JUDGMENT : 1. The writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India questioning the decision of the State by granting him regular promotion on the post of Executive Engineer with effect from the date of issuance of notification, i.e.27.12.2022. With a further direction upon the respondents for consideration of his case for promotion with effect from 25.09.2018, the day when the DPC has recommended the writ petitioner fit for promotion but due to pending departmental proceeding, the same was kept in sealed cover which subsequently has culminated into the order of punishment but quashed by the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition which are required to be enumerated, read hereunder as :- 3. The petitioner joined in the office of Chief Engineer, WRD, Deoghar, Design Division No. 3, Deoghar on 19.01.1987 and worked as Junior Engineer till the petitioner was promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer on 17.09.2001. That it is further stated that after getting promotion petitioner posted in the office of Chief Engineer, WRD, Darbhanga, West Canal Division, Andharathadhi, Madhubani, Bihar. 4. After the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Bihar, the services of the petitioner were allocated to the newly created State of Jharkhand. 5. The petitioner thereafter worked at different places and subsequently posted as Assistant Engineer in Rural Development Special Division, Gumla on 15.01.2009. 6. The Executive Engineer, Rural Development Special Division, Gumla floated a tender inviting contractors to submit their bids for construction of high-level bridges across South Koel River on 10th Km of Kamdara Bano Path. The total value of the work was Rs. 291.86 Lakhs and the period of completion was 18 months form the date of written order to commence the work. 7. The work of construction of High-Level Bridge was completed in the year, 2009 and the completion certificate was issued by the Executive Engineer, Rural Development Special Division, Gumla on 17.06.2010. It was duly certified by the Executive Engineer that the construction of four bridges in one package has been successfully completed by the contractor. 8. The contract was awarded by the Department on turnkey basis according to which the contractor was required to submit its own design and drawing. It was duly certified by the Executive Engineer that the construction of four bridges in one package has been successfully completed by the contractor. 8. The contract was awarded by the Department on turnkey basis according to which the contractor was required to submit its own design and drawing. The contractor submitted his design, which was approved by the then Engineers of the Department. At the relevant time, the petitioner was not concerned with the present work and was not involved in the construction work of the present bridge as the petitioner was even not posted at Gumla. 9. It is the case of the petitioner that an F.I.R. has been lodged and the petitioner has also been made accused in the said FIR giving rise to Gumla P.S Case No. 267/2011. It has been alleged therein that the petitioner remained attached with the bridge work from 15.01.2009 onwards. 10. Thereafter, the respondents decided to proceed departmentally without awaiting the report of the Criminal Case. The petitioner was suspended vide order as contained in memo no. 4127 dated 30.06.2011 with immediate effect in contemplation of a departmental proceeding. 11. The charge memo was issued to the petitioner on 20.09.2011. The only charge levelled against the petitioner was the lack of supervision of the bridge work. It is mentioned in the memo of charge that the 10 spans out of 12 spans of the bridge in question have been badly damaged due to heavy rain during the period form 16.06.2011 to 19.06.2011. 12. The petitioner submitted his reply to the memo of charge on 30.01.2012. The petitioner stated that the petitioner joined as Assistant Engineer only on 15.01.2009 and by that time, the foundation work and sub-structure work of the bridge were completed, and the superstructure work was also about to be completed. The petitioner also stated that the 18th running account bill was prepared on 15.10.2008 i.e. before joining of the petitioner and thereafter neither any measurement was taken nor any payment was made. The petitioner denied all the charges levelled against him. 13. The Enquiry Officer submitted the enquiry report dated 12.04.2013 exonerating the petitioner of the charges as levelled against the petitioner. 14. The petitioner denied all the charges levelled against him. 13. The Enquiry Officer submitted the enquiry report dated 12.04.2013 exonerating the petitioner of the charges as levelled against the petitioner. 14. After receipt of the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority vide notification No. 2852 dated 13.11.2013 imposed punishment on the petitioner and disposed of the departmental proceedings with the following orders:- i. The suspension of the petitioner is revoked form the date of the order. ii. His three increments with cumulative effect is stopped. iii. He will not be entitled for any promotion for next five years. 15. The petitioner earlier moved this Hon'ble court in W.P.(S) no.7433/2013 against the order of the punishment issued vide notification no. 2852 dated 13.11.2013 which was allowed vide order/judgment dated 07.07.2015 by which the order of punishment was quashed with liberty to the respondents to proceed form the stage of second show cause notice after indicating the tentative reasons for differing with the report of the enquiry officer and take a decision in accordance with law. 16. On receipt of order passed by this court in W.P.(S) No.7433/2013 the respondent revoked the notification dated 13.11.2013 and decided to issue second show cause to the petitioner vide letter no. 2998 dated 02.09.2015. 