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2023 DIGILAW 1451 (JHR)

Kamini Mohan Mehra v. State of Jharkhand

2023-12-11

SUBHASH CHAND

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Special P.P. for the State. 2. The present criminal revision has been preferred against the order dated 17th January, 2023 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Khunti in Murhu P.S. Case No.85 of 2019, whereby the discharge petition under Sections 239 and 240 of the Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner has been rejected. 3. The brief facts leading to this criminal revision are that the informant had given a written information with the police station concerned with these allegations that he was account holder of saving bank account no.31484484727 in Murhu Branch District Khunti from which the amount of Rs.35 lakhs was transferred unauthorizedly in the bank account of Sanjay Kumar Kundu s/o Late Manna Kasera Main Road, Murhu District Khunti bearing A/c No.32241683733. The said amount of Rs.35 lakhs was withdrawn by Sanjay Kumar Kundu in three installments i.e., Rs.15 lakhs on 27th February, 2019, Rs.13 lakhs on 28th February, 2019 and Rs.7 lakhs on 1st March, 2019 and ultimately on 2nd April, 2019 Sanjay Kumar Kundu has closed his bank account. The matter was disclosed on 26th September, 2019 when the account holder, namely, Mithila Sharan came to the State Bank of India, Murhu Branch for updating his passbook. He found that Rs.35 lakhs has been unauthorizedly transferred from his account and he informed to the Branch Manager on 27th September, 2019. Then the present Branch Manager, Mr. Abhay Kumar Singh contacted the then Branch Manager Kamini Mohan Mehra over her mobile phone, thereafter, Kamini Mohan Mehra came to the Branch on 30th September, 2019 and deposited Rs.10,00,000/- in the account. On 30th September, 2019 he also met Mithila Sharan and assured him that entire amount shall be deposited in his account within ten days. On 5th October, 2019, Sri Kamini Mohan Mehra apprised to the Branch Manager that one person is coming to deposit Rs.8,00,000/- in the said account on his behalf. Further on 10th October, 2019 Kamini Mohan Mehra again apprised to the Branch Manager that Rs.11,00,000/- shall be deposited in the said account. On 11th October, 2019 Rs.4,50,000/- were deposited. On 15th October, 2019 Sri Mehra said over the phone that Branch Manager, Hemant should go to Arun Saboo and ask him to collect Rs.50,000/- and deposit it in the account of Mithila Sharan. On 11th October, 2019 Rs.4,50,000/- were deposited. On 15th October, 2019 Sri Mehra said over the phone that Branch Manager, Hemant should go to Arun Saboo and ask him to collect Rs.50,000/- and deposit it in the account of Mithila Sharan. On 16th October, 2019 Sri Mehra came himself and stated that rest of the amount would be deposited. As such the whole amount was deposited in the said account. Hence, the F.I.R. was lodged against the accused Sanjay Kumar Kundu and Kamini Mohan Mehra which was registered as Murhu P.S. Case No.85 of 2019 for the offence under Section 406, 409, 467 and 468 of the I.P.C. 4. The re-statement of the informant Abhay Kumar Singh, Branch Manager is at paragraph 7 of the case-diary in which he reiterated the allegations made in the F.I.R. 5. In paragraph 9 of the case-diary, the statement of witness Amarjeet Ram was recorded who is cashier of S.B.I. Murhu Branch. He corroborated the allegations made in the F.I.R. and stated that on 27th February, 2019 Sanjay Kumar Kundu came to withdraw the amount of Rs.15 lakhs from his account at his counter. He asked the reason for withdrawal of so huge amount and he stated that said amount was the sale proceed of his land and same is needed to him for treatment as he was going to Vellore. He contacted the then Branch Manager Kamini Mohan Mehra on this very issue and the Branch Manager ordered to make the payment. Sanjay Kumar Kundu further withdrew the amount of Rs.13,00,000/- on 28th February, 2019 and on 1st March, 2019 of Rs.7,00,000/-. Ultimately he closed his account on 2nd April, 2019. He also stated that such a huge amount of Rs.35,00,000/- could not be transferred from the account of Mithila Sharan without his permission in his personal presence. Thereafter Kamini Mohan Mehra came to S.B.I. Branch and he deposited amount of Rs.10,00,000/- Thereafter on behalf of Kamini Mohan Mehra through different medium deposited the whole amount of Rs.35,00,000/-. 6. In paragraph 10 of the case-diary, witness Prabha Kachhap who was also posted in the S.B.I. Murhu Branch on the date of occurrence also corroborated the prosecution story and gave the same kind of statement as given by the cashier Amarjeet Ram. 7. 6. In paragraph 10 of the case-diary, witness Prabha Kachhap who was also posted in the S.B.I. Murhu Branch on the date of occurrence also corroborated the prosecution story and gave the same kind of statement as given by the cashier Amarjeet Ram. 7. In paragraphs 18 and 19 of the case-diary, witnesses Raman Kumar Tiwari and Hemant Mahto also gave the same kind of statement. 