JUDGMENT : (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) : 1. The instant appeal, filed under Sections 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 09.12.2016 and order of sentence dated 14.12.2016 passed by the learned District & Additional Sessions Judge-XIII, Hazaribag in Sessions Trial Case No.577 of 2011, whereby and whereunder, the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.10,000/-and in case of default of payment of fine, he has to further undergo imprisonment for three months. 2. This Court, before proceeding to examine the legality and propriety of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, deems it fit and proper to refer the background of prosecution case, as per fardbeyan of informant, which reads as under: 3. As per the fardbeyan of the informant-Etwari Ageriya, recorded on 02.09.2011 by the Sub Inspector, S.K. Pathak of Padma O.P., Barhi P.S. alleged that on 02.09.2011, when the informant was coming from his house and reached at four-mile base Camp, he saw the truck stopping on the National Highway No.33 and heard alarm of a driver. The nearby people gathered there and saw that one person having knife in his hand was assaulting the driver. The person was caught hold by the people present there who on enquiry, disclosed his name as Badam Singh, the appellant herein. 4. Thereafter, the driver fell down behind the seat and was found dead and blood was oozing out from his left ribs and the knife was taken away from the appellant. The time of occurrence was after 9’ O clock. The informant has also told the Police Officials in his statement that Badam Singh on being asked informed that the deceased driver Mathura Prasad was the uncle (fufa) of Badam Singh, the appellant herein. The deceased had gone to Bhubneshwar with Truck No. UP 78 BP 4499 to deliver scooter. 5. On the way, scuffle took place and on suspicion, Badam Singh stabbed Mathura Prasad with knife in his ribs and the deceased Mathura Prasad fell on the seat, thereafter, Badam Singh strangulated the driver (deceased) who succumbed to the injuries. 6. The deceased had gone to Bhubneshwar with Truck No. UP 78 BP 4499 to deliver scooter. 5. On the way, scuffle took place and on suspicion, Badam Singh stabbed Mathura Prasad with knife in his ribs and the deceased Mathura Prasad fell on the seat, thereafter, Badam Singh strangulated the driver (deceased) who succumbed to the injuries. 6. On the basis of fardbeyan of informant, Barhi (Padma) P.S. Case No.251/2011 dated 02.09.2011, corresponding to G.R. No.2362 of 2011 was registered against the accused person, appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and investigation was started. 7. After completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet against the accused person, namely, Badam Singh under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 8. Thereafter, the cognizance of the offence was taken against the accused person and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. The charge was framed against the accused person, who had pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 9. In course of trial, the prosecution has examined altogether 4 witnesses i.e., P.W.1-Etwari Ageriya (Informant), P.W.2-Dr. Anwar Imam, P.W.3-Rajdeo Pandey and P.W.4-Shiv Kumar Pathak (Investigating Officer). 10. The trial Court, after concluding the evidence of prosecution, recorded the statement of the accused person under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in which, accused had denied from the prosecution evidence and claimed himself to be innocent. 11. However, the learned trial court after perusal of record found the charge levelled against the appellant proved. Accordingly, the appellant has been found guilty as such convicted and sentenced vide impugned judgment of conviction dated 09.12.2016 and order of sentence dated 14.12.2016, which is the subject matter of instant appeal. 12. Mr. Bhola Nath Rajak, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence suffers from infirmity on the following grounds: (I) The learned trial Court has based the conviction on the basis of the testimony of P.W.1 who has been claimed themselves to be an eyewitness but he cannot be considered to be an eye witness if his testimony will be taken into consideration in entirety. (II) P.W.1, although, has stated in examination-in-chief that he had seen the commission of crime of murder and the assault being given by the accused upon the deceased. But, at the same time in his cross-examination he has not remained consistent with the said version. (II) P.W.1, although, has stated in examination-in-chief that he had seen the commission of crime of murder and the assault being given by the accused upon the deceased. But, at the same time in his cross-examination he has not remained consistent with the said version. The contention has been made that if the testimony of P.W.1 will be taken into consideration in entirety, then it cannot be said that he is an eyewitness. (III) The learned trial Court in the impugned judgment has also relied upon the