17. Instead of mentioning the grounds of difference with the enquiry report in the second show cause, the respondent came out with a different issue that the petitioner had recommended for payment of Rs.45,51,890/- against the total agreement value of Rs. 291.81 Lakhs and due to damage caused to the bridge, the expenses incurred on the bridge has been wasted. The petitioner was directed to submit his reply within 15 days as to why major punishment be not awarded to the petitioner. 18. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the Second Show Cause notice on 15.09.2015 wherein he has stated that in the Second Show Cause notice a new and different charge has been levelled against the petitioner which is not permissible. 19. After receipt of reply, the respondent has again issued the order as contained in memo no. 4467 dated 28.12.2015 whereby and where under it was decided to stop three increments with cumulative effect, no promotion for next three years and for the period of suspension only subsistence allowances shall be payable to the petitioner. 20. 19. After receipt of reply, the respondent has again issued the order as contained in memo no. 4467 dated 28.12.2015 whereby and where under it was decided to stop three increments with cumulative effect, no promotion for next three years and for the period of suspension only subsistence allowances shall be payable to the petitioner. 20. The writ petitioner again preferred writ application bearing W.P.(S) No. 475 of 2016 challenging the punishment order as contained in Memo No. 4467 dated 28.12.2015. After hearing the parties, this court has set aside the order dated 28.12.2015. 21. After the order passed by the writ court, the petitioner has been given regular promotion from the post of Assistant Engineer to the post of Executive Engineer vide notification dated 27.12.2022 without considering the fact that other similarly situated persons have been given promotion from their due date, but the petitioner has been given promotion from 27.12.2022 not from his due date. 22. It is the case of the petitioner that similarly situated person namely Laxmi Narayan has been given promotion w.e.f. 25.09.2018 to the post of Executive Engineer from the post of Assistant Engineer and financial benefits of the said post has been given from the actual date of joining of the said post but the petitioner has been denied his promotion from the due date and has been given promotion from a later date. 23. Being aggrieved with the denial of promotion from due date, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the instant writ petition. 24. It is evident from the factual aspect that the writ petitioner while working as Assistant Engineer, was subjected to a departmental proceeding. While the said departmental proceeding was pending, he became eligible for consideration for promotion for the post of Executive Engineer. His case was placed before the Departmental Promotion Committee. The Departmental Promotion Committee, however, has found the writ petitioner fit for promotion but on the ground of pending departmental proceeding, the same was kept in sealed cover. 25. The said departmental proceeding was culminated into the order of punishment. Finally, the said order of punishment was assailed before this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.475 of 2016 whereby and whereunder the order of punishment dated 28.12.2015 was set aside by allowing the writ petition. 26. 25. The said departmental proceeding was culminated into the order of punishment. Finally, the said order of punishment was assailed before this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.475 of 2016 whereby and whereunder the order of punishment dated 28.12.2015 was set aside by allowing the writ petition. 26. The respondent authorities, thereafter, have notified the decision taken by the Departmental Promotion Committee by granting promotion to the petitioner to the post of Executive Engineer from the date of issuance of notification, i.e., 27.12.2022. 27. The writ petitioner raised grievance that once the order of punishment has been quashed by this Court, it is not available for the appointing authority to grant him promotion to the post of Executive Engineer with effect from 27.12.2022, rather, it should be from the due date of 25.09.2018. 28. The aforesaid grievance having not been redressed, the instant writ petition has been filed. 29. Mr. Deepak Kumar Dubey, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, has submitted that the action of the State authority is absolutely illegal and improper, reason being that once the order of punishment has been quashed by this Court, the implied meaning of the same would be that there was no memorandum of charge, hence, the writ petitioner became entitled for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer from 25.09.2018, but the authority, instead of granting such promotion with effect from 25.09.2018, has granted promotion with effect from 27.12.2022 which is nothing but penalizing the writ petitioner for no fault of his own since the order of promotion has been notified after putting the writ petitioner at loss for four years. 30. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State. 31. Mr. Indranil Bhaduri, learned S.C.-IV appearing for the State of Jharkhand, has defended the decision so taken by the State. 32. It has been submitted that it is not a case where the department has found the writ petitioner not guilty by taking decision of exoneration and that is the reason the department has taken decision not to grant promotion from the due date, i.e., 25.09.2018, rather granted promotion on the basis of the order passed by this Court and immediately thereafter, the due notification was issued granting him promotion to the post of Executive Engineer with effect from the date of issuance of notification. 33. 33. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties, gone across the pleading made in the writ petition as also the counter affidavit. 34. This Court, on the basis of the argument advanced on behalf of the parties, is proceeding to answer the following issue:- (i) Whether the exoneration in the departmental proceeding can only be said to be exoneration on the decision of the disciplinary authority or it will also be said to be an exoneration if the decision so taken by the disciplinary authority has been interfered with by the High Court under the power of judicial review by quashing the impugned decision of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority? 