8. In paragraph 36 of the case-diary, the informant Mithila Sharan stated that from his account no.31484484727, Rs.35,00,000/- was transferred unauthorizedly. He came to know in this regard on 26th September, 2019 when he reached bank for updating his passbook. He made the complaint to that effect to the Branh Manager on 27th September, 2019. Thereafter on 30th September, 2019 he was called to S.B.I. Murhu Branch where he met to the then Branch Manager Kamini Mohan Mehra who stated that mistakenly the said amount was transferred from his account. He also deposited Rs.10,00,000/- on the very day in his account and stated that rest of the amount shall be deposited within ten days. Ultimately total amount of Rs.35,00,000/- was deposited in his account. 9. In paragraph 47 of the case-diary, Sanjay Kumar Kundu has stated that Bank Manager Kamini Mehra used to come by bus and he came in his contact. The Manager Kamini Mehra asked to purchase his land which is situated in Tupudana Ranchi. He agreed for the same and Kamini Mehra assured that purchase amount of same shall be deposited in his account. The Manager also asked him to come to the Bank on 23rd February, 2019 and the amount shall be deposited in his account. As such the Rs.35,00,000/- was deposited in his account, later he told him that he will not purchase the said land and he asked him to withdraw the said amount from the account and give him back. He withdrew the said amount from his account and ultimately gave to Kamini Mohan Mehra after having withdrawn the same from the account and his account was also closed. 10. In paragraph 54 of the case-diary, the statement of Surekha Tigga was recorded. She also stated that in regard to transfer of amount of Rs.35,00,000/- from the account of Mithila Sharan the transfer voucher was given. He asked Prabha Mam to match the signature before generating the que in the computer. 10. In paragraph 54 of the case-diary, the statement of Surekha Tigga was recorded. She also stated that in regard to transfer of amount of Rs.35,00,000/- from the account of Mithila Sharan the transfer voucher was given. He asked Prabha Mam to match the signature before generating the que in the computer. Prabha mam asked her to omit que at the behest of Manager. The que was omitted in the computer and huge amount of Rs.35,00,000/- was transferred which cannot be transferred in absence of the account holder and his permission. She also verified the KYC. 11. In paragraph 77 of the case-diary, the CDR details of the mobile phone of Kamini Mohan Mehra and Sanjay Kumar Kundu were also given and ultimately the charge-sheet was filed. 12. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 13. It is the settled law that while framing charge, the Court has to take into consideration the allegations made in the F.I.R. and also the evidence collected by the I.O. i.e., oral or documentary during the investigation. If from the allegations made in the F.I.R. and the evidence collected during investigation, there are sufficient ground to proceed, the Court should decline to allow the discharge application. If from the cumulative evidence i.e., oral and documentary collected during the investigation and the allegations made in the F.I.R., the Court is of the definite opinion that there is no ground to proceed against the trial, the application for the discharge may be allowed. 14. The Hon’ble Apex court in the case of Palwinder Singh vs. Balwinder Singh & Ors. reported in (2008) 14 SCC 504 at paragraph 13 has held as under : “13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it entered into the realm of appreciation of evidence at the stage of the framing of the charges itself. The jurisdiction of the learned Sessions Judge while exercising power under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is limited. Charges can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshalling and appreciation of evidence is not in the domain of the Court at that point of time. The jurisdiction of the learned Sessions Judge while exercising power under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is limited. Charges can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshalling and appreciation of evidence is not in the domain of the Court at that point of time. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi wherein it was held as under: “23. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, in our view, clearly the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material. Satish Mehra case [Satish Mehra v. Delhi Admn. holding that the trial court has powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage of Section 227 of the Code has not been correctly decided.” 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CBI v. Mukesh Pravinchandra Shroff reported in (2009) 16 SCC 429 at paragraph 2 has held as under : “2. By the impugned order, the Special Court has discharged the accused Raghunath Lekhraj Wadhwa, Jitendra Ratilal Shroff and Mukesh Pravinchandra Shroff from Special Case No. 4 of 1997. From a bare perusal of the impugned order, it would appear that the Special Court has virtually passed an order of acquittal in the garb of an order of discharge. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of the charge, what is required to be seen is as to whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In our view, the Special Court was not justified in discharging the aforesaid accused persons.” 