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2023 DIGILAW 1432 (AP)

Ch. Ravi Sankar v. Govt. of A. P.

2023-11-03

RAVI NATH TILHARI, V.SRINIVAS

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JUDGMENT V.SRINIVAS, J. - Heard Sri K.Ramalingeswara Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner-Applicant, Sri V.Ramesh, learned Government Pleader for Services-IV, for the official respondents and Sri K.R.Srinivas, learned counsel for the unofficial respondent. 2. This Writ Petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India questioning the order dtd. 25/8/2014 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal') in O.A.No.50 of 2014. 3. To determine the writ, the shorn of the facts of the case is required. 4. The petitioner while working as Senior Assistant in P.HC., Tharlam, Vizianagaram District, initially, applied for medical leave from 8/11/1995 for one month, due to medical issues, i.e., unable to walk and discharge his duties and undergoing treatment, his wife expired, due to which he went in depression and his treatment continued till 6/1/1999. During all this period of his treatment, he was said to have submitted continuous leave applications to the respondent officials. When he got completely cured, submitted a representation to the 4th respondent requesting for reposting orders by producing his entire medical history. Then he was allowed to join duty in the existing vacancy as Senior Assistant at K.G. Hospital, Visakhapatnam, with due obedience of reposting orders issued by the 4th respondent in R.C.No.5691/B1/98, dtd. 6/1/1999. 5. After rejoining duty, requested the authorities for several times regulation of said period. Thereafter, in January 2008, he submitted a representation to the authorities duly requesting to regularize the leave as (1) earned leave for 120 days, (2) half pay leave-remaining period on medical grounds, in accordance with his eligibility. Since leave period is not regularized till 2008, he submitted representations on 18/7/2008 and 23/10/2008 for the leave period regularization, in response, the Superintendent King George Hospital, Visakhapatnam, sent proposals to the 4th respondent, vide R.C.No.6500/E1/2008, dtd. 23/10/2008. Then the 4th respondent sought certain remarks from Superintendent, K.G.H., vide R.C.No.1939/B1/2008, dtd. 13/11/2008. 6. Again, he submitted a representation on 8/4/2009 to the 4th respondent and requested to consider his request. Upon which, an enquiry officer was appointed by the 4th respondent, to conduct an enquiry against him on 11/5/2009. After receiving such enquiry notice, he submitted his statement on 8/6/2009 to the Enquiry Officer with all details. 7. Thereafter, the 4th respondent framed charges and served on him, vide R.C.No.1939/B1/2009, dtd. 1/1/2010. Then, he submitted his written statement of defense on 11/8/2010 to the Charge Memo, dtd. After receiving such enquiry notice, he submitted his statement on 8/6/2009 to the Enquiry Officer with all details. 7. Thereafter, the 4th respondent framed charges and served on him, vide R.C.No.1939/B1/2009, dtd. 1/1/2010. Then, he submitted his written statement of defense on 11/8/2010 to the Charge Memo, dtd. 1/1/2010, vide R.C.No.1939/B1/2009. Again, the 4th respondent appointed an enquiry officer, vide R.C.No.1939/B1/2009, dtd. 18/5/2010, to conduct an enquiry under Rule 20 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules 1991 (hereinafter referred to as 'A.P.C.C.A.Rules'). Since, enquiry officer did not conduct enquiry, another enquiry officer was appointed on 3/11/2010 to complete the enquiry under the same charges. 8. The enquiry officer submitted his report, vide R.C.No.97/SA/2010, dtd. 18/5/2011, to the 4th respondent; the opinion of the enquiry officer is, 'found not guilty against him as he applied leave from time to time on medical grounds'. Hence, the leave period is regularized as per leave eligibility. Thereafter, the 4th respondent herein issued an order in L.Dis.No.1114/B1/2011, dtd. 20/9/2011 and regularized his services and declared his probation in the cadre of Senior Assistant. 9. While such is the situation, the 5th respondent, who is his junior, applied to the 1st respondent with a grievance that his promotion has been denied and delayed from 2011. 10. The petitioner further submits, said 5th respondent is at Serial No.50 in the seniority list, whereas he is at Serial No.44. Moreover, "Neither the petitioner nor the 5th respondent preferred any appeal or revision against the final orders passed against the petitioner, dtd. 7/9/2011. 11. Just basing on the compliant brought by the 5th respondent, the 1st respondent instructed the 3rd respondent, "vide Memo No.17268/H1/2012, dtd. 26/9/2012 to conduct a review as per Rule 40 A.P.C.C.A. Rules by setting aside entire disciplinary proceedings issued by the 4th respondent dtd. 7/9/2011 without giving any notice to the petitioner". 12. Basing on the instructions issued by the 1st respondent, dtd. 26/9/2012, the 3rd respondent issued proceedings, vide R.C.No.7780/E3.D/2011, dtd. 23/1/2013, wherein, the dropping proceedings issued in favour of the petitioner was set aside, without giving him opportunity and notice, which is in violation of principles of natural justice. 