testimony of P.W.3 and considering his testimony to be trustworthy, has made the said testimony to be the basis of the conviction, but while doing so, the learned trial Court has committed patent illegality in not considering the cross-examination of P.W.3, wherein, he himself has discredited his version, what he has stated in his examination-in-chief. (IV) The Investigating Officer, however, has supported the prosecution version but he has deposed that he has seized the knife from the place of occurrence but seizure list had not been prepared and the weapon which was seized has never been produced before the trial court. (V) The blood stain which was found at the place of occurrence had not been sent for forensic examination and the inquest report has also not been produced before the learned trial court for its perusal which is required for the just decision of the case. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant, on the aforesaid premise, has submitted that it is a case where it cannot be said that the prosecution has been able to prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubts, rather, as per the testimony of P.W.1 and 3, they cannot be said to be trustworthy witnesses, the impugned judgment needs to be interfered with. 14. Per Contra, Mrs. Priya Shrestha, learned Spl. Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State has defended the impugned judgment by taking the following grounds: - (I) The learned trial Court, while accepting the version of P.W.1 and 3 more particularly by taking into consideration the testimony of P.W.1 as he has disclosed in his examination-in-chief, wherein, the prosecution version has fully been supported, hence, it cannot be said that while accepting the said version, the learned trial Court has committed any error. (II) The doctor, P.W.2 who had conducted the post-mortem on the body of deceased has found a penetrating wound 1/2" cm in diameter, with lacerated margin, in the abdominal cavity deep in left hypochondria. Thus, the testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.3, wherein, they had stated that assault was made by the appellant upon the deceased with the knife, has fully been substantiated by the finding of doctor and by taking together the testimony of P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.3, the prosecution version has been believed by the learned trial Court, which cannot be said to suffer from an error, hence, the instant appeal is having no merit and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence suffers from no infirmity. (III) The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the weapon of crime has not been produced before the learned trial court or the blood stain has not sent for forensic test has not worth to be considered in the light of settled proposition of law that if there is cogent ocular evidence is available then the non-sending of blood stain or non-production of the crime weapon cannot affect the basis of the prosecution case. 15. Learned Spl. Public Prosecutor on the aforesaid premise has submitted by referring to the impugned judgment that the learned trial court has given thoughtful consideration on the testimony based upon the same, the judgment of conviction has been passed, hence, it cannot be said that the judgment of conviction suffers from irregularity. 16. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record more particularly the testimony of the witnesses and the finding recorded by learned trial Court. 17. This Court, before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment of conviction/sentence, deems it fit and proper to refer the testimony of prosecution witnesses. 18. P.W.1-Etwari Agaria, the informant in his examination-in-chief has deposed at paragraph 1 of his deposition that seven months ago from today between nine to ten o'clock, when he reached the road near Four-Mile Base Camp, he saw a truck parked on the road. 19. He has further deposed that he had heard the commotion and went near the truck. Thereafter, People nearby had gathered there. He climbed into the car and saw that one man was killing another with a knife. The killer was caught with the help of the villagers. 19. He has further deposed that he had heard the commotion and went near the truck. Thereafter, People nearby had gathered there. He climbed into the car and saw that one man was killing another with a knife. The killer was caught with the help of the villagers. He told his name as Badam Singh. The person to whom he was killing with the knife, had died. 20. In paragraph 2, he had deposed that the accused, appellant has said that the deceased was the driver, who seems to be his uncle and the accused also told that they had gone to Bhubaneswar and was returning after delivering the scooter and due to disagreement between the two on the way deceased was murdered. 21. He had further testified in paragraph 2 of his testimony that sub-Inspector reached there and recorded his fard-bayan. He had proved the writing of sub-inspector on the fard-bayan which has been marked as Ext-1. 