Research › Search › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 145 (ORI)

Ajaya Kumar Pani v. State of Orissa

2023-01-27

BISWANATH RATH

body2023
JUDGMENT Biswanath Rath, J. - This writ petition involves a challenge to the order passed by the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority vide Annexures-8 & 9 herein. 2. Factual background as narrated and disclosed in the course of hearing appears to be, this is 3rd round of litigation by the Petitioners. Petitioners claiming to be the children of Smt. Basanta Kumari Devi the original lessee, are enjoying a lease of Ac.1.23 decimals of land under Khata No.79, Plot Nos.45, 47 & 48 in village Jamuhata in Keonjhar district being granted by the Tahasildar, Keonjhar on 19.11.1986 involving Encroachment Case No.1 of 1985-86 purely for agricultural purpose. Order passed in the Encroachment Case No.1 of 1985-86 is enclosed as Annexure-1. It is claimed that on the basis of the above order as well as the report of the Revenue Supervisor dated 16.08.1986 settlement was made in favour of the Petitioners. It is claimed that settlement was made after issuing of proclamation and invitation of objections. In a further development Rayati Patta was issued in favour of the mother of the Petitioners. Petitioners have enclosed the report of the Revenue Supervisor as well as Rayati Patta as Annexures-2 & 3 respectively. Petitioners have also enclosed the rent receipt in proof of collection of rent in respect of the disputed property. It is alleged that after lapse of 14 years an appeal vide Lease Appeal No.1 of 2000 was filed before the Court of the Sub-Collector, Keonjhar challenging the order of the Tahasildar, Keonjhar dated 19.11.1986 vide Annexure-1, also intending to cancel the lease involved. Accordingly notices were issued fixing the date of hearing in the matter of condonation of delay and admission of the matter to 12.10.2000. Petitioners themselves have enclosed the memorandum of appeal and the delay condonation application as Annexures-5 & 5/A respectively, which, however, clearly disclosing appeal to have been preferred in 1997. Further verification in the delay condonation application was made on ........ day of August, 1997. In paragraph 5 it is alleged that without service of notice on the lessee the delay was condoned and the appeal was also admitted thereby. Further without sufficiency of notice, the appeal was also allowed by the order dated 27.04.2001. Further verification in the delay condonation application was made on ........ day of August, 1997. In paragraph 5 it is alleged that without service of notice on the lessee the delay was condoned and the appeal was also admitted thereby. Further without sufficiency of notice, the appeal was also allowed by the order dated 27.04.2001. For the attempt of the State authorities to evict the Petitioners on the basis of the appeal order, the lessee was constrained to move T.S. No.79 of 2001 on the file of the Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Keonjhar for declaring the order dated 27.04.2001 null and void. The suit was decreed by the judgment dated 9.05.2003 thereby declaring the order in Lease Appeal No.1 of 2000 as null & void and further directing for reopening of the Lease Appeal No.1 of 2000 for fresh hearing, but after providing opportunity of hearing to the lessee. Petitioners have filed copy of the judgment in T.S. No.79 of 2001 at Annexure-7. It is here claimed that after disposal of the suit finding the lessee died in the meantime i.e. on 5.06.2003 a prayer for substitution of the legal heirs of the deceased lessee was made and notices were accordingly issued to the legal heirs to appear in the proceeding on 14.12.2004 for hearing on the question of substitution. It is alleged that substitution was allowed without even any application for setting aside of abatement and condonation of delay. Petitioners being the legal heirs on their appearance in the proceeding on 29.11.2007 through their Advocate requested for supply of a copy of the appeal memorandum. Copy of which was also supplied to the legal heirs as appearing at Annexures-5 & 5/A to the writ petition. Appeal again involved an ex parte order of eviction on 11.08.2008. Based on a notice being issued by the Tahasildar to the Petitioners to vacate the lease hold property by 10.09.2009, Petitioners were even unable to move an application for stay before the revisional authority, for the Additional District Magistrate, Keonjhar-Opposite Party No.2 remaining busy in administrative matters, the Petitioners were constrained to file W.P.(C) No.13368 of 2008 in the High Court of Orissa for quashing of the order dated 11.08.2008 along with a stay application. W.P.