JUDGMENT : ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. 1. The prayers in the afore captioned Writ Petition (Criminal) are as follows: “(i) Call for records leading to issuance of Ext.P1 and P2 orders and set aside the same. (ii) To declare that the externment order passed against the petitioner is illegal and unsustainable. (iii) Grant such other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.” 2. Heard Sri. S. Abhilash, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. K. A. Anas, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for official respondents 1 to 5. 3. The petitioner herein is aggrieved by the impugned Ext.P-2 externment order dated 28.9.2022 issued by the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of Police (R-2 herein), whereby, it has been ordered, under Section 15(1) of the Kerala Anti-social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “KAA(P)A”) that, in view of the facts and circumstances stated in the said order, it is a fit case to order that, the petitioner shall not enter the territorial limits of Kollam City Police District, for a period of 6 months from the date of execution of the said order, as otherwise, he is very likely to indulge in further prejudicial anti-social activities, as envisaged in Section 2(a) of the KAA(P)A. 4. The brief of the facts of this case is as follows: “4. Crimes have been reckoned by the respondents for the issuance of the impugned Ext.P-2 order, under Section 15(1) of the Act. The details of the said 4 crimes are contained in Ext.P-2 order and have also been reiterated in Para 5 on Pages 3 and 4 of the counter affidavit dated 21.11.2022, filed by the 2nd respondent DIG of Police. There are no factual disputes regarding the allegations raised in those 4 crimes and for the purpose of easy convenience, the abovesaid portion of the counter affidavit are extracted as follows: “5. In issuing the Exhbit.P2 order following cases involved by the petitioner are considered. (i) Crime No 849/2019 of Thekkumbhagom Police Station registered U/s 143, 147, 148, 341, 294(b), 323, 324, 506(ii), 427 r/w 149 IPC and Section 27 of Arms Act: In this crime, the petitioner is the 1st accused. The case was registered on the FI statement of the defacto complainant, Sri. Rahul age 29. (i) Crime No 849/2019 of Thekkumbhagom Police Station registered U/s 143, 147, 148, 341, 294(b), 323, 324, 506(ii), 427 r/w 149 IPC and Section 27 of Arms Act: In this crime, the petitioner is the 1st accused. The case was registered on the FI statement of the defacto complainant, Sri. Rahul age 29. The case is that on 03.09.2019 at 20.00 hrs, petitioner and his associates unlawfully assembled, restrained the complainant and inflicted injuries with weapon, shouted and waved sword and thereby created panic and fear among the public. The enmity behind the incident was the dispute between the petitioner and complainant's friend. He obtained Anticipatory Bail from the Honourable High Court. The case was charge sheeted 02.11.2019. The case is pending for trial in JFMC Chavara as CC No. 703/2019. The next hearing date is on 11.01.2023. (ii) Crime No. 39/2020 of Thekkumbhagom Police Station registered U/s 294(b), 323, 324, 308 and 34 IPC: The petitioner is the 1st accused. The case was registered on the Fl statement defacto complainant Sri. Shefeek age 28. The case is that on 31.01 2020 at 22.00 hrs, the petitioner and his 2 associates assembled together and inflicted injuries to the defacto complainant and attempted to commit culpable homicide by making cut injuries with a copper. The investigation unequivocally revealed that the petitioner had committed the alleged offence. In this case also the petitioner absconded after the incident. Later, as in previous case the petitioner filed a petition for quashing the FIR in before this Honorable Court and Honorable Court in its interim order dated 24.07.2020 in Crl. M.A. No. 1/2020 in Crl. M.C. No. 1745/2020 stayed the investigation temporarily and extending the same till date. The Crl. M.C. is still pending for disposal. (iii) Crime No. 40/2020 of Thekkumbhagom Police Station registered U/s 341, 323, 294(b) and 34 IPC: The petitioner is the 1st accused. The case was registered on the FI statement of defacto complainant Sri. Thulasidharanpillai age 60. The case is that on 31.01.2020 at 20.30 hrs, the petitioner and his associates unlawfully restrained the complainant, abused him with filthy language and manhandled him. The assault was due to the enmity that the complainant refused to disclose the address of his relative. The accused was arrested on 17.03.2020 and enlarged on bail. The case was charge sheeted and is pending trial at JFMC, Chavara as C.C. No. 199/2020. The assault was due to the enmity that the complainant refused to disclose the address of his relative. The accused was arrested on 17.03.2020 and enlarged on bail. The case was charge sheeted