Giridhari Bag v. Commandant, Orissa State Armed Police (OSAP), Koraput
2023-01-27
BISWANATH RATH
body2023
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Biswanath Rath, J. - Originally the Application was filed in the Orissa Administrative Tribunal. On abolition of the Tribunal, the matter was transferred to this Court for its disposal at this end. 2. The Applicant (Petitioner) through the Original Application (presently Writ Petition) involves the following prayer :- 'I. The orders passed under Annexure-2 and under Annexure-4 by the Respondent Nos.1 and 4 be quashed. II. The Respondents be directed to reinstate in service retrospectively w.e.f. the date of his removal i.e. 21.05.02 with all consequential service and pecuniary benefits. III. And pass any other order/orders as deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.' 3. Background involving the case is the Petitioner is a Scheduled Caste person. After passing Matriculation/Board of Secondary Education Certificate Course in the year 1998, being unable to undertake further education, the Petitioner sought for an employment. Coming to know of an advertisement for the post of regular recruitment of Sepoy by the Selection Board at OSAP 3rd Battalion, Koraput, the Petitioner applied for the said post. Based on recruitment process and interview, he was found to be suitable and appointed as Sepoy pursuant to Appointment Order No.119 dated 5.1.2002 and joined the post. Copy of such Appointment Order appears at Annexure-1 to the Writ Petition. While the Petitioner was undergoing training after his appointment pursuant to his appointment letter, he received a letter dated 21.5.2002 issued from the Office of Respondent/O.P.1 that there is pendency of some criminal cases involving the Petitioner in Town P.S. Case No.203 dated 29.12.99, No.36 dated 19.4.2000, No.59 dated 3.4.2001 and No.72 dated 20.4.2001 under different Sections of the Indian Penal Code. It was alleged therein that though such criminal proceedings were subjudiced in the court of law at the relevant point of time, in the inquiry involving a verification process by the Competent Authority, it was found that the Petitioner suppressed all such involvements in the desired Application, further on the basis of confidential report observing the Candidate is an anti-social and a criminal and it is on the basis of such report, the Petitioner was removed from service on 21.5.2002. Copy of order of removal appears at Annexure-2 of the Writ Petition.
Copy of order of removal appears at Annexure-2 of the Writ Petition. It is claimed, after removal of service, the Petitioner approached several times even on production of certified copies of orders of acquittal in his favour and finding no respite, he was compelled to make a representation to the Authority on 5.6.2004 for re-consideration of his case for re-employment in the post of Sepoy. Copy of representation appears at Annexure-3. Pleading further discloses, the representation of the Petitioner was finally rejected and the rejection order was communicated to the Petitioner, vide Memo No.4255 dated 20.11.2004. Copy of such rejection order appears at Annexure-4. 4. Mr.S.Mohanty, learned counsel for the Petitioner in the above factual background advanced his submission that the order of removal from service, vide Annexure-2 is a termination simplicitor and passed without any inquiry further in the involvement of the Petitioner. The order is also alleged to have been passed in violation of the principle of natural justice. Taking into account the provision in the CCA Rules, Mr.Mohanty, learned counsel for the Petitioner claimed, there cannot be any order of termination from service of a candidate already recruited through regular Selection Board if with a stigma in violation of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. It is also alleged, the termination order is not only in violation of the principle of natural justice but also without application of mind and has been passed hastily. On the aspect of criminal cases pending against the Petitioner, learned counsel for the Petitioner through the pleadings in Annexure-5 to 8 series submitted, SC No.35/2000 was tried by the C.J.M.-cum-Asst. Sessions Judge, Kalahandi, Bhawanipatna arising out of G.R. Case No.573 of 1999, there has been already judgment in this case on 11.6.2001 with an order of acquittal in favour of the Petitioner. Similarly, SC No.42/2002 was tried by the C.J.M.-cum-Asst. Sessions Judge, Kalahandi, Bhawanipatna arising out of G.R. Case No.154/2000 relating to Bhawanipatna Town P.S. Case No.36 dated 19.4.2000. Here also by judgment dated 28.3.2003, the Petitioner has been acquitted. SC No.3/4 of 2002 SC No.42/2002 was tried by the C.J.M.-cum-Asst. Sessions Judge, Kalahandi, Bhawanipatna arising out of G.R. Case No.196/2001 relating to Bhawanipatna Town P.S. Case No.59 of 2001. Here also by judgment dated 21.5.2002 the Petitioner has been acquitted.
Here also by judgment dated 28.3.2003, the Petitioner has been acquitted. SC No.3/4 of 2002 SC No.42/2002 was tried by the C.J.M.-cum-Asst. Sessions Judge, Kalahandi, Bhawanipatna arising out of G.R. Case No.196/2001 relating to Bhawanipatna Town P.S. Case No.59 of 2001. Here also by judgment dated 21.5.2002 the Petitioner has been acquitted. Similarly coming to G.R. Case No.234/2001, TR No.309/2003 tried by the J.M.F.C., First Class, Bhawanipatna relating to Bhawanipatna Town P.S. Case No.72 of 2001, the Petitioner has been acquitted by the judgment dated 11.11.2003. Mr.Mohanty, learned counsel for the Petitioner claimed, even in spite of submission of all the acquittal orders before O.P.2, surprisingly rejection of the representation of the Petitioner, vide Annnexure-4 has been passed. Mr.Mohanty, learned counsel for the Petitioner thus claimed, the termination of the Petitioner is biased only on the basis of no disclosure of such criminal cases. Mr.Mohanty, learned counsel for the Petitioner on the footing that the Petitioner has been acquitted of all such criminal cases, non-mentioning of pendency of such cases in the Form submitted for appointment giving disclosures on the antecedent of the Petitioner remains immaterial. Learned counsel for the Petitioner thus contended, the Competent Authority failed in appreciating all the above aspects and therefore has arrived at passing illegal and arbitrary order of termination. 5. Filing written note of submission on reiteration of all such grounds taken note herein above, Mr.Mohanty took this Court to some decisions to find support to his case, such as in K.Gopal @ Khola Gopal vrs. Union of India & ors : AIR 2015 SCW 483 , Babulal vrs. State of Haryana & ors (C.A.No.1309 of 1986 decided on 16.1.1991), Shravan Kumar Jha & ors. Vrs. Ram Sevak Sharma & ors : AIR 1991 SC 309 , Avtar Singh vrs. Union of India : AIR 2016 SC 3598 , S.Naresh Rao vrs. Principal Secretary to Government & ors. (WPC(OAC) No.1058/2016) and Pawan Kumar vrs. Union of India : AIR 2020 SC 2829. This apart, learned counsel for the Petitioner also relied upon some other decisions in Babu Lal vrs. State of Haryana & ors. : (1991) SCC 335, Commissioner of Police, Delhi & ors. Vrs. Dhaval Singh : AIR 1999 SC 2326 , Joginder Singh vrs. Union Territory of Chandigarh : 2015 AIR SCW 483 (AIR 2015 SC (Supp.) 1536 and Mohinder Singh Gill & anr. Vrs.