(C) No.13368 of 2008 got disposed of by the High Court thereby quashing the order dated 11.08.2008 and remanding the matter to the appellate authority for fresh adjudication of the appeal. After remand order of this Court Lease Appeal No.1 of 2000 was freshly disposed of by the order dated 26.06.2009 vide Annexure-8 thereby holding that there is no illegality or impropriety in the said order dated 27.04.2001. For a statutory remedy of revision available U/s.12(2) of the OPLE Act the Petitioners challenged the order at Annexure-8 through OPLE Revision No.3 of 2009 alongwith an application for stay. It is claimed through paragraph no.16 that OPLE Revision No.3 of 2009 was posted to 19.08.2009 for hearing on admission and on which date the matter could not be taken up. The case was next posted to 31.08.2009. On 31.08.2009 hearing on admission of the revision was made in the involvement of the Government pleader. It is alleged that even though the revision was admitted, there was no stay order passed by the revisional authority. It is further alleged that for the revisional authority not granting any interim protection, Petitioners were again constrained to move this High Court in W.P.(C) No.11087 of 2010 thereby seeking a direction to the revisional authority to dispose of the revision as expeditiously as possible and also praying therein for stay of operation of the order dated 26.06.2009 till disposal of the revision. The Hon'ble High Court, however, while disposing of the writ petition directed the revision to be disposed of within a period of three months. The OPLE Revision No.3 of 2009 was finally disposed of on 25.11.2010, however on affirmation of the appeal order, resulting filing of the present writ petition. 3. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners in the above background of the matter bringing in the entire narration made hereinabove, attacked the orders at Annexures-8 & 9 on the ground that reopening of the lease case on the basis of the allegation that the lease was obtained on misrepresentation of fact and non-disclosure of the issue that husband of Smt. Basanta Kumari Devi was a Primary School Teacher and was not a landless person and thus the applicant in the lis played fraud with the public authority, remains incorrect and baseless. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Sr. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners taking this Court to the inquiry report of the Revenue Supervisor at Annexure-2 contented that the Revenue Supervisor adopted a fair procedure in the inquiry with the involvement of all concerned and thereafter submitted his report after taking evidence from local people. It is also contended that after the submission of such report the Tahasildar himself also visited the spot and found, mother of these Petitioners was the real encroacher and the encroachment was unobjectionable. It is also contended that before finalizing the lease aspect there was issuance of proclamation thereby inviting objection before settlement of land in favour of the mother of the Petitioners and the public authority did not receive any objection. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners also contended that once a party attempts to reopen an issue already settled on the premises of playing fraud by the beneficiary, responsibility lies on such party for not only making pleadings on fraud but also need to prove such allegation. It is specifically argued by Mr. Mukherjee, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners that neither there is any allegation of fraud pleaded nor proved. There is even no action against the person playing fraud. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners further also on the ground of institution of appeal after 14 years contended that such long delay should not have been condoned ordinarily. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners also contended that once the appeal period is 30 days and even assuming that there involves an allegation of fraud, there may be entertaining of such appeal at least within one year of detection of such fraud following the provisions at Section 17 of the Limitation Act. It is further submitted that for the fraud having been detected in August, 1997, the appeal should have been filed before 13.08.1998. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Senior Advocate for the appeal brought in 2000 contended that there was gross delay in filing the appeal on 25.09.2000. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Sr. It is further submitted that for the fraud having been detected in August, 1997, the appeal should have been filed before 13.08.1998. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Senior Advocate for the appeal brought in 2000 contended that there was gross delay in filing the appeal on 25.09.2000. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners also takes advantage of some development through OLR Case No.102 of 2000 vide Annexure-4 thereby allowing conversion of lease hold land to homestead land, while also taking advantage of acceptance of rent by the public authority after grant of such lease. 4. Mr. Mukherji, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners giving much stress on the report of the Revenue Supervisor vide Annexure-2 at page 23 of the brief and his observation on the husband of the mother of the Petitioners contended that it is not a case that strength or capability of the mother of the Petitioners was not considered at all. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners for the clear observation of the Revenue Supervisor that mother of the Petitioners has categorically reported that husband was merely a primary school teacher, objected the stand of the administration in cancelling the lease on the premises of the ability of the husband and submitted that action of the authority in this context is not justified. Further taking this Court to the delay aspect reading through the appeal provision in the O.P.L.E Act Mr. Mukherji, learned Senior Advocate submitted that even assuming that there is detection of fraud on 6.02.1997 and approval of filing appeal was obtained on 13.08.1997, filing of lease appeal on 25.09.2000, but the appeal ought to have suffered on the ground of limitation. On reiteration of his earlier submission Mr. Mukherji, learned Senior Advocate again taking this Court to the provision at Section 17 of the Limitation Act submitted that in case of detection of fraud the appeal would have been submitted within one year of detection and/or the sanction and therefore contended that there is no explanation on delay in filing the appeal for the period from 13.08.1998 i.e. the date of sanction till 25.09.2000 i.e. the date of filing of appeal. It is thus contended that condonation of delay in this context becomes bad. Further taking this Court to the decision in the case of Jt. Collector Ranga Reddy Vs. It is thus contended that condonation of delay in this context becomes bad. Further taking this Court to the decision in the case of Jt. Collector Ranga Reddy Vs. D. Narsing Rao as reported in (2015) 3 SCC 695 Mr. Mukherji, learned Senior Advocate contended that action of the appellate authority in condoning the delay and entertaining the appeal after so much years is also hit by the legal position settled through the above judgments. It is, in the above background, Mr. Mukherjee, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners requested this Court for setting aside of the impugned orders at Annexures-8 & 9. 5. Mr. Sonak Mishra, learned State Counsel for Opposite Parties the public authorities in his attempt to support the impugned orders, while keeping in view the ground of attack to the impugned orders at Annexures-8 & 9 also taking this Court to the memorandum of appeal as well as the document vide Annexures-5 & 5/A submitted that Annexure-5/A clearly discloses that affidavit and verification in the delay condonation application attached to the memorandum of appeal were brought in the month of August, 1997 as clearly disclosed from page 39. Looking to the claim of the Petitioners in paragraph 21 Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel contended that fraud was detected in 1997 thereby giving rise to bring appeal. On the allegation that there is no pleading either on fraud or on misrepresentation of fact Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel taking this Court to the pleadings made in the memorandum of appeal at Annexure-5 more particularly the pleadings in paragraph nos.6 & 7, contended that there is clear pleading to the effect that the husband of the mother of the Petitioners was serving as a Primary School Teacher and his annual income at the relevant point of time was Rs.10,632.10/- as revealed from the pay particulars received from the B.D.O, Banaspal and the report of the Revenue Supervisor was submitted in absence of details of particulars of land of the husband of the mother of the Petitioners and thus there is clear pleading on fraud and / or suppression of material facts. Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel thus contended that there was a fit case to be reopened and examined. Mr. Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel thus contended that there was a fit case to be reopened and examined. Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel also contended that in the verification process it has been detected that Baidhar Pani the husband of the lessee i.e. the mother of the Petitioners was already in possession of a piece of Government land. Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel thus contended that there is no delay in filing such appeal. There is also clear averment on the fact that lessee was playing fraud and had obtained lease in clear suppression of material facts. Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel further also contested the proceeding on the premises that there is plea of fraud and parties therein have not only scope to challenge such action, but have also scope to establish their case in the appeal proceeding and as the aggrieved party could unable to disestablish the allegation of playing fraud being the foundation to challenge the appeal order, there is no infirmity in the appeal order and as a consequence there is no infirmity in the revision order also. Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel thus opposed to the entertainability of the writ petition and sought for dismissal of the writ petition. Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel apart from the above submission also took this Court to three decisions of the Hon'ble Court to support the stand of the State herein. 6. Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel filing a written notes of submission along with memo of citations attempted to reiterate the stand of the competent authority that even though there involves a plan of Town Planning Authority, the Tahasildar settled the land without verifying the town plan, which already speaks regarding the observation on illegality committed by the Presiding Officer in deciding the Encroachment Case No.1/1985-86. Further there is also clear observation of the Sub-Collector, Keonjhar in its order dated 26.06.2009 thereby making it clear that husband of the deceased lessee was not only a Government Teacher, but his annual income also remains Rs.10,632.10/-, which exceeded the maximum limit at that point of time, however, it appears, for being considered as a landless person, there was a limit of annual income to the tune of Rs.6,400/- per annum at the relevant point of time. In the process Mr. In the process Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel submitted that there has been definite suppression of material facts by the leaseholder with regard to the income of the husband and properties, if any, and thus submitted that decision in taking out the lease is justified, a reasonable one and a bona fide one. Further taking this Court to the decision of the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by Lrs. & Ors. as reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel contended that for there is established fraud, it vitiates all actions involved therein. Taking this Court to another decision in the case of State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Brundaban Sharma & Anr. as reported in 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 249, Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel contended that once there is allegation of fraud, there is scope for considering the limitation leniently. On the allegation of Mr. Mukherji, learned Senior Advocate that appeal is hit by Section 17(I) of the Limitation Act, Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel taking this Court to the decision in the case of Birla Cement Works Vs. G.M., Western Railways & Anr. as reported in (1995) 2 SCC 493 contended that for the decision of the Hon'ble apex Court, Section 17(I) of the Limitation Act has application only to the suits and not to the authorities created under the statute. It is, in the above background of the matter, Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel claimed that since the impugned order is justified one, there is no scope for interfering in the same and thus prays for dismissal of the writ petition. 7. In the above background, this Court here proceeds as follows:- For the own submission of Mr. Mukherjee, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners that fraud has been detected by August, 1997 as clearly claimed in paragraph No.21 of the brief, this Court finds, there is no substance in the allegation of the Petitioners on entertainment of appeal after 14 years. Further keeping in view the statement of Mr. Mukherjee, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners that fraud has been detected by August, 1997 as clearly borne in paragraph no.21 of the writ petition, it appears, there is definite delay. Further keeping in view the statement of Mr. Mukherjee, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners that fraud has been detected by August, 1997 as clearly borne in paragraph no.21 of the writ petition, it appears, there is definite delay. Considering that there is reopening of the appeal on the ground of fraud this Court is of the view that claim of Mr. Mukherjee, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners that the appeal suffers on account of no pleading on fraud loses its force. This Court keeping in view the counter submission of Mr. Mishra, learned State Counsel that there is specific pleading on fraud and misrepresentation of facts and looking to the averments made in paragraph nos.3 to 7 of the memorandum of appeal vide Annexure-5, finds the following pleadings made in paragraph nos.3, 4, 5, 6 & 7 :- '3. That pending disposal of the above noted encroachment cases, again on report of the R.I, Sadar-II, Keonjhar, another Encroachment case bearing No.1/85-86 was instituted in the Court of the Tahasildar, Keonjhar for the same land against Smt. Basanta Kumari Devi D/o. Sri Natha Kar. On the report of Revenue Supervisor dated 16.08.1986 (Annexure-II) the Tahasildar, Keonjhar vide his order dated 19.11.1986 in the Encroachment Case No.1/85-86 settled the above noted case land in favour of the encroacher Smt. Basanta Kumari Devi. 4. That on verification of R.O.R. it is found that the case land was recorded in Abadagogya Anabadi Khata with kissam Sarad-III in the current settlement. A note of possession was recorded in the name of Baidhar Pani S/o Madhusudan Pani of village-Jamuhata in the remarks column against the above noted plots. 5. That it is revealed from the Encroachment Case No.1/83-84 and 1/85-86 that Sri Baidhar Pani originally belongs to village-Balarampur under Anandapur Tahasil and he was serving as a Primary School Teacher. Basanta Kumari Devi, the encroacher in the encroachment No.1/85-86 is the wife of Sri Baidhar Pani. 6. That the husband of the encroacher was serving as a Primary School Teacher and his annual income from service source was Rs.10,632.10 as per the pay particulars received from B.D.O, Banaspal (Annexur-III). 7. That it has come to the notice of the State Govt. 6. That the husband of the encroacher was serving as a Primary School Teacher and his annual income from service source was Rs.10,632.10 as per the pay particulars received from B.D.O, Banaspal (Annexur-III). 