JUDGMENT : 1. Petitioners are members of the Balusseri Mahallu Juma-ath. They submit that election to the Juma-ath was being done under the supervision of the Advocate commissioners appointed by this Court, which permitted the Advocate Commissioners to make suitable deletions/addition to the voter's list. They also submit that the election has to be conducted in terms of Ext.P1 bye-law. However, when the draft voters list was published by the Advocate Commissioners, petitioners made two objections, namely 79 persons who were from outside the Mahallu were included, which they allege to be a violation of clause 4 of the bye-law. That apart, 154 persons who had no affiliation with the Kerala Naduvathul Mujahideen (KNM), which is the parent organization of the first respondent juma-ath has been included in the list, which is a contravention of clause 7 of the bye-law. Since these objections were summarily rejected, petitioners have instituted this writ petition quashing Exts.P8 and P9 that rejected their objections and also for a direction to the Advocate Commissioners to redraw the draft voters list after accepting the objections raised by the petitioners. 2. We find that the prayers made in the writ petition involve a dispute on the factual aspects, which need not be considered in the above writ petition. That apart, the petitioners have an alternate efficacious remedy to approach the wakf Tribunal, which has given all the powers to consider any disputed questions relating to the wakf. The said Tribunal has all the trappings of the civil court. In such circumstances, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for petitioners that since the Advocate Commissioners were appointed by this Court, they have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, as the same can never be a reason for us to entertain this writ petition, which has factual questions alone to be decided. 3. As held by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 , the non-entertainment of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when an efficacious alternate remedy is available is a rule and self-imposed restriction. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience, and discretion rather than a rule of law. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience, and discretion rather than a rule of law. Again in Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore vs. Mathew K.C. (2018) 3 SCC 85 referring to the earlier judgments of the Apex Court , it was held that High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for the redressal of grievance, a writ petition should not be entertained, ignoring statutory dispensation. Further, in cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High courts normally decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. In City and Industrial Development Corporation vs. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala and Others, (2009) 1 SCC 168 Supreme Court held that the court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is duty bound to consider whether the petitioner has any effective alternate remedy for the resolution of the dispute. 4. Thus, a reading of all the above judgments makes it clear that it is one thing to say that in the exercise of the power vested in it Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its agency/instrumentality or any public authority or order passed by a quasi-judicial body/authority, but it is an altogether different thing to say that each and every petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must be entertained by the High court as a matter, of course, ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person has an effective alternate remedy. 5. We have already held in W.P. (C) No. 3964 of 2023 a statutory mechanism is created under the Act, and we feel that any dispute, question, or other matters whatsoever relating to a wakf property can be decided effectively by the wakf Tribunal. No doubt, the alternate remedy is not an absolute bar for filing the writ petition, but at the same time, it is well settled that writ jurisdiction is a discretionary jurisdiction, and when there is an efficacious alternate remedy, ordinarily, a party must resort to that remedy first before approaching this Court. No doubt, the alternate remedy is not an absolute bar for filing the writ petition, but at the same time, it is well settled that writ jurisdiction is a discretionary jurisdiction, and when there is an efficacious alternate remedy, ordinarily, a party must resort to that remedy first before approaching this Court. Entertaining a writ petition straight away without insisting that a party should avail alternate remedy is an over-liberal approach that is causing immense difficulties to the high court, adding to the huge arrears. That apart, these are disputed questions of facts to be decided by the bodies created under the Wakf Act and time has come for this Court to stop entertaining writ petitions seeking directions relating to a wakf and to insist that the party should first approach the authorities under the Act. When the legislature has provided for a statutory mechanism, the high court ought, under normal circumstances, to refer to the statutory scheme. We do not find any reason at all for entertaining this writ petition, more so when nothing is pleaded or shown as to why the alternate remedy available is not efficacious. 6. The writ petition is dismissed without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner to avail of the alternate remedy.