22. In paragraph 4 he had deposed that a seizure list of the recovered knife was prepared by the police and his signature was obtained. The inquest report of the deceased was also prepared. 23. In his cross-examination at paragraph 8, he had stated that the deceased had wounds in the neck and waist and when he reached at the place of occurrence deceased had already died. 24. In the aforesaid paragraph, he has further stated that he had not witnessed the assault as made by the appellant with knife upon the deceased. 25. P.W.2-Dr. Anwar Imam who conducted the postmortem has deposed that on 02.09.2011, when he was posted as Medical Officer at Sadar Hospital, Hazaribagh, the postmortem of the deceased Mathura Prasad was conducted and found that eyes of the deceased were partially opened and mouth was closed. Rigor mortis was present in both the upper and lower limbs. He had proved the post-mortem report which had been marked as Ext-2. External Examination: Penetrating wound 1/2" cm in diameter, with lacerated margin, abdominal cavity deep in left hypochondria. Injuries were antemortem in nature, caused by hard and blunt penetrating object as knife. Internal Examination: Both lungs were found pale and intact. Heart intact, both chambers were found empty. Abdominal cavity was found full of blood. Spleen ruptured and pale. Upper part of left kidney found ruptured and pale. Right kidney intact and pale. Liver was intact and pale. Injuries were antemortem in nature, caused by hard and blunt penetrating object as knife. Internal Examination: Both lungs were found pale and intact. Heart intact, both chambers were found empty. Abdominal cavity was found full of blood. Spleen ruptured and pale. Upper part of left kidney found ruptured and pale. Right kidney intact and pale. Liver was intact and pale. Hematoma over omen tum. Stomach wall was normal and containing partially digested food. Urinary bladder was empty. Internal Examination of neck:- Hematomas besides over the thyroid cartilage. Hematomas between the muscles of neck. thyroid cartilage and bone was intact. Slight congestion over laryngeal mucosa. Cause of death:-Hemorrhage and shock caused by the injuries to left abdominal organs. Age of injury:-6 to 12 hours. 26. P.W.3-Rajdeo Pandey is the independent witness who has deposed that the occurrence took place 1 year ago near four-mile camp at 9:00-10:00 am where he was deputed at the gate of the plant. Thereafter, altercation took place between the conductor of the vehicle and one person. On alarm, he, along with the villagers came there where he saw that one person had assaulted the second person with knife. When the assailant was fleeing, the nearby people caught hold the assailant. 27. In his cross-examination, he has stated that the he had not seen the assault and the police was called by the villagers. 28. P.W.4-Shiv Kumar Pathak, is the Investigating Officer, has stated in his examination-in-chief that on 02.09.11, he was posted as In-charge in Padma O.P. On that day, informant Etwari Ageria had given his statement regarding the incident. 29. On the basis of this statement, an FIR was registered by the then police station In-charge Barhi Ram Dayal Munda and the charge of investigation was handed over to him. 30. After taking charge of the investigation, the inquest report of deceased Mathura Prasad was prepared in the presence of witnesses, Thereafter, he had inspected the place of occurrence. The body of Mathura Prasad was found behind the driver's seat in the driver's cabin. There is a passenger seat next to the driver's seat and behind it, there were two long seats made for sleeping. A knife was recovered from the incident site, which was seized. 31. He stated in his cross-examination that the knife was seized, but the seizure list was not prepared. 32. There is a passenger seat next to the driver's seat and behind it, there were two long seats made for sleeping. A knife was recovered from the incident site, which was seized. 31. He stated in his cross-examination that the knife was seized, but the seizure list was not prepared. 32. In paragraph 7, he deposed that there was stain of blood at the place where the dead body was found, but it was not seized and sent to the laboratory for examination. 33. It appears from the impugned judgment that the learned trial Court has based the conviction by considering the testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.3 therefore, this Court is required to consider as to whether the P.W.1 can be said to be eyewitness and the testimonies of P.W.1 and P.W.3 are reliable or not based, upon which, the judgment of conviction has been passed. 34. This Court, in order to assess the said issue is discussing the testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.3 so as to come to the conclusion as to whether these two witnesses are eye witnesses or not? 35. The deposition of P.W.1 as under paragraph-8 of the cross-examination read with paragraph-1 of the examination-in-chief, there are vital contradictions, since in paragraph-1, it has been stated by him that he had seen the commission of crime of inflicting knife injury over the body part of the deceased but at paragraph-8 of the cross-examination, it has been deposed by him that he had not seen the assault. 