JUDGMENT : Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J. This Appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 30th September 2020 passed by the learned writ Court in W.P.(L) No.6995 of 2012 whereby the writ petition filed by the husband of the appellant has been dismissed. 2. W.P.(L) No.6995 of 2012 was filed by Johnson Lakra and after dismissal of the writ petition, he filed the present Letters Patent Appeal. However, during the pendency of this Appeal, the writ petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the “workman”) has expired and now the case is being pursued by Bilcho Kujur, claiming to be the wife of Johnson Lakra. The present appellant was substituted vide order dated 25th August 2023. 3. The learned writ Court recorded its findings in paragraphs nos.12 to 17, the extracts of the aforesaid paragraphs are as under: - “12. Be that as it may, after hearing counsel for the parties at length and from perusal of the documents brought on record and the judgments relied upon by the respective parties, this Court is of the opinion that admittedly, there has been unexplained delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. The reference has been made by the appropriate authority after lapse of more than eight years and further, during the evidence, the workman had stated that he was working with other company for some months after the termination made by the respondent management. Hence, it can comfortably be said that the present reference is stale one and the present dispute has lost its significance and as on date, no dispute is in existence. Even the domestic enquiry conducted against the petitioner was held to be fair and proper. 13. The issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty & Ors., reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 , wherein the Hon’ble Court has held as under: “6. Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after lapse of about seven years of order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time When the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. 7. In the present appeal it is not the case of the respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or there was even any irregularity. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after lapse of about seven years of the dismissal of the respondent. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become industrial dispute and appropriate government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming as industrial dispute. Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment. Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment. The present reference is destructive to the industrial peace and defeats the very object and purpose of the Act. Bank was justified in thus moving the High Court seeking an order to quash the reference in question.” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department & Anr., reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 , has held as under: “8. From the facts narrated above, it becomes clear that for a period of fourteen years no grievance was made by the petitioner qua his alleged termination. Though it was averred that the petitioner had approached the Management time and again and was given assurance that he would be taken back in service, there is nothing on record to substantiate this. No notice was served upon the Management. There is no assurance given in writing by the Management at any point of time. Such assertions are clearly self-serving. Pertinently, even the Labour Court has not accepted the aforesaid explanation anywhere and has gone by the fact that the dispute was raised after a delay of fourteen years. Therefore, keeping in mind the aforesaid facts, we would decide the issue which has arisen, namely, whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. ……. ……. 21. On the reading of these judgments, which are discussed hereinafter, it can be discerned that in some decisions where the reference was made after a lapse of considerable period, the Court did not set aside the reference but moulded the relief by either granting reinstatement but denying back wages, fully or partially, or else granted compensation, denying reinstatement. On the other hand, in some of the decisions, the Court held that even when there was no time prescribed to exercise power under Section 10 of the Act, such a power could not be exercised at any point of time to revive matters which had since been settled or had to become stale. We would like to refer to these judgments at this juncture. 22. We would like to refer to these judgments at this juncture. 22. As early as in 1959, this Court in the case of Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen ( (1960) 1 SCR 150 ) pointed out that there is no limitation prescribed in making a reference of disputes to Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Act. At the same time, the Court also remarked that the dispute should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed. In that case, reference was made after four year of dispute having arisen. In these circumstances, this Court held that relief of reinstatement should not be given to the discharged workmen in such a belated and vague reference. 23. Again, in Western India Match Company Ltd., though upholding the reference of dispute made nearly six years after the previous refusal to make the reference, the Court observed that in exercising its discretion to make reference, the Government will take into consideration the time which had lapsed between its earlier decision and the date when it decides to reconsider it in the interest of justice and industrial peace. Following observations from this judgment need to be noticed for the purposes of the present case: '8. From the words used in Section 4(k) of the Act there can be no doubt that the Legislature has left the question of making or refusing to make a reference for adjudication to the discretion of the Government. But the discretion is neither unfettered nor arbitrary for the section clearly provides that there must exist an industrial dispute as defined by the Act or such a dispute must be apprehended when the Government decides to refer it for adjudication. No reference thus can be made unless at the time when the Government decides to make it an industrial dispute between the employer and his employees either exists or is apprehended. Therefore, the expression 'at any time', though seemingly without any limits, is governed by the context in which it appears. Ordinarily, the question of making a reference would arise after conciliation proceedings have been gone through and the conciliation officer has made a failure report. But the Government need not wait until such a procedure has been completed. Therefore, the expression 'at any time', though seemingly without any limits, is governed by the context in which it appears. Ordinarily, the question of making a reference would arise after conciliation proceedings have been gone through and the conciliation officer has made a failure report. But the Government need not wait until such a procedure has been completed. In an urgent case, it can 'at any time', i.e., even when such proceedings have not begun or are still pending, decide to refer the dispute for adjudication. The expression 'at any time' thus takes in such cases as where the Government decides to make a reference without waiting for conciliation proceedings to begin or to be completed. As already stated, the expression 'at any time' in the context in which it is used postulates that a reference can only be made if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. No reference is contemplated by the section when the dispute is not an industrial dispute, or even if it is so, it no longer exists or is not apprehended, for instance, where it is already adjudicated or in respect of which there is an agreement or a settlement between the parties or where the industry in question is no longer in existence. xx xx xx 13. It is true that where a Government reconsiders its previous decision and decides to make the reference, such a decision might cause inconvenience to the employer because the employer in the meantime might have acted on the belief that there would be no proceedings by way of adjudication of the dispute between him and his workmen. Such a consideration would, we should think, be taken into account by the Government whenever, in exercise of its discretion, it decides to reopen its previous decision as also the time which has lapsed between its earlier decision and the date when it decides to reconsider it. These are matters which the Government would have to take into account while deciding whether it should reopen its former decision in the interest of justice and industrial peace but have nothing to do with its jurisdiction under Section 4(k) of the Act. These are matters which the Government would have to take into account while deciding whether it should reopen its former decision in the interest of justice and industrial peace but have nothing to do with its jurisdiction under Section 4(k) of the Act. Whether the intervening period may be short or long would necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and therefore, in construing the expression 'at any time' in Section 4(k) it would be impossible to lay down any limits to it.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Shalimar Works Ltd. Vs. Workmen [ AIR 1959 SC 1217 ], pointed-out that there is no limitation prescribed in making a reference of disputes to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Act. At the same time, the Court also remarked that the dispute should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed. In that case, reference was made after four years of dispute having arisen. 