JUDGMENT : (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) This Appeal has been filed under section 13 of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 read with section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1996”) challenging the judgment dated 23rd December 2019 passed by the learned District Judge-I-cum-Commercial Court, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur in Arbitration Case No.07 of 2019 whereby the petition filed by the respondent under section 34 of the Act of 1996 has been allowed and the Award dated 29th April 2014 passed by the learned Arbitrator has been set aside on the ground that the Award was unsigned and not prepared on stamp paper and consequently invalid and legally not enforceable. As the Award was held to be not enforceable, the learned Commercial Court has refused to enter into the grounds touching upon the merits of the claims allowed and counter-claims disallowed by the learned Arbitrator. Foundational facts 2. The background of the case is that the respondent issued a Notice Inviting Tender in relation to an irrigation project known as Suru Reservoir Project on a turnkey basis at an estimated cost of Rs.3088.375 lakhs. The appellant was declared a successful bidder and consequently, parties entered into an agreement vide agreement no. F207/2004-05 on 10th September 2004. In the midst of the execution of the work dispute arose between the parties and the claimant filed a petition under section 11 (6) of the Act of 1996 before this Court bearing Arbitration Application No. 46 of 2007, in which Hon’ble Justice S.B. Sinha, a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, was appointed as sole Arbitrator. The arbitration proceeding was concluded after the submission of pleadings, and documents as well as the examination of oral witnesses by both the parties, and the Award was passed after hearing the parties. 3. The summary of the Award in connection with the claim and counter-claim has been mentioned in paragraph nos. 336 to 340 of the Award as under: Claim No. Particulars Amount (Rs.) Awarded 1. Non-payment of outstanding bills and interest therein 3,18,94,411.00 Rejected 2. Illegal Encashment of Bank Guarantee furnished by the Claimant against the Mobilization Advance. 1,98,03,000.00 Rs.21,00,000/- + interest from March 2007, @ 18% per annum till the date of actual payment. 3. Claim of Insurance CAR Policy. 6,78,908.00 Rejected 4. Non-payment of outstanding bills and interest therein 3,18,94,411.00 Rejected 2. Illegal Encashment of Bank Guarantee furnished by the Claimant against the Mobilization Advance. 1,98,03,000.00 Rs.21,00,000/- + interest from March 2007, @ 18% per annum till the date of actual payment. 3. Claim of Insurance CAR Policy. 6,78,908.00 Rejected 4. Expenditure incurred on mobilization of machineries. 3,05,03,200.00 3,05,03,200.00 5. Loss due to Idleness of labour mobilized. 36,79,200.00 36,79,200.00 6. Loss on account of establishment of infrastructure and other facilities. 1,92,35,320.00 1,56,91,068.00 7. Additional expenses incurred on mobilization of labour force with machineries. 35,28,525.00 Rejected 8. Loss of Profit 3,96,04,300.00 3,88,25,664.70 9. Loss of Opportunity 6,00,00,000.00 Rejected 10. Loss of Goodwill 5,00,00,000.00 Rejected 11. Legal/Arbitration Expenses 15,00,000.00 and further amount which will be incurred during this proceeding. 28,50,000.00 (towards fees of the Arbitrator) 7,97,102.00 (towards expenditure incurred by the Arbitrator) 10,32,107.00 + interest @ 18% per annum from 3.4.2014 till the date of payment (paid to the Arbitrator on behalf of the Respondent, in terms of Section 38 of the 1996 Act) Total Rs. 25,04,26,864.00 4. The learned Arbitrator has also awarded costs to the claimant and rejected the counter claims of the respondent in the following manner. 337. This Tribunal feels that the Respondent should also pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- to the Claimant by way of exemplary costs. 338. From the total amount of Claim, under Claim No. 4, 5 and 6, a sum of Rs. 77, 86,353/- shall be deducted, in view of the fact that the Claimant has already received the said amount from the Running Account Bills. The total amount payable to the Claimant under the said Claim Nos. 4, 5, and 6, would be Rs. 4,98,73,468/- It must be mentioned that sum of money paid to the Claimant in respect of Running Account Bills (a), (b), (e) & (f) is Rs. 77,86,353/-, and not Rs. 77,87,353/- as has been mentioned in the Counter-claims by the Respondent No. 1. Therefore, the calculations have been made accordingly. 339. The aforementioned awarded amounts shall carry interest from the date of this award till realization @ 18% per annum. 340. The Counter Claims by the Respondent No. 1 are rejected.” 5. The learned Arbitrator made some closing observations in paragraphs nos.341 to 345 of the Award as under: “341. Therefore, the calculations have been made accordingly. 339. The aforementioned awarded amounts shall carry interest from the date of this award till realization @ 18% per annum. 340. The Counter Claims by the Respondent No. 1 are rejected.” 5. The learned Arbitrator made some closing observations in paragraphs nos.341 to 345 of the Award as under: “341. This Arbitration proceeding arise put of an Order dated 15.09.2009 passed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Jharkhand High Court in Arbitration Application No. 46 of 2007, on an application filed by the Claimant herein, formerly known as M/s Nagarjuna Constructions Ltd., under Section 11(6) read with Section 11(8) of the 1996 Act. Pursuant thereto and in furtherance thereof, the Arbitral Tribunal entered it into reference on or about 07.11.2009. 342. Pleadings of the parties were completed, and on or about 21.04.2010. Applications for grant of further time were filed by the parties to file their respective pleadings and issues were framed on 22.05.2010. 