State of Haryana & ors. : (1991) SCC 335, Commissioner of Police, Delhi & ors. Vrs. Dhaval Singh : AIR 1999 SC 2326 , Joginder Singh vrs. Union Territory of Chandigarh : 2015 AIR SCW 483 (AIR 2015 SC (Supp.) 1536 and Mohinder Singh Gill & anr. Vrs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & ors. : AIR 1978 SC 851 . Reading through all the above decisions, Mr.Mohanty, learned counsel for the Petitioner attempted to bring the decisions therein to the rescue of the Petitioner and made a request to this Court for interfering with the impugned order and setting aside the order of termination as well as the order of rejection. 6. Mr.S.Ghosh, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the O.Ps. making strong opposition to the Petitioner's claim submitted, it is a clear case of suppression of material facts. Through Annexure-B to the counter affidavit of the O.Ps. at Page-60 of the Brief, Mr.Ghosh taking this Court to Clauses-7 & 8 contended, there was flat denial to both these vital requirements by the Petitioner in filling the Verification Roll, therefore, completely making denial of even the Petitioner being an accused in any criminal case at the time of filling of such Roll. This Form was filled up by the Petitioner himself. For there is compulsory requirement of disclosure on antecedent involving the nature of job, information as against Clauses-7 & 8 was very much essential. For Mr.Ghosh, this suppression of criminal case aspect could not be noticed for a long time but however during training period, Form No.101 was sent to the Superintendent of Police, Kalahandi on 9.4.2002 for necessary verification on the character and antecedent of the Petitioner. It is after due inquiry, the Superintendent of Police, Kalahandi in his letter dated 15.5.2002 reported that the Petitioner was involved in as many as four criminal cases involving offences under Sections 394/397 of I.P.C., 307/34, I.P.C., 294/307 of I.P.C. and 332 of I.P.C. and all such cases were subjudiced and were already instituted by the time of recruitment of the Petitioner. Mr.Ghosh further contended, the Petitioner in spite of being aware of facing such trials in number of cases indicated herein above deliberately suppressed the matter.
Mr.Ghosh further contended, the Petitioner in spite of being aware of facing such trials in number of cases indicated herein above deliberately suppressed the matter. For the Petitioner already faced in criminal cases, the Authority got justified after necessary verification that the Petitioner is a person with criminal antecedent and not fit for holding the job, particularly looking to the positioning of the Petitioner in a discipline service. The order of termination since based on such inquiry, Mr.Ghosh contended, for the admission of the Petitioner through his pleadings that he was facing all such cases at the time of recruitment process, the Petitioner is a person of having criminal antecedent and this aspect has also been established, therefore, there was no requirement of getting into further inquiry. Taking this Court to other grounds in the counter, Mr.Ghosh, learned Additional Government Advocate contended, this is a proven case of establishing that the Petitioner is a person having criminal antecedent, and therefore, there should not be any leniency shown involving such person, particularly keeping in view the service involved herein is in Police Department. Mr.Ghosh to substantiate his case also took this Court to several decisions to support the State's case, such as Avtar Singh vrs. Union of India & ors. : (2016) 8 SCC 471 , Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. & anr. vrs. Anil Kanwariya : (2021) 10 SCC 136 and a very recent decision of the Hon'ble apex Court in Ex-Const/Dvr Mukesh Kumar Raigar vrs. Union of India & ors. (SLP(C) No.10499 of 2022 decided on 16.1.2023. It is for the decisions also supporting the case of the State Authority, Mr.Ghosh contended, the Writ Petition should be rejected holding the Petitioner has unwanted personality to hold a position in the discipline service. 7. Considering the rival contentions of the Parties and coming to the factual background, this Court finds, the advertisement was made for the post of Sepoy on 16.11.2001. The Petitioner faced the interview and was issued with an order of appointment on 5.1.2002. Verification Roll involving the Petitioner was submitted. This Roll at Clauses-7 & 8 reads as follows :- '7. Whether the applicant has even been accused in a criminal case or has ever been in prison, if so, give details. - No 8. Whether in debt and whether any criinal case or civil suits is pending against him, if so, give details.