7. That it has come to the notice of the State Govt. that the Tahasildar, Keonjhar has not enquired properly into the eligibility criteria of the encroacher and without receiving the land particulars of Sri Baidhar Pani from the Tahasildar, Anandpur and service particulars from B.D.O, Banaspal has settled the case land in favour of Smt. Basanta Kumari Devi D/o Sri Natha Kar of village Jamuhata on the basis of wrong report from the field staff. Basanta Kumari Devi is wife of Sri Baidhar Pani and in consideration of the income of Sri Pani from service source and in the absence of his detailed land particulars and other grounds she was not entitled for settlement of the encroach land as per the provision of the Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Act, 1972. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the learned Tahasildar, Keonjhar in Encroachment Case No.1/85-86 the appellant begs to prefer this appeal on the following grounds alongwith others.' This Court here finds, allegation that the appeal did not involve any pleading on fraud and misrepresentation of facts, falls flat. Further even as of now neither the lessee nor her children denied the allegation that the husband of the lessee was a good earner and was also in occupation of a piece of land as an encroacher. Husband's salary per annum at that point of time had also taken out the eligibility of the family to the entitlement of a piece of land on lease basis on the premises of their landlessness. 8. There is civil court decree in T.S. No.79/2001 preferred by the mother of the Petitioners where the mother of the Petitioners though could set aside the earlier order in appeal, however, also got a direction for reopening of the appeal. The appeal was directed to be disposed of in the involvement of the Petitioners. Civil Court judgment reveals as follows:- 'The suit be and the same is decreed on contest against the Defendants with costs. It is hereby declared that the order dtd.27.4.2001 passed by the Defendant No.4 in Lease Appeal No.1/2000 and the notice dated.14.8.2001 (Ext.1) issued by Defendant No.2 to the plaintiff are illegal, inoperative and null and void. Civil Court judgment reveals as follows:- 'The suit be and the same is decreed on contest against the Defendants with costs. It is hereby declared that the order dtd.27.4.2001 passed by the Defendant No.4 in Lease Appeal No.1/2000 and the notice dated.14.8.2001 (Ext.1) issued by Defendant No.2 to the plaintiff are illegal, inoperative and null and void. Defendant No.4 is directed to dispose of the Lease Appeal No.1/2000 afresh in accordance with law after due notice to the plaintiff and affording her opportunity of being heard. Consequentially the notice (Ext.1) is non-est in law and as such the defendant No.2 is directed not to take any re-course for vacation of the possession of the suit land by the plaintiff. Pleaders' fees at contested scale.' This order of the Civil Court since accepted by the mother of the Petitioners and she, accordingly, participated in the fresh disposal of the appeal is now estopped in challenging the maintainability of such appeal. Acceptance of Civil Court judgment itself amounting to condonation of delay. There is again reopening of the appeal by virtue of order of this Court in W.P.(C) No.13368 of 2008. 9. This Court here finds, Petitioners have moved twice this Court. First through W.P.(C) No.13368 of 2008. It appears, through paragraph no.3 therein Petitioner had already taken the ground of delay in filing the Lease Appeal No.1 of 2000 and as a consequence Petitioner has also taken the ground of delay in paragraph No.13 therein. This writ petition was disposed of on 15.09.2008 in setting set aside the ex parte order in the appeal therein and thereby remanding the matter to the appellate authority for deciding the appeal afresh. Petitioners appeared in the appeal and contested the matter. In the second round of litigation bringing a writ petition vide W.P.(C) No.11087 of 2010 the Petitioner here also in paragraph No.3 took the ground of delay. Through paragraph no.8 Petitioner agitated the condonation of delay. Petitioners even though agitated such grounds twice, but remained satisfied with the two orders of this Court undisputedly also in the involvement of the ground of delay raised by the Petitioners. 10. In the circumstance, this Court finds, Petitioners are estopped from raising the ground of delay even. Through paragraph no.8 Petitioner agitated the condonation of delay. Petitioners even though agitated such grounds twice, but remained satisfied with the two orders of this Court undisputedly also in the involvement of the ground of delay raised by the Petitioners. 