JUDGMENT/ORDER GS PATEL, J. - Regrettably, this Petition has been pending since 2015. Pleadings are complete. We proceed to take it up for final disposal. Rule, returnable forthwith. 2. The challenge in the Petition is to a Tender Notice No. 1 of 2015-16 issued by Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority ("MHADA") inviting bids for a plot of land then called a "social facility plot" and now more accurately termed an "amenity plot" on RSC-20/Gorai-1, Borivali (West). There is also a challenge to a corrigendum or a first extension. Then there is a prayer for a mandamus to direct MHADA to accept the balance 75% of the Petitioner's bid as consideration for the plot of land and for delivery of possession. 3. The facts go back two decades. In 2001, MHADA issued an information brochure and an application form inviting offers for taking on lease 12 plots of land. It seems that MHADA had developed residential complexes at various locations in Mumbai. It invited tenders for the allotment of plots for different purposes. The advertisement was issued under the signature of the 4th Respondent, MHADA's Deputy Chief Engineer. The allotment was to be done by a lease under the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority Act, 1976 ("MHADA Act") read with the applicable Disposal of Land Rules and Regulations. The offer was for long leases of 90 years, the first term or tenure to be of 30 years, renewable for two terms of like periods thereafter. The tender conditions said that earnest money was to be deposited. It would not earn interest for 90 days and would thereafter carry simple interest at 4% per annum. One of the tender conditions was that the successful bidder would have to obtain permission from the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai ("MCGM") within three months of the issue of a letter of intent. Clause 5 of the tender conditions required the Petitioner to obtain a development permission under the then applicable Development Control Regulations ("DCR") and to deposit the remaining 75% within 30 days of the date of a letter of permission from the MCGM to MHADA. An extension of time by two months was contemplated subject to simple interest at 16% per annum. On default of payment of the 75% remainder, the Earnest Money Deposit ("EMD") would be forfeited but the 25% would be refunded, though without interest. 4. An extension of time by two months was contemplated subject to simple interest at 16% per annum. On default of payment of the 75% remainder, the Earnest Money Deposit ("EMD") would be forfeited but the 25% would be refunded, though without interest. 4. The Petitioner, who is a builder, submitted a tender for Amenity Plot No. 5 for Rs.85, 49, 535.13 and deposited Rs.Two lakhs. On 27/6/2001, the Petitioner wrote to the Chief Accounts Officer, MHADA confirming the deposit of Rs.Two lakhs. The Petitioner's bid was accepted. Consequently, he had to deposit an amount of 25%, Rs.21, 37, 384/- by 8/8/2001. The Petitioner made that payment to MHADA by 6/8/2001. 5. Meanwhile, on 5/7/2001 the MCGM wrote to MHADA saying that since the amenity plots were not designated for a particular purpose, an allotment by tender would be inappropriate. The Petitioner was unaware of this. 6. On 31/8/2001, MHADA through the Deputy Chief Engineer wrote to the MCGM saying that MHADA had no objection to the Petitioner submitting building plans and to the issuance of either a Letter of Intent or an Intimation of Disapproval ("IoD") by the MCGM. 7. On 17/10/2001, MHADA wrote to the Petitioner contending that the Petitioner had not submitted plans for MCGM approval. MHADA required the Petitioner to get this done within a fortnight and to obtain approval within a month. At this point, it seems that the Petitioner found himself in a crossfire between the MCGM and MHADA regarding the very nature of the land. For, on 19/11/2001, MCGM wrote to the Petitioner saying that it was MHADA's responsibility first to get the plots in question 'designated' as 'amenity plots'. 