13. Thereafter, the 3rd respondent issued proceedings, dtd. 16/3/2013 and 15/4/2013 and further a show cause notice issued to the petitioner on 9/7/2013 by calling his explanation, for which he submitted his explanation on 27/9/2013. 13. Thereafter, the 3rd respondent issued proceedings, dtd. 16/3/2013 and 15/4/2013 and further a show cause notice issued to the petitioner on 9/7/2013 by calling his explanation, for which he submitted his explanation on 27/9/2013. The petitioner submits that without considering the contents of his explanation the 4th respondent issued the impugned Rc.No.7780/E3.D/2011, dtd. 21/11/2013, under which, imposed a major punishment of stoppage of three (3) annual grade increments with cumulative effect and with period of absence declared as 'dies Non', without giving any opportunity to the petitioner. 14. The impugned orders dtd. 21/11/2013 were communicated, vide Rc.No.1346/B1/2013, dtd. 27/11/2013 issued by the 4th respondent and served on him on 12/12/2013. 15. As against the impugned proceedings dtd. 23/1/2013 and 21/11/2013 issued by the 3rd respondent and Memo No.17268/H.1/2012, dtd. 26/9/2012 issued by the 1st respondent in reopening the issue and imposing a major punishment against the petitioner, for which, petitioner approached the Tribunal and filed O.A.No.50 of 2014 as imposing of major punishment is against to law and that finally on 25/8/2014 the Tribunal erroneously dismissed the said O.A.No.50 of 2014. 16. As against the same, the learned Government Pleader for Services IV appearing for the respondents filed a counter and also argued that the claims made by the petitioner are all false; that as the O.A.No.50 of 2014 lacks grounds, thereby the Tribunal dismissed the said O.A.; that the respondents exercised powers within the frame work of Rule 40 of A.P.C.C.A. Rules and simply moving the Government by 5th respondent cannot be invalidating the move made by the respondent Nos.1 and 3. 17. It is further argued that as per the instructions of Principle Secretary to the Government, vide Memo No.17268/H.1/2012, dtd. 26/9/2012, to the 3rd respondent, who in turn issued proceedings to the 4th respondent, that proceedings in Rc.No.1939/B.1/2008, dtd. 7/9/2011 issued by the 4th respondent are set aside and the 4th respondent is requested to review the entire issue as per Rule 40 of A.P.C.C.A. Rules. 18. The learned Government Pleader for Services IV vehemently argued that the orders of the Tribunal dtd. 25/8/2014 in O.A.No.50 of 2014 are to be uphold on the facts of the case and they need not be set aside as prayed for by the petitioner. 19. 18. The learned Government Pleader for Services IV vehemently argued that the orders of the Tribunal dtd. 25/8/2014 in O.A.No.50 of 2014 are to be uphold on the facts of the case and they need not be set aside as prayed for by the petitioner. 19. The unofficial 5th respondent appeared through his counsel and submitted that this Court cannot set aside the orders of the Tribunal as there is no infirmity in the orders passed by the Tribunal and no illegal assumptions made and there is non-exercise or exercise of jurisdiction irregularity by the Tribunal and exfacie there is no apparent mistake of fact or law in the order of the Tribunal to interfere with the same. 20. Questioning the validity and legal sustainability of the order of the Tribunal, the present Writ Petition came to be filed. 21. In reply to the above, Sri K.Ramalingeswara Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the 3rd respondent, though there is no material or evidence or without questioning the final orders dtd. 7/9/2011, invoked the Rule 40 and Review under A.P.C.C.A. Rules 1991 and in violation of principles of natural justice imposed major penalty, even though there is well considered orders dtd. 7/9/2011 and after regularizing the period of leave. 22. He also submits that no notice was given to the petitioner while passing orders by the 1st respondent on 26/9/2012, which are against principles of natural justice as there are orders were being passed against him as "petitioner found no guilty for the charges leveled against him as he applied leave from time to time on medical grounds, hence the leave period from 8/11/1995 to 8/1/1999 may please be regularized as per eligibility of the individual", which are the orders passed by the disciplinary authority, dtd. 7/9/2011 and the said order was made upset by order dtd. 26/9/2012. 23. He also submits that the decision of Administrative Tribunal under challenge is grossly erroneous, as there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored and judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. 24. He also submits that Article 311 is subject to Article 14. 26/9/2012. 23. He also submits that the decision of Administrative Tribunal under challenge is grossly erroneous, as there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored and judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. 