This Roll at Clauses-7 & 8 reads as follows :- '7. Whether the applicant has even been accused in a criminal case or has ever been in prison, if so, give details. - No 8. Whether in debt and whether any criinal case or civil suits is pending against him, if so, give details. - No.' Annexure-B, the Verification Roll submitted by the Petitioner on 9.4.2002 is a clear disclosure against Clauses-7 & 8 indicating therein that the Petitioner herein is not an accused in criminal case. In Clauses-7 & 8 there is flat denial intimating the Applicant/Petitioner had no criminal case pending against him by the date of submission of Form on 9.4.2002. From the Police verification and on the own submission of the Petitioner, the Petitioner faced the following cases. 1. SC No.35/2000 arising out of G.R. Case No.573 of 1999. 2. SC No.42/2002 arising out of G.R. Case No.154/2000. 3. SC No.3/4 of 2002 arising out of G.R. Case No.196/2001. 4. G.R. Case No.234/2001/TR No.309/2003 involving Bhawanipatna Town P.S. Case No.72 of 2001.' All the four cases taken note herein above were all instituted in between 1999 to 2001, undisputedly, by the date of submission of the Verification Roll. Undisputedly, four cases were pending as on the date of submission of the Verification Roll by the Petitioner in the year 2002. Even assuming that the Petitioner was neither acquitted nor convicted by the time of submission of Verification Roll, nothing prevented the Petitioner to simply indicate the pendency of such cases, as undisputedly the Petitioner was neither acquitted nor convicted by such date, such disclosure would have effect otherwise. Non-disclosure of such vital aspect involving recruitment in the Discipline Department and looking to the number of cases faced by the Petitioner certainly amount to deliberate suppression of information of pendency of criminal cases; may be the Petitioner did not disclose all these to gain over the recruitment Authority and/or the Employer by such suppression. Therefore, the Petitioner did not apply for the post with clear intention of securing an order of appointment and his attempt is in suppression of very vital information. 8.
Therefore, the Petitioner did not apply for the post with clear intention of securing an order of appointment and his attempt is in suppression of very vital information. 8. From the order of termination at Annexure-2, this Court finds, after the Petitioner was engaged, a further verification of the character and antecedent on the recruitment of the Petitioner as Sepoy was made at the level of the Superintendent of Police, Kalahandi and the inquiry clearly revealed, the Petitioner was facing trial in four criminal cases involving Bhawanipatna Town P.S. Case No.203 dated 29.12.1999 under Sections 394/397 of I.P.C., Bhawanipatna Town P.S. Case No.36 dated 19.4.2000 under Sections 307/34 of I.P.C., Bhawanipatna Town P.S. Case No.59 dated 3.4.2001 under Sections 294/307 of I.P.C. and Bhawanipatna Town P.S. Case No.72 dated 20.4.2001 under Section 332 of I.P.C. For pendency of such large number of cases and in involvement of serious offences against the Petitioner even therein, the Petitioner was prima facie found to be an anti-social and a man with repeated criminal background and thus was terminated, vide Annexure-2. 9. Coming to the rejection of the representation at Annexure-4, this Court finds, further the Authority on examination of the whole aspect found, the Petitioner had a clear disclosure of non-involvement in criminal cases by the time of submission of such Form. For clear disclosure and revealing of four criminal cases pending against the Petitioner, subsequently provisions, vide PMR-668(a), PMR-673(c) and Rule-13 of Orissa Military Police Manual, 1953 were all attracted to the case of the Petitioner, and therefore, the Competent Authority appears to have not finding any scope of even considering the case of the Petitioner, who is claiming re-consideration on the order of his termination on the basis of acquittal of the Petitioner in the meantime. For the opinion of this Court, looking to the type of job the Petitioner was holding and the Institution involved therein, the paramount consideration at the relevant point of time was if there is suppression of material disclosures or not, the narrations herein above even as admitted by the Petitioner, he was definitely an accused at least in four criminal cases at the time of filing of Application for such service and this was also a situation when the Verification Roll was obtained from the Petitioner.
Once the Petitioner has deliberate suppression of material facts of his already involvement in four criminal cases, had this been disclosed at the time of applying for the post, there would not have been any occasion in entertaining such Application and involving the Petitioner in the interview process even. There is gross negligence and deliberate suppression by the Petitioner for an attempt to achieve a post in Police Department. For the opinion of this Court, there cannot be showing of any leniency to such person, particularly keeping in view the employment was in discipline service. 10. It is at this stage, keeping in view the grounds in filing the Writ Petition and the counter objection of the State Authority, this Court now proceeds to take into account the decisions cited at Bar. First of all this Court here takes into account the decisions of the Petitioner in Dhaval Singh (supra), which is a case where the Applicant also put a cross in the relevant column meant for disclosure of pendency of criminal case. The Applicant was selected in 1995, however, before the order of appointment could be issued, the Applicant realsing his mistake against such column communicated to the Deputy Commissioner of Police on 15.11.1995, i.e., much ahead of the date of appointment admitting his fault and giving a disclosure thereby of pendency of a criminal case. The case at hand has a clear concealment and cannot fit into such fact. This decision has no application to the present case. In Babu Lal (supra), the background herein is the Applicant was appointed as Sub-Inspector of Food and Supply Department by order dated 13.4.1975 against Ex-Service quota. He was served with suspension order on 15.4.1980 on the Department coming to know the pendency of a criminal proceeding and as a consequence of pendency of criminal case, the Petitioner therein was terminated. This is a case where initiation of the criminal case is taking place in continuing of the Petitioner in employment, which does not fit to the fact of the case at hand. In Joginder Singh (supra), the Petitioner therein applied for the post in 1997, succeeded in the interview in 2001 and found to be fit for the selection to the post of Constable. In the verification of antecedent, he was found to be facing F.I.R. No.200 dated 14.4.1998. In the trial he got acquitted in 1999.
