JUDGMENT 1. The instant petition under Sec. 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973[in short 'Cr.P.C'] has been filed by the Petitioner/Accused No.2 seeking to quash F.I.R.No.397 of 2019 of Arundelpet P.S., which was registered for the offence punishable under Sec. 420 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.[In short, 'I.P.C.'] 2. The facts which led to the filing of this petition are; a. It is the case of the de-facto complainant that Accused Nos., 1 and 2 advised him to purchase the house site plots in the firm of A1 viz., Sai Krishna Town Ships (India) Pvt. Limited in the name of his daughters. It is stated that he purchased the said plots for a total amount of Rs.5, 05, 000.00. When he called upon to register the plots, A1 kept on dragging the issue on one or other pretext, deceiving him fraudulently and inducing him to remit the amounts. It is his case that A2 also co-operated with her husband in cheating the de-facto complainant. Initially, de-facto complainant approached the police on 25/7/2018 and lodged a complaint, but they have not taken any action. Then approached the Superintendent of Police on 29/10/2018, but as all efforts failed, he filed a private complaint before the V Additional Junior Civil Judge's Court, Guntur. b. Crime No.397 of 2019 on the file ofArundalpet P.S., Guntur District was registered, videSec. 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. Petitioner is arrayed as Accused No.2. She is the wife of Accused No.1. The case is under investigation. This F.I.R. is sought to be quashed by A-2/ Petitioner, vide this Petition. Hence, CRL.P. Arguments Advanced at the Bar 3. Heard Sri A.Venkata Durga Rao, learned counsel for Petitioner, Ms. Prasanna Lakshmi, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the State/Respondent No.1 and Sri G. Kondal Rao, learned counsel for Respondent No.2/ de-facto complainant. 4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that Petitioner is no way connected with the alleged transaction between the Accused No.1 and de-facto Complainant. It is submitted that Petitioner being the wife of A1 and Government employee working as Sub-Treasury Officer was falsely implicated in the case in order to bring A-1 to the terms of the de-facto complainant. 4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that Petitioner is no way connected with the alleged transaction between the Accused No.1 and de-facto Complainant. It is submitted that Petitioner being the wife of A1 and Government employee working as Sub-Treasury Officer was falsely implicated in the case in order to bring A-1 to the terms of the de-facto complainant. Next, it is contended that no specific overt acts are attributed against the Petitioner to attract the offence under Sec. 420 r/w 34 of the I.P.C. Contending that the allegations are civil in nature, learned counsel argues that the de-facto complainant is supposed to work out his remedies before a Civil Court and his intention by lodging criminal proceedings is toput the Petitioner in pressure to fulfill his illegal demands. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance on the following decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court; a. Mohammad Wajid and Anr. v. State of U.P. and others, 2023 (1) INSC 683. at para 34 b. Gulam Mustaffa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603. at para 36 c. Mohammad Ziad v. State of U.P.& others, [Crl.Appeal 2633 of 2023 of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, dtd. 29/8/2023.]at para 11 5. Refuting the arguments referred above, learned counsel for Respondent No.2 would submit that there are no grounds to quash the case against Petitioner/A2. He would submit that the allegations made against the Petitioner in the complaint would squarely attract the offence under Sec. 420 of the I.P.C and therefore, the F.I.R. should not be quashed against A-2. 6. After hearing the submission of both sides, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor stated that as the case is under investigation, no conclusions can be drawn at this stage. Point for Determination 7. Having heard the submissions made by the learned counsels and on perusal of the material available on record, the point for determination that arises in this case is as follows; Whether the case against the Petitioner/A-2in Crime No.397 of 2019 on the file of Arundalpet P.S., is liable to be quashed by exercising jurisdiction under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C.? Determination by the Court 8. Determination by the Court 8. Before delving into the instant case, it is appropriate to chalk out certain settled principles of law in the exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 482, which reads as follows; Sec. 482- Saving of inherent powers of High Court "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 9. The idea behind conferring inherent power to the High Court to is to meet exigencies that may likely arise where the Cr.P.C. fails to provide a specific provision, for a given issue. To put it differently, no legislative enactment can be so complete a package to deal with the procedure concerning all causes that are likely to arise. It is for this reason that the Courts have certain inherent powers, in addition to the ones that are expressed by law, for the proper discharge of their functions and effective administration of justice. 