Venkata Naga Malleswari Anamaripudi v. State of Andhra Pradesh
2023-11-02
VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
body2023
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA, J. - The instant petition is filed under Sec. 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 seeking to quash the proceedings against the petitioners/Accused Nos., 5 and 6 in Cr.No.24 of 2020 of Ongole Women Police Station for the offences punishable under Ss. 498-A, 323, 506 r/w 34 of IPC. 2. Heard Sri Ramakrishna Akurathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms.Prasanna Lakshmi, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the State and defacto-complainant. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that so far the Petitioners are concerned, they are the outside members, and are not the relatives of the husband to maintain a case under Sec. 498-A of IPC. He would also submit that there are absolutely no allegations against them to attract the offence under Ss. 323 and 506 of IPC. 4. Per contra, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit that absolutely there are no grounds to quash the case against the petitioners, the contents of the written report presented by the defacto complainant attracts the offences against the petitioners and prays for dismissal of the petition. 5. The point for determination that arises in this case is as follows; Whether the case against the Petitioners is liable to be quashed by exercising jurisdiction under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C.? 6. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. SambhajiraoChandrojiraoAngre, (1988) 1SCC 692. held as follows; "The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage." (emphasis supplied) 7. In Mohammad Wajid &Anr.
In Mohammad Wajid &Anr. v. State of U.P. and others, 2023 (1) INSC 683. the Hon'ble Apex Court while reiterating the position laid down in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanlal and others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC. made a comprehensive analysis on the application of the Sec. . The Apex Court stressed on the necessity to arrive at a balance between the law enforcement power of the State and the protection of citizens from unjust criminal proceedings. It was observed that the right not to be disturbed without sufficient grounds is one of the mandates under Art 21 of the Constitution of India. In relation to quashing of F.I.R. and the material that is to be looked into, it was held in the following terms; "34. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines.
In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged. 35. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held:- "5. ...Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 6.
When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p. 869, para 6) (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Sec. 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the Sec. is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death....." (emphasis supplied) 8.
At the same time the Sec. is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death....." (emphasis supplied) 8. In the instant case, the contents of the written report submitted by the defacto complainant to the police runs as follows: "My marriage was performed by my parents at about 18 years back with Tirumalasetti Sudhakar Rao R/o Ponnur by spending Rs.2.00 lakhs towards lanchanas and 15 sovereigns of gold. I lead marital life at Ponnur with my husband, we blessed with 2 male children. Thereafter my husband harassed me to bring Rs.10.00 lakhs from my father as he sustained losses in the business. I informed the same to my mother-in-law and father-in-law, brother-in-law suresh, they also supported my husband, harassed me both physically and mentally. I bare the harassment keeping in view of my children in mind. While the matter stood thus in the year 2017 my husband developed illicit intimacy with one Malleswari who is residing on the upstairs of our building. When I came to know the same, I saw his cell phone and found some photos with the said person, when I questioned him he confessed about his relationship and further informed that in view of their relationship she gave divorce to her husband and my husband informed me to get Rs.10.00 lakhs and further informed that I have to lead conjugal life along with Malleswari. My mother- in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law also supported my husband and he used to beat me in front of my children, my brother-in-law also got divorce from his wife by harassing her and likewise they are planning to send me away from the house. Likewise in the year 2017 in order to sell the land which is on my name, they forced to sign on empty stamp papers by beating me to execute the same in favour of I Ram Mohan Rao who is a 3d person, when my children rescued me, they threatened them and send away, moreover my husband did not get any loses in the business, but he used to spend money to Malleswari. The same was discussed by all in front of me, all of them including Malleswari beaten me.
The same was discussed by all in front of me, all of them including Malleswari beaten me. In the last year October my husband forced me to get Rs.10.00 lakhs out of retirement benefits of my father or otherwise not to enter into house and necked me out of the house and locked, the keep my children in the house without talk to me as there is no other alternative I informed to my parents and came to at Ongole, since then I held mediation when the mediators we to their house they informed them to bring Rs.10.00 lakhs otherwise I should come, they answered like that without opening their doors. When I tried to talk with my children over phone, they used to scold me, when I went to my inlaws house along with elders and relatives, they closed the door and they did not allow the children to come to me and they did not allow me to see the children also and also threatened me that if I did not go out they will foist a case and send me behind the bars. As there is no other alternative myself and the relatives who accompanied me were assaulted by my husband. My mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, Malleswari, Immidisetty Rammohan Rao, beat us with hands and legs, due to fear of death we left the place. So kindly take appropriate action against my husband, My mother in law, father-in-law, brother-in-law and Malleswari who developed illicit relationship with my husband, ImmidisettyRammohanrao according to law." 9. Sec. 498-A of I.P.C. is a powerful weapon engrafted by the law, to the rescue of a married woman, subjected to cruelty or harassment by husband or by the relative of husband.The Hon'ble Apex Court in U. Suvetha v. State, (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 36. interpreted the term "relative" as appearing in Sec. 498A of I.P.C. and held that a girlfriend or a concubine cannot be brought into such purview, in the following terms; "9. The word "cruelty" having been defined in terms of the aforesaid Explanation, no other meaning can be attributed thereto. Living with another woman may be an act of cruelty on the part of the husband for the purpose of judicial separation or dissolution of marriage but the same, in our opinion, would not attract the wrath of Sec. 498-A of the Penal Code.
Living with another woman may be an act of cruelty on the part of the husband for the purpose of judicial separation or dissolution of marriage but the same, in our opinion, would not attract the wrath of Sec. 498-A of the Penal Code. An offence in terms of the said provision is committed by the persons specified therein. They have to be the "husband" or his "relative". Either the husband of the woman or his relative must have subjected her to cruelty within the aforementioned provision. If the appellant had not (sic) been instigating the husband of the first informant to torture her, as has been noticed by the High Court, the husband would be committing some offence punishable under the other provisions of the Penal Code and the appellant may be held guilty for abetment of commission of such an offence but not an offence under Sec. 498-A of the Penal Code. 10. In the absence of any statutory definition, the term "relative" must be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson or granddaughter of an individual or the spouse of any person. The meaning of the word "relative" would depend upon the nature of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood, marriage or adoption. *** 13. Furthermore, Sec. 498-A is a penal one. It, thus, deserves strict construction. Ordinarily, save and except where a contextual meaning is required to be given to a statute, a penal provision is required to be construed strictly. This Court in T. Ashok Pai v. CIT [ (2007) 7 SCC 162 : (2007) 8 Scale 354 ] held as under: (SCC p. 168, para 17) "17. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the more stringent is the law, more strict construction thereof would be necessary. Even when the burden is required to be discharged by an assessee, it would not be as heavy as on the prosecution. (See P.N. Krishna Lal v. Govt. of Kerala [1995 Supp (2) SCC 187 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 466] .)" (Emphasis supplied) 10. In the instant case, admittedly the Petitioners are not relatives of the husband. Such being the case, invoking Sec. 498-A of the I.P.C. as against them is unwarranted. 11.
(See P.N. Krishna Lal v. Govt. of Kerala [1995 Supp (2) SCC 187 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 466] .)" (Emphasis supplied) 10. In the instant case, admittedly the Petitioners are not relatives of the husband. Such being the case, invoking Sec. 498-A of the I.P.C. as against them is unwarranted. 11. Vide Sec. 323 of IPC, any person who voluntarily causes hurt, except on grave and sudden provocation, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to Rs.1, 000.00 or with both. VideSec. 321 of IPC, whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person and does thereby cause hurt to any person is said to voluntarily cause hurt. 12. As held in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423 . a bare reading of the definition of "criminal intimidation", punishable under Sec. 506 would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do. 13. So far as the offences under Sec. 323 and 506 I.P.C. are concerned, no prima facie case is forthcoming from the allegations levelled. In that view of the matter, this Court is inclined to exercise jurisdiction vested under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. 14. In the result, this Criminal Petition is allowed. Theproceedings against the Petitioners/Accused Nos., 5 and 6 in Cr.No.24 of 2020 of Ongole Women Police Station are hereby quashed. 15. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.