35. This Court, before answering the said issue deems it fit and proper to deal with the very concept of keeping the matter in the sealed cover. 36. The sealed cover process is not under any recruitment/promotion rule. The issue fell for consideration before three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109 with respect to a matter arisen from an order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal regarding the action of the disciplinary authority while challenging one circular of depriving public servant on the ground of pending departmental proceeding. The Hon'ble Apex Court has interpreted the same and laid down the proposition by evolving concept of sealed cover. 37. Under the aforesaid process, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down to keep the matter of promotion of a public servant in the sealed cover without putting any restriction for consideration of the case of such public servant before the Departmental Promotion Committee. The object behind it, which was though by Hon'ble Apex Court, that in a case of pending departmental proceeding and if the decision finally goes in favour of the delinquent employee by exoneration then why such public servant will be made to suffer. 38. The aforesaid suffering was the basic object as also to put restriction upon the frivolous allegation to be made before disciplinary authority by the rival to snatch away the right of consideration/promotion. 39. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further laid down that under the sealed cover process the case of the public servant who is facing the departmental proceeding is also to be considered. 39. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further laid down that under the sealed cover process the case of the public servant who is facing the departmental proceeding is also to be considered. The Departmental Promotion Committee is to assess his overall performance based upon his service record or the other eligibility criteria, as the case may be, and is required to give its opinion regarding fitness or unfitness. 40. In a case of unfitness, the case of such public servant, even if exonerated, will have no positive result in favour of such public servant. However, in case of the concerned public servant having been found to be fit, then exoneration will have bearing. 41. The concept has been carved out that in case of a public servant having been found to be fit but the departmental proceeding is pending, then the case of such public servant is to be kept in sealed cover so as to open it after exoneration in the departmental proceeding. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is being quoted hereunder as :- “8. The common questions involved in all these matters relate to what in service jurisprudence has come to be known as “sealed cover procedure”. Concisely stated, the questions are: (1) What is the date from which it can be said that disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against an employee? (2) What is the course to be adopted when the employee is held guilty in such proceedings if the guilt merits punishment other than that of dismissal? (3) To what benefits an employee who is completely or partially exonerated is entitled to and from which date? The “sealed cover procedure” is adopted when an employee is due for promotion, increment etc. but disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against him at the relevant time and hence, the findings of his entitlement to the benefit are kept in a sealed cover to be opened after the proceedings in question are over. Hence, the relevance and importance of the questions. 22. This sentence is preceded by the observation that when the employee is completely exonerated on the conclusion of the disciplinary/court proceedings, that is, when no statutory penalty, including that of censure, is imposed, he is to be given a notional promotion from the date he would have been promoted as determined by the Departmental Promotion Committee. 22. This sentence is preceded by the observation that when the employee is completely exonerated on the conclusion of the disciplinary/court proceedings, that is, when no statutory penalty, including that of censure, is imposed, he is to be given a notional promotion from the date he would have been promoted as determined by the Departmental Promotion Committee. This direction in the Memorandum has also to be read along with the other direction which follows in the next sub-paragraph and which states that if it is found as a result of the proceedings that some blame attaches to the officer then the penalty of censure at least, should be imposed. This direction is in supersession of the earlier instructions which provided that in a case where departmental disciplinary proceedings have been held, “warning” should not be issued as a result of such proceedings. 23. There is no doubt that when an employee is completely exonerated and is not visited with the penalty even of censure indicating thereby that he was not blameworthy in the least, he should not be deprived of any benefits including the salary of the promotional post. It was urged on behalf of the appellant-authorities in all these cases that a person is not entitled to the salary of the post unless he assumes charge of the same. They relied on F.R. 17(1) of the Fundamental Rules and Supplementary Rules which reads as follows: “F.R. 17. (1) Subject to any exceptions specifically made in these rules and to the provision of sub-rule (2), an officer shall begin to draw the pay and allowances attached to his tenure of a post with effect from the date when he assumes the duties of that post, and shall cease to draw them as soon as he ceases to discharge those duties: Provided that an officer who is absent from duty without any authority shall not be entitled to any pay and allowances during the period of such absence.” 