8. Confronted with this, and having very little choice in the matter, on 18/12/2001, the Petitioner wrote to MHADA asking it to designate Plot No. 5 as an amenity plot. Nothing significant happened until 26/7/2002 when MCGM wrote to MHADA saying that Plot No. 5 was under a reservation of what is called a 'welfare centre'. Again, there seems to have been a quietus until 22/1/2003 when the MCGM wrote to MHADA or its architect saying that some other amenity plots had been duly designated as such. 9. On 10/2/2003, MHADA wrote to the Petitioner saying that the Petitioner had not paid the remaining 75% of his bid and demanding that this be paid with interest. Again, there seems to have been a quietus until 22/1/2003 when the MCGM wrote to MHADA or its architect saying that some other amenity plots had been duly designated as such. 9. On 10/2/2003, MHADA wrote to the Petitioner saying that the Petitioner had not paid the remaining 75% of his bid and demanding that this be paid with interest. Dr Chandrachud for the Petitioner contends that the letter is fundamentally misconceived because the demand for payment and interest could not have been made for one simple reason: the time for payment had not yet arisen. The balance 75% was payable within a stipulated time after permission was received from the MCGM. Unless that permission was received, time did not begin to run against the Petitioner. Prima facie, this appears to be correct. 10. On 13/3/2003, the Petitioner wrote to MHADA saying that there was a delay in obtaining the development permission for no other reason than the failure on MHADA's own part to designate the amenity plots. That had only been done on 22/1/2003. The Petitioner said that the 75% was required to be paid only after the MCGM granted approval. 11. On 16/12/2003, MHADA wrote to the Petitioner asking for payment again. A reminder followed on 22/12/2003 now demanding payment within 15 days. The Petitioner replied on 18/1/2004 reiterating his stand. 12. Again the entire affair seems to have gone into limbo until 30/7/2006 when the Petitioner wrote to MHADA asking for an extension of time to make the balance payment in view of the real estate market condition. Although this is noted in the pleadings and elsewhere, subsequent events will show that this is of very little consequence. The only point to note is that the Petitioner was not alone in seeking extensions and relaxations. There is documentation on record to show that in October and November 2006, MHADA did give relaxations and extensions to others of as much as two years to make payment. It was not until 5/5/2007 that the MCGM issued an IoD to the Petitioner. Within a few days, on 23/5/2007, the Petitioner wrote to MHADA enclosing a copy of the IoD and offering to pay the balance 75%. On 7/6/2008, MCGM issued a Commencement Certificate ("CC") dtd. 7/1/2008 for the Amenity Plot No 5. On 15/3/2008, the Petitioner wrote to MHADA repeating his offer. 13. Within a few days, on 23/5/2007, the Petitioner wrote to MHADA enclosing a copy of the IoD and offering to pay the balance 75%. On 7/6/2008, MCGM issued a Commencement Certificate ("CC") dtd. 7/1/2008 for the Amenity Plot No 5. On 15/3/2008, the Petitioner wrote to MHADA repeating his offer. 13. On 11/10/2010, and another two years had gone past without any activity, the Petitioner wrote to the Chief Accounts Officer, MHADA enclosing a pay order for the balance 75%. There is apparently an internal noting of MHADA to accept the payment and this can be seen from the document at page 79. There is an endorsement to that effect. As it happens, MHADA did not encash that pay order. 14. On 15/11/2010, the Petitioner wrote to MHADA again enclosing the same pay order which had obviously been earlier returned. This was reiterated on 24/3/2011, the pay order having been re-validated now a second time. Between 4/6/2011 and 4/11/2011, the Petitioner wrote to MHADA several times reiterating his previous stand. In the meantime, the Petitioner was called upon by the MCGM to pay property tax. 15. The Petitioner continued to correspond with MHADA between February 2012 and April 2014. 16. It is only after this that, according to MHADA, it sent a letter of 21/5/2014 informing the Petitioner that his offer stood cancelled. 17. There a great deal of dispute about the genuineness of this communication from MHADA but we need not in a writ petition go into that aspect of the matter. As it happens, this letter of 21/5/2014 on which much reliance is placed by MHADA in its affidavits is not referred to at all in any of the subsequent correspondence. The lack of a back reference to the 21/5/2014 so called 'cancellation' is itself telling. For if there was indeed a cancellation, later correspondence would have said so and would have pointed to this very letter. There is, on the contrary, a complete elision of this letter in subsequent correspondence by MHADA. 18. On 23/6/2014, the Petitioner wrote to MHADA enclosing a demand draft of the balance 75%. 19. More correspondence ensued between December 2014 and March 2015 and it was only on 24/5/2015 that the Petitioner learnt that MHADA was issuing fresh tenders for Plot No. 5. This is when, on 26/5/2015, the Petitioner sent a notice to MHADA. 18. On 23/6/2014, the Petitioner wrote to MHADA enclosing a demand draft of the balance 75%. 