ORDER : 1. This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) is filed to quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 116 of 2020 on the file of the Additional Junior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, registered for the offence punishable under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’). 2. The petitioner is the accused in the aforesaid Calendar Case. Basing on a report lodged by 2nd respondent/defacto complainant, a case in Crime No. 24 of 2019 of Mangalagiri Town police station was registered against the petitioner/accused, and after completion of investigation, police laid charge sheet for the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC. The allegations, in brief, of the charge sheet are as follows: 2nd respondent/defacto complainant is a house wife. Municipal authorities were digging a canal in front of their house in Koppuravuri Colony, Mangalagiri town. On 25.10.2020 at about 2.30 PM, when LW-2 P. Venkateswara Rao and other colony members were discussing the issue, the accused, residing in the lane beside, went and had talk with him and insulted him and others. On that, when 2nd respondent/defacto complainant asked the petitioner/accused as to why he was insulting LW-2 P. Venkateswara Rao, for which the petitioner/accused abused her in filthy language, placed his hand on her shoulder and pushed away her. In this regard, a report came to be lodged by her to police. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that even accepting the entire accusations in the charge-sheet to be true, still no prima facie case for the offence alleged would attract as against the petitioner, for the reason that an altercation took place between the petitioner and 2nd respondent and in connection with the same, the petitioner allegedly pushed 2nd respondent by putting his hand on her shoulder and abused her. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that there was no intention on the part of the petitioner herein to outrage modesty of 2nd respondent. 4. Though notice has been served on 2nd respondent, there is no representation on her behalf. 5. Learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for 1st respondent-State would contend that there are accusations in the charge sheet, and whether there was intention on the part of the petitioner or not, is a question of fact and the same has to be decided in the course of trial. 6. 5. Learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for 1st respondent-State would contend that there are accusations in the charge sheet, and whether there was intention on the part of the petitioner or not, is a question of fact and the same has to be decided in the course of trial. 6. On 27.01.2020, 2nd respondent/defacto complainant lodged a report alleging that in front of her house, municipal authorities were digging a canal and on 25.01.2020 at about 2.30 PM, LW-2 P. Venkateswara Rao and Others were discussing the issue and at that time, the petitioner/accused, who was residing in the adjacent lane, went and spoke to him in an insulting manner. On hearing the same, 2nd respondent/defacto complainant asked the petitioner/accused as to why he was insulting LW-2 P. Venkateswara Rao. On which, the petitioner/accused abused her in filthy language and placed his hand on her shoulder and pushed her away. 7. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even accepting the accusations to be true, there was no intention on the part of the petitioner to outrage modesty of 2nd respondent in order to attract the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC. In support of his contention, he relied on a decision in Rupan Deol Bajaj and Another vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Another, (1995) 6 SCC 194 wherein it is held thus: (paragraphs 17 and 20). “17. It is undoubtedly correct that if intention or knowledge is one of the ingredients of any offence, it has got to be proved like other ingredients for convicting a person. But, it is also equally true that those ingredients being states of mind may not be proved by direct evidence and may have to be inferred from the attending circumstances of a given case. Since, however, in the instant case we are only at the incipient stage we have to ascertain, only prima facie, whether Mr. Gill by slapping Mrs. Bajaj on her posterior, in the background detailed by her in the FIR, intended to outrage or knew it to be likely that he would thereby outrage her modesty, which is one of the essential ingredients of Section 354 IPC. The sequence of events which we have detailed earlier indicates that the slapping was the finale to the earlier overtures of Mr. The sequence of events which we have detailed earlier indicates that the slapping was the finale to the earlier overtures of Mr. Gill, which considered together, persuade us to hold that he had the requisite culpable intention. Even if we had presumed he had no such intention he must be attributed with such knowledge, as the alleged act was committed by him in the presence of a gathering comprising the elite of the society - as the names and designations of the people given in the FIR indicate. While on this point we may also mention that there is nothing in the FIR to indicate, even remotely, that the indecent act was committed by Mr. Gill, accidentally or by mistake or it was a slip. For the reasons aforesaid, it must also be said that - apart from the offence under Section 354 IPC - an offence under Section 509 IPC has been made out on the allegations contained in the FIR as the words used and gestures made by Mr. Gill were intended to insult the modesty of Mrs. Bajaj. 