ORDER : B.S. BHANUMATHI, J. This civil revision petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is filed against the order dated 24.11.2022 in I.A.No.138 of 2022 in O.S.No.2 of 2021 on the file of the Court of I Additional District Judge, Srikakulam, allowing the application filed by the proposed defendants under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC r/w Rule 28 of Civil Rules of Practice to implead the petitioners No.1 and 2 as defendants No. 2 and 3 in the suit. 2. Heard Sri A.V.Pardhasaradhi, learned counsel for the revision petitioner/plaintiff and Sri G.Rama Gopal, learned counsel for the respondents 1 & 2/proposed defendants. 3. The Writ petitioner/respondent/plaintiff filed the suit against the 3rd respondent/defendant herein for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 07.03.2019. The averments are to the effect that the plaintiff agreed to purchase Ac.17.81 cents out of Ac.23.75 cents in Sy.No.14-4A of Maruvada Village, Ranasthalam Mandal, Srikakulam District, for an amount of Rs.1,06,00,000/- and both parties entered into an agreement of sale dated 07.03.2019. At the request of the defendant, the plaintiff made some payments in advance. The balance sale consideration is to be paid within 11 months from the date of agreement and the defendant shall execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff after payment of total sale consideration. However, as the defendant failed to execute the sale deed in spite of total payment, the plaintiff is constrained to file the suit. 4. It is represented that written statement was filed by the defendant. Copy of the same has not been filed. 5. The 3rd parties who are the 1st and 2nd respondents herein filed I.A.No.138 of 2022 seeking to implead them as 2nd and 3rd defendants stating briefly is as follows:- The defendant in the suit agreed to sell the suit schedule property to them under the agreement of sale deed dated 15.02.2019. They came to know that this suit was filed basing on the agreement of sale deed dated 07.03.2019 alleged to have been executed by the defendant on receipt of advance amount of Rs.68,20,000/- out of total sale consideration of Rs.1,06,00,000/-. They came to know that this suit was filed basing on the agreement of sale deed dated 07.03.2019 alleged to have been executed by the defendant on receipt of advance amount of Rs.68,20,000/- out of total sale consideration of Rs.1,06,00,000/-. The plaintiff acted as a mediator in the dispute arose between the defendant and his vendee by name Natarajan Chandra Prabhu under a sale agreement executed on 26.09.2018 by receiving advance amount of Rs.16,00,000/-(cash of Rs.10,00,000/- and amount of Rs.6,00,000/- through RTGS) out of sale consideration of Rs.1,10,00,000/-. Thus, the dispute was settled in the presence of the plaintiff. As per the settlement, on 15.02.2019, Natarajan Chandra Prabhu handed over his original agreement of sale and the original sale deed of the defendant to the petitioners on payment of an amount of Rs.16,00,000/- which he had paid as advance and additional sum of Rs.4,00,000/- to him. Thus, on 15.02.2019, the defendant executed the agreement of sale deed dated 15.02.2019 for Rs.1,71,90,000/- on receipt of advance amount of Rs.70,00,000/- which includes the amount paid to the previous vendee i.e., Natarajan Chandra Prabhu. The plaintiff, being a mediator, is well aware of all these facts, however filed the present suit without adding them or the previous agreement holder, Natarajan Chandra Prabhu, as necessary parties either in collusion with the defendant or by fabricating the suit agreement of sale. Some of the amounts mentioned in the plaint which were alleged to have been made through SBI cheque bearing No.846695 for Rs.12,00,000/- to the defendant were originally given by Natarajan Chandra Prabhu and even the plaint mentioned challan amount was paid in the name of one Simhachalam who is the nominee of these proposed defendants and Natarajan Chandra Prabhu. Therefore, the petitioners stated that they are necessary parties to the suit. 6. The respondent/plaintiff opposed the petition by filing the counter. The averments of the counter, in brief, are as follows:- The agreement of sale deed dated 15.02.2019 is not true. The allegation that the petitioners recently came to know that the plaintiff filed the suit and that the plaintiff acted as a mediator in the dispute arose between the defendant and Natarajan Chandra Prabhu etc., yet he did not add the petitioners as defendants in the suit the allegations and further the collusion between the plaintiff and defendant and fabrication of the suit agreement pleaded are all false. The denial of the payment through RTGS and SBI cheque payment is incorrect. The theory set up by the petitioners is strange and does not fit in the facts of the plaint or written statement in the suit. Had really the petitioners entered into any agreement with the defendant on 15.02.2019, it is a separate sale transaction and the cause of action is different and they have to seek their remedy by approaching competent court and not by way of getting themselves impleaded in the present suit. The impleadment of the proposed defendants does not serve any purpose in the present suit, as the suit can be effectively adjudicated on the foot of the agreement of sale deed dated 07.03.2019 even in their absence as the proposed parties and the defendant are hand in glove and colluded together to delay the suit proceedings. Therefore, the plaintiff prayed to dismiss the petition. 