19. More correspondence ensued between December 2014 and March 2015 and it was only on 24/5/2015 that the Petitioner learnt that MHADA was issuing fresh tenders for Plot No. 5. This is when, on 26/5/2015, the Petitioner sent a notice to MHADA. On 27/5/2015, MHADA issued an advertisement inviting tenders inter alia for plot no. 5. A copy of that document is at page 81. 20. This Writ Petition was filed on 27/5/2015. 21. What happened after the filing of this Writ Petition is significant. First there was an order of 1/6/2015 noting a statement by MHADA that no tenders were being issued for the sale of Plot No. 5. The Court observed that if any further steps were taken, these would be subject to orders in the Writ Petition. On 6/2/2016, MHADA decided to cancel the impugned fresh tender. Frankly, at this point the Petition ought to have ended, but it ought to have ended with a consequence, i.e., not only a disposal of the Petition as infructuous but obviously requiring an acceptance by MHADA of the 75% tender by the Petitioner. For some reason that we are unable discern, that did not come to pass. Instead, in July 2018, MHADA filed an Affidavit in Reply. We have seen this and one of the principal contentions taken is that since this is a commercial dispute, a Writ Petition would not lie. 22. We will deal with this submission immediately. We do not believe that it is correctly placed in view of the settled law on the subject. There is a large body of learning on non-arbitrariness required of governments even in commercial contracts. But we need refer to only two of these. In paragraphs 19 to 24 of its decision in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi & Ors v State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, (1991) 1 SCC 212 . the Supreme Court held that even if commitments are viewed as purely contractual matters, they nonetheless attract Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and this excludes arbitrariness and permits judicial review of impugned state or administrative action. the Supreme Court held that even if commitments are viewed as purely contractual matters, they nonetheless attract Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and this excludes arbitrariness and permits judicial review of impugned state or administrative action. Paragraph 20 of Shrilekha Vidyarthi puts it even more emphatically when it says that even where the matter is purely contractual, the applicability of Article 14 is not excluded when it comes to judicial review or oversight of executive actions of the State. The Supreme Court said that the State cannot shed its state personality and exercise unbridled power unfettered by the requirements of Article 14 merely because the affairs fall in this sphere of contractual matters. It is not open to the Government to say that it is controlled only by private law principle applicable to private individuals and nothing more. The personality of the State requires a regulation of its conduct in all spheres and this is controlled by the requirements of Article 14. This does not undergo a radical change, that is to say is not abandoned, merely because there is a contractual arrangement. Article 14 and contractual obligations of the State are not, the Supreme Court said, alien or antithetical concepts. They can and do coexist. We need only quote the first sentence of paragraph 24 of Shrilekha Vidyarthi which reads thus: "The State cannot be attributed the split personality of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde in the contractual field so as to impress on it all the characteristics of the State at the threshold while making a contract requiring it to fulfil the obligation of Article 14 of the Constitution and thereafter permitting it to cast off its garb of State to adorn the new robe of a private body during the subsistence of the contract enabling it to act arbitrarily subject only to the contractual obligations and remedies flowing from it." 23. This statement of law is reaffirmed and reiterated in Tata Cellular vs. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 . and, particularly in paragraphs 70 to 82 and 94. Indeed, the first line of paragraph 70 is sufficient for a disposal of the contention raised in the present Affidavit in Reply because it is here that the Supreme Court said that, undeniably, principles of judicial review apply to the exercise of contractual powers by government bodies to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. 24. Indeed, the first line of paragraph 70 is sufficient for a disposal of the contention raised in the present Affidavit in Reply because it is here that the Supreme Court said that, undeniably, principles of judicial review apply to the exercise of contractual powers by government bodies to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. 