26. We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby that he is not found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher post along with the other benefits from the date on which he would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary/criminal proceedings. However, there may be cases where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed at the instance of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. In such circumstances, the concerned authorities must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. Life being complex, it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circumstances under which such consideration may become necessary. To ignore, however, such circumstances when they exist and lay down an inflexible rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated in disciplinary/criminal proceedings he should be entitled to all salary for the intervening period is to undermine discipline in the administration and jeopardise public interests. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the Tribunal that to deny the salary to an employee would in all circumstances be illegal. While, therefore, we do not approve of the said last sentence in the first sub-paragraph after clause (iii) of paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum, viz., “but no arrears of pay shall be payable to him for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion”, we direct that in place of the said sentence the following sentence be read in the Memorandum: “However, whether the officer concerned will be entitled to any arrears of pay for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion, and if so to what extent, will be decided by the concerned authority by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the disciplinary proceeding/criminal prosecution. Where the authority denies arrears of salary or part of it, it will record its reasons for doing so.” 34. Where the authority denies arrears of salary or part of it, it will record its reasons for doing so.” 34. In this case, the respondent-employee’s case was considered for promotion by the DPC in August 1982. However, the result was kept in a sealed cover in view of the pending disciplinary proceedings against him. According to the employee, on October 11, 1985 the disciplinary proceedings ended in complete exoneration. Thereafter, a DPC was again constituted in March 1986 which, after consideration of the employee’s case, recommended him for promotion w.e.f. July 26, 1986. This was obviously contrary even to the instructions contained in the Memorandum. He was entitled to promotion from the date his immediate junior was promoted in or after August 1982 if he was in August 1982 found fit for promotion by the DPC. The Tribunal has, therefore, rightly directed the appellant to open the sealed cover and if the DPC in 1982 had found him fit for promotion, to give him the promotion from the date on which his immediate junior was promoted. However, while doing so, the Tribunal has also directed arrears of salary to be paid for intervening period along with all consequential benefits. Since we have held disagreeing with the decision of the Full Bench of the Tribunal that the benefit of the arrears of salary will not flow automatically but will depend upon the circumstances in each case, we modify the said order to the extent it directs the payment of arrears of salary, and direct the appellant-authority to consider whether the employee in the circumstances of the case was entitled to any arrears of salary and to what extent. The authority will, of course, give reasons for denial of the whole or part of the arrears of salary. The appeal is, therefore, allowed partly with no order as to costs. 42. It is evident from the aforesaid paragraphs that the basic idea is that the public servant who is facing the departmental proceeding in case of exoneration may not be allowed to suffer. 43. Coming back to the facts of this case, admittedly herein, the writ petitioner was punished by the disciplinary authority. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the aforesaid order of punishment, had challenged the same before this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.475 of 2016 which has been allowed by quashing the order of punishment dated 28.12.2015. 43. Coming back to the facts of this case, admittedly herein, the writ petitioner was punished by the disciplinary authority. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the aforesaid order of punishment, had challenged the same before this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.475 of 2016 which has been allowed by quashing the order of punishment dated 28.12.2015. 44. The ground has been taken by the State, as per the counter affidavit, that the principle to keep the matter in sealed cover will not be applicable since the writ petitioner was not exonerated by the disciplinary authority, rather, the order of punishment was quashed and set aside by this Court. 45. The law is well settled that the departmental proceeding will be said to be initiated the day when the memorandum of charge will be issued followed by the appointment of Enquiry Officer/Presenting Officer and thereafter it is incumbent upon the Enquiry officer to give finding regarding proof or regarding the charge as levelled in the memorandum of charge. 46. In case of charge having not found to be proved then a mechanism has also been carved out which is not in Conduct Rule, rather, it is in the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and Others v. Kunj Behari Misra [ (1998) 7 SCC 84 ]. 47. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court has propounded the proposition that in case the charge has not been found to be proved but the same is not acceptable to the disciplinary authority then what to be done. The disciplinary authority has been conferred with the power to differ with the opinion but the simultaneous action which is required to be followed in order to provide an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee to assign the difference of opinion along with the reason and provide the same so that an objection be filed on behalf of the public servant. 