7. The 2nd respondent/defendant filed counter briefly stating as follows:- The 2nd respondent never intended to sell the property either to the petitioners or to the plaintiff, at any point of time. There are some business transactions between the 2nd respondent, the plaintiff and the proposed defendants in relation to the real estate business. In that connection, they demanded the 2nd respondent to sign on empty non- judicial stamps and white papers for the purpose of business transaction and also for security for the amount of share of 2nd respondent in investments in the business borne by the proposed parties and the plaintiff. Later, some differences arose among them. The agreement of sale was fabricated using the papers signed by 2nd respondent available with them and thus got filed the present litigation. The transaction in the present suit and the transaction claimed by the petitioners/proposed parties are different. The plaintiff and the proposed parties colluded to drag on the proceedings and got filed the present petition. The proposed parties have no locus standi to get themselves impleaded in the present suit which is filed for specific performance on the basis of alleged agreement of sale between the plaintiff and defendants. The proposed defendants have to file a separate suit but not to be implead in the present suit. The 2nd respondent also prayed to dismiss the petition stating that it is frivolous and requested to impose exemplary costs. 8. The proposed defendants have to file a separate suit but not to be implead in the present suit. The 2nd respondent also prayed to dismiss the petition stating that it is frivolous and requested to impose exemplary costs. 8. After hearing both the parties, the trial court allowed the petition observing that the proposed defendants have substantial interest over the property and that they may be necessary to adjudicate the lis effectively and completely and that in their presence, the defendant has to explain why the petitioners/proposed parties have the custody of his title documents and the plaintiff also needs to answer as to how could he enter into the agreement of sale without looking into the title deeds of the vendor. 9. Being aggrieved by the order, this revision petition is filed by the 1st respondent/plaintiff, stating that the trial court committed grave error in appreciating the case law and settled principles in a petition filed under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, that while deciding an application filed by third parties, the plaintiff is the dominus litis and against his wish, he cannot be asked to fight the legal battle, that in a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale, the only necessary or proper party would be the vendor-cum-owner of the property, who enters into agreement of sale, that the trial Court failed to understand the provision of law properly, that it is erroneous to hold that the respondents 1 and 2/proposed parties are prior agreement holders to the petitioner/plaintiff and that the trial Court misapplied the judgment of the apex Court in Sumtibai and others Vs. Paras Finance Company and others, (2007) 10 SCC 82 and other High Courts which are not applicable to the facts of the case. 10. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner reiterated his contentions as stated in the grounds of revision. He relied on the decisions of Supreme Court of India in Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd. and others, AIR 2010 SC 3109 , in support of his contention that the plaintiff in a suit being dominus litis may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. He further contended that in the case on hand, if the plaintiff does not wish to implead the necessary parties, he is at liberty to choose the parties, but the plaintiff cannot be compelled to implead parties against his wish. 11. He further relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Gurmit Singh Bhatia v. Kiran Kant Robinson and others, (2020)3 SCC 773 in support of the contention that the plaintiff cannot be compelled to implead a person for specific performance against his wish and particularly a person against whom no relief is claimed. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents/proposed parties submitted that even in a suit for specific performance, third parties to the agreement can be impleaded as proposed parties, though not necessary parties. In this regard, he placed reliance on the decision of Sumtibai and others v. Paras Finance Company Ltd. (1 supra) at para 14 wherein the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733 was distinguished stating that in the opinion of the supreme court, it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit and that to take a contrary view would lead to multiplicity of proceedings. 