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vikram Johar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 2019 SC 2109 at paragraph 19 has held as under : “19. It is, thus, clear that while considering the discharge application, the Court is to exercise its judicial mind to determine whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the Court is not to hold the mini trial by marshalling the evidence.” 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerala and Another reported in 2010 (2) SCC 398 at paragraphs 11 and 25 has held as under : “11. It is true that in such proceedings, the Court is not to hold the mini trial by marshalling the evidence.” 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerala and Another reported in 2010 (2) SCC 398 at paragraphs 11 and 25 has held as under : “11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. 25. As discussed earlier, Section 227 in the new Code confers special power on the Judge to discharge an accused at the threshold if upon consideration of the records and documents, he finds that “there is not sufficient ground” for proceeding against the accused. In other words, his consideration of the record and documents at that stage is for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228, if not, he will discharge the accused. This provision was introduced in the Code to avoid wastage of public time when a prima facie case was not disclosed and to save the accused from avoidable harassment and expenditure.” 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tarun Jit Tejpal vs. The State of Goa & Anr. reported in 2019 (4) East Cr C 208 (SC) at paragraphs 9.1 to 9.5 has held as under : “9.1 In the case of N. Suresh Rajan (Supra) this Court had an occasion to consider in detail the scope of the proceedings at the stage of framing of the charge under Section 227/228 CrPC. After considering earlier decisions of this Court on the point thereafter in paragraph 29 to 31 this Court has observed and held as under: "29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. After considering earlier decisions of this Court on the point thereafter in paragraph 29 to 31 this Court has observed and held as under: "29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. 30. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. 30. Reference in this connection can be made to a recent decision of this Court in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat vs. State of U.P. [ (2013) 11 SCC 476 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 21 : AIR 2013 SC 52 ], in which, after analysing various decisions on the point, this Court endorsed the following view taken in Onkar Nath Mishra vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [ (2008) 2 SCC 561 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507] : (Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat case [ (2013) 11 SCC 476 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 21 : AIR 2013 SC 52 ], SCC p. 482, para 15) "15. 11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. ( Onkar Nath case [ (2008) 2 SCC 561 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507 ], SCC p. 565, para 11)" (emphasis in original) 31. Now reverting to the decisions of this Court in Sajjan Kumar [Sajjan Kumar vs. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] and Dilawar Balu Kurane [Dilawar Balu Kurane vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310], relied on by the respondents, we are of the opinion that they do not advance their case. The aforesaid decisions consider the provision of Section 227 of the Code and make it clear that at the stage of discharge the court cannot make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if it was conducting a trial. The aforesaid decisions consider the provision of Section 227 of the Code and make it clear that at the stage of discharge the court cannot make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if it was conducting a trial. It is worth mentioning that the Code contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Session under Section 227 in a case triable by it; cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245. From a reading of the aforesaid sections it is evident that they contain somewhat different provisions with regard to discharge of an accused: 31.1. Under Section 227 of the Code, the trial court is required to discharge the accused if it "considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". However, discharge under Section 239 can be ordered when "the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless". The power to discharge is exercisable under Section 245(1) when, "the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction". 31.2. Section 227 and 239 provide for discharge before the recording of evidence on the basis of the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard. However, the stage of discharge under Section 245, on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence referred in Section 244 has been taken. 