14. The other submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner regarding non-supply of copy of the enquiry report, it would be apposite to mention here that merely because there is a right to receive the copy of enquiry report and if the same has not been supplied, the entire proceeding cannot be said to be vitiated. In this regard reference can be had to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Om Prakash Mann Vs. Director of Education (Basic) & Ors., reported in (2006) 7 SCC 558 . The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “8. The second ground that no copy of the enquiry report had been furnished to the appellant thereby violated the principle of natural justice has also no substance. On this ground the learned Judge recorded a finding that the appellant was unable to show as to how he has been prejudiced for non-furnishing of the copy of the report. We agree with the finding of the learned Judge of the High Court. 9. By now it is well settled principle of law that doctrines of principle of natural justice are not embodied Rule. They cannot be applied in a straightjacket formula. To sustain the complaint of violation of the principle of natural justice one must establish that he has been prejudiced by non-observance of principle of natural justice. 9. By now it is well settled principle of law that doctrines of principle of natural justice are not embodied Rule. They cannot be applied in a straightjacket formula. To sustain the complaint of violation of the principle of natural justice one must establish that he has been prejudiced by non-observance of principle of natural justice. As held by the High Court the appellant has not been able to show as to how he has been prejudiced by non-furnishing of the copy of the enquiry report. The appellant has filed a detail appeal before Appellate Authority which was dismissed as noticed above. It is not his case that he has been deprived of making effective appeal for non-furnishing of copy of enquiry report. He has participated in the enquiry proceedings without any demur. It is undisputed that the appellant has been afforded enough opportunity and he has participated throughout the enquiry proceedings, he has been heard and allowed to make submission before the enquiry Committee.” Further, in case of Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. Vs. Kailas Chandra Ahuja, reported in (2008) 9 SCC 31 , the Hon’ble Court has held as under: 18. So far as the supply of report of the Inquiry Officer is concerned, it was held by the Constitution Bench that the delinquent employee had a right to receive the Inquiry Officer's report and a denial thereof would constitute breach of natural justice. Speaking for the majority, Sawant J. stated: [ECIL V. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 ] "29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice". (emphasis supplied) 19. The Court then considered the effect of non-supply of Inquiry Officer's report on the delinquent. The majority stated: [B.Karunakar case (supra)] "30. (emphasis supplied) 19. The Court then considered the effect of non-supply of Inquiry Officer's report on the delinquent. The majority stated: [B.Karunakar case (supra)] "30. (v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with backwages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an `unnatural expansion of natural justice' which in itself is antithetical to justice". (emphasis supplied) 20. Holding that it was incumbent on the delinquent employee to show prejudice, the majority held that non-supply of report of the Inquiry Officer to the delinquent employee would not by itself make the order of punishment null and void or non est. The majority concluded: [B. Karunakar’s case (supra)] “31. (emphasis supplied) 20. Holding that it was incumbent on the delinquent employee to show prejudice, the majority held that non-supply of report of the Inquiry Officer to the delinquent employee would not by itself make the order of punishment null and void or non est. The majority concluded: [B. Karunakar’s case (supra)] “31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment". (emphasis supplied) 21. From the ratio laid down in B. Karunakar’s case (supra), it is explicitly clear that the doctrine of natural justice requires supply of a copy of the Inquiry Officer's report to the delinquent if such Inquiry Officer is other than the Disciplinary Authority. It is also clear that non-supply of report of Inquiry Officer is in the breach of natural justice. But it is equally clear that failure to supply a report of Inquiry Officer to the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in proceedings being declared null and void and order of punishment non est and ineffective. It is also clear that non-supply of report of Inquiry Officer is in the breach of natural justice. But it is equally clear that failure to supply a report of Inquiry Officer to the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in proceedings being declared null and void and order of punishment non est and ineffective. It is for the delinquent-employee to plead and prove that non-supply of such report had caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. If he is unable to satisfy the Court on that point, the order of punishment cannot automatically be set aside. …… ……. 24. In our considered view, the High Court was wrong in making the above observation and virtually in ignoring the ratio of B. Karunakar that prejudice should be shown by the delinquent. To repeat, in B. Karunakar, this Court stated; “30 (v) ……Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case". …… ……. 36. The recent trend, however, is of `prejudice'. Even in those cases where procedural requirements have not been complied with, the action has not been held ipso facto illegal, unlawful or void unless it is shown that nonobservance had prejudicially affected the applicant. ……. ……. 39. In B. Karunakar’s case (supra), this Court considered several cases and held that it was only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report "would have made a difference" to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. The law laid down in B. Karunakar was reiterated and followed in subsequent cases also [vide State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 ; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237 ]. ……. …… 44. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that though supply of report of Inquiry Officer is part and parcel of natural justice and must be furnished to the delinquent-employee, failure to do so would not automatically result in quashing or setting aside of the order or the order being declared null and void. For that, the delinquent employee has to show `prejudice'. For that, the delinquent employee has to show `prejudice'. Unless he is able to show that non-supply of report of the Inquiry Officer has resulted in prejudice or miscarriage of justice, an order of punishment cannot be held to be vitiated. And whether prejudice had been caused to the delinquent- employee depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. 15. From going through the records of the case, it has also been noticed that petitioner was caught thrice while committing theft and it is settled laws that misappropriation amounts to loss of confidence and dismissal is the proper punishment in such cases. The petitioner had no legal right to continue in service any further. This Court is in full agreement with the observations made by learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur. 16. The judgments referred by Mr. Kishore Kr. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner does not come to his rescue as nothing has been brought on record to show that how the petitioner was prejudiced by non-supply of copy of the enquiry report and when the dispute was not in existence, how the unexplained stale claim could have been ignored by the learned Labour Court. 17. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, no interference is warranted in the instant writ application and the same is hereby dismissed.” Arguments of the Appellant 4. The learned writ Court while dismissing the writ petition has not considered the case of the workman in accordance with law. The findings of the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur in the order dated 09th December 2011 whereby the domestic inquiry was held to be fair and proper, is perverse in as much as the learned Labour Court did not consider the cross-examination of the management witness no.2 on the validity of the domestic inquiry. The cross-examination of the management witness no.2 reflects that the inquiry was not conducted in accordance with law. He submits that the order dated 09th December 2011 passed in Reference Case No.8 of 2004 called for interference by the learned writ Court but aforesaid aspects of the matter have not been considered and the writ petition has been dismissed by holding that the case suffered from laches and was a stale case. 5. He submits that the order dated 09th December 2011 passed in Reference Case No.8 of 2004 called for interference by the learned writ Court but aforesaid aspects of the matter have not been considered and the writ petition has been dismissed by holding that the case suffered from laches and was a stale case. 5. The award dated 17th July 2012 passed in Reference Case No.8 of 2004 was also not decided properly. The provision of section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has not been properly followed. The punishment of dismissal was highly disproportionate to the allegations made against the workman considering the facts and circumstances of the case. The workman was found to be guilty of only an ‘attempt to theft’ and the punishment of dismissal on account of such a finding is harsh and disproportionate. He has also submitted that the aforesaid aspects of the matter have neither been properly considered by the learned Labour Court nor by the learned writ Court and, therefore, the impugned judgment passed by the learned writ Court, as well as the award impugned before the learned writ Court, calls for interference. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the following judgments: (i) “Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and others” (2000) 2 SCC 455 paragraph nos.6, 7 and 8 (ii) “M/s. Western India Match Co., Ltd. Vs. The Western India Match Co. Workers Union and others” 1970 (1) SCC 225 paragraph no.8 (iii) “B.C Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others” (1995) 6 SCC 749 paragraph nos.12 and 13 (iv) “Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and another” (2015) 15 SCC 1 paragraph no.23 (v) “Shambhu Nath Goyal Vs. Bank of Baroda and others” (1983) 4 SCC 491 paragraph no.2 Arguments of the Respondent 7. The learned counsel for the respondent has opposed the prayer of the appellant. There were two inquiries in connection with two different incidents and the workman had admitted his guilt in his show cause reply. The inquiry was rightly held to be fair and proper and both the inquiry reports are detailed reports. The learned Labour Court has rightly answered the reference which did not call for any interference. There were two inquiries in connection with two different incidents and the workman had admitted his guilt in his show cause reply. The inquiry was rightly held to be fair and proper and both the inquiry reports are detailed reports. The learned Labour Court has rightly answered the reference which did not call for any interference. The law is well settled that the scope for interference in the matter of award passed by the learned Labour Court or learned Industrial Tribunal is very limited and no interference is permissible in the absence of any perversity. He has relied upon the following judgments: (i) “Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. Karunamoy Banerjee” (1968) 1 SCR 251 (ii) “Management of M/s Usha Breco Limited Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur and others” 2005 LAB. I.C. 986 (iii) “Usha Breco Mazdoor Sangh Vs. Management of Usha Breco Limited and another” (2008) 5 SCC 554 (iv) “The workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. The Management and others” (1973) 1 SCC 813 Findings of this Court 8. In the judgment reported in M/s Firestone, Tyre and Rubber Co. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the insertion of Section 11-A in Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as inserted in 1971, and has dealt with the power of the Tribunal to interfere with the order of dismissal. It has been held that even where the dismissal of a workman by an employer on ground of misconduct is preceded by a proper and valid domestic inquiry, Section 11-A now empowers the Labour Court or Tribunal to reappraise the evidence and examine the correctness of the finding of the domestic inquiry. Section 11-A further empowers the Tribunal to interfere with the punishment and alter the same. It has also been held that the mere fact that no inquiry or defective inquiry has been held by the employer does not by itself render, the dismissal of workman illegal. Section 11-A further empowers the Tribunal to interfere with the punishment and alter the same. It has also been held that the mere fact that no inquiry or defective inquiry has been held by the employer does not by itself render, the dismissal of workman illegal. The right of the employer to adduce evidence justifying his action for the first time in such a case is not taken away by the proviso to Section 11-A. The legal position as existing prior to coming into force of Section 11-A and changes effected thereby were duly explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 33 to 41A of the report and the portions relevant for the purposes of the present case is quoted as under: - “33 The question is whether Section 11-A has made any changes in the legal position mentioned above and if so, to what extent? The Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be taken into account for the purpose of interpreting the plain words of the section. But it gives an indication as to what the legislature wanted to achieve. At the time of introducing Section 11-A in the Act, the legislature must have been aware of the several principles laid down in the various decisions of this Court referred to above. The object is stated to be that the Tribunal should have power in cases, where necessary, to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement or award any lesser punishment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons has specifically referred to the limitations on the powers of an Industrial Tribunal, as laid down by this Court in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. case. 34. This will be a convenient stage to consider the contents of Section 11-A. To invoke Section 11-A, it is necessary that an industrial dispute of the type mentioned therein should have been referred to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. In the course of such adjudication, the Tribunal has to be satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified. If it comes to such a conclusion, the Tribunal has to set aside the order and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms as it thinks fit. The Tribunal has also power to give any other relief to the workman including the imposing of a lesser punishment having due regard to the circumstances. If it comes to such a conclusion, the Tribunal has to set aside the order and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms as it thinks fit. The Tribunal has also power to give any other relief to the workman including the imposing of a lesser punishment having due regard to the circumstances. The proviso casts a duty on the Tribunal to rely only on the materials on record and prohibits it from taking any fresh evidence. Even a mere reading of the section, in our opinion, does indicate that a change in the law, as laid down by this Court has been effected. According to the workmen the entire law has been completely altered; whereas according to the employers, a very minor change has been effected giving power to the Tribunal only to alter the punishment, after having held that the misconduct is proved. That is, according to the employers, the Tribunal has a mere power to alter the punishment after it holds that the misconduct is proved. The workmen, on the other hand, claim that the law has been re-written. 35. We cannot accept the extreme contentions advanced on behalf of the workmen and the employers. We are aware that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation enacted in the interest of employees. It is well settled that in construing the provisions of a welfare legislation, courts should adopt, what is described as a beneficent rule of construction. If two constructions are reasonably possible to be placed on the section, it follows that the construction which furthers the policy and object of the Act and is more beneficial to the employees, has to be preferred. Another principle to be borne in mind is that the Act in question which intends to improve and safeguard the service conditions of an employee, demands an interpretation liberal enough to achieve the legislative purpose. But we should not also lose sight of another canon of interpretation that a statute or for the matter of that even a particular section, has to be interpreted according to its plain words and without doing violence to the language used by the legislature. But we should not also lose sight of another canon of interpretation that a statute or for the matter of that even a particular section, has to be interpreted according to its plain words and without doing violence to the language used by the legislature. Another aspect to be borne in mind will be that there has been a long chain of decisions of this Court, referred to exhaustively earlier, laying down various principles in relation to adjudication of disputes by industrial courts arising out of orders of discharge or dismissal. Therefore it will have to be found from the words of the section whether it has altered the entire law, as laid down by the decisions, and, if so, whether there is a clear expression of that intention in the language of the section. 36. We will first consider cases where an employer has held a proper and valid domestic enquiry before passing the order of punishment. Previously the Tribunal had no power to interfere with its finding of misconduct recorded in the domestic enquiry unless one or other infirmities pointed out by this Court in Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. case existed. The conduct of disciplinary proceedings and the punishment to be imposed were all considered to be a managerial function with which the Tribunal had no power to interfere unless the finding was perverse or the punishment was so harsh as to lead to an inference of victimisation of unfair labour practice. This position, in our view, has now been changed by Section 11-A. The words “in the course of the adjudication proceeding, the Tribunal is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified” clearly indicate that the Tribunal is now clothed with the power to reappraise the evidence in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the said evidence relied on by an employer establishes the misconduct alleged against a workman. What was originally a plausible conclusion that could be drawn by an employer from the evidence, has now given place to a satisfaction being arrived at by the Tribunal that the finding of misconduct is correct. The limitations imposed on the powers of the Tribunal by the decision in Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. case, can no longer be invoked by an employer. The limitations imposed on the powers of the Tribunal by the decision in Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. case, can no longer be invoked by an employer. The Tribunal is now at liberty to consider not only whether the finding of misconduct recorded by an employer is correct; but also to differ from the said finding if a proper case is made out. What was once largely in the realm of the satisfaction of the employer, has ceased to be so; and now it is the satisfaction of the Tribunal that finally decides the matter. 