13. He further relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Robin Ramjibhai Patel v. Anandibai Rama @ Rajaram Pawar, (2018) 15 SCC 614 wherein referring to the previous decision of the Supreme Court in Kasturi case (5th supra) allowed impleadment of three proposed parties in suit for specific performance and he has drawn the attention of this court to paras 8 to 10: “8. In the afroresaid context, this Court also considered the provisions o Order 1 Rule 10 CPC and in para 7 it expressed its view that the relevant provisions show that the necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale are not only parties to the contract or their legal representatives but also a person who had purchased the contracted property from the vendor. It was further elaborated that: (Kasturi case, SCC p.738, para 7) “7. … In equity as well as in law, the contract constitutes rights and also he regulates the liabilities of the parties. It was further elaborated that: (Kasturi case, SCC p.738, para 7) “7. … In equity as well as in law, the contract constitutes rights and also he regulates the liabilities of the parties. A purchaser is a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims adversely to the claim of a vendor is, however, not a necessary party. From the above, it is now clear that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party.” 9. In our considered opinion, the judgment of the three-Judge Bench in Kasturi case recognizes this special status of a plaintiff which is well settled by several earlier judgments also and when the plantiff wants to implead certain persons as defendants on the ground that they may be adversely affected by the outcome of the suit, then interest of justice also requires allowing such a prayer for impleadment so that the persons likely to be affected are aware of the proceedings and may take appropriate defence as suited to their vendors. 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we have no hesitation to setting aside the orders of the trial court as well as the High Court refusing the impleadment. As prayed by the appellant the applications for impleadment and for amendment are allowed. Resultantly the appeal is also allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.” 14. He further relied on the decision of this High Court in Dharji Krishna Murthy and others vs. M.Shankar Reddy and others, 2014 (6) ALT 447 in support of his contention that the third party can be impleaded in the suit for specific performance and has drawn attention of this court to para 22: “22. Coming to the case on hand, the suit agreement of sale was executed as long back as in 09.11.1999 and the 1st respondent herein instituted the present suit on 22.12.2011 and the proposed parties/petitioners herein are tracing out their right to the property by virtue of a registered sale agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney dated 06.08.2011. Therefore, it cannot be said that the said transaction is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that the said transaction is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Another significant aspect in the present case is that the defendants 1 to 3 remained ex parte and they are not contesting the suit. Therefore, the persons prima facie likely to be affected are the petitioners in the event of granting decree by the Court below in favour of the plaintiff. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Order I Rule 10 CPC and Section 16(b) of the Specific Relief Act and the pre-suit transaction by registered document dated 06.08.2011, this Court deems it appropriate that the proposed parties/petitioners herein are proper and necessary parties for the litigation for the present lis for effective adjudication of the issue involved in the present lis.” 15. In reply, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that in Robin Ramjibhai Patel (5th supra), the plaintiff filed a petition to implead the third party and thus it has no application to the facts of the present case, where third parties filed the petition to implead them. 16. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in Gurmit Singh (3rd supra) is applicable to the facts and circumstances in the present case since the impleadment of the third party who purchased the property pending the suit was allowed in that case. 17. Before proceeding further, it is apropos to mention Order 1, Rule 10(2) CPC and it reads as follows: “10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.— (1) ……….. (2) Court may strike out or add parties.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.” 18. All the above referred decisions have been rendered on the basis of the decision of Full Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Kasturi case (4th Supra) wherein it was held as follows: “15. That apart, from a plain reading of the expression used in subrule (2) Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC "all the questions involved in the suit" it is abundantly clear that the legislature clearly meant that the controversies raised as between the parties to the litigation must be gone into only, that is to say, controversies with regard to the right which is set up and the relief claimed on one side and denied on the other and not the controversies which may arise between the plaintiff/appellant and the defendants inter se or questions between the parties to the suit and a third party. In our view, therefore, the court cannot allow adjudication of collateral matters so as to convert a suit for specific performance of contract for sale into a complicated suit for title between the plaintiff/ appellant on one hand and Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 and Respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to 11 on the other. This addition, if allowed, would lead to a complicated litigation by which the trial and decision of serious questions which are totally outside the scope of the suit would have to be gone into. As the decree of a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, if passed, cannot, at all, affect the right, title and interest of the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to 11 in respect of the contracted property and in view of the detailed discussion made herein earlier, the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to 11 would not, at all, be necessary to be added in the instant suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. 