JUDGMENT : (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) 1. These writ petitions are under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for quashing of the demand letters passed by the District/Assistant Mining Officer, whereby and whereunder, the demand has been raised on account of additional royalty along with the interest. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petitions which are common in nature and requires to be enumerated, read as under: The writ petitioner-company is engaged in the mining and sale of coal for which the writ petitioner company has acquired several mines. Consequently, the writ petitioner company has acquired lands through Coal Bearing Area (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 for the purpose of developing Mines and other establishments connected with the Mines. It is the case of the writ petitioner that the coal which is being mined by the writ petitioner-company in the said mines is a specified mineral and therefore, the rate of royalty is being determined and revised by the Central Government from time to time and in absence of any special rate for washed coal notified by the Central Government in exercise of their powers under Section 9(3) of the MMDR Act, the coal company or any other mining lease for mineral coal are liable to make payment of royalty only at the rate specified for each grade of coal and the washery grade of coal is a separate grade of coal for which royalty is being paid by the writ petitioner-company at the rate specified. It is the case of the writ petitioner that under Rule 64(B) and 64(C) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 in case processing of mine is carried out within the lease area then royalty shall be chargeable on the processed mineral removed from the lease area and the writ petitioner-company has not been granted any lease by the State Government or the Central Government for mining coal as the land where the mining operations are being done has been acquired by the writ petitioner-company under the Coal Bearing Act (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957. It is the specific case of the writ petitioner that where the mineral is processed within a lease hold areas, the lessee is liable to pay royalty on the processed mineral, however, if the minerals are not processed within the lease hold areas, no royalty on the processed mineral is required to be paid rather royalty is required to be paid on the minerals removed from the mining lease areas and the writ petitioner-company is regularly making payment of sum equivalent to royalty to the State Government under the coal which is mined in different mines of the writ petitioner-company in terms of Section 9(3) of the MMDR Act. 3. However, while ignoring the settled proposition the concerned District/Assistant Mining Officer of the concerned districts demanded additional royalty as follows: (i) In W.P.(C) No. 2927 of 2017 vide letter dated 25.10.2016 contained in Memo No.4441/M had directed the Kargali Colliery to pay an additional royalty of Rs.8,76,39,205/- along with interest of Rs.3,88,58,658/-; (ii) In W.P.(C) No. 1258 of 2011 vide letter No.654 dated 14.10.2009 had directed the Piparwar Washery to pay an additional royalty of Rs.8,50,71,806/-; (iii) In W.P.(C) No. 1266 of 2011 vide letter no.3865 dated 17.11.2009; letter no.3963 dated 24.11.2009; letter no.5073 dated 12.12.2009 had directed the Sawang Washery to pay an additional royalty of Rs.21,66,34,052/-; (iv) In W.P.(C) No. 1300 of 2011 vide letter No.893 dated 26.02.2010 had directed the Kathara Washery to pay an additional royalty of Rs.62,26,66,130/-; (v) In W.P.(C) No. 1469 of 2011 vide letter No.1228 dated 13.10.2009 had directed the Rajrappa Washery to pay an additional royalty along with interest of Rs.14,65,99,464/-. Being aggrieved with the demand of such additional royalty amount, the writ petitioner-company approached the respondent-authority by filing representation stating therein that no additional royalty is required to be paid on the coal washed at Washeries as the same are not situated within any lease hold area but no heed has been paid thereof against which the present writ petitions have been preferred seeking quashing of the aforesaid demand letters. 4. 4. It appears from the pleading made in the writ petitions and as referred above that the writ petitioner has challenged different demands issued by way of royalty on the ground that the said royalty is not payable by the writ petitioner on account of the land owned by the Central Coal Field Limited, the writ petitioner, which has been acquired under the provision of Coal Bearing Act, 1957. 5. The ground has also been taken therein that the royalty has been paid on the unprocessed coal but without taking into consideration the aforesaid fact again the demand in lieu of the royalty has been made upon the processes coal in view of the provision of Rule 64 (B) and 64 (C) of the Mining Concession Rules, 1960 (pre-amended). 6. Argument has been advanced on behalf of Mrs. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the writ petitioner-Central Coal Fields Limited that however pleading has been made that the Central Coal Fields Limited is not liable to make payment of the royalty since the land has been acquired under the Coal Bearing Act, 1957 but the main ground is that the royalty has been paid on the unprocessed coal since the case of the writ petitioner for making payment of royalty is under the fold of the provision of Rule 64(B)(2) of the Rules, 1960. 