In Joginder Singh (supra), the Petitioner therein applied for the post in 1997, succeeded in the interview in 2001 and found to be fit for the selection to the post of Constable. In the verification of antecedent, he was found to be facing F.I.R. No.200 dated 14.4.1998. In the trial he got acquitted in 1999. The Applicant being terminated and not being posted went to the C.A.T., Chandigarh for a direction for issuing of appointment order. The Tribunal passed order on 12.3.2003 allowing the Original Application of the Applicant thereby directing appointment of the Petitioner, as Constable. The Respondent therein went to the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which set aside the order of the C.A.T. with observation that what would be relevant is the conduct and character of the Candidate and not the actual result thereof in the criminal case and upheld the decision of the Authority on the premises of bad antecedent. Hon'ble apex Court in its judgment through paragraph-27 held, the High Court has committed a grave error both on facts and in law and it has failed to follow the legal principles laid down and upheld the decision of the C.A.T. The case involved recruitment process in 1997 and selection in 2001. The Petitioner got entangled in criminal case in 1998 and got acquitted in 1999. In reading the said decision, this Court finds, this case does not involve a case of suppression but a case of mere facing of a criminal case and it does not fit to the case at hand. In Pramod Singh Kirar vrs. State of Madhya Pradesh & ors. : 2022 SCC Online SC 1661, it involves a posting of Police Constable but in the verification form, the Applicant clearly mentioned of pendency of a case under Section 498A of I.P.C. and his candidature was rejected as he was already involved in a criminal case but was already acquitted. The Single Judge allowed the proceeding and set aside the cancellation of his candidature. State went in Writ Appeal. The Division Bench allowed the Appeal and set aside the order of the Single Bench. The Division Bench allowed the Appeal on the premises of concealment of information in involvement of criminal case.
The Single Judge allowed the proceeding and set aside the cancellation of his candidature. State went in Writ Appeal. The Division Bench allowed the Appeal and set aside the order of the Single Bench. The Division Bench allowed the Appeal on the premises of concealment of information in involvement of criminal case. By setting aside the judgment of the Division Bench, the Hon'ble apex Court allowed the Appeal on the footing the Applicant involved in the criminal case alleged in 2001 and was already acquitted in 2006, which has nothing to do in the appointment process taking place in 2013-14. This decision also does not fit to the case at hand. The decision in Shrawan Kumar Jha & ors. vrs. State of Bihar & ors. : 1991 Supp.(1) SCC 330 also does not fit to the case at hand, as this is not a case involving Police Department where criminal antecedent is very essential. In Avtar Singh (supra), the three Judges Bench in the Hon'ble apex Court on examination of several decisions on this point finally through Paragraph-38 of the judgment came to observe as follows :- '38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of aforesaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus: 38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information. 38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information. 38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the Government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision. 38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourse appropriate to the case may be adopted : - 38.4.1.
38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourse appropriate to the case may be adopted : - 38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse. 38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee. 38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee. 38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. 38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case. 38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper. 38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime. 38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding Departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form. 38.10.
38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding Departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form. 38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for. 38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.' 11. This Court here reading Paragraph-38 of the Avtar Singh decision, in Paragraph-38.1, Hon'ble apex Court held, the information provided by a Applicant to the Employer must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information. In the case at hand, the information provided by the Applicant undisputedly amounts to suppression and false mention of the required information. Thus the decision at Paragraph-38.4 deals with a case in case of suppression of false information of involvement of criminal case and conviction or acquittal had already recorded before filling of the Application/Verification Form and such fact later comes to the knowledge of the Employer, Hon'ble apex Court framed guideline under Paragraphs-38.4.1, 38.4.2 & 38.4.3, which are to be followed. For the difference in the facts here, these Clauses have no application to the present case except there is clear application of Clause-38.1 and finds to be supportive to the case of the O.Ps. rather. 12. Coming to the discussions on the citations by Mr.Ghosh, learned Additional Government Advocate for the O.Ps., relied on the decision in Avtar Singh (supra) applicability of decision here is already dealt in Paragraph-11 above. The decision of Anil Kanwariya (supra) involves termination of an Employee on un-disclosure of pending criminal cases (suppression of material facts) thereby giving a false declaration.
Coming to the discussions on the citations by Mr.Ghosh, learned Additional Government Advocate for the O.Ps., relied on the decision in Avtar Singh (supra) applicability of decision here is already dealt in Paragraph-11 above. The decision of Anil Kanwariya (supra) involves termination of an Employee on un-disclosure of pending criminal cases (suppression of material facts) thereby giving a false declaration. In deciding the object of required information in Attestation Form and thereby declaration to ascertain and verify the character and antecedent of the Incumbent to adjudge his suitability to enter into and continue in service through Paragraphs-8 to 16, Hon'ble apex Court came to observe as follows :- '8. While considering the aforesaid issues, few decisions of this Court on appointment obtained by fraud/misrepresentation and/or appointment obtained by suppression of material facts are required to be referred to and considered. 8.1. In B. Chinnam Naidu (supra), this Court has observed that the object of requiring information in the attestation form and the declaration thereafter by the candidate is to ascertain and verify the character and antecedents to judge his suitability to enter into or continue in service. It is further observed that when a candidate suppresses material information and/or gives false information, he cannot claim any right for appointment or continuance in service. 8.2. In Devendra Kumar (supra), while joining the training, the employee was asked to submit an affidavit giving certain information, particularly, whether he had ever been involved in any criminal case. The employee submitted an affidavit stating that he had never been involved in any criminal case. The employee completed his training satisfactorily and it was at this time that the employer in pursuance of the process of character verification came to know that the employee was in fact involved in a criminal case. It was found that the final report in that case had been submitted by the prosecution and accepted by the Judicial Magistrate concerned. On the basis of the same, the employee was discharged abruptly on the ground that since he was a temporary government servant, he could be removed from service without holding an enquiry. The said order was challenged by the employee by filing a writ petition before a Single Judge of the High Court which was dismissed. The Division Bench upheld that order, which was the subject matter of appeal before this Court.