16. It is difficult to conceive that while deciding the question as to who is in possession of the contracted property, it would be open to the Court to decide the question of possession of a third party/ or a stranger as first the lis to be decided is the enforceability of the contract entered into between the appellant and the respondent No. 3 and whether contract was executed by the appellant and the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 for sale of the contracted property, whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and whether the appellant is entitled to a decree for specific performance of a contract for sale against the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Secondly in that case, whoever asserts his independent possession of the contracted property has to be added in the suit, then this process may continue without a final decision of the suit. Apart from that, the intervener must be directly and legally interested in the answers to the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale.” 19. Nextly, in Sumtibai case (1 supra), it was held that the decision of the Supreme Court in Kasturi case is clearly distinguishable and the relevant portion of the decision at para 14 is as follows: “14. In view of the aforesaid decisions we are of the opinion that Kasturi case is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion it cannot be laid down a an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit. In our opinion, if C can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can certainly file an application for impleadment. To take a contrary view would lead to multiplicity of proceedings because then C will have to wait until a decree is passed against B, and then file a suit for cancellation of the decree on the ground that A had no title in the property in dispute. Clearly, such a view cannot be countenanced.” 20. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Mumbai International Airport (2nd supra) observed that the decision of Sumtibai (1st supra) is not held to be good law, in view of the earlier decision of the three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Kasturi case (4th supra). However, at para 11 of the decision, it was held by the Supreme Court that there is no conflict between the decisions in Kasturi case and Sumtibai case. 21. In Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. (2nd supra) it was contended before the Supreme Court that the decision in Sumtibai case is not good law in view of an earlier three-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Kasturi case. 21. In Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. (2nd supra) it was contended before the Supreme Court that the decision in Sumtibai case is not good law in view of an earlier three-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Kasturi case. The Supreme Court, having considered the facts and the ratios in the said two decisions, held as follows: “8. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2) of Code of Civil Procedure ('Code' for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. The said sub-rule is extracted below: … …. ….. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party: (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the question involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party. A 'necessary party' is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. If a 'necessary party' is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A 'proper party' is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. A 'proper party' is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance. 11. On a careful consideration, we find that there is no conflict between the two decisions. The two decisions were dealing with different situations requiring application of different facets of Subrule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1. This is made clear in Sumtibai itself. It was observed that every judgment must be governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found; that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision and that even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect; that there is always peril in treating the words of a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. The decisions in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay [ 1992 (2) SCC 524 ] and Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra [ 1995 (3) SCC 147 ] also explain in what circumstances persons may be added as parties. 12. Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order 1 of Rule 10(2) CPC regarding striking out or adding parties. The said sub-rule is not about the right of a non-party to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial discretion of the court to strike out or add parties at any stage of a proceeding. 12. Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order 1 of Rule 10(2) CPC regarding striking out or adding parties. The said sub-rule is not about the right of a non-party to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial discretion of the court to strike out or add parties at any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo motu or on the application of the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The court can add anyone as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper party. Such deletion or addition can be without any conditions or subject to such terms as the court deems fit to impose. In exercising its judicial discretion under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code, the court will of course act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice. This Court in Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest Import: 1981 (1) SCC 80 reiterated the classic definition of 'discretion' by Lord Mansfield in R. v. Wilkes 1770 (98) ER 327 that 'discretion' when applied to courts of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, 'but legal and regular'. We may now give some illustrations regarding exercise of discretion under the said Sub-Rule. 12.1) If a plaintiff makes an application for impleading a person as a defendant on the ground that he is a necessary party, the court may implead him having regard to the provisions of Rules 9 and 10(2) of Order 1. If the claim against such a person is barred by limitation, it may refuse to add him as a party and even dismiss the suit for nonjoinder of a necessary party. 12.2) If the owner of a tenanted property enters into an agreement for sale of such property without physical possession, in a suit for specific performance by the purchaser, the tenant would not be a necessary party. 12.2) If the owner of a tenanted property enters into an agreement for sale of such property without physical possession, in a suit for specific performance by the purchaser, the tenant would not be a necessary party. But if the suit for specific performance is filed with an additional prayer for delivery of physical possession from the tenant in possession, then the tenant will be a necessary party in so far as the prayer for actual possession. 12.3) If a person makes an application for being impleaded contending that he is a necessary party, and if the court finds that he is a necessary party, it can implead him. If the plaintiff opposes such impleadment, then instead of impleading such a party, who is found to be a necessary party, the court may proceed to dismiss the suit by holding that the applicant was a necessary party and in his absence the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in the suit. 12.4) If an application is made by a plaintiff for impleading someone as a proper party, subject to limitation, bona fides etc., the court will normally implead him, if he is found to be a proper party. On the other hand, if a non-party makes an application seeking impleadment as a proper party and court finds him to be a proper party, the court may direct his addition as a defendant; but if the court finds that his addition will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may dismiss the application even if he is found to be a proper party, if it does not want to widen the scope of the specific performance suit; or the court may direct such applicant to be impleaded as a proper party, either unconditionally or subject to terms. For example, if 'D' claiming to be a co-owner of a suit property, enters into an agreement for sale of his share in favour of 'P' representing that he is the co-owner with half share, and 'P' files a suit for specific performance of the said agreement of sale in respect of the undivided half share, the court may permit the other co-owner who contends that 'D' has only one-fourth share, to be impleaded as an additional defendant as a proper party, and may examine the issue whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement in respect of half a share or only one-fourth share; alternatively the court may refuse to implead the other co-owner and leave open the question in regard to the extent of share of the vendor-defendant to be decided in an independent proceeding by the other co-owner, or the plaintiff; alternatively the court may implead him but subject to the term that the dispute, if any, between the impleaded co-owner and the original defendant in regard to the extent of the share will not be the subject matter of the suit for specific performance, and that it will decide in the suit, only the issues relating to specific performance, that is whether the defendant executed the agreement/contract and whether such contract should be specifically enforced. In other words, the court has the discretion to either to allow or reject an application of a person claiming to be a proper party, depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party. 13. If the principles relating to impleadment, are kept in view, then the purported divergence in the two decisions will be found to be non- existent. The observations in Kasturi and Sumtibai are with reference to the facts and circumstances of the respective cases. In Kasturi, this Court held that in suits for specific performance, only the parties to the contract or any legal representative of a party to the contract, or a transferee from a party to the contract are necessary parties. In Sumtibai, this Court held that a person having semblance of a title can be considered as a proper party. Sumtibai did not lay down any proposition that anyone claiming to have any semblance of title is a necessary party. In Sumtibai, this Court held that a person having semblance of a title can be considered as a proper party. Sumtibai did not lay down any proposition that anyone claiming to have any semblance of title is a necessary party. Nor did Kasturi lay down that no one, other than the parties to the contract and their legal representatives/ transferees, can be impleaded even as a proper party.” 