and is pending trial at JFMC, Chavara as C.C. No. 199/2020. The next posting date is on 07.11.2022. (iv) Crime No. 320/2022 of Thekkumbhagom Police Station registered U/s 294(b), 341, 353 and 34 IPC: The petitioner is the 1st accused. The case was registered on the Fl statement of the defacto complainant Sri. Anilkumar age 48, Excise Preventive Officer. The case is that on 07.07.2022 at 22.00 hrs, the petitioner and his associates unlawfully restrained the complainant and other Excise officers, abused them using filthy language and obstructed them from discharging their official duty of conducting raid at the house of this petitioner's relative. The investigation revealed that the petitioner had committed the offence as alleged. The case was charge sheeted on 15.08.2022 and is pending trial in JFMC, Chavara as C.C. No. 563/2022. Next posting date is on 08.12.2022.” 5. Since there are no factual disputes regarding the allegations raised in the above crimes, there are no serious disputes that the petitioner herein would satisfy the definitional parameters of “known rowdy” as per Section 2(p)(iii) read with Section 2(t) of the KAA(P)A, going by the nature of allegations in the first 3 crimes. Of course, the petitioner has got a contention that the 4th crime cannot be reckoned, as the said case was initiated on the basis of complaints of Excise Officers under the NDPS Act and therefore, it should be treated at par with the prohibitory stream of Clause (iii) of Section 2(p), which applies to complaints initiated at the instance of police officers. The abovesaid contention of the petitioner would be separately considered hereinafter. However, there is no dispute that, even if the 4th crime is otherwise excluded, still, the first 3 crimes would rope in the petitioner to fall within the definitional parameters of “known rowdy” as above. In that regard, yet another fine tuned contention is raised by the petitioner, that the second and third crimes are replications of the selfsame allegations that are said to have happened on the same day and therefore, only one such crime should have been taken into account. That contention would also be separately dealt with by us hereinafter. 6. In that regard, yet another fine tuned contention is raised by the petitioner, that the second and third crimes are replications of the selfsame allegations that are said to have happened on the same day and therefore, only one such crime should have been taken into account. That contention would also be separately dealt with by us hereinafter. 6. Going by the factual pleadings and materials on record, it appears that, R-2 (DIG of Police) has followed the prescribed procedure under Section 15(1) before the issuance of the impugned Ext.P-2 externment order. It is seen that, Ext.P-4 report dated 22.8.2022 was submitted by the 3rd respondent-City Police Commissioner (District Police Chief) to the 2nd respondent-DIG of Police, whereby the former has recommended that, in view of the factual details contained therein, it is a fit case for the 2nd respondent-DIG to issue an order of externment against the petitioner, so as to restrain him from entering the territorial limits of the above Police District for a limited period, as otherwise, he is likely to indulge in prejudicial anti-social activities. Thereafter, R-2 (DIG of Police) has issued the statutory show cause notice dated 15.9.2022, notifying the petitioner to show cause as to why the externment order, as above, in terms of Section 15(1) of the KAA(P)A, should not be passed. The said show-cause notice was received by the petitioner on 18.9.2022. The petitioner has submitted reply thereto, which was considered by the 2nd respondent. R-2 (DIG of Police) has, thereafter, given personal opportunity of hearing to the petitioner on 26.9.2022, as per the statutory requirement and has, thereafter, passed Ext.P-2 externment order on 28.9.2022. The externment order has been duly served on the petitioner and the order was got executed on 5.10.2022. The currency period of the impugned Ext.P-2 externment order is for a period of 6 months from 5.10.2022 (date of execution of order). Thereafter, the petitioner has filed representation before the Advisory Board as per Ext.P-3 dated 19.10.2022, purportedly under Section 15(2), but the same was filed after the limitation period of 15 days for filing such representations, as mandated in Section 15(2) of the Act. Hence, the Advisory Board has rejected Ext.P-3 request, as per Ext.P-1 order dated 4.11.2022, on the ground that Ext.P-3 is time barred. 7. Hence, the Advisory Board has rejected Ext.P-3 request, as per Ext.P-1 order dated 4.11.2022, on the ground that Ext.P-3 is time barred. 