48. The underlying idea behind it is that when the charge has not been found to be proved and if in a case the same is not acceptable then the reason must be communicated to the public servant so that the same be considered by the disciplinary authority in order to fulfil the cardinal principle of natural justice, the relevant paragraph of the judgment is being quoted and referred hereunder as :- “17. These observations are clearly in tune with the observations in Bimal Kumar Pandit case [ AIR 1963 SC 1612 ] quoted earlier and would be applicable at the first stage itself. The aforesaid passages clearly bring out the necessity of the authority which is to finally record an adverse finding to give a hearing to the delinquent officer. If the enquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar case [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 ] the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the enquiry officer. It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions, then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings, what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority.” 49. The second eventuality is the case where the charge has been found to be proved. In such circumstances, the disciplinary authority, after receipt of the enquiry report, is to accept it and after providing the opportunity regarding the finding, is to pass necessary order of punishment as provided under the Conduct Rule. 50. If the Conduct Rule provides the mechanism of appeal or revision, the same is required to be filed. In such circumstances, the disciplinary authority, after receipt of the enquiry report, is to accept it and after providing the opportunity regarding the finding, is to pass necessary order of punishment as provided under the Conduct Rule. 50. If the Conduct Rule provides the mechanism of appeal or revision, the same is required to be filed. If the order passed by the disciplinary authority has been assailed before the appellate and the revisional authority and both the higher forum if refused to interfere with the order passed by the disciplinary authority, the same will attain finality so far as the stages of administrative disciplinary authorities are concerned. 51. Further, it will be said to be attained finality on the principle of merger since the order if affirmed by the appellate authority and subsequent thereto if the revisional authority affirms it, then the order passed by the disciplinary authority will be said to be affirmed initially in the order passed by the appellate authority and after its affirmation by the revisional authority, the order passed by the appellate authority will be said to be merged with the order passed by the revisional authority. The order passed by the disciplinary authority or appellate authority will have no existence. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 in particular at paragraph 7, 8, 12 and 42, which reads as under:- “7. The doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of constitutional law nor a doctrine statutorily recognised. It is a common law doctrine founded on principles of propriety in the hierarchy of justice delivery system. On more occasions than one this Court had an opportunity of dealing with the doctrine of merger. It would be advisable to trace and set out the judicial opinion of this Court as it has progressed through the times. 8. In CIT v. Amritlal Bhogilal and Co. this Court held: “There can be no doubt that, if an appeal is provided against an order passed by a tribunal, the decision of the appellate authority is the operative decision in law. If the appellate authority modifies or reverses the decision of the tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced. If the appellate authority modifies or reverses the decision of the tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced. In law the position would be just the same even if the appellate decision merely confirms the decision of the tribunal. As a result of the confirmation or affirmance of the decision of the tribunal by the appellate authority the original decision merges in the appellate decision and it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative and capable of enforcement;” 12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by an inferior court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way — whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view. 42. “To merge” means to sink or disappear in something else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or be swallowed up. Merger in law is defined as the absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater, whereby the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is not increased; an absorption or swallowing up so as to involve a loss of identity and individuality. 52. The decision in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (Supra) was followed by a three-Judge Bench decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad reported in (2004) 8 SCC 724 , wherein at paragraph 23 and 24 it has been held which reads hereunder as:- “23. 52. The decision in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (Supra) was followed by a three-Judge Bench decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad reported in (2004) 8 SCC 724 , wherein at paragraph 23 and 24 it has been held which reads hereunder as:- “23. The doctrine of merger is based on the principles of propriety in the hierarchy of the justice delivery system. The doctrine of merger does not make a distinction between an order of reversal, modification or an order of confirmation passed by the appellate authority. The said doctrine postulates that there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. 