22. Subsequently, in Gurmit Singh case (3rd supra), the Supreme Court having regard to its earlier decisions in Robin Ramjibhai Patel (5th supra), Gurmit Singh (3rd supra) and Kasturi (4th supra) and other cases answered the question „ whether the plaintiff can be compelled to implead a person in the suit for specific performance, against his wish and more particularly with respect to a person against whom no relief has been claimed by him?? Further, it is pertinent to mention that the decision in Sumtibai (1st supra) has not been brought to the notice of the Supreme Court in Gurmit Singh case (3rd supra). Moreover, in the case of Mumbai International Airport (2nd supra) also it was observed that there is no conflict between the decisions in Kasturi (4th supra) and Sumtibai (1 supra) cases which is already noted above. That apart, it is also observed that referring the decision Sumtibai case (1 supra) that every judgment is rendered depending upon the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found and that a little difference in facts and additional facts make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision and even single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. The decision of the Supreme Court in Gurmit Singh (3rd supra) and also the decision in Sumtibai case (1 supra) were rendered by the coordinate benches and the decision in Sumtibai case (1 supra) has not so far been over-ruled nor was it discussed in Gurmit Singh case (3rd supra). In view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Mumbai International Airport case (2nd supra) the decision in Sumtibai (1 supra) holds the field. As per the said decision, there is no absolute proposition that whenever a suit was filed, no party can be impleaded in that suit. Moreover, each case is to be decided based on facts in that particular case. 23. As per the said decision, there is no absolute proposition that whenever a suit was filed, no party can be impleaded in that suit. Moreover, each case is to be decided based on facts in that particular case. 23. The learned counsel for the respondents No.1 and 2 relied on the decision of this High Court in Darji Krishna Murty (6th supra) wherein after considering the decisions in Mumbai International (2nd supra) and other cases allowed impleadment of third party to suit agreement, but in whose favour there is a registered sale agreement-cum-GPA executed prior to filing of the suit. 24. It is not only the necessary party, but a proper party can also be added as a party to a suit. In any type of case, even when the plaintiff does not wish to implead a party, permitting a party to be impleaded in the suit as defendant is certainly allowed by law as explained in the above noted cases. It is not just that a suit may ultimately end in dismissal, if a necessary party is not added, but unless all necessary facts are pleaded and established, it may not be possible to correctly decide a lis before a Court, because in the absence of a party, be it necessary or proper, no pleading and evidence will be on record. 25. As such, in the present case, it is to be seen whether the proposed parties are necessary or proper parties and in their absence, the suit can be effectively adjudicated. As the relief of specific performance is an equitable relief and a discretionary relief, a party can show whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief or not by placing evidence, though no relief is necessary to be granted against that party. In the present case though the proposed parties are „proper parties? only and they do not join the defendant to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff so long as they hold their agreement of sale only, certainly they can show whether the case pleaded by the plaintiff is true or not and whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief or not. The interest claimed by them in the suit schedule property is in conflict with the interest claimed by the plaintiff. The interest claimed by them in the suit schedule property is in conflict with the interest claimed by the plaintiff. Moreover, it is not a frivolous contention raised, but a serious contention raised, by stating that the original sale deed i.e., title deed relating to the suit schedule property is in their hands along with another agreement of sale allegedly executed by the defendant in their favour before the suit agreement of sale. In their absence, the real facts may not be established and Court may have to decide the case on partially truth. 26. As such, in the light of the facts pleaded by the petitioners in support of their contention that they need to be impleaded as defendants, this Court is of the view that they can be permitted to come on record in the interest of justice or else, there would be no pleading or evidence for proper and complete and effective adjudication of the dispute involved in this case. As such, this court does not see any reason to interfere with the result of the trial court 27. In the result the revision petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall and closed.