20. In dealing with the above section in Veeda Menezes vs. Yusuf Khan Haji Ibrahim Khan, AIR 1966 SC 1773 : 1966 Cri. L.J. 1489 a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the object of framing the section was to exclude from the operation of the Penal Code, 1860 those cases which from the imperfection of language may fall within the letter of the law but are not within its spirit and are considered, and for the most part dealt with by the courts, as innocent. In other words, the section is intended to prevent penalisation of negligible wrongs or of offences of trivial character. In interpreting the expression ‘harm’ appearing in the section this Court said that it is wide enough to include physical injury as also injurious mental reaction. As regards the applicability of the section in a given case, this Court observed as follows: “Whether an act which amounts to an offence is trivial would undoubtedly depend upon the nature of the injury, the position of the parties, the knowledge or intention with which the offending act is done, and other related circumstances. There can be no absolute standard or degree of harm which may be regarded as so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain of the harm. There can be no absolute standard or degree of harm which may be regarded as so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain of the harm. It cannot be judged solely by the measure of physical or other injury the act causes.” He also placed reliance on a decision in Bhavanam Lalitha Reddy vs. Perumalla Pumachandra Rao and Others, 2013 Law Suit (Hyd) 25 wherein it is held thus: (paragraphs 6 and 7). “What amounts to outraging modesty of a woman is nowhere defined in the Penal Code. According to the Supreme Court, the essence of woman’s modesty is her sex. Modesty of a woman can be said to be outraged if the action of the offender could be perceived as offending the decency of a woman. Every physical assault on a woman cannot be said to be the act of outraging her modesty. The essence of the offence is that the assault or use of criminal force must be with the intention of outraging the modesty of the woman or with the knowledge that the woman’s modesty will be outraged. 7. However, the facts of the above case relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner are different from the facts of the present case. In the instant case, there was a quarrel between the complainant and A.1 and A.2 about the enhancement and/or payment of the rent and vacating the house belonging to them. In the course of the said quarrel, A.2 allegedly came upon the petitioner, abused her in filthy language, demanded her to pay the rent at higher rate or to vacate the premises, caught hold tuft and kicked her by pulling her down. The aforesaid alleged criminal act does not attract the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 354 of I.P.C. since it was not done with an intention to outrage the modesty of the petitioner or with the knowledge that her modesty will be outraged. Therefore, in my opinion, the learned Magistrate rightly framed the charges under Sections 323, 506 and 509 of I.P.C. and rejected the claim of the petitioner for framing of another charge for the offence punishable under Sec. 354 IPC. Therefore, there are no grounds to insist upon the learned Magistrate to frame a charge for the offence punishable under Section 354 of I.P.C. The Criminal Petition is accordingly dismissed.” 8. Therefore, there are no grounds to insist upon the learned Magistrate to frame a charge for the offence punishable under Section 354 of I.P.C. The Criminal Petition is accordingly dismissed.” 8. A perusal of the abovesaid judgments goes to show that intention or knowledge is one of the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 354 IPC and these ingredients have to be inferred from the with which the offending act has been done and other related circumstances of the given case. Since the case on hand is only at incipient stage, whether the petitioner herein put his hand on the shoulder of 2nd respondent and whether he had requisite culpable intention or not, cannot be inferred in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It has to be proved after full-fledged trial. 9. Damage to the reputation of 2nd respondent/defacto complainant was substantial or not, has to be decided during the course of trial. At this stage, this Court, in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would not be in a position to conduct a roving enquiry into the questions of fact whether the petitioner had any intention to outrage modesty of 2nd respondent/defacto complainant or not. These are all questions fact which have to be decided in the course of trial. Delay of two days in lodging the police report, by itself, would not, by any stretch of imagination, be a ground for quashing the impugned proceedings. Therefore, there are no grounds to quash the impugned proceedings. 10. In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. 11. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this Criminal Petition, shall stand closed.