10. In the circumstance, this Court finds, Petitioners are estopped from raising the ground of delay even. To add to above in paragraph no.21 Petitioners themselves in their attempt to challenge the condonation of delay in filing the appeal contended that the alleged fraud was detected before August, 1997 and sanction of the competent authority was also obtained in the same month, thus the appeal should have been brought at least within one year of such detection at least by 13.08.1998 and that too for the appeal being filed on 25.09.2000 there is no explanation for the delay between 13.08.1998 to 25.09.2000. Petitioners here also took support of the memorandum of appeal submitted by him and filed vide Annexure-5. The condonation of delay application is also filed at Annmexure-5/A. Looking to the year of appeal as mentioned in Annexure-5 more particularly at page 33 of the brief, this Court finds, there appears to be; the appeal was initially brought in 1997 and in the delay condonation application vide Annexure-5/A starts from page 37 at page 39 verification in such application appears to have been done on...........th day of August, 1997. Annexure-6 is the appeal order. Petitioner himself since filed copy of the memorandum of appeal and the condonation of delay vide Annexures-5 & 5/A it is possible that the appeal was in fact brought in 1997 and there might be re-numbering of the appeal in 2000. From the documents enclosed by the Petitioners themselves and for the observation made hereinabove, this Court finds strength in the claim of the State Counsel through the document. Further even assuming that there is delay in filing appeal in 2000, however, taking into consideration the decision vide (2015)3 SCC 695 this Court finds, the case cited by Mr. Mukherji, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners indicated hereinabove involves a challenge to the action of the year 2004 to the discovery in 1991 but however involving an issue of five decades back. Mukherji, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners indicated hereinabove involves a challenge to the action of the year 2004 to the discovery in 1991 but however involving an issue of five decades back. Hon'ble apex Court even though appreciated the detection aspect in the year 1991, however for the litigation brought in 2004 after 13 years of such detection, declined to entertain the SLP. In the case at hand admittedly the detection was made in 1997 and the memorandum of appeal at Annexure-5 shows, the appeal was brought in 1997. As per the own document of the Petitioners however the appeal was decided by the order vide Annexure-6 appears to be registered in 2001. This Court here even though finds, principle decided through the above judgment does not apply to the case at hand and that there is possibly two years delay, however looking to the decision in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by Lrs. (supra) finds, the Hon'ble apex Court through paragraph Nos.4 & 5 has taken the following view:- '4. The High Court reversed the findings of the trial court on the following reasonings: 'Let us assume for the purpose of argument that this document, Ex. B-15, was of the latter category and the plaintiff, the benamidar, had completely divested himself of all rights of every description. Even so, it cannot be held that his failure to disclose the execution of Ex. B-15 would amount to collateral or extrinsic fraud. The utmost that can be said in favour of the defendants is that a plaintiff who had no title (at the time when the suit was filed) to the properties, has falsely asserted title and one of the questions that would arise either expressly or by necessary implication is whether the plaintiff had a subsisting title to the properties. It was up to the defendants, to plead and establish by gathering all the necessary materials, oral and documentary, that the plaintiff had no title to the suit properties. It is their duty to obtain an encumbrance certificate and find out whether the plaintiff had still a subsisting title at the time of the suit. The plaintiff did not prevent the defendants, did not use any contrivance, nor any trick nor any deceit by which the defendants were prevented from raising proper pleas and adducing the necessary evidence. It is their duty to obtain an encumbrance certificate and find out whether the plaintiff had still a subsisting title at the time of the suit. The plaintiff did not prevent the defendants, did not use any contrivance, nor any trick nor any deceit by which the defendants were prevented from raising proper pleas and adducing the necessary evidence. The parties were fighting at arm's length and it is the duty of each to traverse or question the allegations made by the other and to adduce all available evidence regarding the basis of the plaintiff's claim or the defence of the defendants and the truth or falsehood concerning the same. A party litigant cannot be indifferent, and negligent in his duty to place the materials in support of his contention and afterwards seek to show that the case of his opponent was false. The position would be entirely different if a party litigant could establish that in a prior litigation his opponent prevented him by an independent, collateral wrongful act such as keeping his witnesses in wrongful or secret confinement, stealing his documents to prevent him from adducing any evidence, conducting his case by tricks and misrepresentation resulting in his misleading of the Court. Here, nothing of the kind had happened and the contesting defendants could have easily produced a certified registration copy of Ex. B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff; and, it is absurd for them to take advantage of or make a point of their own acts of omission or negligence or carelessness in the conduct of their own defence.' The High Court further held as under: 'From this