24. It is precisely arbitrariness that is questioned by the Petitioner in the present Petition. 25. Returning to the chronology, the Affidavit in Reply also says curiously that one Ganesh Corporation was given a two-year extension but that this was because of a delay on the part of the MCGM. Surely this is equally true of the case of the Petitioner, and we see no method by which, without falling afoul of Article 14, MHADA could have made this relaxation for one entity and not for others similarly situated. Then in paragraph 19, MHADA said something new. It said it had decided to develop Plot No. 5 "on its own" and had invited tenders in 2015 for self -development on a turnkey basis. 26. By 4/10/2018, MHADA had decided to cancel the subsequent tender for the property in question 27. On 7/1/2019, the Petitioner filed an Affidavit in Rejoinder. Amongst other things, the Petitioner pointed out that at least three entities were granted possession even without submitting an MCGM IoD and making payment of the 75% balance. Relaxations were given by MHADA to as many as nine other successful bidders. 28. On 19/11/2019, the Division Bench noted MHADA's submission regarding self-development. The Court asked MHADA to file an affidavit setting out what steps precisely had been taken towards this self development. MHADA filed an additional affidavit on 5/12/2019 and then a third affidavit on 17/1/2020. 29. In these affidavits, MHADA now said that the other entities were indeed granted extensions but that was because they had either agreed to or had actually paid interest. 30. On 28/1/2020, the Division Bench noted that though MHADA had filed affidavits, it had not described what steps it had taken for self-development. The Court asked for a further affidavit. This led to MHADA for filing a fourth affidavit on 11/2/2020. This now said that the later tender regarding Plot No. 5 was cancelled and that MHADA's decision to self-develop the plot would be implemented 'after this Writ Petition was decided'. The Court asked for a further affidavit. This led to MHADA for filing a fourth affidavit on 11/2/2020. This now said that the later tender regarding Plot No. 5 was cancelled and that MHADA's decision to self-develop the plot would be implemented 'after this Writ Petition was decided'. This is a significant turn around because at no point earlier had MHADA said that its tender or its proposal for self-development was subject to the outcome of this Writ Petition. 31. This is where matters stood from 11/2/2020 onwards. Mr Lad today has instructions to state that the plot is in the same state that it is. It has not been developed by MHADA. There is no proposal for self-development by MHADA. On the plot, there is a 15% reservation on it. 32. But now the planning regime has changed and there is in place the Development Control and Promotional Regulations, 2034 and the Petitioner would undoubtedly be allowed to take the benefits of that changed development planning regime. This might result in higher FSI and greater benefits. The submission by Dr Chandrachud is that there is no quarrel with whatever amenity is to be provided on the plot in question. It is approximately 15000 sq ft. Of this, 15% would be under a reservation and Dr Chandrachud states on instructions from the Petitioner who is present in Court that the necessary requirements would be followed including the development of the amenity and the delivery of possession of that amenity free of cost to the planning authority. We accept that statement. 33. But Dr Chandrachud's submission is that the action of MHADA is entirely indefensible. The balance 75% required from the Petitioner was conditional upon receiving municipal development permission and that payment had to be made within a prescribed time after permission was received. The entire process was initially delayed because MHADA itself had not got the plots designated as 'amenity plots'. Then there was a delay on part of the MCGM. For reasons that are entirely unclear, MHADA did not accept the Petitioner's payment tendered not once, but twice. The first time was on 11/10/2010, a payment that the Petitioner offered not once but three times, only to be refused. Then payment was offered again on 23/6/2014 by demand draft and yet again was refused. For reasons that are entirely unclear, MHADA did not accept the Petitioner's payment tendered not once, but twice. The first time was on 11/10/2010, a payment that the Petitioner offered not once but three times, only to be refused. Then payment was offered again on 23/6/2014 by demand draft and yet again was refused. MHADA cannot, Dr Chandrachud submits, and we think rightly, rely upon its so called cancellation letter of 21/5/2014 simply because this cancellation letter is not even referenced by MHADA itself in any of the subsequent correspondence that followed thereafter. 