24. He also submits that Article 311 is subject to Article 14. Principles of natural justice and the audi-alteram partem rule are part of Article 14 and, therefore, a show cause notice asking for the explanation of the government servant with respect to the charges against him as also a notice to show cause with respect to the proposed penalty are required to be given by Article 14 and the not giving of such notices or either of them renders the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank invalid under law. 25. It is further submitted that the Tribunal should have seen the orders passed by the 1st respondent, dtd. 26/9/2012 were not under Rule 40 of C.C.A. Rules, which are passed behind back of petitioner and they are liable to be set aside including the consequential proceedings for violation of natural justice. 26. In the above background, now the issue that emerges for consideration of this Court in the present writ petition is "whether the order passed by the Tribunal, which is impugned in the present writ petition, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case warrants any interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?" 27. There is absolutely no controversy about the ground reality that though the Disciplinary Authority issued a charge memo on 1/1/2010, framing two charges against the applicant, the said proceedings were taken into a logical end by the Disciplinary Authority. In respect of charge memo, an Enquiry Officer was appointed and he submitted a report on 20/6/2009 and enquiry officer stated that the whole period is to be treated as leave on medical grounds which is beyond the ability of the petitioner, but not unauthorized absence and that the petitioner has not committed any irregularities and he was not under unauthorized absence. 28. 28. It is a matter of fact that the sanction of leave is related to the period from 8/11/1995 to 8/1/1999 i.e., after lapse of ten (10) years, a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the 4th respondent, thereafter, regular enquiry was followed as per the procedure by following the A.P.C.C.A. Rules and thereafter without any specific orders second enquiry was ordered on 18/5/2010, more so, the petitioner was not given any notice contemplated under Rule 40 of A.P.C.C.A. Rules, which is mandate under law, as Rules itself specifying without providing a reasonable opportunity of making a representation over the orders passed in favour of the petitioner. 29. This Court also perused the orders in O.A.No.50 of 2014 and no doubt, the Tribunal perused the Rule 40 of A.P.C.C.A. Rules. But, at Paragraph Nos.6 to 8 are relevant to consider here. In the above said paras the authority held who entertained revision can also have entertained the same either suo-motu or an application from any person and the order under Rule 40 has got wide powers either to confirm or to modify or to set aside the order passed by the disciplinary authority etc., which is not in dispute. 30. At paragraph No.7 of the Tribunal order says the case under which an application before the authority is not a case where the appeal is filed by any of the parties. Therefore, Rule 40(1) of A.P.C.C.A. Rules has no application. As well in paragraph No.8 of the Tribunal order held "this is not a case where 5th respondent filed revision. The 5th respondent moved the Government to entertain the revision petition against the order passed by the disciplinary authority, since 5th respondent is interested in getting his promotion in preference to the applicant, in the case of applicant is debarred from claiming the same in lieu of proposed punishment in the disciplinary proceedings. Simply because 5th respondent moved the matter and took notice to the 1st respondent about the alleged injustice done to him, it cannot be said that the action of the 1st respondent in directing the 3rd respondent to entertain the revision petitioner either malafide or lacks bonafides". 31. Simply because 5th respondent moved the matter and took notice to the 1st respondent about the alleged injustice done to him, it cannot be said that the action of the 1st respondent in directing the 3rd respondent to entertain the revision petitioner either malafide or lacks bonafides". 31. Under the above circumstances, it is to be seen whether there was any injustice caused to the petitioner by the Government as well as the appointing authority and that whether there is any mistake found in the order of the Tribunal. 32. To decide the above, it is to be keep in mind that there are some legal parameters while deciding the issues by the public authorities. In this connection, it is to be keep in mind the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in between Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.) Sindri v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 . in which it was held that: "Principles of natural justice required that a person who is likely to be effected an administrative order should be given notice and an opportunity to be heard". 33. The Hon'ble Apex Court highlighted the importance of giving reasons in administrative decisions. In 2010, in B.P.Singhal v. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 331 . the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: "The reasoned decisions are essential element of principle of natural justice and they held in ensuring fairness in administrative actions". 34. Way back in the year, 1962 itself the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reiterated that the right to a fair hearing is a cardinal principle of natural justice. It emphasized that an individual effected by administrative decision must be given an opportunity to present his case (State of Bihar v. Kameswar Prasad Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1166 ). In State of Bihar v. Kameswar Prasad Singh, (1969) 2 SCC 262 . the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that "the powers of an administrative authority must be exercised fairly and reasonably. The Court held that natural justice is a part and parcel of the rule of law". 35. In State of Bihar v. Kameswar Prasad Singh, (1969) 2 SCC 262 . the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that "the powers of an administrative authority must be exercised fairly and reasonably. The Court held that natural justice is a part and parcel of the rule of law". 35. Thus, there must be procedural compliance and it is essential to ensure that the government followed the appropriate legal procedure when making its decision, which includes providing the petitioner with due process, adhering to the principles of natural justice and following the correct administrative procedure and thereafter should have a valid and legally justifiable reasons for its decision and that those decisions shall not be arbitrary or discriminatory or lacked a reasonable basis and that decision was should be consistent with relevant laws and regulations. 36. Lastly, in Sterling Computers Limited Etc. v. M&N Publications Limited, AIR 1996 SC 51 . the Hon'ble Supreme Court held at Para Nos.7 and 8 as follows: "7.Public authorities are essentially different from those of private persons. Even while taking decision in respect of commercial transactions, a public authority must be guided by relevant considerations and not by irrelevant ones. If such a decision is influenced by extraneous considerations which it ought not to have been taken into account the ultimate decision is bound to be vitiated, even if it is established that such decision had been taken without bias. 8.While exercising the power of judicial review, in respect of contracts entered on behalf of the State, the Court is concerned primarily as to whether there has been any infirmity in the 'decision making process'. By way of judicial review, the Court cannot examine the details of the terms of the contract which have been entered into by the public bodies or the state. Courts have inherent limitations on the scope of any such enquiry. But the Courts can certainly examine whether "decision making process" was reasonable, rational not arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution." 37. Courts have inherent limitations on the scope of any such enquiry. But the Courts can certainly examine whether "decision making process" was reasonable, rational not arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution." 37. In this legal back drop, when this Court perused Rule 40 of A.P.C.C.A. Rules, wherein also it is mentioned in the second proviso that "provided further that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by any revising authority unless the Government servant concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penalty proposed and where it is proposed to impose any of the major penalties specified in rule 9 or to enhance the minor penalty imposed by the order sought to be revised to any of the major penalties and if an inquiry under rule 20 has not already been held in the case, no such penalty shall be imposed except after inquiring in the manner laid down in rule 20, subject to the provisions of rule 25 and except after consultation with the Commission, where such consultation is necessary". 38. The Hon'ble Apex Court in S.Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka and Ors, 1993 Supp. (4) SCC 595. at para No.36 observed that:- "It is the duty of the court to rectify, revise and re-call its orders as and when it is brought to its notice that certain of its orders were passed on a wrong or mistaken assumption of facts and that implementation of those orders would have serious consequences. An act of Court should prejudice none. "Of all these things respecting which learned men dispute", said Cicero, "there is none more important than clearly to understand that we are born for justice and that right is founded not in opinion but in nature". This very idea was echoed by James Madison (The Federalist, No. 51 at p. 352). He said: "Justice is the end of the government. It is the end of the civil society. This very idea was echoed by James Madison (The Federalist, No. 51 at p. 352). He said: "Justice is the end of the government. It is the end of the civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained or until liberty be lost in the pursuit." Keeping this wholesome principle in view, this Court shall now approach the case to discern whether the errors pointed by the wife in the judgment could be treated as an error on the face of the record or as a sufficient cause within the meaning of Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure that would justify the court's exercise of its review powers." 