343. The examination of the witnesses was completed by 12.03.2011. 344. Despite a clear direction, the Respondent No. 1, however, except making payments of Rs.1,50,000/- towards fees of the Arbitrator, and a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- towards expenditure incurred by him sometime in Feb'2010, did not pay either the fees of the Arbitral Tribunal or the charges incurred by it towards travels, stay at hotels, charges for the conference rooms, and other incidental charges, as also the payments made to the stenographer, who attended the arbitral proceedings throughout. 345. Despite directions issued by this Tribunal from time to time, and despite undertakings given by the Respondent No. 1 to deposit the fees, and other expenses incurred by the Arbitral Tribunal, the Respondent No. 1 did not do so for a long time.” 6. The Arbitral Award was challenged under section 34 of the Act of 1996 by the respondent on merits as well as on the ground that the Award was neither prepared on stamp paper nor signed by the learned Arbitrator. 7. The learned Commercial Court recorded the submissions of both parties and framed the following issues for consideration in paragraph no.5 of the impugned judgment: (i) Whether the award as it stands was valid and legally enforceable without the signature of the learned sole arbitrator tribunal? (ii) Whether the award is liable to be set aside in view of the objection? 8. (ii) Whether the award is liable to be set aside in view of the objection? 8. The learned Commercial Court allowed the application filed under section 34 of the Act of 1996 and set aside the Award holding that the Award was not enforceable as the Award was neither signed by the learned Arbitrator nor was prepared on stamp paper. The learned Commercial Court did not deal with the grounds raised by the respondent in connection with the claims allowed by the learned Arbitrator and also the counter-claim disallowed by the learned Arbitrator. In paragraph no.9 of the impugned judgment, the learned Commercial Court has referred to the provisions of section 31 and section 34 of the Act of 1996 stating that the Arbitral Award is required to be made in writing and signed by the member of the Arbitral Tribunal. The learned Commercial Court has recorded its findings in paragraphs nos.8, 10 to 12 as follows: “8…... After considering the entire material available on the record, I find that there is lot of force in the argument of learned counsel of the applicant that on the last page of the award the date has been mentioned as 29-04-2014, whereas the said Hon’ble Sole Arbitrator had not made his signature on any page of the said award, even on the last page. The same cannot be said to be an arbitral award in pursuance of section 31 (1) of the Act. Moreover, the said award is not published on the required stamp paper. The copy of the said award has not been issued to any of the respondent named in the said award. In fact, in absence of signature on the said award the same cannot be said to pass as also such award could not be passed on requisite stamp. 9……….. 10. Coming now to the first ground of challenge to the impugned award raised by the Petitioner, subsection (1) of Section 31 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 requires the Arbitral Award to be made in writing and signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. Subsection (2) of Section 31 provides that for the purpose of subsection (1), signatures of majority of members of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be sufficient so long as the reason for any omitted signature is stated. Subsection (2) of Section 31 provides that for the purpose of subsection (1), signatures of majority of members of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be sufficient so long as the reason for any omitted signature is stated. Sub-section (1) requires that the arbitral award has to be in writing and to be signed by the Arbitral Tribunal. The Act now places the matter beyond doubt by providing that what is required in law for a valid award. The reasons for the omission of the signature of an Arbitrator have to be stated. That is exactly what has happened in the present case. The award passed by the Hon’ble Arbitrator can be interfered with on the grounds mentioned in Section 34 (2A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which runs as follows: 2[(2A) An Arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. 11. If one has regard to the impugned award in the present case, what transpires, in the first place, is that there is no signature of the learned arbitrator available on the impugned award dated 29-04-2014. The want of signature of the learned sole arbitrator cannot be attributed simply to any administrative exigency or ministerial lapse or difficulty or even his having taken a dissenting view. It rather goes to the root of the award and undermines its validity. But that, to my mind does not carry the matter any further because what is to be considered is whether the award as it stands was valid without the signature of sole arbitrator. There is absolutely nothing either in the award or in the communication, as mentioned above, to indicate that after the matter was closed for order/ award, the learned arbitrator has not put his signature on the impugned award. No doubt, under the scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the award within the meaning of the Act is really an award after signing it. In the premises, the impugned award cannot be termed as a valid award in the eyes of law and it is not legally enforceable. 12. Hence, issue no.1 Whether the award as it stands was valid and legally enforceable without the signature of learned sole arbitrator tribunal? In the premises, the impugned award cannot be termed as a valid award in the eyes of law and it is not legally enforceable. 