34. Most importantly, Dr Chandrachud submits that there is no explanation as to why the Petitioner was clearly discriminated against. He was in a single class with other tenderers and bidders. They were granted extensions and the Petitioner pointed this out. Only the Petitioner was refused these extensions although he was similarly situated to others. Demands for interest cannot be a qualifying factor and in fact the demand today, if it is for interest from 2007, is wholly untenable. 35. Again, Dr Chandrachud is right in submitting that any claim for interest will fail and interest will cease to run the moment valid tender is made. It is not open to a party to refuse payment and then, following that refusal to say that interest must be paid and that too at 16% per annum going back to 2007. The result would be unjust and inequitable. The MHADA Affidavit is unclear about the so-called interest payment by other tenderers and for what period this was levied and collected. What is being said now is that although this Petition was filed in 2015, interest should be computed from 2022- 23 running back to 2007. Such a submission, Dr Chandrachud says, needs only to be stated to be rejected and we believe he is justified in saying this. 36. Having said that, Dr Chandrachud readily accepts that values have increased. The price of land in 2023 is not what it was in 2014 or in 2010, let alone 2007. He has taken instructions immediately in Court and says that his client will pay not the additional amount of Rs.64.12 lakhs to make a total of Rs.85.49 lakhs, but will pay an additional amount of Rs.15 lakhs as long as this is not read to be a payment of interest. He has taken instructions immediately in Court and says that his client will pay not the additional amount of Rs.64.12 lakhs to make a total of Rs.85.49 lakhs, but will pay an additional amount of Rs.15 lakhs as long as this is not read to be a payment of interest. This is simply an ad-hoc increase in the tender that has been offered in the tender bid. 37. On the question of interest again, Dr Chandrachud points out that interest would run in both directions, and it is impossible to say that merely that 16% interest should be payable to MHADA. After all, MHADA has had the Petitioner's 25%, an amount of Rs.21.37 lakhs since 6/8/2001 and the interest on that amount is not being brought into reckoning at all. In view of the tender of the balance 75%, it could not have been forfeited. It is unthinkable that the government can refuse tender of the balance amount, not return the initial 25% amount, and then claim interest at 16% on the refused balance or second instalment. Clause 5 that we have noted above says that the 25% amount would have to be refunded though without interest, and such a clause cannot be invoked at the late stage meaning that the 25% paid on 6/8/2001 would be returned in 2023 but without carrying any interest at all. This should not, therefore, be seen as a question of off-setting one claim for interest against another because there is no provision for this. 38. The statement made by Dr Chandrachud to make conditional payment of Rs.15 lakhs on an ad hoc basis appears to us to be a reasonable resolution of the matter. We are not required to decide whether MHADA is or is not entitled to interest and we are making no general pronouncement in that regard. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, we accept that the additional amount offered by the Petitioner is adequate. The Petition succeeds to that extent and of course reliefs will need to be moulded accordingly. 39. Hence the following order. 40. Rule is made absolute with the following order (a) MHADA will accept the balance of amount of Rs.64.12 lakhs and an additional amount of Rs.15 lakhs to be paid by the Petitioner to MHADA within four weeks from the date this order is uploaded. 39. Hence the following order. 40. Rule is made absolute with the following order (a) MHADA will accept the balance of amount of Rs.64.12 lakhs and an additional amount of Rs.15 lakhs to be paid by the Petitioner to MHADA within four weeks from the date this order is uploaded. (b) Upon that payment being made, the Petitioner will be put in possession of plot no. 5. (c) The Petitioner will develop the amenity on the plot in accordance with the rules, regulations and requirements and deliver possession of them as directed. 41. The Petitioner will be entitled to any additional benefits that may be applicable to the plot in question under the current development control regime. 42. No costs.