37. If there has been no enquiry held by the employer or if the enquiry is held to be defective, it is open to the employer even now to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal justifying the order of discharge or dismissal. We are not inclined to accept the contention on behalf of the workmen that the right of the employer to adduce evidence before the Tribunal for the first time recognised by this Court in its various decisions, has been taken away. There is no indication in the section that the said right has been abrogated. If the intention of the legislature was to do away with such a right, which has been recognised over a long period of years, as will be noticed by the decisions referred to earlier, the section would have been differently worded. Admittedly, there are no express words to that effect, and there is no indication that the section has impliedly changed the law in that respect. Therefore, the position is that even now the employer is entitled to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal even if he had held no enquiry or the enquiry held by him is found to be defective. Of course, an opportunity will have to be given to the workman to lead evidence contra. The stage at which the employer has to ask for such an opportunity, has been pointed out by this Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. case. No doubt, this procedure may be time consuming, elaborate and cumbersome. As pointed out by this Court in the decision just referred to above, it is open to the Tribunal to deal with the validity of the domestic enquiry, if one has been held as a preliminary issue. Ltd. case. No doubt, this procedure may be time consuming, elaborate and cumbersome. As pointed out by this Court in the decision just referred to above, it is open to the Tribunal to deal with the validity of the domestic enquiry, if one has been held as a preliminary issue. If its finding on the subject is in favour of the management, then there will be no occasion for additional evidence being cited by the management. But if the finding on this issue is against the management, the Tribunal will have to give the employer an opportunity to cite additional evidence justifying his action. This right in the management to sustain its order by adducing independent evidence before the Tribunal, if no enquiry has been held or if the enquiry is held to be defective, has been given judicial recognition over a long period of years. (emphasis supplied) 38. All parties are agreed that even after Section 11-A, the employer and employee can adduce evidence regarding the legality or validity of the domestic enquiry, if one had been held by an employer. 39. Having held that the right of the employer to adduce evidence continues even under the new section, it is needless to state that, when such evidence is adduced for the first time, it is the Tribunal which has to be satisfied on such evidence about the guilt or otherwise of the workman concerned. The law, as laid down by this Court that under such circumstances, the issue about the merits of impugned order of dismissal or discharge is at large before the Tribunal and that it has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved, continues to have full effect. In such a case, as laid down by this Court, the exercise of managerial functions does not arise at all. 40. Therefore, it will be seen that both in respect of cases where a domestic enquiry has been held as also in cases where the Tribunal considers the matter on the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the satisfaction under Section 11-A, about the guilt or otherwise of the workman concerned, is that of the Tribunal. It has to consider the evidence and come to a conclusion one way or other. It has to consider the evidence and come to a conclusion one way or other. Even in cases where an enquiry has been held by an employer and a finding of misconduct arrived at, the Tribunal can now differ from that finding in a proper case and hold that no misconduct is proved. 41. We are not inclined to accept the contentions advanced on behalf of the employers that the stage for interference under Section 11-A by the Tribunal is reached only when it has to consider the punishment after having accepted the finding of guilt recorded by an employer. It has to be remembered that a Tribunal may hold that the punishment is not justified because the misconduct alleged and found proved is such that it does not warrant dismissal or discharge The Tribunal may also hold that the order of discharge or dismissal is not justified because the alleged misconduct itself is not established by the evidence. To come to a conclusion either way, the Tribunal will have to re-appraise the evidence for itself. Ultimately it may hold that the misconduct itself is not proved or that the misconduct proved does not warrant the punishment of dismissal or discharge. That is why, according to us, Section 11-A now gives full power to the Tribunal to go into the evidence and satisfy itself on both these points. Now the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to reappraise the evidence and come to its conclusion enures to it when it has to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to it in which an employer relies on the findings recorded by him in a domestic enquiry. Such a power to appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion about the guilt or otherwise was always recognised in a Tribunal when it was deciding a dispute on the basis of evidence adduced before it for the first time. Both categories are now put on a par by Section 11-A. 41-A. Another change that has been effected by Section 11-A is the power conferred on a Tribunal to alter the punishment imposed by an employer. If the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the misconduct is established, either by the domestic enquiry accepted by it or by the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the Tribunal originally had no power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management. If the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the misconduct is established, either by the domestic enquiry accepted by it or by the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the Tribunal originally had no power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management. Once the misconduct is proved, the Tribunal had to sustain the order of punishment unless it was harsh indicating victimisation. Under Section 11-A, though the Tribunal may hold that the misconduct is proved, nevertheless it may be of the opinion that the order of discharge or dismissal for the said misconduct is not justified. In other words, the Tribunal may hold that the proved misconduct does not merit punishment by way of discharge or dismissal. It can, under such circumstances, award to the workman only lesser punishment instead. The power to interfere with the punishment and alter the same has been now conferred on the Tribunal by Section 11-A.” 9. The judgment passed in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra), inter alia, deals with the issue regarding the stage as to when a prayer can be made by the employer to adduce evidence to justify the action taken against the employee. It has been held that such prayer has to be made at the earliest possible stage and even at the time of filing the written statement as by this time it is known to the employer that the workman is questioning the legality and validity of the domestic inquiry. The ratio of the judgment passed in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra) has been approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Constitution Bench Judgment reported in (2001) 5 SCC 433 [Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. Lakshmidevamma (Smt) and Another]. 10. In the present case, the ratio of the judgment passed in the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal (supra) does not apply as the domestic inquiry was held to be fair and proper and the scope of inquiry by the learned Labour Court was as to whether the Labour Court would differ from the findings recorded by the domestic inquiry and as to whether the punishment imposed by the employer required any interference considering the proportionality of the punishment imposed. 11. The judgments in the case of Prabhakar (supra), M/s Western India Match Co. 11. The judgments in the case of Prabhakar (supra), M/s Western India Match Co. Ltd. (supra) and Nedungadi Bank Ltd. (supra), inter alia, deal with the power of the government to refer the dispute for adjudication ‘at any time’ and it has been held that the expression ‘at any time’ in the context in which it is used postulates that a reference can only be made if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. The argument that once a reference has been made under Section 10 of the Act, a Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court, has also been rejected by holding that an administrative order which does not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels outside that is certainly subject to judicial review, limited though it might be. The High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. 12. In the judgment in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), paragraph nos. 12 and 13 the scope of judicial review under writ jurisdiction in connection with disciplinary proceeding has been considered and it has been held that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. The power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. It has also been held that in a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal and also held that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. 13. The writ petition was filed challenging the following two orders: - (i) Order dated 09th December 2011 passed in Reference Case No.8 of 2004 by which the preliminary issue was decided and the domestic inquiry was held to be fair and proper. 