36. This Court, on the basis of the analysis of the testimony as under paragraph-1 and paragraph-8, is of the view that the P.W.-1 cannot be said to be eye witness since he became inconsistent in the cross-examination and hence, whatever has been deposed by him in the examination-in-chief cannot be said to be trustworthy. 37. This Court, on consideration of the testimony of the P.W.3 as recorded under paragraph-1 in chief wherein it has been stated that he, along with the villagers came at the place of occurrence where he saw that one person had assaulted the second person with knife and when the assailant was fleeing, the nearby people caught hold the assailant. 38. However, in his cross-examination, he has stated that the he had not seen the assault and the Police were called by the villagers. 39. 38. However, in his cross-examination, he has stated that the he had not seen the assault and the Police were called by the villagers. 39. Therefore, by taking into consideration the testimony of P.W.3 in entirety, we are of the view that the P.W.-3 cannot be said to be reliable or trustworthy witness as his testimonies suffer with vital contradictions. 40. Further, it appears from the impugned judgment that on the basis of testimony of P.W.1 which has been considered to be an eyewitness having said to be corroborated by the testimony of the P.W.3, the judgment of conviction has been passed. 41. The law is well settled that even on the basis of testimony of one witness, if it is trustworthy, the conviction can be there. But, the trustworthiness of the said testimony, is the requirement for its consideration in order to come to the conclusion that the testimony of such witnesses, are trustworthy. 42. The trustworthy witness will be said to be a witness if there is no major contradiction both in examination-in-chief and cross examination. 43. Here, the P.W.1 has deposed in examination-in-chief that he had seen the commission of crime and as such, based upon the said testimony, as recorded in examination-in-chief, the learned trial Court has considered the P.W.1 as an eye witness. 44. But, the learned trial Court has failed to consider the deposition which has been recorded in his cross-examination, at paragraph-8 wherein, he has deposed that he had not seen the assault. 45. Therefore, according to our considered view, the testimony of P.W.1 cannot be said to be trustworthy so as to be said to be reliable witness for convicting the accused person. 46. If the testimony of P.W.1 itself has been held to be untrustworthy, then there is no question of its corroboration from the testimony of other witnesses. 47. Thus from aforesaid deduction it is evident that the informant P.W.1 cannot be construed as an eyewitness and his testimonies deserve to be discarded. 48. Further P.W.3 also cannot be termed as reliable witness, because the testimonies of both the witnesses are full of contradictions. As such the conviction of the appellant cannot be upheld on the basis of the testimonies of P.W.1 and 3 because there are major contradictions in the examination-in-chief of aforesaid witnesses vis-a-vis in their cross-examination. 49. 48. Further P.W.3 also cannot be termed as reliable witness, because the testimonies of both the witnesses are full of contradictions. As such the conviction of the appellant cannot be upheld on the basis of the testimonies of P.W.1 and 3 because there are major contradictions in the examination-in-chief of aforesaid witnesses vis-a-vis in their cross-examination. 49. It is the settled proposition of law that if the result of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, accused could establish the probability of his defence and if probability was established by accused, it would really entitle him to the benefit of doubt, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bhikam Saran Vrs. State of U.P., reported in (1953) 2 SCC 560, wherein, at paragraph-16, it has been held as under:- “16. It is significant to observe that the appellant led no evidence in defence but merely relied upon the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in order to establish his defence. He had not to affirmatively establish his defence in the manner in which the prosecution had to establish its case. If as the result of his cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses he could establish the probability of his defence it was enough for his purposes, because if such a probability was established by him it would really entitle him to the benefit of the doubt insofar as such probability would prevent the prosecution case being established beyond reasonable doubt.” 