7. It is well settled, by a series of rulings of this Court, in cases as in Biju Aduppukallingal vs. Advisory Board, KAAPA, 2014 (3) KLT 69 (DB) [Paras 11 and 15] that, the Advisory Board constituted under the KAA(P)A is not a Court or a quasi-judicial Tribunal and therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, empowering condonation of delay beyond the time limit, will not apply. Therefore, the time limit prescribed in the special enactment, like KAA(P)A, would be applicable and as there is no specific provision in the KAA(P)A for condoning the delay, for petitions filed after the prescribed period of 15 days, the same is liable to be dismissed by the Advisory Board as 'time barred'. Hence, the dismissal of Ext.P-3 petition, as per Ext.P-1 order, by the Advisory Board, is fully in order. However, that does not take away the right of an externee, like the petitioner, to challenge the basic externment order on other tenable grounds in judicial review proceedings before this Court. 8. The petitioner has raised 5 contentions. Both sides have made submissions on the same. The applicant's counsel would contend that, in case the applicant is entitled to succeed on all 5 grounds or atleast one such ground and even if he succeeds only in one ground, the same would result in the quashment of the impugned externment order, etc. Per contra, the learned Prosecutor would strongly oppose each of the grounds and would urge that, those grounds are not tenable, etc. We shall get into the details of the rival contentions, as we proceed to deal with each of the contentions: Contention A 9. The first contention raised by the petitioner is that, there is inordinate and unexplained delay in the issuance of the impugned Ext.P-2 externment order on 28.9.2022, even though the last prejudicial activity (the 4th crime) is said to have been committeed on 7.7.2022. Hence, it is urged that, the live-link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of externment, as envisaged in Section 15(1), has been snapped, etc. 10. Hence, it is urged that, the live-link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of externment, as envisaged in Section 15(1), has been snapped, etc. 10. In regard to this contention, it has to be noted that the 4th and the last crime is said to have occurred on 7.7.2022 and the crime was reported to the police authorities only on 8.7.2022. The applicant had secured anticipatory bail from the Sessions Court, Kollam, in regard to his involvement in the said 4th crime, Crime No. 320/2022 of Thekkumbhagom Police Station, on 27.7.2022. Thereafter, the police has completed the investigation and has filed the final report by way of charge sheet before the competent criminal court on 16.8.2022. The police authorities had conducted enquiries in the matter and regarding the details of the various crimes in which the petitioner has been involved, later, the 3rd respondent District Police Chief has submitted Ext.P-4 report, dated 22.8.2022, alerting the 2nd respondent-DIG, to initiate externment proceedings in terms of Section 15(1) against the petitioner, in view of the reasons stated therein. This led to the statutory show cause notice on 15.9.2022, which was received by the petitioner on 18.9.2022. The petitioner submitted reply thereto on 26.9.2022. Thereafter, R-2 (DIG of Police) had personally heard him on 26.9.2022 and Ext.P-2 externment order has been issued, thereafter, on 28.9.2022. 11. After hearing both sides, we note that the crime was not reported on the same day of the incident. After the reporting of the crime, the applicant had secured anticipatory bail on 27.7.2022. According to the respondents, they thought it fit to ascertain as to whether the case would be chargesheeted against him. The final report, by way of charge sheet, was filed on 16.8.2022. It is, thereafter, that the police authorities had collected various details regarding the crimes in which the petitioner had been involved and also, about the likelihood of him committing further anti-social prejudicial activities etc., and time was taken in that regard. Thereafter, the District Police Chief has submitted the report, as per Ext.P-4, on 22.8.2022 and the consequent action, in compliance with the statutorily prescribed procedure, has also been effectuated by the 2nd respondent-DIG. 12. Thereafter, the District Police Chief has submitted the report, as per Ext.P-4, on 22.8.2022 and the consequent action, in compliance with the statutorily prescribed procedure, has also been effectuated by the 2nd respondent-DIG. 12. After taking note of the overall conspectus of the facts of this case, we are of the view that the delay, as between the last crime and the externment order, cannot be said to be inordinate or unexplained, etc. We are fortified in our view in the light of the dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case in Vishnuja vs. State of Kerala, 2018 (1) KLT 978 (DB) [Paras 13-15]. Hence, we are not inclined to accede to the 1st contention of the writ petitioner and therefore, it cannot be said that the live-link between the last prejudicial activity and the purposes of externment, in terms of Section 15(1), has been snapped. Contention B 13. The 2nd contention raised by the petitioner is that, the 2nd and 3rd crimes are actually replications of the same set of allegations in respect of the same incident and therefore, only one such crime should have been reckoned and the reckoning of the 2nd and 3rd crimes, as two separate crimes, would show non application of mind and would also show that the relevant aspects have not been duly adhered to etc., and hence, the impugned order is liable to be interdicted. 