13. The writ petition was filed challenging the following two orders: - (i) Order dated 09th December 2011 passed in Reference Case No.8 of 2004 by which the preliminary issue was decided and the domestic inquiry was held to be fair and proper. (ii) The award dated 17th July 2012 passed in Reference Case No.8 of 2004 by which the learned Labour Court answered the reference against the workman. A prayer was also made in the writ petition seeking a direction upon the respondent to reinstate the workman in service with all consequential benefits after setting aside the order dated 09th December 2011 and 17th July 2012. 14. It is not in dispute that the workman was posted at Tubes Division of M/s TISCO Ltd. (now M/s Tata Steel Ltd.). On 28th November 1991, the workman was on C shift duty and a surprise check of his personal locker was carried out at around 11.15 p.m. in the presence of the workman and a slab of lucas weighing 8.5 kgs and 4 pairs of hand gloves were found in the personal locker of the workman. A charge sheet dated 03rd December 1991 was issued to the workman in which the following allegations were made: - “It is reported that while you were in ‘C’ shift duty on November 28, “91, a surprise check of your personal locker at CR Mill was carried out by Security personnel at about 11.15 p.m. in your presence and in the presence of Shri S.P. Chakladar, P.No. 380140, Dy. D.M., (CR/CP & HT) during which one (1) slab of lucas weighing 8.5 Kgs was recovered. This slab is neither in use in your department nor was / issued to you. Therefore, the slab was under your possession unauthorizedly. Further, four pairs of hand gloves were also found in your locker. The above act on your part amounts to attempted theft and dishonesty in connection with company’s property.” 15. In reply to the aforesaid allegations, the workman responded as under: “(2) In reply to your charge-sheet I respectfully beg to say that the alleged slab of luoas was lying just below my locker and I without knowing the nature of my action I put the same into my locker due to my mental derangement from which I have just recovered and still I have some mental weaknesses. As regard gloves I have just collected nearby place of my work to be used then in my work which were thrown here and there. Sir, I have no intention to commit any type of theft in the Company. In previous occasion I was never charge-sheeted of any misconduct by the Company. Under the circumstances I beg your apology in this regard and I ensure I will not keep anything in my locker which are objectionable. So sir, I again beg your pardon.” 16. Upon perusal of the reply filed by the workman, it is apparent that as per his explanation, the slab of lucas was lying near his locker and without knowing the nature of his action, he had picked up the same and put it in his locker. However, the workman claimed that he had just recovered from mental derangement and was still suffering from mental weakness. The workman begged apology and assured that in future he would not keep any objectionable material in his locker. 17. Another incident took place on 08th January 1992, when the workman was on C shift duty (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.), and instead of leaving the company premises at the end of his shift in the morning, he remained inside the premises and at about 7.30 a.m., the workman was caught taking out a piece of lucas and was apprehended with the same. In connection with the incident of 08th January 1992, another charge sheet was issued to the workman, wherein the following allegations were made: “(3) You are hereby asked to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against you for the following act which amounts to misconduct within the meaning of Standing Order No. 24 for which you are liable to be punished under Standing Order No. 25 of the Works Standing Orders. On 8-1-92, you were in ‘C’ shift duty (i.e. from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.). It has been reported that instead of leaving the Company’s premises at the end of your shift (i.e. at 6:00 a.m.), you remained inside. At about 7:30 a.m., Shri Kameshwar Singh, P. No. 380173, Foreman, Galvanising section of S.T.P. on being informed that you were taking out a piece of lucas, caught you and reported the matter to the Security control room. At about 7:30 a.m., Shri Kameshwar Singh, P. No. 380173, Foreman, Galvanising section of S.T.P. on being informed that you were taking out a piece of lucas, caught you and reported the matter to the Security control room. Thereafter, Security personnel, namely, Shift Inspector P. K. Singh, P. No. 388064, Sub Inspector Shri N. P. Singh, P. No. 305150 and Sepoy Shri G. N. Singh, P. No. 305175 arrived at the spot and found that you were unauthorisedly in possession of a piece of lucas belonging to the Company. You were then taken to Security control room. Had you not been apprehended, you would have got away with the material belonging to the Company. The above act on your part amounts to attempted theft of Company’s property.” 18. In response to the said allegation, the workman gave the following reply: “Respected Sir, With due respect I beg to state that I became a drinker due to bad company. Now I am under treatment at Rashmi Panth. I took the lucas piece at the Glublizing deptt. on 9.1.92 while I was in a drunken state, and I had no feeling of what I was doing. I feel so much ashamed for the same. Sir, I have a big family to be maintained by me. Under such circumstances, I pray to please give me a chance for which I shall remain ever grateful to you.” 19. Upon perusal of the reply to the allegation relating to the incident of 08th January 1992, it is apparent that the workman had replied to the charge sheet stating that he had become a drinker due to bad company and he was under treatment. He had taken the lucas piece while he was in a drunken state and had no feeling of what he was doing. The workman expressed that he was ashamed of the same. The workman stated that he had a big family to maintain and prayed that he be given a chance and begged apology for his conduct. 20. Upon perusal of the aforesaid reply submitted by the workman, it is clear that even in connection with the allegation dated 08th January 1992, the workman did not deny the incident rather he tried to explain the circumstances by stating that he was in a drunken condition and had no feeling as to what he was doing and was also ashamed of his conduct. 21. After receiving the reply in connection with the two incidents, separate inquiries were conducted in connection with each allegation by the same inquiry officer and two different inquiry reports both dated 23rd October 1992 were submitted before the disciplinary authority. In both inquiries, the workman was found guilty of ‘attempted theft’ of the company’s property which were said to be misconduct under clause X of Order 24 of the Work Standing Order and the charge was held to be established. 22. In connection with the 1st charge sheet dated 03rd December 1991, it has been recorded in the inquiry report that despite repeated notices, the workman was not appearing. However, the last notice of inquiry dated 02nd May 1992 was sent fixing the date on 15th May 1992 at 10.30 a.m. and on that day, the workman turned up in the inquiry which was held and concluded on the same day. This has been specifically recorded in the inquiry report dated 23rd October 1992 in connection with the chargesheet dated 03rd December 1991. The opportunities given to the workman have been recorded in the inquiry report in paragraph A wherein it has been stated that on the date of inquiry i.e., on 20th February 1992 at 10.30 a.m., the charge sheeted employee did not turn up, in spite of having received the notice of enquiry as indicated by the acknowledgement card bearing his signature. It was decided to give the charge sheeted employee another opportunity and the enquiry was postponed. On 21st February 1992, an application alongwith a photocopy of a medical prescription from the charge sheeted employee was received by the enquiry officer wherein the applicant asked for postponement of the inquiry in view of the fact that the charge sheeted employee had been admitted at the de-addiction centre at baridih and was likely to remain there for a month. The charge sheeted employee stated that he would send intimation of his recovery to enable the enquiry officer to fix a fresh date for the enquiry. However, since more than a month had elapsed and no further intimation had been received from the charge sheeted employee, another notice of enquiry Cr/109/not/06 dated 06th April 1992 was sent by registered post to the charge sheeted employee informing him that the inquiry would be held on 20th April 1992 at 10.00 a.m. This notice of enquiry came back undelivered. Thereafter, another notice dated 06th April 1992 was issued fixing the date of inquiry as 20th April 1992, but the workman did not turn up. Accordingly, a fresh notice of enquiry CR/109/NOT/10 dated 02nd May 1992 was sent fixing the enquiry on 15th May 1992 at 10.30 a.m. in the office of the undersigned. On the above date, the charge sheeted employee turned up for the enquiry which was held and concluded on the same day. 23. In connection with the 2nd chargesheet dated 10th January 1992, it has been specifically recorded in the inquiry report that repeated opportunities were granted to the workman to participate in the inquiry proceedings. In the inquiry report, it has been inter alia recorded that the date of inquiry was fixed on 04th May at 10.30 a.m. on which day the workman was present and the inquiry began. It has been further recorded that after making his statement and production of one witness, the management representative asked for an adjournment since he wished to produce more witnesses and, consequently, the inquiry was adjourned and it was decided that it would resume on 07th May. On 07th May the workman did not turn up and, thereafter, the inquiry was fixed on 16th May at 10 a.m. on which day the workman was present for the inquiry which was held and concluded on the same day. The details regarding the opportunities given to the workman have been