39. In the back drop of above settled law, considering the case on hand, it is found that on two charges an enquiry officer was appointed and after making a due enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted a report to the disciplinary authority i.e., 3rd respondent by holding that the charges framed against the petitioner were not proved and for the unauthorized absence of duty from 8/11/1995 to 8/1/1999 for a period of three (3) years two (2) months, the applicant has got his own explanation and accepted by the 4th respondent. 40. After that the Government on the application of 5th respondent on 26/9/2012 made the following order: "The Director of Public Health and Family Welfare vide reference cited, has furnished enquiry report on the complaint filed by Sri D.Bhaskara Kumar, Senior Assistant. On perusal of the said enquiry report it was noticed that, the Enquiry Officer in his report has observed that if the promotions were given along with other cadres in the month of June 2011, Sri Bhaskara Kumar, Senior Assistant, would have promoted as Officer Superintendent w.e.f.2011 by then the issue of Sri Ch.Ravishankar is not finalized and pending for disposal. He was allegedly denied the opportunity. Further the charges leveled against Sri Ch.Ravishankar, Senior Assistant were dropped in the month of September 2011, after a gap of about 11 years. Timely action was not taken. 2. The Director of Public Health and Family Welfare is therefore directed to review the entire issue as per rule 40 of APCS (CC&A) Rules, 1991 by setting aside disciplinary proceedings issued by the Regional Director of Medical and Health Services, Visakhapatnam vide his Proc. dtd. Timely action was not taken. 2. The Director of Public Health and Family Welfare is therefore directed to review the entire issue as per rule 40 of APCS (CC&A) Rules, 1991 by setting aside disciplinary proceedings issued by the Regional Director of Medical and Health Services, Visakhapatnam vide his Proc. dtd. 7/9/2011 and deal with the concerned for above lapses suitably and report compliance." 41. Thus, from the above, it is clear while passing orders on 26/9/2012 there is no information nor any notice nor a memo to the petitioner for passing an order by invoking Rule 40 of A.P.C.C.A. Rules. In the above paras, the Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again said that public authority/government while exercising the power of review in respect of the orders, it should examine the detailed information and opportunity must be given and thereafter a reasoned order should be passed i.e., the Government should issue notice prior to 26/9/2012 to the petitioner, asking him to submit his statement, thereafter, the Government should pass a reasoned order, then only the order dtd. 26/9/2012 is legally sustainable. 42. In the present case, on perusal of the entire record, admittedly, the unofficial 5th respondent did not prefer any appeal nor any revision against the final orders dtd. 7/9/2011, vide Proceedings in Rc.No.1939/B.1/2008. Further, it is not the case of respondent Nos.1, 3 or 4 that they have given notice to the petitioner while passing the order, dtd. 26/9/2012, vide memo No.17268/H.1/2011-2. Even the Tribunal, while considering the fact position as well the law, failed to see whether there is any preconditional notice was issued to the petitioner or not. On the other hand, it went on to see simply because Government passed an order on the complaint by the 5th respondent, the said order is not in any way vitiated. 43. In this case, the petitioner filed this petition in the nature of Writ of Certiorari called for the orders passed in O.A.No.50 of 2014, dtd. 25/8/2014 by the Tribunal as well the proceedings vide Rc.No.7780/E3.D/2011, dtd. 21/11/2013 under which setting aside the final orders issued in Rc.No.1939/B1/2008, dtd. 7/9/2011. 44. 43. In this case, the petitioner filed this petition in the nature of Writ of Certiorari called for the orders passed in O.A.No.50 of 2014, dtd. 25/8/2014 by the Tribunal as well the proceedings vide Rc.No.7780/E3.D/2011, dtd. 21/11/2013 under which setting aside the final orders issued in Rc.No.1939/B1/2008, dtd. 7/9/2011. 44. It is the specific case of the petitioner that from 8/11/1995 to 8/1/1999, he has submitted his leave applications along with medical advice from time to time and after lapse of ten (10) years i.e., on 7/9/2011 after due enquiry as contemplated under A.P.C.C.A. Rules, final orders were passed by the 4th respondent by dropping all charges and regularized his leave (from 8/11/1995 to 23/1/1996 (both days inclusive in short 'BDI') for 135 days from his earned leave on medical grounds, half pay leave from 22/3/1996 to 18/8/1996 (BDI) for 150 days on medical grounds, 3.EOL from 19/8/1996 to 8/1/1999 (BDI) on medical grounds). After sanction of above the leave, he was regularized and made him eligible for pay and allowances and that the authorities concerned had made entries in his service register and thereafter his probation in the cadre of Senior Assistant was declared as per rules. 