10. Inherent powers, are as the word suggests, are inalienably present in the Court. They are not conferred, but are merely safeguarded and preserved by provision under Sec. 482 to the High Court. A bare perusal of Sec. 482 makes it clear that the Code envisages that inherent powers of the High Court are not limited or affected so as to make orders as may be necessary; (i) to give effect to any order under the Code or, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or, otherwise (iii) to secure ends of justice. A court while sitting in Sec. 482 jurisdiction is not functioning as a court of appeal or a court of revision. It must exercise its powers to do real and substantial justice, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. These powers must be invoked for compelling reasons of abuse of process of law or glaring injustice, which are against sound principles of criminal jurisprudence. 11. Specific circumstances warranting the invocation of the provision must be present. To identify these specific circumstances, it is essential to discuss some precedents.The decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanlal and others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC. 11. Specific circumstances warranting the invocation of the provision must be present. To identify these specific circumstances, it is essential to discuss some precedents.The decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanlal and others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC. is considered as the guiding torch in the application of Sec. 482. At paras 102 and 103, the circumstances are spelt out as follows; "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Sec. 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Sec. 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec. 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Sec. 155(2) of the Code. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Sec. 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." (emphasis supplied) 12. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1SCC 692.. held as follows; "The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage." (emphasis supplied) 13. While reiterating the position of law laid down by a catena of decisions, the Apex Court in Ramveer Upadhyay and Another v. State of U.P. and Another held that Sec. 482 is designed so as to ensure that criminal proceedings are not used as weapons of harassment by complainants. The Court further held as follows; "39. In our considered opinion criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such possibility would not justify interference under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after closure of the earlier criminal case cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue, would have to be decided in the trial. In exercise of power under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence." (emphasis supplied) 14. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 . the Hon'ble Apex Courtobserved as follows; "46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 . the Hon'ble Apex Courtobserved as follows; "46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of theopinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down aninflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts underSec. 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by thetests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in theaforementioned cases" (emphasis supplied) 15. A three- Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and others, summarized the law for invocation on inherent powers in the following terms; "57. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Khawaja Nazir Ahmad (supra), the following principles of law emerge: i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the "rarest of rare cases". (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Sec. 482 Cr. P.C. is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court); v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Sec. 482 Cr. P.C. ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Sec. 482 Cr. P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the court when it exercises the power under Sec. 482 Cr. P.C., only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR." (emphasis supplied) 16. P.C., only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR." (emphasis supplied) 16. In Gulam Mustafa (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court having expounded the law on the point, held thus; "36. What is evincible from the extant case- law is that this Court has been consistent in interfering in such matters where purely civil disputes, more often than not, relating to land and/or money are given the colour of criminality, only for the purposes of exerting extra-judicial pressure on the party concerned, which, we reiterate, is nothing but abuse of the process of the court. ..." (emphasis supplied) 17. In Mohammad Wajid(supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court while reiterating the position held in Bhajanlal (supra), made a comprehensive analysis on the application of the Sec. . The Apex Court stressed on the necessity to arrive at a balance between the law enforcement power of the State and the protection of citizens from unjust criminal proceedings. It was observed that the right not to be disturbed without sufficient grounds is one of the mandates under Art 21 of the Constitution of India. In relation to quashing of F.I.R. and the material that is to be looked into, it was held in the following terms; "34. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior mo- tive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged. 35. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held: - "5. ...Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. ...Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p. 869, para 6) (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Sec. 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an in- strument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the Sec. is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death....." (emphasis supplied) 18. In Mohammad Ziad(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Courtin the context of exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 482 held as under; "11. We have taken note of R Kalyani (supra), pressed into service by the State, particularly Paragraph 15(4) which states "(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue." There is no quibble thereto. An FIR may not be quashed merely because the allegations of criminality have a civil element. But when the civil dispute is the overwhelming flavour of the criminal accusation, the Courts can intervene." (emphasis supplied) 19. In Thermax Ltd.v.K.M.Johny and others, (2011) 13 SCC 412 . the Hon'ble Apex Court, held as follows; 28. After considering the power under Sec. 482 of the Code and adverting to a series of decisions including Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [ (1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507] and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], this Court concluded thus : (Alpic case [ (2001) 3 SCC 513 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 565], SCC pp. 518 and 520, paras 7 and 10) 10. ... The injury alleged may form the basis of civil claim and may also constitute the ingredients of some crime punishable under criminal law. When there is dispute between the parties arising out of a transaction involving passing of valuable properties between them, the aggrieved person may have a right to sue for damages or compensation and at the same time, law permits the victim to proceed against the wrongdoer for having committed an offence of criminal breach of trust or cheating. When there is dispute between the parties arising out of a transaction involving passing of valuable properties between them, the aggrieved person may have a right to sue for damages or compensation and at the same time, law permits the victim to proceed against the wrongdoer for having committed an offence of criminal breach of trust or cheating. Here the main offence alleged by the appellant is that the respondents committed the offence under Sec. 420 IPC and the case of the appellant is that the respondents have cheated him and thereby dishonestly induced him to deliver property. To deceive is to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false and which the person practising the deceit knows or believes to be false. It must also be shown that there existed a fraudulent and dishonest intention at the time of commission of the offence.There is no allegation that the respondents made any wilful misrepresentation. Even according to the appellant, the parties entered into a valid lease agreement and the grievance of the appellant is that the respondents failed to discharge their contractual obligations. In the complaint, there is no allegation that there was fraud or dishonest inducement on the part of the respondents and thereby the respondents parted with the property. It is trite law and common sense that an honest man entering into a contract is deemed to represent that he has the present intention of carrying it out but if, having accepted the pecuniary advantage involved in the transaction, he fails to pay his debt, he does not necessarily evade the debt by deception." After finding so, this Court concluded that the learned Judge of the High Court was perfectly justified in quashing the proceedings and disinclined to interfere in such matters, dismissed the appeal. ................. 30. This Court, in paras 8-9 of the judgment, observed as under: (Anil Mahajan case [ (2005) 10 SCC 228 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 746], SCC pp. 231-32) "8. The substance of the complaint is to be seen. Mere use of the expression 'cheating' in the complaint is of no consequence. ................. 