recorded in paragraph A of the inquiry report dated 10th January 1992. However, the date of inquiry was fixed for 21-2-92 at 10.30 a.m. on the morning of 21-2-92, an application signed by the charge sheeted employee was received by the inquiry officer. The applicant asked for postponement of the inquiry in view of the fact that the charge sheeted employee had been admitted at the de-addiction centre at Baridih. A photocopy of the signed prescription revealed that he had been admitted on 18th February 1992 and was likely to remain there for thirty days. The charge sheeted employee stated that he would intimate the inquiry officer about his recovery to enable him to fix another date of inquiry. Thereafter, another notice of inquiry dated 07th April 1992 was sent out by registered post and 21st April 1992 at 9.30 a.m. was fixed as the date and time of the inquiry. The charge sheeted employee stated that he would intimate the inquiry officer about his recovery to enable him to fix another date of inquiry. Thereafter, another notice of inquiry dated 07th April 1992 was sent out by registered post and 21st April 1992 at 9.30 a.m. was fixed as the date and time of the inquiry. The notice came back undelivered and hence the inquiry was adjourned again. The next date of inquiry was fixed for 04th May at 10.30 a.m. The charge sheeted employee was present on 04th May and the inquiry began. After making his own statement and producing one witness, the management representative asked for an adjournment since he wished to produce more witnesses. Hence, the inquiry was adjourned and it was decided that it would resume on 07th May. The charge sheeted employee however, did not turn up on 07th May. The inquiry was then fixed on 16th May at 10.00 a.m. The charge sheeted employee was present for the inquiry which was held and concluded on the same day. 24. The inquiry report in connection with the charge sheet dated 03rd December 1991 also gives the list of the witnesses produced by the management who produced as many as 5 witnesses. It has been recorded that the workman did not produce any witness. It has also been recorded that the management representative produced as many as 7 exhibits. The inquiry report has considered the materials on record and has also considered the statement of the workman during the inquiry wherein he contended that he was a brown sugar addict at that time and hardly knew as to what he was doing or not doing and that he was responsible for whatever mistakes he committed during such period. He was also told by the management representative during cross-examination that there was every likelihood of a serious accident in the event of a workman not being in his senses. It has been recorded in the inquiry report itself that the charge sheeted employee agreed that the slab of lucas was used in the galvanization section and that he indeed was in its unauthorized possession. The workman also confirmed that the slab of lucas (management exhibit) was the same as had been recovered from his locker. It has been recorded in the inquiry report itself that the charge sheeted employee agreed that the slab of lucas was used in the galvanization section and that he indeed was in its unauthorized possession. The workman also confirmed that the slab of lucas (management exhibit) was the same as had been recovered from his locker. With regard to the pairs of new hand gloves found in the locker of the workman, it has been recorded that it may not be abnormal or unusual phenomena to have gloves in the locker but the fact was that at a given time a workman should not be in possession of more than one pair since the gloves are issued on a replacement basis. The inquiry officer not only discussed the evidence and materials produced on behalf of the management but also considered the statement of the workman and ultimately recorded the finding and conclusion that the workman was found in unauthorized possession of slab of lucas weighing 8.5 kgs valued @ Rs.68 per kg and 4 pairs of hand gloves and on the basis of evidence adduced before the inquiry officer, it was held that the workman was held guilty of ‘attempted theft’ of company’s property. 25. So far as the inquiry report in connection with the charge sheet dated 10th January 1992 is concerned, it has been recorded in the inquiry report itself that the management representative had produced as many as 6 witnesses but the workman did not produce any witness. It has been also recorded that the management had produced one exhibit. The inquiry officer analyzed the evidences and statements and after discussing the management witnesses, the inquiry officer also recorded that the workman in his own statement during the inquiry did not refute the charge of ‘attempted theft’ leveled against him and that the workman had attributed his action to his habit of drug taking and had appealed to the management to give him a chance. On cross-questioning the workman admitted that the charges leveled against him were true and also confirmed that the slab of lucas (management exhibit 1) had been recovered from him at the galvanizing section on 09th January 1992. On cross-questioning the workman admitted that the charges leveled against him were true and also confirmed that the slab of lucas (management exhibit 1) had been recovered from him at the galvanizing section on 09th January 1992. The inquiry officer clearly recorded that based on the evidence adduced before the inquiry officer during the course of the inquiry proceeding, it could be concluded that the workman had ‘attempted theft’ of the company’s property and hence the charges leveled against him were proved. 26. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of both the inquiry reports and issued the order of dismissal by recording that the workman was found guilty of two separate acts of misconduct as per Standing Order No.24 of the Work Standing Order and he was discharged from the services of the company with immediate effect vide order dated 24th October 1992. The workman was also directed to collect his dues from the accounts department on any working day after handing over the company’s property, if any, in his possession. 27. The workman raised the industrial dispute by filing a representation dated 31st January 2001 after expiry of 9 years from the order of his dismissal requesting the General Manager of the management to withdraw the order of termination and to reinstate him with full back wages. When no positive response was received by the workman from the side of the management, he approached the authorities and the Government of Jharkhand vide Notification dated 21st February 2003 referred the dispute to the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur for adjudication. The terms of reference were: - “Whether the dismissal of Johnson Lakra, the workman of M/s TISCO Ltd., Jamshedpur from the date of 24th October 1992 by the management is justified? If not, what relief he is entitled to?” 28. Based on the aforesaid Notification, Reference Case No.8 of 2004 was instituted before the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur. Vide order dated 09th December 2011, the domestic inquiry was held to be fair and proper and ultimately the reference case was disposed of against the workman vide order dated 17th July 2012. If not, what relief he is entitled to?” 28. Based on the aforesaid Notification, Reference Case No.8 of 2004 was instituted before the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur. Vide order dated 09th December 2011, the domestic inquiry was held to be fair and proper and ultimately the reference case was disposed of against the workman vide order dated 17th July 2012. The workman being aggrieved by the order dated 09th December 2011 (holding the domestic inquiry as fair and proper) as well as the award dated 17th July 2012 filed the writ petition which was dismissed and the order of learned writ Court is the subject matter of consideration before this Court. 29. Before the writ Court, the workman did not file a copy of the written statement filed before the learned Labour Court but the summary of the written statement and the stand of the workman before the learned Labour Court has been recorded in paragraph no.10 of the writ petition which is quoted as under: “10. That the petitioner filed his written statement in Ref. Case No 8/04 that without considering the reply submitted by the petitioner, the domestic enquiry was conducted only to complete formality. It is submitted that during domestic enquiry petitioner was neither heard properly & fairly nor reasonable opportunity of defence was allowed to him and further no regard was given to the standing orders of the Management nor settle principles of law and fair play and thus in aforesaid state of affairs the enquiry was conducted in one day and report was prepared and the petitioner was dismissed with effect from 24/10/92. It is further stated in written statement that there after petitioner raised the demand of withdrawal of order of termination and reinstatement with full back wages but his grievances was not fulfilled then sought remedy u/s 2A of I.D.Act and approached the local conciliation officer to intervene in the dispute for settlement but the conciliation failed report was submitted to the state Government who after careful examination of dispute referred the dispute/ issue of illegal dismissal for adjudication to the learned labour court, Jamshedpur vide notification dated 21/2/2003. The petitioner raised the following points in his written statement: (a) The workman has been framed in fabricated case of attempt of theft case and as such the alleged incident of attempted theft was not reported to police, and workman was victimised. The petitioner raised the following points in his written statement: (a) The workman has been framed in fabricated case of attempt of theft case and as such the alleged incident of attempted theft was not reported to police, and workman was victimised. (b) The workman is not guilty of any misconduct as stated in charge sheets and allegations levelled against the workman is false, fabricated and without any substance. (c) The Divisional Manager (CR-ERW) of M/S TISCO Ltd. (Tube Division) Jamshedpur was not competent to issue charge sheets, appoint enquiry officer and pass order of dismissal (d) That a set of tutored witnesses were used against the workman from the time of alleged incident to the stage of domestic enquiry and as such the enquiry was an eye wash to only complete the formality. (e) That during course of enquiry the management failed to prove that alleged material have been stolen from the managements store/department. (f) That before passing the order of dismissal the finding of enquiry officer was not given to workman with a chance to allow reasonable opportunity to workman to satisfy the disciplinary authority that he is not guilty of allegation/charge. (g) That the statement of witnesses examined in domestic enquiry were not correctly recorded by the enquiry officer being subordinate in the M/S TISCO Ltd. (Tube Division) and administration and because of his subordination he can never be expected to act against the interest of management whether right or wrong passed by the officer of management.” 