45. From the above, it is clear that after ten (10) years passing of service of the petitioner, one finding was given that the leave of the petitioner was accepted and enquiry contemplated against the petitioner was done as per A.P.C.C.A. Rules and after making all these formalities, the 4th respondent accepted the enquiry report and dropped the action according to law and thereafter, the 1st respondent simply because the unofficial 5th respondent made a complaint, for which, without perusing any record and without any opportunity and without giving any reasons, issuing the memo dtd. 26/9/2012, vide Memo No.17268/H.1/2011-2, in our view is that the authorities (respondent Nos.1, 3 and 4) failed to adhering the principle of natural justice, which is nothing but the procedure exercised was unfair and unreasonable as natural justice is part and parcel of rule of law as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.K.Karipak case (referred to supra). 46. No doubt, in our view, it is not obligatory upon the disciplinary authority to dispense with the whole of the inquiry. 46. No doubt, in our view, it is not obligatory upon the disciplinary authority to dispense with the whole of the inquiry. Depending upon the circumstances of the case, the disciplinary authority can dispense with only a part of the inquiry but to have pass a reasoned order. 47. Moreover, imposition of penalty is not a part of the inquiry and once an inquiry is dispensed with, whether in whole or in part, it is obligatory upon the disciplinary authority to give an opportunity to the government servant to make a representation with respect to the penalty proposed to be imposed upon him. In this case, admittedly, a major penalty was imposed i.e., punishment of stoppage of three (3) annual increments with cumulative effect. If such a drastic major penalty is intended to initiate, the authorities must adhere to the rules contemplated under A.P.C.C.A. Rules. 48. In this connection, it is also relevant to refer the Constitutional Bench judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 . wherein at Para No.135 held as follows: 135. It was vehemently contended that if reasons are not recorded in the final order, they must be communicated to the concerned government servant to enable him to challenge the validity of the reasons in a departmental appeal or before a court of law and that failure to communicate the reasons would invalidate the order. This contention too cannot be accepted. The constitutional requirement in clause (b) is that the reason for dispensing with the inquiry should be recorded in writing. There is no obligation to communicate the reason to the government servant. As clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this point final, the question cannot be agitated in a departmental appeal, revision or review. The obligation to record the reason in writing is provided in clause (b) so that the superiors of the disciplinary authority may be able to judge whether such authority had exercised its power under clause (b) properly or not with a view to judge the performance and capacity of that officer for the purposes of promotion etc. The obligation to record the reason in writing is provided in clause (b) so that the superiors of the disciplinary authority may be able to judge whether such authority had exercised its power under clause (b) properly or not with a view to judge the performance and capacity of that officer for the purposes of promotion etc. It would, however, be better for the disciplinary authority to communicate to the government servant its reason for dispensing with the inquiry because such communication would eliminate the possibility of an allegation being made that the reasons have been subsequently fabricated. It would also enable the government servant to approach the High Court under Article 226 or, in a fit case, this Court under Article 32. If the reasons are not communicated to the government servant and the matter comes to the court, the court can direct the reasons to be produced, and furnished to the government servant and if still not produced, a presumption should be drawn that the reasons were not recorded in writing and the impugned order would then stand invalidated. Such presumption can, however, be rebutted by a satisfactory explanation for the nonproduction of the written reasons. 49. In view of the above legal position and findings, this Court finds valid reason to meddle with the order passed by the Tribunal, which is impugned in the present writ petition. 50. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed by setting aside the order dtd. 25/8/2014 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No.50 of 2014. Consequently, the Proceedings in Rc.No.7780/E3.D/2011, dtd. 21/11/2013 as well the proceedings, vide Rc.No.7780/E3.D/2011, dtd. 23/1/2013, are hereby set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand closed.