12. Hence, issue no.1 Whether the award as it stands was valid and legally enforceable without the signature of learned sole arbitrator tribunal? is decided in favour of applicant/ respondent and against the Opposite party/claimant. Thus, issue No. II "Whether the award is liable to be set aside in view of the objection?" is affirmative. This court find that the impugned award is not legally enforceable, then in my view there in no need to go to in detail and consider other points raised by the applicant/ respondent. In the above facts and circumstances the impugned award of the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be sustained. The Arbitration Petition u/s 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside the arbitral award dated 29-04-2014 passed by the Learned Sole arbitrator Hon'ble Justice (Retd.) S.B. Sinha, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India is, accordingly, allowed, and the impugned award dated 29-04-2014 passed by the Learned Sole arbitrator Hon'ble Justice (Retd.) S.B. Sinha, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India is hereby set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Let the original record of proceeding be returned to the office of the learned sole arbitrator.” 9. The claimant is the appellant before this Court. Both the parties were heard and have filed their written submissions before this Court along with copies of the judgments relied upon by them. 10. The appellant has relied upon the following judgments: (i) “A Anasuya Devi and Another. V. M. Manik Reddy and others” (2003) 8 SCC 565 (ii) “State of West Bengal v. Sree Sree Ma Engineering and Another” (1987) 4 SCC 452 (iii) “Union of India v. Bhola Prasad Agarwal and Another passed by High Court of Chhattisgarh on 21.09.2022 bearing Case No. Arbitration Appeal No. 15 of 2022” (iv) “M/s. Chandok Machineries v. M/s S.N. Sunderson and Co.” 2018 SCC Online Del 11000 (v) “Uma Shankar Goenka, H.U.F. & Others v. R. Saraogi & Company and Another 1996 SCC Online Cal 16 (vi) “Parsvnath Developers Ltd. Vs. Wisecan Engineering Pvt. Ltd. and Another” 2021 SCC Online P & H 4608. 11. The respondent has referred to the following judgments : (i) “Delhi Development Authority Vs. Wisecan Engineering Pvt. Ltd. and Another” 2021 SCC Online P & H 4608. 11. The respondent has referred to the following judgments : (i) “Delhi Development Authority Vs. R.S. Sharma and Company” (2008) 13 SCC 80 (ii) “BGS SGS Soma JV vs. NHPC Limited” (2020) 4 SCC 234 (iii) “Emkay Global Financial Services Limited Vs. Girdhar Sondhi” (2018) 9 SCC 49 (iv) “Patel Engineering Ltd. Vs. North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd.” (2020) 7 SCC 167 (v) “Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Company Ltd. Vs. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI)” (2019) 15 SCC 131 . Findings of this Court. 12. The entire case revolves around e-mail communication of an Award to the counsel for the respondent. The Award as communicated through e-mail was unsigned and not prepared on stamp paper. The specific case of the respondent is that they were never served with a copy of the Award by the learned Arbitrator. In the written submissions filed before this Court, a stand has been taken by the respondent that the Award which is said to be sent to the secretary of the Department neither served nor could be served as it was sent at the wrong address. 13. On the other hand, the specific case of the appellant is that the signed award prepared on stamp paper was duly served, and a copy of the award prepared on stamp paper and signed by the learned Arbitrator on the last page which also contained the date of the Award was received by the appellant along with a covering letter. The covering letter as well as the Award as communicated to the appellant has been filed before this Court along with the memorandum of appeal. 14. Though the receipted copy of the Award was not filed by the appellant before the learned Commercial Court, but a counter affidavit was filed mentioning that the Award was prepared on stamp paper and was signed by the learned Arbitrator on the last page. Before this Court, the appellant has also filed certain documents to demonstrate that the Award was duly served upon the secretary of the respondent Department and also that the Award as received by the appellant was filed by the appellant before the executing Court as well as before this Court in L.P.A. No. 432 of 2011. Before this Court, the appellant has also filed certain documents to demonstrate that the Award was duly served upon the secretary of the respondent Department and also that the Award as received by the appellant was filed by the appellant before the executing Court as well as before this Court in L.P.A. No. 432 of 2011. The records of the executing Court as well as the LPA have been received and kept with the records of this case. 15. For the purposes of the controversy involved in the present case, the relevant provisions are section 2(h), sections 31 to 34 of the Act of 1996. These provisions of law have been the subject matter of consideration in various judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and other High Courts. 16. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in “Union of India vs. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors” (2005) 4 SCC 239 , the question that arose for consideration was what would be the effective date on which the arbitral award can be said to have been delivered to the party as that would be the date wherefrom the limitation within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act shall be calculated. 17. The aforesaid provisions have been analysed in the aforesaid judgment and, interalia, in paragraphs 6 and 8 of the judgment it has been held as under: - “6. Form and contents of the arbitral award are provided by Section 31 of the Act. The arbitral award drawn up in the manner prescribed by Section 31 of the Act has to be signed and dated. According to sub-section (5), “after the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party”. The term “party” is defined by clause (h) of Section 2 of the Act as meaning “a party to an arbitration agreement”. The definition is to be read as given unless the context otherwise requires. Under sub-section (3) of Section 34 the limitation of 3 months commences from the date on which “the party making that application” had received the arbitral award. We have to see what is the meaning to be assigned to the term “party” and “party making the application” for setting aside the award in the context of the State or a department of the Government, more so a large organisation like the Railways. 8. We have to see what is the meaning to be assigned to the term “party” and “party making the application” for setting aside the award in the context of the State or a department of the Government, more so a large organisation like the Railways. 8. The delivery of an arbitral award under sub-section (5) of Section 31 is not a matter of mere formality. It is a matter of substance. It is only after the stage under Section 31 has passed that the stage of termination of arbitral proceedings within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act arises. The delivery of arbitral award to the party, to be effective, has to be “received” by the party. This delivery by the Arbitral Tribunal and receipt by the party of the award sets in motion several periods of limitation such as an application for correction and interpretation of an award within 30 days under Section 33(1), an application for making an additional award under Section 33(4) and an application for setting aside an award under Section 34(3) and so on. As this delivery of the copy of award has the effect of conferring certain rights on the party as also bringing to an end the right to exercise those rights on expiry of the prescribed period of limitation which would be calculated from that date, the delivery of the copy of award by the Tribunal and the receipt thereof by each party constitutes an important stage in the arbitral proceedings.” (emphasis supplied) 18. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. ARK Builders (P) Ltd., reported in (2011) 4 SCC 616 the issue was whether the period of limitation for an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is to be reckoned from the date a copy of the award is received by the objector by any means and from any source, or it would start running from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to him by the arbitrator. More preciously, the following was the issue framed: - “Whether the period of limitation for making an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter “the Act”) for setting aside an arbitral award is to be reckoned from the date a copy of the award is received by the objector by any means and from any source, or it would start running from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to him by the arbitrator?” 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the expression “party making that applicant had received the arbitral award” cannot be read in isolation and it must be understood in light of section 31(5) of the Act of 1996 that requires a signed copy of the Award to be delivered to each party. It has also been held that reading the two provisions together it is quite clear that the limitation prescribed under section 34(3) would commence only from the date a signed copy of the Award is delivered to the party making the application for setting it aside. In paragraphs 15, 17 and 18, after following the judgment of Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors (supra), it has been held as follows: “15. The highlighted portion of the judgment extracted above, leaves no room for doubt that the period of limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act would start running only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to/received by the party making the application for setting it aside under Section 34(1) of the Act. The legal position on the issue may be stated thus. If the law prescribes that a copy of the order/award is to be communicated, delivered, dispatched, forwarded, rendered or sent to the parties concerned in a particular way and in case the law also sets a period of limitation for challenging the order/award in question by the aggrieved party, then the period of limitation can only commence from the date on which the order/award was received by the party concerned in the manner prescribed by the law.” 17. In light of the discussions made above we find the impugned order of the Bombay High Court unsustainable. The High Court was clearly in error not correctly following the decision of this Court in Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors and in taking a contrary view. In light of the discussions made above we find the impugned order of the Bombay High Court unsustainable. The High Court was clearly in error not correctly following the decision of this Court in Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors and in taking a contrary view. The High Court overlooked that what Section 31(5) contemplates is not merely the delivery of any kind of a copy of the award but a copy of the award that is duly signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. 18. In the facts of the case the appellants would appear to be deriving undue advantage due to the omission of the arbitrator to give them a signed copy of the award coupled with the supply of a copy of the award to them by the respondent claimant but that would not change the legal position and it would be wrong to tailor the law according to the facts of a particular case.” 20. In ARK Builders (P) Ltd (supra), the Award was not served upon the appellant at all on account of non-payment of the cost of arbitration, and a copy of it was served by the claimant, upon which, the appellant had approached the learned Arbitrator for a signed copy which was ultimately given to the appellant and it was claimed that the limitation would start running from the date the learned Arbitrator gave the signed Award to the appellant. In the said case a signed copy of the Award was asked for from the Arbitrator which was served only on 19th January 2004 and was taken to be the starting point for calculating the period of limitation. 21. Similarly in the judgment reported in (2012) 9 SCC 496 “Benarsi Krishna Committee and Others versus Karmyogi Shelters Private Limited” the starting point of limitation was taken to be the date when the party challenging the Award had obtained a copy from the learned Arbitrator and not from the date it was served upon their counsel. Paragraph nos. 15,16 and 17 of the said judgment are quoted as under: - “15. Paragraph nos. 15,16 and 17 of the said judgment are quoted as under: - “15. Having taken note of the submissions advanced on behalf of the respective parties and having particular regard to the expression “party” as defined in Section 2(1)(h) of the 1996 Act read with the provisions of Sections 31(5) and 34(3) of the 1996 Act, we are not inclined to interfere with the decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court impugned in these proceedings. The expression “party” has been amply dealt with in Tecco Trichy Engineers case and also in ARK Builders (P) Ltd. case, referred to hereinabove. It is one thing for an advocate to act and plead on behalf of a party in a proceeding and it is another for an advocate to act as the party himself. The expression “party”, as defined in Section 2(1)(h) of the 1996 Act, clearly indicates a person who is a party to an arbitration agreement. The said definition is not qualified in any way so as to include the agent of the party to such agreement. Any reference, therefore, made in Section 31(5) and Section 34(2) of the 1996 Act can only mean the party himself and not his or her agent, or advocate empowered to act on the basis of a vakalatnama. In such circumstances, proper compliance with Section 31(5) would mean delivery of a signed copy of the arbitral award on the party himself and not on his advocate, which gives the party concerned the right to proceed under Section 34(3) of the aforesaid Act. 16. The view taken in Pushpa Devi Bhagat case is in relation to the authority given to an advocate to act on behalf of a party to a proceeding in the proceedings itself, which cannot stand satisfied where a provision such as Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act is concerned. The said provision clearly indicates that a signed copy of the award has to be delivered to the party. Accordingly, when a copy of the signed award is not delivered to the party himself, it would not amount to compliance with the provisions of Section 31(5) of the Act. The said provision clearly indicates that a signed copy of the award has to be delivered to the party. Accordingly, when a copy of the signed award is not delivered to the party himself, it would not amount to compliance with the provisions of Section 31(5) of the Act. The other decision cited by Mr Ranjit Kumar in Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti case was rendered under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which did not have a provision similar to the provisions of Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act. The said decision would, therefore, not be applicable to the facts of this case also. 17. In the instant case, since a signed copy of the award had not been delivered to the party itself and the party obtained the same on 15-12-2004, and the petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed on 3-2-2005, it has to be held that the said petition was filed within the stipulated period of three months as contemplated under Section 34(3) of the aforesaid Act. Consequently, the objection taken on behalf of the petitioner herein cannot be sustained and, in our view, was rightly rejected by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.” (emphasis supplied) 22. In the judgment in the case of Benarsi Krishna Committee (supra) the provisions of sections 2(1)(h), 31(5) and 34(3) of the Act of 1996 have been interpreted and it has been clearly held that ‘party’ to arbitration proceedings does not include their agent or Advocate who represented the ‘party’ in arbitral proceedings. However, in the said case, upon receipt of knowledge about the passing of the Award the ‘party’ obtained the Award from the Arbitrator and then filed the petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 calculating the limitation period for filing the petition from the receipt of the Award directly from the learned Arbitrator. 23. So far as the present case is concerned, in paragraph 1 of the application filed u/s. 34 of the Act of 1996, the respondent stated that the Arbitral Award dated 29th April 2014 was sent by e-mail to the office of the Advocate Sri Chandrashekhar Prasad Sinha who had appeared and represented the respondent in the arbitration proceeding. 24. 23. So far as the present case is concerned, in paragraph 1 of the application filed u/s. 34 of the Act of 1996, the respondent stated that the Arbitral Award dated 29th April 2014 was sent by e-mail to the office of the Advocate Sri Chandrashekhar Prasad Sinha who had appeared and represented the respondent in the arbitration proceeding. 24. Paragraph 12 of the application under section 34 of the Act of 1996 reads as under:- "From perusal of the award in which the date on the last page is mentioned as 29.04.2014, whereas the said Hon'ble Sole Arbitrator has not made his signature on any page of the said award, even on the last page. Moreover, the said award is not published on the required stamp paper.” 25. Thereafter, in the petition filed under section 34 of the Act of 1996, the respondent raised several grounds of challenge to the Arbitral Award in sub-para-A (i) to (xii) of paragraph-12 with respect to allowing the claim of the appellant and grounds in sub-para & B(i) to (iv) of paragraph 12 against the rejecting of Counter Claim of the respondent. In sub-para-A (iv) of paragraph 12 of the petition filed under section 34 of the Act of 1996, the factum of the Award being without the signature of the learned Arbitrator has been reiterated. In paragraph 18 of the application under section 34 of the Act of 1996, the respondent stated that although the alleged Award is dated 29th April 2014, in the absence of delivery of such alleged Award in pursuance of section 31(5) of the Act of 1996, the Award shall not be treated as delivered. It has been asserted that the unsigned Award cannot be said to be an Arbitral Award in terms of section 31(1) of the Act of 1996. It was stated that the alleged Arbitral Award was seen only on 9th May 2014 by the counsel of the respondent and was forwarded to the respondent by a special messenger on 19th May 2014. It was also asserted that the alleged Award is not an Arbitral Award in pursuance of section 31 (1) (5) and even u/s. 31 (4) of the Act of 1996 as such the same has been passed at Delhi whereas the venue of such proceeding was fixed at Ranchi u/s.20 of the Act of 1996. 26. It was also asserted that the alleged Award is not an Arbitral Award in pursuance of section 31 (1) (5) and even u/s. 31 (4) of the Act of 1996 as such the same has been passed at Delhi whereas the venue of such proceeding was fixed at Ranchi u/s.20 of the Act of 1996. 26. At the end of the petition filed under section 34 of the Act of 1996, the respondent stated as under: - “21. That in the facts and circumstances as stated above although the alleged award, the copy of which is being enclosed herewith and form part of this petition, is not an Arbitral award as stated above. However, the applicant reserves its right to file any additional point filing a supplementary petition along with required documents if needed, in the interest of justice and also reserves it right to demonstrate how the alleged awards is fit to be set aside. It is, therefore, prayed that this learned court is pleased to admit this petition and issue notices and after hearing the parties, be pleased to set aside the alleged award in question.” 27. A counter affidavit was filed by the appellant before the learned Commercial Court wherein the statement made in paragraph no.12 of the petition under section 34 of the Act of 1996 was specifically denied in toto. It was mentioned that it was incorrect to say that the Award was not properly stamped. It was also denied that a copy of the Award was not furnished to the parties. The portions relevant to the present case of paragraph 12 (I) of the counter affidavit filed before the learned Commercial Court are quoted as under: - “12…. I) With regards to Para-12 of the Petition, it is submitted that the averments with regards to the fact that the Learned Arbitrator has not made his signature on any of the pages of the Award except for the last page does not make any ground to set aside the Award under Section 34. It is incorrect to say that the Award was not properly stamped. It is denied that the copy of the Award was not furnished to the parties. The averment that the Award is based on a biased view against the Petitioner herein is untenable and unsustainable. It is incorrect to say that the Award was not properly stamped. It is denied that the copy of the Award was not furnished to the parties. The averment that the Award is based on a biased view against the Petitioner herein is untenable and unsustainable. The averment that the Arbitrator has not applied his mind by making the Award is incorrect and the Petitioner is under obligation to prove the same. The statements made in paragraph 12 and the sub-paragraphs are denied in toto. (i) ……………………….. (ii) ………………….. (vi) Further it is submitted that all other averments are absolutely denied by the respondent and the Petitioner is put to the strict proof of all the averments made in the Petition as the onus lies on the Petitioner to substantiate the same.” 28. Upon perusal of the petition under section 34 of the Act of 1996 filed by the respondent before the learned Commercial Court, this Court finds that the cause of action for filing the petition has been shown to be the receipt of a copy of the unsigned Award, but not prepared on any stamp paper, through e-mail by the concerned Advocate of the respondent as forwarded by the learned Arbitrator to the respondent by the Advocate. In spite of having knowledge about the passing of the Award, the respondent did not make any endeavor to approach the learned Arbitrator to find out about the reason for the non-receipt of the Award by the respondent or to obtain a copy of the Award directly from the learned Arbitrator. 29. Upon perusal of the lower Court records, this Court finds that although the respondent had mentioned that the Award was received by the counsel of the respondent through e-mail, but there is no material i.e. screenshot of the e-mail communication, or covering letter of the counsel for the respondent who had received the e-mail or the decision-making process of the respondent which could have indicated as to how and when the e-mail copy of the Award was received. 30. Receipt of the Award is an important event that gives rise to cause of action to many steps in the matter of arbitration including that of filing an application for setting aside the award under section 34 and also for seeking rectification of the Award as permissible under section 33 of the Act of 1996. 