30. With regard to the preliminary issue raised as to whether the domestic inquiry conducted by the management against the workman was fair and proper, the grievance of the workman has been stated in paragraph nos.12 and 14 of the writ petition that several points were not considered by the learned Labour Court, that is, the management witness admitted that the statement of witness S.K. Singh, Kameshwar Tiwari, Mahendra Prasad and S.P. Chakalghar were not given to the workman during the inquiry proceedings and also that copy of the document was not given to the workman and apart from that there were several discrepancies regarding date which created serious doubt about the truthfulness of the fair inquiry. The workman had also raised a grievance in paragraph no.14 of the writ petition that the punishment was not proportionate to the alleged misconduct. The workman had also raised a grievance in paragraph no.14 of the writ petition that the punishment was not proportionate to the alleged misconduct. Paragraph nos.12 and 14 of the writ petition is quoted as under: “12. That the petitioner submits that preliminary issue was raised as to whether the domestic enquiry conducted by the management against the workman is fair, proper and in accordance with the principle of natural justice was decided by order dated 9/12/11. It is submitted that preliminary issue in which question of fact is involved can not be decided as preliminary issue as such order dated 9/12/11 is bad in the eye of law and further several points were not consider by the learned court below though the management witness admitted that statement of witness S.K.Singh, Kameshwar Tiwari, MahendraPrasad, S.P.Chaklaghar was not given to workman during the enquiry proceeding and also stated that copy of document was not given to workman and apart from that there was several discrepancy were found regarding date which creates serious doubt about the truthfulness of fair enquiry. 14. That the petitioner submits that the learned court below without considering the case of workman and own admission of M.W.-2 about not giving the statement as well as document and also not considered that at no point of time the enquiry officer intimated or asked the workman to lead defence witness, thus the fairness of enquiry officer is questionable which has great bearing effect on enquiry report. It is submitted that punishment is also not proportionate with alleged misconduct.” 31. Upon perusal of the entire writ records, this Court finds that no grievance has been raised by the workman in connection with the recording of the statement of the workman and his admission of guilt not only in his reply to the show cause but also during the inquiry proceedings when he was examined. This is the situation in connection with both the inquiry reports. 32. This is the situation in connection with both the inquiry reports. 32. This Court finds that while considering the matter regarding the legality and validity of domestic inquiry vide order dated 09th December 2011, the learned Labour Court has passed a detailed order by recording the submission of both the parties and in paragraph no.5 of the order dated 09th December 2011, it has taken note of the fact that the workman had participated in the inquiry and his statement shows that he was a habitual drunker and had made mistake due to addiction of drug. The learned Labour Court has recorded that though there were some mistakes committed by the inquiry officer during the inquiry proceeding in connection with obtaining the date and signature of the witness but they were of minor nature and were not sufficient to demolish the merit of the inquiry particularly when the workman had admitted his guilt in his reply to the charge sheet and also in his statement before the inquiry officer. The learned Labour Court also considered that apart from the aforesaid, even in exhibit 6 which was an application of the workman after his discharge from service, he again admitted his guilt stating that this was done in a drunken state and now he has given up taking brown sugar. The findings of the learned Labour Court are recorded in paragraph nos.5 and 6 as under: “5. Heard and perused the oral and documentary evidence of the parties. From those evidence it is clear that two chargesheet were issued against the workman for the commission of attempted theft of slab of lucas and some pairs of hand gloves from the company, and it was also deducted from his locker and also from his possession on surprise inspection, and in reply the workman admitted his guilt and stated that he has done some mistake under the influence of liquor, and he could not understand the nature of gravity of the act. In this way I find that when the workman confessed/admitted his guilt there was no any necessity for the domestic enquiry conducted by the management but even then the management instituted a an enquiry against the workman and the workman participated in the enquiry who declined to cross-examine the witness of the management but he gave his evidence to the E.0. and he was cross- examined by the management. and he was cross- examined by the management. His statement shows that he is habitual drunker, and he had made mistake due to addiction of drug During evidence he has stated that he remained present on each and every date in the enquiry but the management has not examined any witness in his presence and he was not also examined in the enquiry In this way I find that the evidence of the workman is not reliable. On the find other hand M.W.2 has stated that on Ext. M/2 date of beginning the enquiry was not mentioned, and on some page signature of the witness was not obtained, and on some page date has not mentioned, and the enquiry report there is no any mentioned about the ordersheet of enquiry proceeding. In this way it appears that, no doubt, some mistake has been committed by the E.O. during the enquiry proceeding but, in my view, such minor mistakes are not sufficient to demolish the merit of the enquiry, and particularly in this case while the workman has admitted his guilt in his reply to chargesheet and also in his statement before the E.O. Apart of that Ext. 6 is a application of the Workman after his discharge from the service in which he again admitted his guilt stating that this was done by him in drunken stage and now he has given up taking brown sugar. 6. Considering the above discussed facts I am of opinion that the domestic enquiry conducted by the management against the workman is fair and proper. The legality and propriety of the concerned authority shall be considered at the time of final hearing of the case u/s. 11A of the I.D.Act. Put up on 6.1.2012 for hearing on merit.” 33. 6. Considering the above discussed facts I am of opinion that the domestic enquiry conducted by the management against the workman is fair and proper. The legality and propriety of the concerned authority shall be considered at the time of final hearing of the case u/s. 11A of the I.D.Act. Put up on 6.1.2012 for hearing on merit.” 33. After having gone through the order dated 09th December 2011, this Court finds that the learned Labour Court has considered all the materials placed in connection with the evidence regarding the legality and validity of domestic inquiry which was tried as a preliminary issue and after appreciating the materials on record held that the domestic inquiry was fair and proper with particular reference to the fact that the workman has admitted his guilt in his reply to chargesheet and also in his statement before the inquiry officer and again in the application of the workman after his discharge from the service admitting his guilt stating that this was done by him in drunken state and now he has given up taking brown sugar. This Court finds no illegality or perversity in the order dated 09th December 2011 holding the domestic inquiry as fair and proper and, consequently, the said order dated 09th December 2011 has rightly not been interfered with by the learned writ Court in the limited scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 34. So far as the final award dated 17th July 2012 passed in Reference Case No.8 of 2004 is concerned, the learned Labour Court has exercised the power within the realm of section 11A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in as much as the learned Labour Court has considered the materials produced by the management which included the resolution of the Managing Director exhibit M, charge sheet dated 03rd December 1991 and the reply exhibit M/1, inquiry proceeding exhibit M/2, charge sheet dated 10th January 1992 and its reply exhibit M/3, inquiry proceeding exhibit M/4, inquiry report M/5, representation of the workman dated 31st March 1996 exhibit M/6. 35. 35. The case of the workman was also considered who examined himself as W.W.