decision it follows that except proceedings for probate and other proceedings where a duty is cast upon a party litigant to disclose all the facts, in all other cases, there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to Court with a true case and prove it by true evidence. It would cut at the root of the fundamental principle of law of finality of litigation enunciated in the maxim 'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium' if it should be held that a judgment obtained by a plaintiff in a false case, false to his knowledge, could be set aside on the ground of fraud, in a subsequent litigation.' Finally, the High Court held as under: 'The principle of this decision governs the instant case. At the worst the plaintiff is guilty of fraud in having falsely alleged, at the time when he filed the suit for partition, he had subsisting interest in the property though he had already executed Ex. B-15. Even so, that would not amount to extrinsic fraud because that is a matter which could well have been traversed and established to be false by the appellant by adducing the necessary evidence. The preliminary decree in the partition suit necessarily involves an adjudication though impliedly that the plaintiff has a subsisting interest in the property.' 5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that 'there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence'. The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. For the involvement of fraud played by one of the party in paragraph no.6 the Hon'ble apex Court held as follows:- '6. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Ex. B-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellants-defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Ex. B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.' Similarly through the decision in the case of State of Orissa & Ors. (supra) the Hon'ble apex Court in paragraph no.16 again finding that there involves fraud and suppression of material facts, came to hold as follows:- '16. It is, therefore, settled law that when the revisional power was conferred to effectuate a purpose, it is to be exercised in a reasonable manner which inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. Absence of limitation is an assurance to exercise the power with caution or circumspection to effectuate the purpose of the Act, or to prevent miscarriage of justice or violation of the provisions of the Act or misuse or abuse of the power by the lower authorities or fraud or suppression. Length of time depends on the factual scenario in a given case. Length of time depends on the factual scenario in a given case. Take a case that patta was obtained fraudulently in collusion with the officers and it comes to the notice of the authorities after a long lapse of time. Does it lie in the mouth of the party to the fraud to plead limitation to get away with the order? Does lapse of time an excuse to refrain from exercising the revisional power to unravel fraud and to set it right? The answers would be no.' 11. For the background narrated hereinabove and the decision taken note hereinabove settling the legal position that mere delay cannot take away the challenge of the party, in the event there is involvement of fraud, this Court in paragraph no.7 has already come to observe that there is clear pleading of fraud. Not only that there is also establishment of such allegation by the contesting authority. 12. Coming to reliance of the provision at Section 17(I) of the Limitation Act in the context filing of appeal at least within one year from the date of detection of fraud, this Court finds, considering similar situation involving statutory authorities the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Birla Cement Works (supra) in paragraph no.3 came to observe as follows:- '3. Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply only to a suit instituted or an application made in that behalf in the civil suit. The Tribunal is the creature of the statute. Therefore, it is not a civil court nor the Limitation Act has application, even though it may be held that the petitioner discovered the mistake committed in paying 'overcharges' and the limitation is not saved by operation of Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act.' This decision clarifies the position of applicability of Section 16 & 17 of the Limitation Act only to suits and not to the proceedings undertaken by the authorities under Statute and or Tribunal under any Statute. 13. In the circumstance, this Court finds, there is no illegality in condonation of delay, if any. Further the orders passed by the Appellate Authority as well as the Revisional authority are also legal and justified requiring no interference in both the orders vide Annexures-8 & 9. In the result, this Court declines to interfere in the impugned order and set aside the same. 14. The Writ Petition stands dismissed. Further the orders passed by the Appellate Authority as well as the Revisional authority are also legal and justified requiring no interference in both the orders vide Annexures-8 & 9. In the result, this Court declines to interfere in the impugned order and set aside the same. 14. The Writ Petition stands dismissed. There is, however, no order as to costs.