The said order was challenged by the employee by filing a writ petition before a Single Judge of the High Court which was dismissed. The Division Bench upheld that order, which was the subject matter of appeal before this Court. Dismissing the appeal, this Court observed and held that the question is not whether the employee is suitable for the post. The pendency of a criminal case/proceeding is different from suppressing the information of such pendency. The case pending against a person might not involve moral turpitude but suppressing of this information itself amounts to moral turpitude. It is further observed that the information sought by the employer if not disclosed as required, would definitely amount to suppression of material information and in that eventuality, the service becomes liable to be terminated, even if there had been no further trial or the person concerned stood acquitted/discharged. 8.3. It is further observed by this Court in Devendra Kumar that where an applicant/employee gets an order by misrepresenting the facts or by playing fraud upon the competent authority, such an order cannot be sustained in the eye of the law. 'Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal'. It is further observed and held that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit those persons who have defrauded or misrepresented themselves and in such circumstances the court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining petitions on their behalf. 8.4. The relevant observations in the said decision are in paras 12, 13, 18 &25, which are as under: (Devendra Kumar case, SCC pp.368-69 & 371) '12. So far as the issue of obtaining the appointment by misrepresentation is concerned, it is no more res integra. The question is not whether the applicant is suitable for the post. The pendency of a criminal case/proceeding is different from suppressing the information of such pendency. The case pending against a person might not involve moral turpitude but suppressing of this information itself amounts to moral turpitude. In fact, the information sought by the employer if not disclosed as required, would definitely amount to suppression of material information. In that eventuality, the service becomes liable to be terminated, even if there had been no further trial or the person concerned stood acquitted/discharged. 13.
In fact, the information sought by the employer if not disclosed as required, would definitely amount to suppression of material information. In that eventuality, the service becomes liable to be terminated, even if there had been no further trial or the person concerned stood acquitted/discharged. 13. It is a settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an office by misrepresenting the facts or by playing fraud upon the competent authority, such an order cannot be sustained in the eye of the law. 'Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.' [Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1994 SC 853 .] In Lazarus Estates Ltd. V. Beasley [ (1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 : (1956) 1 ALL ER 341 (CA)] the Court observed without equivocation that: (QB p. 712) ... No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything.' 18. The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit those persons who have frauded or misrepresented themselves. In such circumstances the court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining petitions on their behalf. In Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran (1995) Supp (4) SCC 100 this court, after placing reliance upon and approving its earlier judgment in Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi (1990) 3 SCC 655 , observed as under: (M. Bhaskaran case, SCC p. 104, para 6) If by committing fraud any employment is obtained, the same cannot be permitted to be countenanced by a court of law as the employment secured by fraud renders it voidable at the option of the employer. 25. More so, if the initial action is not in consonance with law, the subsequent conduct of party cannot sanctify the same. Sublato fundamento cadit opus - a foundation being removed, the superstructure falls. A person having done wrong cannot take advantage of his own wrong and plead bar of any law to frustrate the lawful trial by a competent court. In such a case the legal maxim nullus commodum caprere potest de injuria sua propria applies. The persons violating the law cannot be permitted to urge that their offence cannot be subjected to inquiry, trial or investigation.
In such a case the legal maxim nullus commodum caprere potest de injuria sua propria applies. The persons violating the law cannot be permitted to urge that their offence cannot be subjected to inquiry, trial or investigation. [Vide Union of India v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav (1996) 4 SCC 127 :1996 SCC (Cri) 592: AIR 1996 SC 1340 and Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056.] Nor can a person claim any right arising out of his own wrongdoing (jus ex injuria non oritur). 8.5 In Jainendra Singh (supra), this Court summarised the principles to be considered in a case where the appointment is obtained by misrepresentation and/or suppression of facts by candidates/appointees as under: '29.1. Fraudulently obtained orders of appointment could be legitimately treated as voidable at the option of the employer or could be recalled by the employer and in such cases merely because the respondent employee has continued in service for a number of years, on the basis of such fraudulently obtained employment, cannot get any equity in his favour or any estoppel against the employer. 29.2. Verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to the post under the State and on account of his antecedents the appointing authority if find not desirable to appoint a person to a disciplined force can it be said to be unwarranted. 29.3. When appointment was procured by a person on the basis of forged documents, it would amount to misrepresentation and fraud on the employer and, therefore, it would create no equity in his favour or any estoppel against the employer while resorting to termination without holding any inquiry. 29.4. A candidate having suppressed material information and/or giving false information cannot claim right to continue in service and the employer, having regard to the nature of employment as well as other aspects, has the discretion to terminate his services. 29.5. The purpose of calling for information regarding involvement in any criminal case or detention or conviction is for the purpose of verification of the character/antecedents at the time of recruitment and suppression of such material information will have clear bearing on the character and antecedents of the candidate in relation to his continuity in service. 29.6.
29.5. The purpose of calling for information regarding involvement in any criminal case or detention or conviction is for the purpose of verification of the character/antecedents at the time of recruitment and suppression of such material information will have clear bearing on the character and antecedents of the candidate in relation to his continuity in service. 29.6. The person who suppressed the material information and/or gives false information cannot claim any right for appointment or continuity in service. 29.7. The standard expected of a person intended to serve in uniformed service is quite distinct from other services and, therefore, any deliberate statement or omission regarding a vital information can be seriously viewed and the ultimate decision of the appointing authority cannot be faulted. 29.8. An employee on probation can be discharged from service or may be refused employment on the ground of suppression of material information or making false statement relating to his involvement in the criminal case, conviction or detention, even if ultimately he was acquitted of the said case, inasmuch as such a situation would make a person undesirable or unsuitable for the post. 29.9. An employee in the uniformed service pre-supposes a higher level of integrity as such a person is expected to uphold the law and on the contrary such a service born in deceit and subterfuge cannot be tolerated. 29.10. The authorities entrusted with the responsibility of appointing Constables, are under duty to verify the antecedents of a candidate to find out whether he is suitable for the post of a Constable and so long as the candidate has not been acquitted in the criminal case, he cannot be held to be suitable for appointment to the post of Constable.' 8.6. In Daya Shankar Yadav (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider the purpose of seeking the information with respect to antecedents. It is observed and held that the purpose of seeking the information with respect to antecedents is to ascertain the character and antecedents of the candidate so as to assess his suitability for the post.
In Daya Shankar Yadav (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider the purpose of seeking the information with respect to antecedents. It is observed and held that the purpose of seeking the information with respect to antecedents is to ascertain the character and antecedents of the candidate so as to assess his suitability for the post. It is further observed that when an employee or a prospective employee declares in a verification form, answers to the queries relating to character and antecedents, the verification thereof can lead to any of the following consequences: '15...(a) If the declarant has answered the questions in the affirmative and furnished the details of any criminal case (wherein he was convicted or acquitted by giving benefit of doubt for want of evidence), the employer may refuse to offer him employment (or if already employed on probation, discharge him from service), if he is found to be unfit having regard to the nature and gravity of the offence/crime in which he was involved. (b) On the other hand, if the employer finds that the criminal case disclosed by the declarant related to offences which were technical, or of a nature that would not affect the declarant's fitness for employment, or where the declarant had been honourably acquitted and exonerated, the employer may ignore the fact that the declarant had been prosecuted in a criminal case and proceed to appoint him or continue him in employment. (c) Where the declarant has answered the questions in the negative and on verification it is found that the answers were false, the employer may refuse to employ the declarant (or discharge him, if already employed), even if the declarant had been cleared of the charges or is acquitted. This is because when there is suppression or non-disclosure of material information bearing on his character, that itself becomes a reason for not employing the declarant. (d) Where the attestation form or verification form does not contain proper or adequate queries requiring the declarant to disclose his involvement in any criminal proceedings, or where the candidate was unaware of initiation of criminal proceedings when he gave the declarations in the verification roll/attestation form, then the candidate cannot be found fault with, for not furnishing the relevant information.
But if the employer by other means (say police verification or complaints, etc.) learns about the involvement of the declarant, the employer can have recourse to courses (a) or (b) above.' Thereafter, it is observed and held that an employee can be discharged from service or a prospective employee may be refused employment on the ground of ........suppression of material information or making false statement in reply to queries relating to prosecution or conviction for a criminal offence (even if he was ultimately acquitted in the criminal case). 8.7. In Abhijit Singh Pawar (supra), when the employee participated in the selection process, he tendered an affidavit disclosing the pending criminal case against him. The affidavit was filed on 22.12.2012. According to the disclosure, a case registered in the year 2006 was pending on the date when the affidavit was tendered. However, within four days of filing such an affidavit, a compromise was entered into between the original complainant and the employee and an application for compounding the offence was filed under Section 320 Cr.P.C. The employee came to be discharged in view of the deed of compromise. That thereafter the employee was selected in the examination and was called for medical examination. However, around the same time, his character verification was also undertaken and after due consideration of the character verification report, his candidature was rejected. The employee filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging rejection of his candidature. The learned single Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh allowed the said writ petition. The judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge directing the State to appoint the employee came to be confirmed by the Division Bench which led to appeal before this Court. After considering catena of decisions on the point including the decision of this Court in the case of Avtar Singh, this Court upheld the order of the State rejecting the candidature of the employee by observing that as held in Avtar Singh, even in cases where a truthful disclosure about a concluded case was made, the employer would still have a right to consider antecedents of the candidate and could not be compelled to appoint such candidate. 8.8. After reproducing and/or re-considering para 38.5 of the decision in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), in paragraph 13, this Court observed and held as under: '13.
8.8. After reproducing and/or re-considering para 38.5 of the decision in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), in paragraph 13, this Court observed and held as under: '13. In Avtar Singh (supra), though this Court was principally concerned with the question as to non-disclosure or wrong disclosure of information, it was observed in para 38.5 that even in cases where a truthful disclosure about a concluded case was made, the employer would still have a right to consider antecedents of the candidate and could not be compelled to appoint such candidate. 8.9. In the said decision, this Court also considered the conduct on the part of the employee in getting discharge on the basis of the compromise which was obtained within a period of four days of filing the affidavit/disclosure. In paragraph 14, it is observed and held as under: '14. In the present case, as on the date when the respondent had applied, a criminal case was pending against him. Compromise was entered into only after an affidavit disclosing such pendency was filed. On the issue of compounding of offences and the effect of acquittal under Section 320(8) of CrPC, the law declared by this Court in Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685 , specially in paras 34 and 35 completely concludes the issue. Even after the disclosure is made by a candidate, the employer would be well within his rights to consider the antecedents and the suitability of the candidate. While so considering, the employer can certainly take into account the job profile for which the selection is undertaken, the severity of the charges levelled against the candidate and whether the acquittal in question was an honourable acquittal or was merely on the ground of benefit of doubt or as a result of composition. 9. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, the impugned order passed by the Division Bench dismissing the appeal and confirming the order passed by the learned single Judge quashing and setting aside the order of termination terminating the services of the employee on the ground of non-disclosure/suppression of material fact and filing a false declaration and directing the appellants to reinstate the respondent-employee is unsustainable. 10.
10. Apart from the fact that at the time when the respondent applied in the month of October/November, 2013 though he was already convicted by the competent court and was given the benefit under Section 3 of the Act 1958 only, he did not disclose his conviction, but even at the time when he filed a declaration on 14.04.2015 he filed a false declaration that neither any criminal case is pending against him nor he has been convicted by any court of law and relying upon such a declaration the appellants gave him appointment. Only on police verification/receipt of the antecedent's report from the Superintendent of Police, Sawai Madhopur, the appellants came to know about the conviction of the respondent. Therefore, the appellants were absolutely justified in terminating the services of the respondent. 11. Even the conduct on the part of the respondent to obtain the order subsequently from the learned Sessions Court in an appeal and getting the benefit of Section 12 of the Act 1958 deserves consideration. As observed hereinabove, the judgment and order of conviction by the learned trial Court was passed as far back as on 5.8.2013. For two years, the respondent did not file any appeal before the learned Sessions Court. After a period of approximately two years and after he obtained the appointment on the basis of the false declaration that neither any criminal case is pending against him nor he has been convicted by any court of law and having realised that his conviction and the benefit granted under Section 3 of the Act 1958 by the learned trial Court only will come in his way, subsequently after a period of two years he filed an appeal before the learned Sessions Court on 11.08.29015 and the appeal came to be disposed of within a period of one month, i.e., on 9.9.2015 and the learned Sessions Court granted the benefit of Section 12 of the Act 1958. 12. From the judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Court, it appears that the respondent only prayed for giving the benefit of Section 12 of the Act 1958 and nothing was contended by him with regard to conviction and order of sentence.
12. From the judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Court, it appears that the respondent only prayed for giving the benefit of Section 12 of the Act 1958 and nothing was contended by him with regard to conviction and order of sentence. Therefore, with a view to get out of the conviction and the benefit of Section 3 of the Act 1958 only and having realised that his conviction may come in his way, he preferred an appeal after a period of two years and obtained the benefit of Section 12 of the Act 1958 which provides that a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law. 13. Even otherwise, subsequently getting the benefit of Section 12 of the Act 1958 shall not be helpful to the respondent inasmuch as the question is about filing a false declaration on 14.04.2015 that neither any criminal case is pending against him nor he has been convicted by any court of law, which was much prior to the order passed by the learned Sessions Court granting the benefit of Section 12 of the Act 1958. As observed hereinabove, even in case of subsequent acquittal, the employee once made a false declaration and/or suppressed the material fact of pending criminal case shall not be entitled to an appointment as a matter of right. 14. The issue/question may be considered from another angle, from the employer's point of view. The question is not about whether an employee was involved in a dispute of trivial nature and whether he has been subsequently acquitted or not. The question is about the credibility and/or trustworthiness of such an employee who at the initial stage of the employment, i.e., while submitting the declaration/verification and/or applying for a post made false declaration and/or not disclosing and/or suppressing material fact of having involved in a criminal case. If the correct facts would have been disclosed, the employer might not have appointed him. Then the question is of TRUST.
If the correct facts would have been disclosed, the employer might not have appointed him. Then the question is of TRUST. Therefore, in such a situation, where the employer feels that an employee who at the initial stage itself has made a false statement and/or not disclosed the material facts and/or suppressed the material facts and therefore he cannot be continued in service because such an employee cannot be relied upon even in future, the employer cannot be forced to continue such an employee. The choice/option whether to continue or not to continue such an employee always must be given to the employer. At the cost of repetition, it is observed and as observed hereinabove in catena of decision such an employee cannot claim the appointment and/or continue to be in service as a matter of right. 15. In view of the afore-stated facts and circumstances of the case, both, the learned Division Bench as well as the learned Single Judge have clearly erred in quashing and setting aside the order of termination terminating the services of the respondent on the ground of having obtained an appointment by suppressing material fact and filing a false declaration. The order of reinstatement is wholly untenable and unjustified. 16. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeals succeed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench, as well as, the order passed by the learned Single Judge quashing and setting aside the order of termination are hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the writ petition filed by the respondent-employee stands dismissed and the order of termination stands restored. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.' This case appears to be fitting to the case of the State-O.Ps. In a very recent decision in the case of Ex-Const/Dvr Mukesh Kumar Raigar vrs. Union of India & ors. : 2023 SCC Online SC 27 : (SLP(C) No.10499 of 2022 decided on 16.1.2023), Hon'ble apex Court in Paragraphs-9 to 14 came to observe as follows :- '9. Having regard to the guiding principles, laid down in case of Avtar Singh (supra) and in case of Satish Chandra Yadav (supra), this Court has no hesitation in holding that the Single Bench of the High Court had committed an error in interfering with the order passed by the respondents-authorities.
Having regard to the guiding principles, laid down in case of Avtar Singh (supra) and in case of Satish Chandra Yadav (supra), this Court has no hesitation in holding that the Single Bench of the High Court had committed an error in interfering with the order passed by the respondents-authorities. The respondents-authorities had after taking into consideration the decision in case of Avtar Singh terminated the services of the petitioner holding inter-alia that while the petitioner was appointed in CISF, a criminal case was pending against him at the time of his enrolment in the force, but he did not reveal the same and that there was deliberate suppression of facts which was an aggravating circumstance. It was also held that CISF being an armed force of Union of India, is deployed in sensitive sectors such as airports, ports, department of atomic energy, department of space, metro, power and steel, for internal security duty etc., and therefore, the force personnel are required to maintain discipline of the highest order; and that the involvement of the petitioner in such grave offences debarred him from the appointment. Such a well-reasoned and well considered decision of the respondent-authorities should not have been interfered by the Single Bench in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when there were no allegations of malafides or of non-observance of rules of natural justice or of breach of statutory rules were attributed against the respondent authorities. 10. The Constitution Bench, in case of State of Orissa & Others vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra had observed way back in 1963 that having regard to the gravity of the established misconduct, the punishing authority had the power and jurisdiction to impose punishment. The penalty was not open to review by the High Court under Article 226. A three-judge Bench in case of B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India & Ors. had also held that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court.
had also held that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on the charges of 8 AIR 1963 SC 779 9 (1995) 6 SCC 749 misconduct by a public servant, the Court or Tribunal would be concerned only to the extent of determining whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the rules of natural justice and statutory rules were complied with. 11. In Om Kumar & Others vs. Union of India this Court had also after considering the Wednesbury Principles and the doctrine of proportionality held that the question of quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority, and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or the other of the well-known principles known as 'Wednesbury Principles' namely whether the order was contrary to law, or whether relevant factors were not considered, or whether irrelevant factors were considered or whether the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. 12. Again, a three-judge Bench in case of Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) & Ors. vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava 10 (2001) 2 SCC 386 11 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. vs. Wednesbury Corporation circumscribing the power of judicial review by the constitutional courts held as under: '24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence.
The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25. xxxxxxx 26. xxxxxxx 27.xxxxxxxx 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.' 13. In view of the afore-stated legal position, we are of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court had rightly set aside the order passed by the Single Bench, which had wrongly interfered with the order of removal passed by the respondent authorities against the petitioner. The petitioner having been found to have committed gross misconduct right at the threshold of entering into disciplined force like CISF, and the respondent authorities having passed the order of his removal from service after following due process of law and without actuated by malafides, the court is not inclined to exercise its limited jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. 14. In that view of the matter the SLP is dismissed.' This case however confirms the decision of the Competent Authority involving suppression of information. A proceeding was initiated against the delinquent for his involvement in gross misconduct and indiscipline undertaking a disciplinary proceeding exercise.
14. In that view of the matter the SLP is dismissed.' This case however confirms the decision of the Competent Authority involving suppression of information. A proceeding was initiated against the delinquent for his involvement in gross misconduct and indiscipline undertaking a disciplinary proceeding exercise. Therefore, the Petitioner also appears to have to accepted his mistake. Finally the Hon'ble apex Court upheld the decision of the Authority for gross misconduct and suppression of material facts. 13. After glance of the above decisions, this Court here finds, it is true that the position on the outcome in case of suppression of material facts or misreport of actual facts and concealment of necessary requirement can be a reason to take away the service of the Petitioner. Even in spite of such judgment, this Court here finds a glaring distinction in between the decisions relied upon by both the Parties and the case at hand appears to be an order of removal, vide Annexure-2 was issued simply at the stage of verification of character and antecedent of the recruited Sepoy, the Petitioner. Since there was already an appointment based on an interview in a regular vacancy, this Court here finds the offer of appointment at Annexure-1 reads as follows :- 'Sub.:- Appointment of Sepoys. You have been provisionally selected by the Selection Board of Sepoys recruitment test held from 16-11-2001 onwards at OSAP 3rd Bn. Koraput for appointment as Sepoy in O.S.A.T. 3rd Bn. Koraput temporarily. Your appointment is subject to medical fitness and verification of character and antecedents. In case any irregularity is found in the above connection or any other criteria of your selection, your candidature for appointment as Sepoy will be cancelled. You are therefore instructed to appear before the undersigned on 23-1-2002 during office hours with the following documents in original. On the event of your appointment, you have to stay in this Battalion barrack and you have to deposit mess advance of Rs.1000/- after appointment. You have to bring your own bedding and utensils for your personal use. You will be provided only bachelor accommodation in the barrack. No family member will be accommodated. Within a week of your appointment you will have to proceed to the training centre for Basic training for nine months. No T.A./D.A. will be allowed for your journey to this unit for the above purpose. DOCUMENTS 1. Educational Qualification Certificate. 2. Caste Certificate.
You will be provided only bachelor accommodation in the barrack. No family member will be accommodated. Within a week of your appointment you will have to proceed to the training centre for Basic training for nine months. No T.A./D.A. will be allowed for your journey to this unit for the above purpose. DOCUMENTS 1. Educational Qualification Certificate. 2. Caste Certificate. 3. Sports Certificate. 4. Employment Exchange Card. 5. Conduct Certificate. 6. Passport size photograph (two nos). Sd./-Commandant, OSAP, 3rd Bn. Koraput.' The offer of appointment clearly discloses that the appointment therein was subject to medical fitness and verification of character and antecedents. 14. In the above situation, this Court finds, in the event there was contingency in not continuing the Petitioner in service upon verification of the character and antecedent finding material against him, a bare minimum show cause notice should have been issued to the Petitioner and only after giving opportunity of show cause based on concrete material itself a decision as appropriate could have been taken. However, it is a case involving detection of the suppression of material facts on involvement of the delinquent in criminal cases in the process of verification of documents on the ground of concealment of fact of criminal cases, the impugned order at Annexure-2 appears to have been passed strictly in terms of the conditions in the offer of appointment. Further for the undisputed non-disclosure of pendency of large number of criminal cases, no opportunity would have helped the Petitioner. 15. Considering the prospect of giving further opportunity to the Petitioner, if to yield any outcome in favour of the Petitioner, this Court here observes, for the detailed discussion in Sub-Paragraph-14, on detection of four criminal cases pending against the Petitioner at the time of consideration of the case of the Petitioner further even at the time of offer of appointment, there is clear suppression as well as misrepresentation of the actual facts not only in the verification report but at all stages taking place in the meantime. For the settled position of law narrated through the above decisions, this Court finds, in the ultimate a dismissal order was bound to come. For the settled position of law and for the Petitioner not disputing his involvement in four criminal cases pending at the time of submitting Application for recruitment as well as Verification Roll, the Writ Petition is bound to fail.
For the settled position of law and for the Petitioner not disputing his involvement in four criminal cases pending at the time of submitting Application for recruitment as well as Verification Roll, the Writ Petition is bound to fail. In the circumstance, this Court declines to entertain the Writ Petition, which is dismissed accordingly. No costs.