24. It is trite that when an appellate court passes a decree, the decree of the trial court merges with the decree of the appellate court and even if and subject to any modification that may be made in the appellate decree, the decree of the appellate court supersedes the decree of the trial court. In other words, merger of a decree takes place irrespective of the fact as to whether the appellate court affirms, modifies or reverses the decree passed by the trial court.” 53. Now the question is that if the revisional authority has affirmed the order passed by the appellate authority, it impliedly will mean that the order passed by the disciplinary authority imposing punishment will be merged with the order passed by the revisional authority. 54. The order passed by the revisional authority, if has been challenged before High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the purpose of exercising the power of judicial review and if the order passed by the revisional authority is quashed and set aside by the High Court then the meaning of the same will be that the order passed by the revisional authority or other authorities, i.e., original and the appellate authority, will also be said to be not in existence. 55. 55. It further requires to refer herein that the moment the memorandum of charge has been issued against a public servant and culminates to order of punishment on acceptance of the finding of the proved enquiry report and subsequently if the said order is being quashed either by the appellate or revisional authority or by the writ court in exercise of power of judicial review, then the memorandum of charge itself will be said to be not in existence. 56. The distinction which has been tried to be carved out by the learned counsel for the State that distinct parameter is to be followed in a case where the employee has been found to be exonerated by the disciplinary authority and in a case of punishment if it has been quashed by the High Court, the employee concerned cannot be given the same treatment. 57. But this court is not impressed with such argument, reason being that as per the discussion made hereinabove, the moment the High Court in exercise of power of judicial review has interfered with the order of punishment, then the order of punishment will not only be said to be not in existence, rather, it will go to the day when the memorandum of charge was issued. The memorandum of charge, therefore, will have no existence in a case where the High Court has passed the order by quashing the order of punishment. 58. The consideration which has been given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman (Supra) the whole object is not to punish the delinquent employee merely because the departmental proceeding was pending on the due date of consideration for promotion and in case of exoneration the promotion is to be granted from the due date, i.e., the day when the concerned delinquent employee was found to be fit for promotion. 59. The word “exoneration” is to be treated in the broader sense which means that the concerned public servant has been found to be not guilty for all practical purposes that can either be by the disciplinary authority or by the appellate authority or by the revisional authority. 60. 59. The word “exoneration” is to be treated in the broader sense which means that the concerned public servant has been found to be not guilty for all practical purposes that can either be by the disciplinary authority or by the appellate authority or by the revisional authority. 60. So far as the power of High Court is concerned when the High Court has been conferred with the power to interfere with the administrative decision of the disciplinary authority in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India then it is not available for the State who has a different parameter so far as the decision taken by the High Court under its power of judicial review. Otherwise, the very power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will be in question. 61. It is not a case of the State that High Court while quashing the order dated 28.12.2015 has exceeded its jurisdiction which can also not be taken since, as has been informed at Bar that the said order has not been challenged before the higher forum. 62. Further, the ground has been taken by the writ petitioner of parity. It has been contended that one of the identical person against whom departmental proceeding was going on the day when the Departmental Promotion Committee sat and convened meeting, i.e., Laxmi Narayan, who has been granted promotion from the due date after his exoneration. 63. The aforesaid fact has not been disputed by the State. 64. The question now remains that there cannot be two different parameters of exoneration if the order of exoneration has been passed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority or the revisional authority and there will be different parameter if the order passed by the disciplinary authority either of the stages has been quashed by the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by way of judicial review. 65. This Court, in view of the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that not granting promotion from the due date, i.e., 25.09.2018, is nothing but suffers from impropriety and in the teeth of very object of the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman (Supra). 66. 65. This Court, in view of the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that not granting promotion from the due date, i.e., 25.09.2018, is nothing but suffers from impropriety and in the teeth of very object of the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman (Supra). 66. This Court, therefore, is of the view that this writ petition deserves to be allowed. 67. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands allowed. 68. The respondents are directed to issue fresh notification based upon the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee where the writ petitioner has been found to be fit for promotion with effect from 25.09.2018. 69. In consequence thereof, the arrears of difference of salary from 25.09.2018 till the date of superannuation is directed to be released within the period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.