7. It has been contended that it is not a case of Rule 64(B)(1) of the Rules, 1960 since the washeries are located beyond the lease hold area and hence, the royalty which was required to be paid by the Central Coal Fields Limited, the writ petitioners, on the unprocessed coal as per the requirement of the statutory provision as contained under Rule 64(B)(2) of the aforesaid Rules has been paid but the District/Assistant Mining Officer while raising demands has not considered the aforesaid fact and has raised demands on the processed coal also by making reference of the provision of Rule 64(B) and 64(C) of the aforesaid Rules. 8. It has further been contended that it is not a case where the provision of Rule 64(B) is at all applicable since the same is for other purpose but even then the demands have been raised both under Rule 64(B) and 64(C). 9. 8. It has further been contended that it is not a case where the provision of Rule 64(B) is at all applicable since the same is for other purpose but even then the demands have been raised both under Rule 64(B) and 64(C). 9. Further contention has been made that the provision of Rule 64(B) contains two provision, sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) thereof and both are for different eventualities of making payment of royalty while 64(C) thereof is for other purpose of raising demand of royalty. Therefore, contention has been made that the impugned orders does not refer as to under which specific provision of law such demands have been raised. 10. Further, before taking such decision, the District/Assistant Mining Officer has not provided opportunity of hearing which is gross violation of the principles of natural justice. 11. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner based upon the aforesaid ground has submitted that the impugned orders suffer from illegality and hence, are not sustainable in the eyes of law and are fit to be quashed and set aside. 12. Per contra, Mr. Jai Prakash, learned AAG-IA appearing for the respondent-State has submitted by referring to the pleading made in the writ petitions that the writ petitioner has pleaded by denying the liability since the land has been owned by virtue of acquisition made under the Coal Bearing Act, 1957, hence, on this ground the writ petitioner has not no case since in some of the paragraphs, the writ petitioner has admitted that the amount of royalty has been paid regularly which goes to suggest that once the royalty is being paid regularly, where is the question to raise the issue that the royalty is not applicable to be paid by the writ petitioner. 13. Learned AAG-IA is fair enough to submit that it is not a case of Rule 64(C) of the Rules, 1960. However, he has also agreed that Rule 64(B) contains two provisions, as such, it was incumbent upon the District/Assistant Mining Officer to pass order by referring therein the implication of the provision of Rule 64(B)(1) or 64(B)(2). 14. Furter admission is that by coming to the orders impugned that no show cause notice/opportunity of hearing was given to the writ petitioner. 15. 14. Furter admission is that by coming to the orders impugned that no show cause notice/opportunity of hearing was given to the writ petitioner. 15. In response to the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted by referring to paragraphs 14 and 19 of the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2927 of 2017 wherein the fact has been admitted that the amount of royalty has been paid and hence now only question which is to be considered that it is a case of Rule 64(B)(2) and not Rule 64 (A) since the writ petitioner has already paid the royalty of unprocessed coal as per the requirement of Rule 64(B)(2), hence, the demands are illegal. 16. It has also been submitted in response that since no show cause notice was given, as such, serious prejudice has been cause and if the show cause notice would have been issued to the writ petitioner, then all the facts would have been brought to the notice of the concerned authority before taking any decision. 17. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the decision of the authorities impugned in these writ petitions. 18. Serious objection has been raised on behalf of the State that the writ petitioner has denied its liability by taking the ground that the land has been acquired under the Coal Bearing Act, 1957, therefore, the land being owned by the writ petitioner, hence, the writ petitioner is not liable to make payment of royalty. 19. However, in course of argument, Mr. Das at bar has submitted by referring to paragraphs-14 and 19 of the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2927 of 2017 that the royalty of unprocessed coal has been paid as raised by the competent authority and this Court has taken note of the said paragraphs. For ready reference, the said paragraphs are being reproduced as under: “14. That it is stated that thus apparently where the mineral is processed within a lease hold area, the lessee is liable to pay royalty on the processed mineral. However, if the minerals are not processed within the lease hold area, no royalty on the processed mineral is required to be paid rather royalty is required to be paid on the minerals removed from the mining lease area. However, if the minerals are not processed within the lease hold area, no royalty on the processed mineral is required to be paid rather royalty is required to be paid on the minerals removed from the mining lease area. The petitioner company is regularly making payment of some equivalent to royalty to the State Government under the coal, which is mined in different mines of the petitioner company in terms of Section 9(3) of the Mines & Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act. Acknowledging the legal provision, even the State Government never insisted for payment of royalty on the coal processed in Kargali Washery of CCL. 19. That it is submitted that in view of the fact that the Kargali Washery of the petitioner is not situated over the leased area, the respondents are not justified in demanding additional royalty on the washed coal.” 20. Mr. Das, on the basis of the aforesaid pleading, has submitted that the amount of royalty has been paid of unprocessed coal, hence, there is no liability rather argument is if the statement made at paragraphs 14 and 29 will be taken into consideration that since the royalty has been paid of unprocessed coal which as per the requirement of Rule 64(B)(2), hence, the demands are illegal. 21. Further ground is that no show cause notice has been issued to the writ petitioner, hence, there is violation of principles of natural justice. 22. This Court is now considering as to whether the demands issued against the writ petitioner can be said to be without following the principles of natural justice. 23. The law is well settled that any demand or any adverse decision is being taken by the competent authority, the same is only after providing opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned reason being that the principle to provide opportunity of hearing is the cardinal principle of natural justice as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Anr., (1978) 1 SCC 248 . Relevant paragraph, i.e., paragraph-184 of the said judgment is being referred as under: “184. It was submitted on behalf of the state that an order under sub-clause 10(3)(c) is on the subjective satisfaction of the passport authority and that as the decision is purely administrative in character it cannot be questioned in a court of law except on very limited grounds. It was submitted on behalf of the state that an order under sub-clause 10(3)(c) is on the subjective satisfaction of the passport authority and that as the decision is purely administrative in character it cannot be questioned in a court of law except on very limited grounds. Though the courts had taken the view that the principle of natural justice is inapplicable to administrative orders, there is a change in the judicial opinion subsequently. The frontier between judicial or quasi-judicial determination on the one hand and an executive or administrative determination on the other has become blurred. The rigid view that principles of natural justice applied only to judicial and quasi-judicial acts and not to administrative acts no longer holds the field. The views taken by the courts on this subject are not consistent. While earlier decisions were in favour of administrative convenience and efficiency at the expense of natural justice, the recent view is in favour of extending the application of natural justice and the duty to act fairly with a caution that the principle should not be extended to the extreme so as to affect adversely the administrative efficiency. In this connection it is useful to quote the oft-repeated observations of Lord Justice Tucker in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All ER 109, 118] “The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth ... but, whatever standard is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case.” In R. v. Gaming Board ex. p. Benaim [ (1970) 2 QB 417 : (1970) 2 All ER 528] Lord Denning held that the view that the principle of natural justice applied only to judicial proceedings and not to administrative proceedings has been overruled in Ridge v. Baldwin [(1964) AC 40] . The guidance that was given to the Gaming Board was that they should follow the principles laid down in the case of immigrants, namely, that they have no right to come in, but they have a right to be heard. The guidance that was given to the Gaming Board was that they should follow the principles laid down in the case of immigrants, namely, that they have no right to come in, but they have a right to be heard. The Court held in construing the words the Board “shall have regard only” to the matter specified, the Board has a duty to act fairly and it must give the applicant an opportunity of satisfying them of the matter specified in the section. They must let him know what their impressions are so that he can disabuse them. The reference to the cases of immigrants is to the decisions of Chief Justice Parker in Re H. K. (An infant [(1967) 2 QB 617, 630]). In cases of immigrants though they had no right to come into the country it was held that they have a right to be heard. These observations apply to the present case and the plea of the petitioner that the authority should act fairly and that they must let her know what their impressions are so that, if possible, she can disabuse them, is sound.” 24. It has also been settled that show cause notice given or not is to be reflected from the impugned decision so that the order be said to be after observance of principles of natural justice. 25. We have considered the impugned order and found therefrom that there is no reference of show cause notice contained therein. 26. Learned AAG-IA has fairly submitted by accepting the order raising liability that no opportunity of hearing was given to the writ petitioner. 27. The writ petitioner has also made statement that all of a sudden, demand notices have been issued. The aforesaid statement has not been refuted by the learned State counsel. 28. The issue since has been raised regarding applicability of Rule 64 (1) or Rule 64(B)(2) and further the demand has been raised under Rule 64(C) but there is no consideration as to whether Rule 64(B)(1) is applicable or Rule 64(1) is applicable. The aforesaid statement has not been refuted by the learned State counsel. 28. The issue since has been raised regarding applicability of Rule 64 (1) or Rule 64(B)(2) and further the demand has been raised under Rule 64(C) but there is no consideration as to whether Rule 64(B)(1) is applicable or Rule 64(1) is applicable. Further, there is no reason assigned therein that on what basis Rule 64(C) is applicable, as such, since the impugned orders, it is very much clear that the aforesaid orders has been passed raising the demands without any show cause that too there is no discussion of applicability of the specific provision either Rule 64(B)(1) or Rule 64(B)(2) and further why Rule 64(C) has been referred therein, there is no reference contained therein. 29. This Court, therefore, is of the view the said orders cannot be said to be reasoned and speaking. 30. The law is well settled that in absence of any reason, if any decision taken by the administration authority, the same also amounts to violation of principles of natural justice since reason is said to be the soul of the decision. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Raj Kishore Jha Vrs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in (2003) 11 SCC 519 , wherein, it has been held at paragraph-19 as under:- “… … …Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. Without the same, it becomes lifeless. … … 31. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. & Anr. Vrs. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors., reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496, wherein, at paragraph 47, it has been held as under: “47. --------- (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.”. 32. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the impugned orders since have been issued without providing opportunity of hearing to the writ petition and further without making discussion about the applicability of the provision of Rule 64(B)(1), Rule 64(B)(2) and Rule 64(C), hence, this Court is of the view that the impugned orders require interference. 33. 32. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the impugned orders since have been issued without providing opportunity of hearing to the writ petition and further without making discussion about the applicability of the provision of Rule 64(B)(1), Rule 64(B)(2) and Rule 64(C), hence, this Court is of the view that the impugned orders require interference. 33. Accordingly, the impugned orders dated 25.10.2016, 14.10.2009, 17.11.2009, 24.11.2009, 12.12.2009, 26.02.2010 13.10.2009 are quashed and set aside. 34. Since this court has interfered with the impugned orders on the ground of violating of principles of natural justice, hence, the requirement of law will be that the matter needs to be referred before the concerned District/Assistant Mining Officer to pass fresh orders by providing opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner so as to decide : (i) Whether it is a case of Rule 64(B)(1) or; (ii) Whether it is a case of Rule 64(B)(2) or; (iii) Whether it is a case of Rule 64(C). 35. Let the concerned competent authority take decision to that effect by passing a speaking order in accordance with the law but prior to that it is incumbent upon the concerned District/Assistant Mining Officer to issue show cause notice to the writ petitioner which shall be issued within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. The writ petitioner, on receipt of such show cause notice, will file response within a period of three weeks thereafter. The concerned District/Assistant Mining Officer will take decision in accordance with law preferably within a period of two months from the date of receipt of such response by passing a reasoned order. Needless to say that if there is none appearance on behalf of the concerned party even after receipt of the notice, the concerned authority will be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law. The demands which are subject matter of the instant writ petitions, will depend upon the final outcome of the decision to be taken by the concerned District/Assistant Mining Officer. 36. Accordingly, all the instant writ petitions stand disposed of with the aforesaid observations and directions. 37. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.