14. After hearing both sides and after examining the facts and circumstances of this case, we note that the only commonality in the 2nd and 3rd crimes supra is that, it is said to have happened in the premises of a temple where a festival was going on. The aforesaid 3rd crime supra is said to have occured at 8.30 P.M. on 31.1.2020 in the temple premises, where the festival was going on, whereas the 2nd crime supra is said to have occured at 10 P.M. on 31.1.2020 in the same temple premises. Further, we also note that the subject matter of the allegations, raised in these two crimes, are separate and distinct and has occurred at different points of time. Further, we also note that the subject matter of the allegations, raised in these two crimes, are separate and distinct and has occurred at different points of time. Merely because the said incidents, involving the petitioner, are said to have occurred on the same day, in the same temple premises where the festival was going on, but at different points of time, cannot lead this Court to infer that it is on the same set of allegations. Further, while exercising powers of judicial review of KAA(P)A proceedings, be it under Section 3(1) or under Section 15(1), this Court, ordinarily, cannot go beyond the allegations of a crime. For all these reasons, we are constrained to reject the 2nd contention of the petitioner as well. Contention C 15. The 3rd contention urged by the petitioner is regarding non consideration of the efficacy of the conditions imposed in the anticipatory bail secured by the petitioner. 16. In that regard, we note that the Division Bench of this Court, in the case in Kiran Shaji vs. State of Kerala and Others, 2018 (4) KHC 465 (DB) [Para 13], has held that, an order of externment, passed in terms of Section 15(1), is only an order restricting the externee's entry into the area concerned and therefore, their Lordships of the Division Bench were of the considered opinion that, non consideration of bail order, in regard to the conditions imposed in granting bail to the externee/accused, by the authority who has issued the externment order, is not fatal to the decision making process of the order of externment, passed under Section 15(1). It will be profitable to refer to Para 13 of the decision of this Court in Kiran Shaji's case supra, which reads as follows: “13. Yet another contention taken up by the petitioner is that while granting bail in Crime No. 1060/2017 of Angamaly Police Station, this Court had imposed certain conditions, one of which was restricting his entry into Ernakulam District for a period of two months. It is contended that the detaining authority while passing the order did not consider this condition imposed in the bail order. It is true that the detaining authority has not discussed the sufficiency of the restriction imposed in the bail order but the fact regarding grant of bail was noticed and necessarily the order was passed subsequent to the consideration of these facts. It is true that the detaining authority has not discussed the sufficiency of the restriction imposed in the bail order but the fact regarding grant of bail was noticed and necessarily the order was passed subsequent to the consideration of these facts. The authority was of the opinion that despite the restriction issued by the Court to keep the accused outside the jurisdiction of Ernakulam, the time for which such order was effective was not sufficient. The impugned order also reserves the right of the petitioner to approach the rural police chief with a written request for permission to enter the district in case of any contingencies, like attending marriage or death of near relatives or in case he requires medical treatment for himself. It is to be understood that this is not a case where a detention order has been passed under KAAPA. It is only an order restricting the petitioner’s entry into Ernakulam Sessions Division where he is involved in six crimes. Even this Court while sitting on bail jurisdiction, had deemed it appropriate to impose restrictions on the petitioner entering Ernakulam District for two months, looking at the one crime he was involved in. In the impugned order, the period of the restriction was for a longer period of one year considering the gravity of the fact regarding the number of crimes that the petitioner is involved in. That period too has been reduced to six months by Ext. P2 order. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that non-consideration of the condition imposed in granting bail by the authority is not fatal to the impugned restrain order.” 17. Further, we also note that, apart from the 4th crime, the petitioner has also involved himself in 3 previous crimes and all the 4 crimes have been reckoned in the above decision making process. Dealing with a contention regarding the efficacy of bail conditions and its effect on a preventive detention order, passed under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P)A, the Division Bench of this Court has held, in Para 12 of the case in Anita Antony vs. State of Kerala, 2022 (4) KLT 271 (DB), as follows: “12. Dealing with a contention regarding the efficacy of bail conditions and its effect on a preventive detention order, passed under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P)A, the Division Bench of this Court has held, in Para 12 of the case in Anita Antony vs. State of Kerala, 2022 (4) KLT 271 (DB), as follows: “12. The second contention is a claim that the detenu had scrupulously followed the bail conditions in the last crime [Crime No. 460 of 2021 of Alappuzha North Police Station] and therefore, the subjective satisfaction to initiate proceedings under the KAA(P)A is vitiated. We cannot endorse the said submission of the learned counsel. As rightly pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, the last prejudicial activity reckoned by the detaining authority is the fourth crime and in all previous crimes, while being enlarged on bail, the detenu was put on similar condition that he shall not indulge in any criminal activity while on bail. This condition has been contemptuously violated by the detenu, as is established by the subsequent crimes, including the last one of the year 2021. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the compliance with the bail condition in the last crime cannot be gainsaid by the detenu, to assail the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, which is otherwise established by materials on record.” In the light of these aspects, we are of the view that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed on the basis of the abovesaid contention. Contention D 18. Yet another contention urged by the petitioner is that, Section 107 Cr.P.C. proceedings taken against him, has not been duly taken into account by the externment authority while rendering the impugned Ext.P-2 order. In that regard, it has to be noted that the 2nd respondent has held, in paras 7 & 9 of pages 22 & 23, of Ext.P-2 order, as follows: 19. A reading of Paras 7 and 9 supra of Ext.P-2 would show that the abovesaid aspects emanating from Section 107 Cr.P.C. Proceedings, initiated against the petitioner, has been taken into account and considered. Hence, it cannot be said that the 2nd respondent has omitted to take into consideration those aspects. So, the abovesaid contention of the petitioner would also fail. Contention E 20. Hence, it cannot be said that the 2nd respondent has omitted to take into consideration those aspects. So, the abovesaid contention of the petitioner would also fail. Contention E 20. The last contention urged by the petitioner is that the 4th crime could not have been taken into account at all, as the same was initiated on the basis of a complaint of an Excise officer and that, such a complaint by an Excise officer should be treated at par with the complaint of a police officer and hence, the restriction under Clause (iii) of Section 2(p) would come into play. 21. In that regard, it is to be noted that the legislative mandate, contained in Clause (iii) of Section 2(p) of the KAA(P)A, is only in regard to complaints said to be initiated by police officers. Excise officers cannot be comprehended in the meaning of the term 'police officers' as understood in the above provision. The Legislature in the system has included within its ambit of exclusion only police officers, as per Clause (iii) supra. The said legislative mandate therein cannot be extended by the Court by including within its ambit of exclusion other departmental officers like Excise officers. It is to be noted that this position is so held only in the limited context of the legislative mandate engrafted in Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAAP Act, which is a piece of preventive detention law and not a provision of a punitive detention law. It has been held in a catena of case laws of both the Apex Court and various High Courts that there is a substantial difference between a preventive detention law and a law relating to punitive detention. It has been held in a catena of case laws of both the Apex Court and various High Courts that there is a substantial difference between a preventive detention law and a law relating to punitive detention. It has often been said that the very jurisdictional foundation of preventive detention envisaged in Art. 22(3)(b) and the other sub clauses of Art. 22 of the Constitution of India is based on a “Jurisdiction of Suspicion.” For instance, the provision of preventive detention as in Section 3(1) of KAAPA envisages that where the proposed detenu satisfies the objective criteria of the definitional contours of “known rowdy” or “known goonda” as per Section 2 thereof and where the authorised detaining authority on the basis of materials reaches the subjective satisfaction that he has to be detained in order to prevent him from committing further prejudicial activities, as otherwise, he would so commit such activities, then only the aforesaid objective criteria is based on objective assessment and the latter satisfaction is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority based on materials. The said subjective satisfaction, arrived at by the authority, is essentially based on a jurisdiction of suspicion that such a person, who satisfies the prescribed objective criteria, is very likely to indulge in further prejudicial activities, by assessing the materials which throws light on his proclivity for such activities. Whereas, for punitive detention, it is elementary that such detention cannot be on the basis of suspicion or surmises or moral conviction and detention as a punishment, by awarding a sentence, can be effected only if the charges against the accused are proved beyond reasonable doubt in a trial, through due process. So, preventive detention, as envisaged in Article 22(3), can be effected on the basis of the jurisdiction of suspicion, if authorised by a competent law and based on the prescribed procedure thereof. Whereas, detention as a punishment can be imposed only by following the due process and proving the charges beyond reasonable doubt and there is no question of convicting and sentencing an accused in a criminal proceedings for punitive detention, based on suspicion or surmises, etc. Moreover, the objective of a preventive detention law is to prevent the detenu from committing further prejudicial activities in future, whereas the objective of a punitive detention law is to punish the accused for having committed a criminal offence in the past. Moreover, the objective of a preventive detention law is to prevent the detenu from committing further prejudicial activities in future, whereas the objective of a punitive detention law is to punish the accused for having committed a criminal offence in the past. These elementary aspects have to be borne in mind in appreciating the substantial and essential differences between preventive detention and punitive detention. Therefore, the perspective taken in various case laws relating to criminal proceedings for punitive detention that excise officers should be treated at par with police officers for the purpose of attracting bar against admissibility of confession as in Section 25 of the Evidence Act, cannot be the basis to hold that excise officers will stand at par as far as the exclusion mandated in Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAAP Act is concerned. For the basis of taking action for preventive detention based on jurisdiction of suspicion, the Legislature has specifically envisaged that the exclusion envisaged in Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAAP Act will be attracted only in respect of police officers. When that is the position, the Courts cannot widen the afore exclusion in Section 2(p)(iii), which is limited only to police officers, to other categories of officers like those belonging to excise department. If the Legislature intended otherwise, then such prescriptions would have been certainly stipulated in Section 2(p)(iii) so as to include other categories of officers. This position is so only in the context of the afore provision in the preventive detention law like KAAPA and not in the context of attracting the bar against admissibility of confession as per Section 25 of the Evidence Act, in criminal trials, which is in the domain of punitive detention. 22. That apart, even in the case of complaints of police officers, the Division Bench of this Court has held in Joicy vs. State of Kerala and Others, 2018 (1) KHC 37 (DB) in Para 12 thereof as follows: “12. Of-course, in these two crimes, the defacto complainants are the Assistant Sub Inspectors of Police. The complaints were preferred by them as they sustained injuries in the attack by the detenu and the co-accused and they had given statements while undergoing treatment in the hospital. It is significant to note that the injured though police officers are the two victims in the attack by the detenu. They are two individuals/human beings. The complaints were preferred by them as they sustained injuries in the attack by the detenu and the co-accused