30. Receipt of the Award is an important event that gives rise to cause of action to many steps in the matter of arbitration including that of filing an application for setting aside the award under section 34 and also for seeking rectification of the Award as permissible under section 33 of the Act of 1996. Receiving an Award also has a bearing on the cause of action to file an application for enforcement of the award under section 36 of the Act of 1996. For all the aforesaid steps, receipt of the Award by party to the arbitral proceedings is a condition precedent. In the absence of receipt of the Award, the cause of action to take any of the aforesaid steps does not arise. 31. In the present case, the respondent had simply produced a copy of the Award stating it to be an e-mail copy of the Award as received by their Advocate and sought for quashing of the same by filing a petition under section 34. Simultaneously, the respondent took a stand in paragraph no. 12(iv) of the petition under section 34 that no Award was passed and that the Award was unsigned and not prepared on a stamp paper, and that the Award was not served upon the respondent. 32. From the perusal of the records, it is apparent that on 17th November 2014, the Registry of the learned Commercial Court raised objection that the case filed under section 34 of the Act of 1996 was not maintainable as the petition was delayed by 3 ½ months. However, a separate petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed by the respondent for condonation of delay taking the sole ground that the delay was on account of the non-receipt of approval of the competent authority in time in order to challenge the Award. The delay was condoned, the case was admitted and notice was issued to the appellant vide order dated 20th November 2014 passed by the learned Commercial Court. However, the order of condonation of delay in filing the petition under section 34 of the Act of 1996 is not under challenge in the present memorandum of appeal though the appellant in the written submission has raised objection to the condonation of delay. However, the order of condonation of delay in filing the petition under section 34 of the Act of 1996 is not under challenge in the present memorandum of appeal though the appellant in the written submission has raised objection to the condonation of delay. Since the order dated 20th November 2014 is not under challenge in the memorandum of appeal, this Court is not inclined to enter into the legality of such order. 33. This Court finds that on the one hand, the respondent had filed a petition for setting aside the Award by calculating the limitation from the date of receipt of such Award i.e. 19.05.2014 in the office of the respondent as received by their Advocate and on the other hand took a stand that the Award sought to be challenged was not an Arbitral Award in terms of section 31 (1) and (5) of the Act of 1996. 34. From perusal of the covering letter of the learned Arbitrator enclosing the signed Award prepared on stamp paper as annexed with the memorandum of appeal, it is apparent that the Award was forwarded to the Company Secretary of the appellant and also to the Secretary, Water Resources Department, Government of Jharkhand. The Award reflects that the Secretary of the Water Resources Department, Government of Jharkhand was respondent no.1 before the learned Arbitrator and the other respondents were certainly under respondent no. 1. So far as the concerned Advocates of the parties are concerned, copy of the Award was sent to them through e-mail which was apparently for information that the Award has been passed. 35. As per the case of the respondent, it was the e-mail copy received by their Advocate which was used before the learned Commercial Court to challenge the Award. But upon receipt of the information regarding the passing of the Award, no steps were taken by the respondent to contact the learned Arbitrator to get a signed copy of the Award or to at least inform the learned Arbitrator that the respondent had not received a signed copy of the Award. There can always be a gap between the issuance of an Award by the Arbitrator and its receipt by the party. 36. This Court is of the considered view that the learned Arbitrator was under no obligation to forward a signed copy of the Award to the counsels of the respective parties. There can always be a gap between the issuance of an Award by the Arbitrator and its receipt by the party. 36. This Court is of the considered view that the learned Arbitrator was under no obligation to forward a signed copy of the Award to the counsels of the respective parties. Rather the obligation of the learned Arbitrator was to prepare two copies of the Award, one for the claimant and other for the respondents and send the same to the parties. The State challenged the Award received through e-mail on merits and simultaneously raised a plea that e-mail copy was not an Award in the eyes of law in as much as the same was not signed and not prepared on a stamp paper and also stating that the Award was not received by the respondents, and also on merits. In spite of having taken such objection that the Award was not communicated, the respondent had filed an application for condonation of delay in challenging the Award and the delay was also condoned. The Award having once challenged, the delay in challenge to the Award having been condoned at the instance of the respondent, it cannot be said that there is no Award in the eyes of law at all. 37. In such circumstances, the plea raised by the respondent that the Award was never communicated to them is inconsistent and contrary to their act of challenging the Award on merits after seeking condonation of delay in challenging the Award. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondent to contend that there is no Award in the eyes of the law. 38. Had the respondent approached the learned Arbitrator raising a grievance regarding non-receipt of the Award after coming to know about the passing of the award, the reason for non-communication to the respondent would have come to light and a copy of the Award given by the learned Arbitrator and such receipt of the Award would have been the appropriate cause of action to challenge the Award and limitation would have been calculated accordingly. 39. 39. It is important to note that the Award duly signed and prepared on stamp paper as filed by the appellant before this Court as well as the executing Court and LPA record is the same Award communicated to the Advocate of the respondent through e-mail except being on stamp paper containing the signature of the learned Arbitrator on the last page of the Award as received by the appellant. It is not in dispute that the learned Arbitrator passed away as back as in the year 2019 and now the respondent cannot approach the learned Arbitrator to obtain a copy or to find out the reasons for non-communication of the Award. 40. This Court had also called for the records of Execution Case No. 1 of 2018 and upon perusal of the records it appears from the order dated 11th April 2018 that a petition was filed in the executing Court on behalf of the appellant praying therein for the return of the original Award which was allowed vide order dated 11th April 2018 with a clear stipulation that the Award in original shall be produced before the Court as and when required and the award in original was directed to be replaced by the true copy of the Award. A copy of the Award as received by the appellant has also been found in the record of the L.P.A. No. 432 of 2011. 41. It is not in dispute that the Award in the original has been received by the appellant and it is in their custody. Apart from the difference that the e-mail copy of the Award as received by the respondent did not contain the signature of the learned Arbitrator and that it was not prepared on a stamp paper, no other difference as such has been pointed out by the respondent between the Award as received by the appellant and the one received by the counsel of the respondent through e-mail. 42. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, this Court is of the considered view that the Award could not have been set aside on the ground that the e-mail copy of the Award as received by the Advocate of the respondent was unsigned. 43. 42. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, this Court is of the considered view that the Award could not have been set aside on the ground that the e-mail copy of the Award as received by the Advocate of the respondent was unsigned. 43. It was also the case of the respondent before the learned Commercial Court in the petition under section 34 of the Act of 1996 that the Award was not prepared on a stamp paper and was accordingly not enforceable. 44. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “A Anasuya Devi” (supra), the High Court had taken a view in appeal under section 37 of the Act of 1996 that since the Award was not stamped and registered, it was invalid and without jurisdiction. The order of the High Court was under challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal by holding that such an issue was not required to be gone into at the stage of proceeding under section 34 of the Act of 1996 and in fact such an issue was premature at that stage. It has also been held that section 34 of the Act provides for setting aside the Award on the ground enumerated therein and it was not in dispute that an application for setting aside the Award would not lie on any other ground which is not enumerated in section 34 of the Act of 1996. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the question as to whether the Award was required to be stamped and registered, would be relevant only when the parties would file the Award for its enforcement under section 36 of the Act of 1996. 45. This Court is of the considered view that the Arbitral Award can be set aside only on the grounds which are enumerated under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. However, there are certain objections that can be raised at the stage of execution, one of them may be an objection as to stamping of the Award. This Court is of the view that the learned Commercial Court has acted in manifest excess of its jurisdiction while holding that the Award is not executable on the ground that it has not been prepared on stamp paper. This Court is of the view that the learned Commercial Court has acted in manifest excess of its jurisdiction while holding that the Award is not executable on the ground that it has not been prepared on stamp paper. The issue as to whether the Award was stamped or not and what was the consequences of such a defect, if any, are to be determined by the executing Court under Section 36 of the Act of 1996. The learned Commercial Court while passing the impugned judgment has travelled beyond the scope of section 34 of the Act of 1996 by deciding on the executability of the Award instead of confining it to the grounds referrable to section 34 of the Act of 1996. 46. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside. Since the learned Commercial Court while passing the impugned judgment has not dealt with other objections raised under section 34 of the Act of 1996 with regards to the claims allowed and counter-claim disallowed by the learned Arbitrator, we remit the matter to the learned Commercial Court to decide the same. 47. The appellant shall file the original award as received from the learned Arbitrator before the learned Commercial Court and shall take back the same only with permission from the learned Commercial Court. The learned Commercial Court shall decide the matter expeditiously. 48. Pending Interlocutory application, if any, is closed. 49. There shall be no order as to costs. (Shree Chandrashekhar, J.) I agree.