50. Further, the principle of ‘benefit of doubt’ belongs exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of ‘benefit of doubt’ can be invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana Vrs. Bhagirath & Ors., reported in (1999) 5 SCC 96 , wherein, it has been held at paragraph-7 as under:- “7. The High Court had failed to consider the implication of the evidence of the two eyewitnesses on the complicity of Bhagirath particularly when the High Court found their evidence reliable. The benefit of doubt was given to Bhagirath “as a matter of abundant caution”. Unfortunately, the High Court did not point out the area where there is such a doubt. The High Court had failed to consider the implication of the evidence of the two eyewitnesses on the complicity of Bhagirath particularly when the High Court found their evidence reliable. The benefit of doubt was given to Bhagirath “as a matter of abundant caution”. Unfortunately, the High Court did not point out the area where there is such a doubt. Any restraint by way of abundant caution need not be entangled with the concept of the benefit of doubt. Abundant caution is always desirable in all spheres of human activity. But the principle of benefit of doubt belongs exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of benefit of doubt can be invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. It is the reasonable doubt which a conscientious judicial mind entertains on a conspectus of the entire evidence that the accused might not have committed the offence, which affords the benefit to the accused at the end of the criminal trial. Benefit of doubt is not a legal dosage to be administered at every segment of the evidence, but an advantage to be afforded to the accused at the final end after consideration of the entire evidence, if the Judge conscientiously and reasonably entertains doubt regarding the guilt of the accused.” 51. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnegowda Vrs. State of Karnataka reported in (2017) 13 SCC 98 , at paragraph-32 and 33 has held as under:- “32. ------The minor variations and contradictions in the evidence of the eyewitnesses will not tilt the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused but when the contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses proves to be fatal to the prosecution case then those contradictions go to the root of the matter and in such cases the accused gets the benefit of doubt. 33. It is the duty of the Court to consider the trustworthiness of evidence on record. As said by Bentham, “witnesses are the eyes and ears of justice.-----’’ 52. From perusal of record it appears that although the Investigating Officer, has supported the prosecution version but in his deposition, he has deposed that he had seized the knife from the place of occurrence but seizure list had not been prepared. However, in the testimony of the P.W.1 it has come that the seizure list of the knife has been prepared. 53. However, in the testimony of the P.W.1 it has come that the seizure list of the knife has been prepared. 53. Thus from the aforesaid fact it is amply clear that there is gross contradiction between the testimonies of the said witnesses and the weapon of the crime has never been produced before the trial court and as such prosecution story is not substantiated. 54. The hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Niranjan Panja v. State of W.B., reported in (2010) 6 SCC 525 has categorically held that the discovery of the crime weapon cannot be relied upon in the absence of the weapon being produced before the court. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted herein as under: “14. The High Court has accepted the evidence on the recovery of the so-called weapon. We fail to follow as to how the said discovery could at all be relied upon in the absence of the weapon being produced before the court. Again, the High Court has also commented upon the medical evidence of Dr. Ardhendu Bikash Das, the Medical Officer (PW 11) when he spoke about the injuries upon the dead body being possible by siuli katari. In the absence of siuli katari being seen by the doctor in the court, this evidence should have been discarded. It seems that the so-called weapon of the offence was lost. The High Court had also expressed its displeasure and directed that the circumstance under which the said weapon was lost should be informed to the Court and also as to who was responsible for the loss of the material weapon. We do not see any traces about the same.--------------” 55. Further the blood stain which was found at the place of occurrence had not been sent for forensic examination. It is settled proposition of law that non-sending of blood stain and clothes of the deceased or injured to chemical examiner for chemical examination is not fatal to the case of the prosecution if the ocular testimony is found credible and cogent. 56. But in the instant case the ocular evidence is not trustworthy due to contradiction as discussed herein in the preceding paragraphs and as such non-sending of blood stained is fatal for the prosecution version. 57. 56. But in the instant case the ocular evidence is not trustworthy due to contradiction as discussed herein in the preceding paragraphs and as such non-sending of blood stained is fatal for the prosecution version. 