and they had given statements while undergoing treatment in the hospital. It is significant to note that the injured though police officers are the two victims in the attack by the detenu. They are two individuals/human beings. Just because of the fact that they are police officers, they do not cease to be human beings. The provisions of this Act will no way curtail the rights of the Police Officers. At no stretch of imagination it could be construed that the words employed in Section 2(p) (iii) that “complaints initiated by persons other than police officers” would mean that when police officers are attacked and complaints are registered against the assailants those cases shall not be reckoned for passing an order under Section 3 of KAAPA for issuing detention order against the persons who are repeatedly indulging in criminal activities causing threat, fear, nuisance and disturbance to the society at large. In fact, the police officers are in a better position than ordinary citizen as they were prevented from discharging their official duty. In the course of that they sustained injuries. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, if accepted, would mean that even if police officers are assulted any number of times, the assailants could not be brought to book under the KAAPA. The intention of legislature could never be so. Clause (iii) of Section 2 (p) of KAAPA would only indicate misuse of powers by police officers and to safeguard the interest of detenu . It appears that in both these incidents while the deteneu along with the co-assailants were creating threat and fear in the public, the duty bound police personnel attempted to prevent them and avert causing terror and threats to public at large by them and tried to maintain law and order at the respective places, but they were wrongfully attacked with deadly weapons and attempted to murder them. In fact, the records would indicate that the detenu is a dangerous person, who is involved in prejudicial activities and will not spare even police officials who are supposed to protect law and order situation for the welfare and security of the general public, which is of prime importance and that the detenu is a person who has no respect towards law and order. The embargo in Section 2(p)(iii) of KAAPA does not mean to say that complaints lodged by police officers who sustained injuries in an attack by the detenu, which resulted in launching of prosecution against the assailants cannot be recokned to pass a detention order to bring them under the definition of known rowdy or Known goonda. The intention of legislation could only be to avoid or prevent misuse or expolitation of the powers of Police personnel and it could never be to discard the complaints of Police officers when they themselves become victims in the attack by such miscreants which is quite often now a days. So, it is not correct to conclude that these two crimes could not be recokned so as to bring the detenu within the sweep of Section 2(p)(iii) of KAAPA and consequently to pass an order under Section 3 of KAAPA. So at any cost, it cannot be construed that the detaining authority with non-application of mind disregarded the provisions of the Act and passed the order of detention against the detenu. A hyper technical approach is not possible, though preventive detention is preventive and not punitive.” 23. In the facts of the present case, the allegation is that, when the excise officers had come to the house of the relatives of the petitioners in search of narcotic substances, the petitioner and his relatives had prevented the excise officers from discharging their duties of investigation as per the NDPS Act. Even if it is assumed that the said act was done by police officers, the same cannot come within the scope of exclusion in terms of Clause (iii) of Section 2(p), as the allegation in the said crime is that the officers concerned were prevented from discharging their duties. Hence, in view of the dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Para 12 of Joicy's case supra, the abovesaid contention of the petitioner is not liable to be accepted. Moreover, we note that, as per the impugned Ext.P-2 order, the right of entry and movement of the petitioner to the entire District of Kollam has not been restricted and only a partial restriction has been made, i.e. he shall not enter into the specific limits of the Kollam City Police District. In other words, he is not restricted from entering into the limits of the Kollam Rural Police District. In other words, he is not restricted from entering into the limits of the Kollam Rural Police District. For all these reasons, we note that the petitioner has not been able to successfully invoke the limited jurisdiction of judicial review in the facts of this case. In other words, the petition fails. 24. Accordingly, the above Writ Petition (Criminal) will stand dismissed.