-1 and the learned Labour Court also recorded that during the evidence workman had stated that he was working in another company for some months after his dismissal and that he was present before the inquiry officer during inquiry and that he was dismissed with an intention to victimize him and his case was that he was not given 2nd show cause notice nor any termination benefit after his termination. 36. The learned Labour Court evaluated the materials on record and recorded its findings from paragraph no.8 onwards and recorded that the workman had claimed that he had committed the misconduct due to his mental condition and that he had admitted his guilt during inquiry proceedings. So far as 2nd charge sheet is concerned, it has been considered that the workman again admitted his guilt but had stated that he had made this mistake in a drunken state and begged for pardon. The learned Labour Court recorded that the workman had committed misconduct for the first time on 28th November 1991 for which a charge sheet was issued to him and he replied on 06th December 1991 admitting his guilt and also begged pardon for such misconduct and undertook not to repeat the mistake in future and that he had done this mistake due to his mental condition but the workman again committed the same mistake on 08th January 1992 just after a month of his undertaking given on 06th December 1991. In reply to the 2nd chargesheet, the workman admitted his guilt and stated that he became a drunker due to bad company and had taken the piece of lucas and also expressed his shame and begged pardon. The learned Labour Court referred to exhibit G in which the workman had categorically stated that he had become an addict of brown sugar and was mentally weak and had committed such mistake for which he was charge-sheeted. The learned Labour Court referred to exhibit G in which the workman had categorically stated that he had become an addict of brown sugar and was mentally weak and had committed such mistake for which he was charge-sheeted. The learned Labour Court recorded that in reply to both the charge sheets, the workman had admitted his guilt but in spite of that the management constituted the domestic inquiry for both the charge sheets separately in which the workman participated in the inquiry and during inquiry also, the workman admitted his guilt and the inquiry officer found the charge fully approved and, ultimately, recorded the finding at paragraph no.8 which is quoted as under: “8. Evaluating the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties it is clear that the workman, Johnson Lakra was working at the relevant time as labour in C.R.Mill of the company, and he was discharged from the service after concluding the two enquiry proceedings against him by the management, and the allegation was for committing theft of lucas on both the occasions and also for committing theft of four pairs or hand glob. Ext. M/1 is the first chargesheet and it is alleged that the workman was in his 'c' shift duty on 28.12.1991, and security personnel made surprise checking of personal locker in the department, and one slab of lucas and hand globs were found kept in his locker unauthorizedly. And in reply workman has admitted the allegations and has stated that the said slab was lying just below my locker and he put the same into the locker due to mental derailment from which he was just recovered but was in some mental weakness, and he has collected the said gloves from the place of work which it were thrown here and there. Thus it appears that he has claimed that he had committed the said misconduct due to his mental condition. During enquiry witness of the management, Mr. K.P.Singh, ID.S. Officer has stated that he had conducted surprise checking and has found those articles from the locker of the workman which was kept in his locker in authorised manner. The concerned workman has also admitted his guilt during his enquiry proceeding, and he had full knowledge about the charges levelled against him. And I also find that the workman has never denied to the said allegations. Ext. The concerned workman has also admitted his guilt during his enquiry proceeding, and he had full knowledge about the charges levelled against him. And I also find that the workman has never denied to the said allegations. Ext. M/3 is the 2nd chargesheet with an allegations that the workman was on his duty on 8.1.1992, and in the next morning after his duty was over he went to galvanising section of S.T.P. and took a piece of lucas and was taking out of it from the company, and he was apprehended, and the said material was recovered from his possession. In reply he has mentioned that he had become drunker due to bad company and was under treatment at Rashmipanth, and he has done this mistake in drunken state and has beg pardon. And during enquiry workman has also admitted his facts. In this way I find that the workman has committed misconduct at the first time on 28.11.1991 for which a chargesheet was issued to him, and workman replied on 6.12.1991 admitting his guilt and had also beg pardon for such misconduct and also undertook not to repeat the mistake in future, and he has done such mistake due to his mental condition. But the workman again committed the same mistake on 8.1.1992 just after a month of his undertaking given on 6.12.1991, and in reply the concerned workman admitted his guilt and has stated that he became a drunker due to bad company and has taken the said piece of lucas from the galvanising department of the company and for such act the workman expressed his ashame and beg pardon Ext. G is the petition written by the concerned workman to the Chief Personnel Executive of Tisco after his separation from the service of the company in which he has categorically stated that he had become addict of brown Suger; and hence he was mentally weak and has committed the said mistake for which he was chargesheeted And therefore it is crystal clear that in reply of both chargesheet the concerned workman has admitted his guilt, and there was no legal impediment for the management to held a domestic enquiry but the management constituted the domestic enquiry for both the chargesheets separately, and workman participated in the enquiry and during enquiry workman has admitted his guilt, and E.O. found the charges fully proved against workman. Apart of that from the reply and petition of the concerned workman it also indicate that at the relevant time the concerned workman was addicted with brown suger and has committed misconduct from committing attempt to theft and also of the theft of the property of the company which was in the possession of galvanising department of the company and the said materials was not issued to him, and the material was taking out by the workman from the company's premises. Under the circumstance the concerned workman was rightly dismissed from the service of the company by the management, and the dismissal order, in my view, is not harsh and also not strikingly disproportionate with the alleged charge. And thus the dismissal of the workman, Mr. Johnson Lakra from the service of M/s. Tisco Ltd: by the management is justified and the concerned workman is not entitled to get any benefit. 9. The management has pleaded that the demand of the present reference is stale. I also find that the workman was terminated from the service on 24.10.1992, and the workman has raised his dispute by submitting his later of demand to the management on 31.1.2001; and hence it is clear that the workman has raised his dispute after a elapse of more than 8 years, and during evidence workman has stated that he was working with other company for some months after the termination made by the management. Thus the present reference, in my opinion, is stale one, and the present dispute has lost its significance. In the result, the present reference is, hereby, answered in favour of the management and against the concerned workman.” 37. This Court finds that the learned Labour Court has not only decided the reference on merits but has additionally recorded that the workman had raised the industrial dispute after more than 8 years from the date of his termination and that during evidence the workman has stated that he was working with some other company for some months after his termination while observing that the reference was a stale one and the dispute had lost its significance. 38. The learned writ Court vide paragraph no.12 of the impugned order has refused to interfere with the finding of the learned Labour Court observing the claim of the workman was stale. This Court finds no illegality with such finding of the learned writ Court. 38. The learned writ Court vide paragraph no.12 of the impugned order has refused to interfere with the finding of the learned Labour Court observing the claim of the workman was stale. This Court finds no illegality with such finding of the learned writ Court. Moreover, the fact remains that the learned writ Court has also considered the case of the workman on merits and refused to interfere by citing reasons in paragraph nos. 15 and 16 that the workman had admitted his guilt thrice and that he was not prejudiced by non-supply of the inquiry report. This Court finds no illegality or perversity with the aforesaid findings of the learned writ Court about the merits of the case. 39. This Court also finds that the learned Labour Court has also considered the point as to whether the punishment of dismissal was harsh or strikingly disproportionate to the alleged charge and has held that the dismissal was justified by a well-reasoned order. This Court finds no reason to differ with the said findings of the learned Labour Court and also the impugned order of the writ Court refusing to interfere with the award. 40. This Court finds that the learned Labour Court has considered every aspect of the matter and has passed a well-reasoned award dated 17th July 2012 and the learned writ Court has rightly refused to interfere with the award. 41. Accordingly, this Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed.