitlements. Comparative examination of the statutes made in the preceding paragraphs also manifests the overlapping areas of operation of the two enactments. The overarching congruency of purpose and the underlying similarity of objects of the two statutes evidenced in the common fields of operation can be achieved by an integrated interpretation of the enactments. Provisions of one statute and authorities thereunder can be applied by analogy to the other enactment to realise the legislative intent of the latter. 49. Integrated approach of statutory construction will ensure that the claimants are not denied their legal entitlements under the enactments merely because one forum is chosen in preference to proceedings under the other Act. Integrated interpretation will entail a composite reading of the statutes and conflated application of analogous judicial authorities. The statutes will be read as part of an extended legislative scheme to the extent of their overlapping and consistent fields of operation. 50. Now the caution. Before invoking the integrated method of statutory interpretation certain prerequisites have to be established and while applying it various limitations have to be observed. Firstly, it has to be established for a fact that the claimants had a right to equally approach either of the two tribunals under the respective statutes. Secondly, the legal entitlements of the claimants have to be affirmed in the facts of a case. Thirdly this line of enquiry shall be applied only in common and overlapping areas of the statutes. Lastly this method of construction shall not extend to provisions which disclose a contrary intent or fields which are covered by specific provisions under the respective enactments. 51. The endeavour of the Court should be to realise the statutory intent of both enactments by benefiting the claimants without prejudice to other party. The Court cannot depart from any express provisions or Act in a manner contrary to the statutory scheme of either enactment. 52. 51. The endeavour of the Court should be to realise the statutory intent of both enactments by benefiting the claimants without prejudice to other party. The Court cannot depart from any express provisions or Act in a manner contrary to the statutory scheme of either enactment. 52. The entitlement of claimants to future prospects as seen earlier flows from the provisions of the E.C. Act, but the method of calculation of the amount is absent in the said statute. 53. The method of computing future wages under the M.V. Act/Rules framed thereunder and cases in point can reliably guide the determination of compensation under the E.C. Act. 54. The head of future prospects was evolved by Courts while awarding just compensation under the M.V. Act. With the advantage of such judicial authorities, Rules have been framed in regard to the same in the State of U.P. 55. The Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (Hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Rules 1998) provide for calculation of future prospects. Rule 220A-3(iii) of the Rules is relevant and is reproduced hereunder: ''(3) The future prospects of a deceased, shall be added in the actual salary or minimum wages of the deceased as under: '' (i) Below 40 years of age 50% of the salary.'' 56. The UP Rules, 1998 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC Online SC 822. In Urmila Shukla (supra) upon consideration of various judgements including National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and others, 2017 (16) SCC 680 , held: ''10. The discussion on the point in Pranay Sethi was from the standpoint of arriving at ''just compensation'' in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 11. If an indicia is made available in the form of a statutory instrument which affords a favourable treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken to have limited the operation of such statutory provision specially when the validity of the Rules was not put under any challenge. The prescription of 15% in cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 50-60 years as stated in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. The prescription of 15% in cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 50-60 years as stated in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. If a statutory instrument has devised a formula which affords better or greater benefit, such statutory instrument must be allowed to operate unless the statutory instrument is otherwise found to be invalid.'' (emphasis supplied) 57. The Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 were not under consideration before the Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi (supra) or Sarla Verma (Smt) and others v. Delhi Transport Company and another, 2009 (6) SCC 121 . Future prospects in Pranay Sethi (supra) were determined without noticing the U.P. Rules, 1998. This fact was adverted to in Urmila Shukla (supra): ''8. It is submitted by Mr. Rao that the judgment in Pranay Sethi does not show that the attention of the Court was invited to the specific rules such as Rule 3(iii) which contemplates addition of 20% of the salary as against 15% which was stated as a measure in Pranay Sethi. In his submission, since the statutory instrument has been put in place which affords more advantageous treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi ought not to be considered to limit the application of such statutory Rule.'' 58. The U.P. Rules, 1998 are statutory in nature and their operation is not stymied by Pranay Sethi (supra). The U. P. Rules, 1998 have the force of law and shall apply with full force in appropriate cases. The U.P. Rules, 1998 are more beneficial for the claimants than the provisions made in Pranay Sethi (supra) for them. The holdings in Pranay Sethi (supra) cannot dilute the advantages conferred by U.P. Rules, 1998 upon the eligible beneficiaries. 59. In this wake, this Court finds that the claimants/respondents are entitled to 50% of the wages under the head of future prospects in proceedings under the E.C. Act, since the prerequisites discussed above are satisfied. VI. Conclusions and Directions 60. The first substantial question of law is answered as follows: 61. The claimants/workmen are entitled to grant of future prospects while calculating compensation under the E.C. Act since the conditions precedent for the same are duly satisfied. VI. Conclusions and Directions 60. The first substantial question of law is answered as follows: 61. The claimants/workmen are entitled to grant of future prospects while calculating compensation under the E.C. Act since the conditions precedent for the same are duly satisfied. The amount payable under the head of future prospects is fifty percent of the wages determined under the E.C. Act. 62. Coming to the second substantial question of law, this Court finds that there is merit in the submissions of Sri B.C. Naik, learned counsel for the insurance company that the funeral expenses have been explicitly provided for under the scheme of E.C. Act. Hence there can be no lawful recourse to or authorities arising out of the M.V. Act while granting compensation under the EC Act under that head. The conditions precedent for adoption of integrated interpretation are not established in this issue. 63. Attention is called to Section 4(4) of the E.C. Act, 1923 which states thus: ''(4) If the injury of the [employee] results in his death, the employer shall, in addition to the compensation under sub-section (1), deposit with the Commissioner a sum of [two thousand and five hundred rupees] for payment of the same to the eldest surviving dependant of the [employee] towards the expenditure of the funeral of such [employee] or where the [employee] did not have a dependant or was not living with his dependant at the time of his death to the person who actually incurred such expenditure. [Provided that the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time, enhance the amount specified in this sub-section.]'' 64. The second substantial question of law is accordingly answered as follows: 65. The determination of funeral expenses and other benefits shall be made in accordance with Section 4 (4) of the E.C. Act, 1923. 66. In light of the answers to the substantial questions of law, the compensation to which the claimants/cross objectors are entitled is tabulated below: i. Date of accident 27/28.06.2006 ii. Name of deceased Rashid iii. Age of the deceased 23 years iv. Occupation of the deceased Helper/cleaner v. Name, Age and Relationship of claimants with the deceased Sr. No. Name Relation 1. Yamin Father 2. Munni Mother 3. Wahid Brother Computation of compensation Sr. No. Heads Amount (in Rupees) 1. Annual Income 32774.72 2. Name of deceased Rashid iii. Age of the deceased 23 years iv. Occupation of the deceased Helper/cleaner v. Name, Age and Relationship of claimants with the deceased Sr. No. Name Relation 1. Yamin Father 2. Munni Mother 3. Wahid Brother Computation of compensation Sr. No. Heads Amount (in Rupees) 1. Annual Income 32774.72 2. Deduction -50% as per section 4(1)(a) of E.C. Act 1923 3. Factor-219.95 as per Schedule IV to the E.C. Act, 1923 4. Income-Rs. 2714.56 wages per month as per Minimum Wages Act, 1948 5. Compensation-2714.56 x 219.95 x 50% 2,98.533.74 6. Future prospects 1,49,266.87 7. Non pecuniary (funeral expenses) 5000 8. Total compensation 4,52,800.61 9. Interest 12% 67. The compensation calculated under the M.V. Act by applying the multipliers and the rate based calculation under the E.C. Act eventually arrived at almost the same figures. A chart in this regard is part of the appendix. The chart does not depict material differences in the compensation amount in the facts and circumstances of this case. (see appendixii). 68. Cross objection filed on behalf of the claimants-respondents is allowed to the extent indicated above and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. VII Appendix Section 4 and 5 of the E.C. Act ''[4. The chart does not depict material differences in the compensation amount in the facts and circumstances of this case. (see appendixii). 68. Cross objection filed on behalf of the claimants-respondents is allowed to the extent indicated above and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. VII Appendix Section 4 and 5 of the E.C. Act ''[4. Amount of compensation.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely:- (a) where death results from the injury an amount equal to 3 [fifty per cent.] of the monthly wages of the deceased 1[employee] multiplied by the relevant factor; or an amount of 4 [one lakh and twenty thousand rupees], whichever is more; (b) where permanent total disablement results from the injury an amount equal to 5 [sixty per cent.] of the monthly wages of the injured 1[employee] multiplied by the relevant factor; or an amount of 6 [one lakh and forty thousand rupees],whichever is more: 7 [Provided that the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time, enhance the amount of compensation mentioned in clauses (a) and (b);] Explanation I.-For the purposes of clause (a) and clause (b), ''relevant factor'', in relation to a 1 [employee] means the factor specified in the second column of Schedule IV against the entry in the first column of that Schedule specifying the number of years which are the same as the completed years of the age of the 1 [employee] on his last birthday immediately preceding the date on which the compensation fell due. 8 * * * ** (c) where permanent partial disablement results from the injury. (i) in the case of an injury specified in Part II of Schedule I, such percentage of the compensation which would have been payable in the case of permanent total disablement as is specified therein as being the percentage of the loss of earning capacity caused by that injury, and (ii) in the case of an injury not specified in Schedule I, such percentage of the compensation payable in the case of permanent total disablement as is proportionate to the loss of earning capacity (as assessed by the qualified medical practitioner) permanently caused by the injury. Explanation I.-Where more injuries than one are caused by the same accident, the amount of compensation payable under this head shall be aggregated but not so in any case as to exceed the amount which would have been payable if permanent total disablement had resulted from the injuries. Explanation II.-In assessing the loss of earning capacity for the purposes of subclause (ii), the qualified medical practitioner shall have due regard to the percentages of loss of earning capacity in relation to different injuries specified in Schedule I; (d) where temporary disablement, whether total or partial results from the injury a half-monthly payment of the sum equivalent to twenty-five per cent. of monthly wages of the 1 [employee], to be paid in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2). of monthly wages of the 1 [employee], to be paid in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2). 2 [(1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), while fixing the amount of compensation payable to a1 [employee] in respect of an accident occurred outside India, the Commissioner shall take into account the amount of compensation, if any, awarded to such 1 [employee] in accordance with the law of the country in which the accident occurred and shall reduce the amount fixed by him by the amount of compensation awarded to the 1 [employee] in accordance with the law of that country.] 3 [(1B) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify, for the purposes of sub-section (I), such monthly wages in relation to an employee as it may consider necessary;] (2) The half-monthly payment referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) shall be payable on the sixteenth day- (i) from the date of disablement where such disablement lasts for a period of twenty-eight days or more, or (ii) after the expiry of a waiting period of three days from the date of disablement where such disablement lasts for a period of less than twenty-eight days; and thereafter half-monthly during the disablement or during a period of five years, whichever period is shorter: Provided that- (a) there shall deducted from any lump sum or half-monthly payments to which the 1 [employee] is entitled the amount of any payment or allowance which the 1 [employee] has received from the employer by way of compensation during the period of disablement prior to the receipt of such lump sum or of the first halfmonthly payment, as the case may be; and (b) no half-monthly payment shall in any case exceed the amount, if any, by which half the amount of the monthly wages of the 1 [employee] before the accident execeds half the amount of such wages which he is earning after the accident. Explanation.-Any payment or allowance which the 1 [employee] has received from the employer towards his medical treatment shall not be deemed to be a payment or allowance received by him by way of compensation within the meaning of clause (a) of the proviso. Explanation.-Any payment or allowance which the 1 [employee] has received from the employer towards his medical treatment shall not be deemed to be a payment or allowance received by him by way of compensation within the meaning of clause (a) of the proviso. [(2A) The employee shall be reimbursed the actual medical expenditure incurred by him for treatment of injuries caused during the course of employment.] (3) On the ceasing of the disablement before the date on which any half-monthly payment falls due there shall be payable in respect of that half-month a sum proportionate to the duration of the disablement in that half-month.] [(4) If the injury of the 2 [employee] results his death, the employer shall, in addition to the compensation under sub-section (1), deposit with the Commissioner a sum of 3 [two thousand and five hundred rupees] for payment of the same to the eldest surviving dependant of the 2 [employee] towards the expenditure of the funeral of such 2 [employee] or where the2 [employee] did not have a dependant or was not living with his dependant at the time of his death to the person who actually incurred such expenditure.] 4 [Provided that the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time, enhance the amount specified in this sub-section.] [4A. Compensation to be paid when due and penalty for default.-(1) Compensation under Section 4 shall be paid as soon as it falls due. (2) In cases where the employer does not accept the liability for compensation to the extent claimed, he shall be bound to make provisional payment based on the extent of liability which he accepts, and, such payment shall be deposited with the Commissioner or made to the 2 [employee], as the case may be, without prejudice to the right of the 2 [employee] to make any further claim. [(3) Where any employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due, the Commissioner shall- (a) direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amount of the arrears, pay simple interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent. [(3) Where any employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due, the Commissioner shall- (a) direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amount of the arrears, pay simple interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent. per annum or at such higher, rate not exceeding the maximum of the lending rates of any scheduled bank as may be specified by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette, on the amount due; and (b) if, in his opinion, there is no justification for the delay, direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amount of the arrears and interest thereon, pay a further sum not exceeding fifty per cent. of such amount by way of penalty: Provided that an order for the payment of penalty shall not be passed under clause (b) without giving a reasonable opportunity to the employer to show-cause why it should not be passed. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, ''scheduled bank'' means a bank for the time being included in the Second Schedule to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. [(3A) The interest and the penalty payable under sub-section (3) shall be paid to the 2 [employee] or his dependant, as the case may be.] 5. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, ''scheduled bank'' means a bank for the time being included in the Second Schedule to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. [(3A) The interest and the penalty payable under sub-section (3) shall be paid to the 2 [employee] or his dependant, as the case may be.] 5. [Method of calculating wages.-8***9 [In this Act and for the purposes thereof the expression ''monthly wages'' means me amount of wages deemed to be payable for a month's service (whether wages are payable by the month or by whatever other period or at piece rates), and calculated] as follows, namely:- (a) where the 1 [employee] has, during a continuous period of not less than twelve months immediately preceding the accident, been in the service of the employer who is liable to- pay compensation, the monthly wages of the 1 [employee] shall be one-twelfth of the total wages which have fallen due for payment to him by the employer in the last twelve months of that period; [(b) where the whole of the continuous period of service immediately preceding the accident during which the 1 [employee] was in the service of the employer who is liable to pay the compensation was less than one month, the monthly wages of the 1 [employee] shall be 3*** the average monthly amount which, during the twelve months immediately preceding the accident, was being earned by a1 [employee] employed on the same work by the same employer, or, if there was no 1 [employee] so employed, by a1 [employee] employed on similar work in the same locality;] [(c) [in other cases [including cases in which it is not possible for want of necessary information to calculate the monthly wages under clause (b)]], the monthly wages shall be thirty times the total wages earned in respect of the last continuous period of service immediately preceding the accident from the employer who is liable to pay compensation, divided by the number of days comprising such period. 6 Explanation.-A period of service shall, for the purposes of 7 [this 8 [section]] be deemed to be continuous which has not been interrupted by a period of absence from work exceeding fourteen days.'' ii VII Appendix Computation of compensation under Motor Vehicles Act Age of deceased 23 years Income Rs.2714.56 wages per month as per Minimum Wages Act, 1948 Annual Income Rs. 32,474.72 Future Prospects 50% (Rs.16,287.36) Total Income with future prospects Rs. 32474.72+ Rs.16,287.36=Rs. 48,762.08 Deduction 50% as per Sarla Verma’s case since the deceased was bachelor Multiplier 18 as per Sarla Verma’s case Compensation 24,381.04 x 18= Rs. 4,38,958.72 Non-pecuniary Rs. 5000 funeral expenses Total compensation Rs. 4,43,958.72 Interest As granted by the learned tribunal