57. Further from perusal of impugned order it is evident that the inquest report of dead body of the deceased has also not been produced before the learned trial court. 58. The aforesaid facts like non-production of crime weapon, non-sending of blood stain found at the place of occurrence and further non-production of inquest report amount to vital omission from the prosecution side as such it will not be safe to curtail the liberty of accused person in the absence of cogent evidence. 59. Further, it is settled connotation of law that in the criminal trial, unless the prosecution establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt a conviction cannot be passed on the accused and a criminal court cannot afford to deprive lifelong liberty of the appellant without having at least a reasonable level of certainty that the appellant was the real culprit. 60. The Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of decision has propounded the proposition that in the criminal trial, there cannot be any conviction if the charge is not proved beyond all reasonable doubts, as has been held in the case of Rang Bahadur Singh & Ors. Vrs. State of U.P., reported in (2000) 3 SCC 454 , wherein, at paragraph-22, it has been held as under:- “22. The amount of doubt which the Court would entertain regarding the complicity of the appellants in this case is much more than the level of reasonable doubt. We are aware that acquitting the accused in a case of this nature is not a matter of satisfaction for all concerned. At the same time we remind ourselves of the time-tested rule that acquittal of a guilty person should be preferred to conviction of an innocent person. Unless the prosecution establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt a conviction cannot be passed on the accused. A criminal court cannot afford to deprive liberty of the appellants, lifelong liberty, without having at least a reasonable level of certainty that the appellants were the real culprits. We really entertain doubt about the involvement of the appellants in the crime.” 61. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnegowda & Ors. Vrs. A criminal court cannot afford to deprive liberty of the appellants, lifelong liberty, without having at least a reasonable level of certainty that the appellants were the real culprits. We really entertain doubt about the involvement of the appellants in the crime.” 61. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnegowda & Ors. Vrs. State of Karnataka (Supra) has held at paragraph-26 as under:- “26. Having gone through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the findings recorded by the High Court we feel that the High Court has failed to understand the fact that the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and this is a classic case where at each and every stage of the trial, there were lapses on the part of the investigating agency and the evidence of the witnesses is not trustworthy which can never be a basis for conviction. The basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is that the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.” 62. We, on appreciation of the testimony of P.W.1 since has come to the conclusion that the testimony of P.W.1, cannot be considered to be an eye witness. 63. The learned trial Court has based the conviction by considering the testimony of P.W.1 to be an eye witness, hence, the impugned judgment of conviction, according to our considered view, cannot be said to be justified. 64. P.W.1, since, has been considered by this Court not to be an eye witness, therefore, it cannot be said that the prosecution has been able to prove charge beyond all reasonable doubts, as the learned trial Court has passed the judgment of conviction/sentence by considering the testimony of P.W.1 to be an eye witness. 65. We, on the entirety of the facts and circumstances and as per the discussion made hereinabove, are of the view that the impugned judgment of conviction/sentence, needs to be interfered with. 66. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction dated 09.12.2016 and order of sentence dated 14.12.2016 passed by the learned District & Additional Sessions Judge-XIII, Hazaribag in Sessions Trial Case No.577 of 2011, are hereby quashed and set aside. 67. In the result, the instant appeal stands allowed. 68. 66. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction dated 09.12.2016 and order of sentence dated 14.12.2016 passed by the learned District & Additional Sessions Judge-XIII, Hazaribag in Sessions Trial Case No.577 of 2011, are hereby quashed and set aside. 67. In the result, the instant appeal stands allowed. 68. In consequence thereof, the appellant, namely, Badam Singh is discharged from his criminal liability and directed to be released forthwith from judicial custody in connection with S.T. No.577 of 2011, if not required in any other cases. 69. Let this order/judgment be communicated forthwith to the Court concerned along with the Lower Court Records. I Agree (Navneet Kumar, J.)