30. This Court, in paras 8-9 of the judgment, observed as under: (Anil Mahajan case [ (2005) 10 SCC 228 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 746], SCC pp. 231-32) "8. The substance of the complaint is to be seen. Mere use of the expression 'cheating' in the complaint is of no consequence. Except mention of the words 'deceive' and 'cheat' in the complaint filed before the Magistrate and 'cheating' in the complaint filed before the police, there is no averment about the deceit, cheating or fraudulent intention of the accused at the time of entering into MoU wherefrom it can be inferred that the accused had the intention to deceive the complainant to pay. ..." (emphasis supplied) 20. In the backdrop of the precedential guidance, the facts of the instant case shall be scrutinized. At this juncture, it is essential to extract the relevant portions of the complaint filed by the de-facto complainant, which read as follows; "It is most humbly submit that... 1. A1 and A2 are the husband and wife. 2. A1 and A2 advised and pacified the complainant, to purchase house site plots in A1's firm, in the names of his daughters, Pullabotla Jahnavi and Pullabotla. Anusha @ Manasa. Upon their advise, the complainant purchased two house sites plots, admeasuring each 135 square yards each, on installment basis, paid the total amount from 31/8/2014 to 22/11/2015, as against to the allotment of two plots, under PB No.109 and 13, a total amount of Rs.5, 05, 000.00 (Rupees five lakhs and five thousand only). At that juncture, the complainant called upon the Accused to register the said plots, in favour of his daughters, for which the Accused are dragging on the matter. Whenever, the complainant demands for registration said allotted plots, the A1 postponing to register the plots, on one or other pretext. 3. Inspite of many oral requests, A1 did not choose to register the plots, as agreed for, thereby deceived the complainant, fraudulently inducing him to remit huge amounts to himself and thus cheated the complainant. A2 also co-operated her husband in cheating complainant and making mockery of the complainant, when he requested A1 and A2 for either register the plots or else return of his remitted money. 4. At that juncture, the complainant approached SHO, Arundalpet P.S. on 25/7/2018 and lodged a complaint. A2 also co-operated her husband in cheating complainant and making mockery of the complainant, when he requested A1 and A2 for either register the plots or else return of his remitted money. 4. At that juncture, the complainant approached SHO, Arundalpet P.S. on 25/7/2018 and lodged a complaint. As he did not initiate any action, the complainant approached the SP., Urban, Guntur District, on 29/10/2018 stating all the facts and requested to render him justice. But all of his efforts were futile. Therefore, the complainant prays the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to take on file the complaint and conduct proceedings and punish the A1 and A2, for their intentional committing of offence of cheating punishable U/s. 420 IPC as stipulated above and punish A1 and A2 in accordance with law or forward the same u/s.156 (3) in the interest of Justice." 21. As understood by the series of judgments discussed, in a given case, there may be civil as well as criminal liability and the court has to examine the facts and circumstances of each case. The alleged transaction between A-1 and de-facto complainant took place on 22/11/2015. A thorough perusal of the contents of the complaint would show that Petitioner also advised Respondent No.2 to purchase two plots from the firm of A-1. It is not his case that Petitioner is owner of these plots. At the end of the complaint, there is another allegation that Petitioner co-operated with her husband for cheating the respondent No.2. However, the wayin which the Petitioner co-operated is not spelt out. To give benefit of doubt, this is not a case where the de-factocomplainant has rushed to the police station in a hurry to initiate action. As mentioned above, the alleged transaction took place in 2015, lodging of complaint started in 2018 and the private complaint was filed on 1/12/2019, which was registered as FIR by police on 28/7/2019. 22. It is also settled principle in law that to attract the offence under Sec. 420of I.P.C., it is essential that there must be dishonest intention to deceive the other person. As held inThermax Ltdsupra, mere mention of the words "cheating"or "deceiving" in the complaint, without proper averments asserting the role would not attract the offence. On a perusal of the relevant portions of the complaint already quoted, this Court does not find prima facie establishment of the offence under Sec. 420. As held inThermax Ltdsupra, mere mention of the words "cheating"or "deceiving" in the complaint, without proper averments asserting the role would not attract the offence. On a perusal of the relevant portions of the complaint already quoted, this Court does not find prima facie establishment of the offence under Sec. 420. Moreover, A-2 is working as a government servant and is not the owner of either the plots or the firm, maintained by her husband/A-1. 23. The saving of the High Court's inherent power to prevent abuse of process of the Court is designed to achieve a salutary pubic purpose, i.e., a Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. This Court finds that there are justifiable grounds to exercise its jurisdiction under Sec. 482 on the strength of (1), (5) and (7) in para 102 of Bhajanlal supra; (iii), (xiv) and (xv) of para 57 of Neeharika supra, and para 6 (ii) at R.P. Kapur supra. Therefore, as the very ingredients of the offending Sec. are not attracted, prosecution initiated against the A-2 is untenable and is liable to be quashed. 24. In result, the Criminal Petition is allowed. The proceedings against Petitioner/Accused No.2 on the file of Arundalpet Police Station, Guntur in F.I.R.No.397 of 2019 registered for the offence punishable under Sec. 420 r/w. 34 of I.P.C., are hereby quashed. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall also stand closed.