31.3. Thus, there is difference in the language employed in these provisions. But, in our opinion, notwithstanding these differences, and whichever provision may be applicable, the court is required at this stage to see that there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused. Reference in this connection can be made to a judgment of this Court in R.S. Nayak vs. A.R. Antulay [ (1986) 2 SCC 716 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 256]. The same reads as follows: (SCC pp. 755-56, para 43) "43. Reference in this connection can be made to a judgment of this Court in R.S. Nayak vs. A.R. Antulay [ (1986) 2 SCC 716 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 256]. The same reads as follows: (SCC pp. 755-56, para 43) "43. Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is no scope for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is required to consider the question of framing of charge under Section 245(1) is a preliminary one and the test of prima facie case has to be applied. In spite of the difference in the language of the three sections, the legal position is that if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed." 9.2 In the subsequent decision in the case of S. Selvi (Supra) this Court has summarised the principles while framing of the charge at the stage of Section 227/228 of the CrPC. This Court has observed and held in paragraph 6 and 7 as under: "6. It is well settled by this Court in a catena of judgments including Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609, Dilawar Balu Kurane vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310, Sajjan Kumar vs. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371, State vs. A. Arun Kumar, (2015) 2 SCC 417 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 96 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 505, Sonu Gupta vs. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 265, State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2003) 2 SCC 711 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 688, Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 47 and Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038 that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 of the Code in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his rights to discharge the accused. The Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the statements and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the materials as if he was conducting a trial. 7. In Sajjan Kumar vs. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371, this Court on consideration of the various decisions about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, laid down the following principles: (SCC pp. 376-77, para 21) "(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face 8/31/23, 3:08 PM Tarun Jit Tejpal VS State of Goa about:blank 8/10 value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal."" 9.3 In the case of Mauvin Godinho (Supra) this Court had an occasion to consider how to determine prima facie case while framing the charge under Section 227/228 of the CrPC. In the same decision this Court observed and held that while considering the prima facie case at the stage of framing of the charge under Section 227 of the CrPC there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. 9.4 At this stage the decision of this Court in the case of Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad (Supra) is also required to be referred to. In that aforesaid decision this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of enquiry at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227/228 of the CrPC. In paragraphs 11 to 14 observations of this Court in the aforesaid decision are as under : "11. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having bearing on the contentions urged for the parties, provides: "227. Discharge.-- If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing." 12. Section 228 requires the Judge to frame charge if he considers that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The interaction of these two sections has already been the subject-matter of consideration by this Court. Section 228 requires the Judge to frame charge if he considers that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The interaction of these two sections has already been the subject-matter of consideration by this Court. In State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh [ (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533 : (1978) 1 SCR 257 ], Untwalia, J., while explaining the scope of the said sections observed: [SCR p. 259 : SCC pp. 41-42 : SCC (Cri) pp. 535-36, para 4] Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously Judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 13. In Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal [ (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609 : (1979) 2 SCR 229 ], Fazal Ali, J., summarised some of the principles: [SCR pp. 234-35 : SCC p. 9 : SCC (Cri) pp. 13. In Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal [ (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609 : (1979) 2 SCR 229 ], Fazal Ali, J., summarised some of the principles: [SCR pp. 234-35 : SCC p. 9 : SCC (Cri) pp. 613-14, para 10] "(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused had been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial." 14. These two decisions do not lay down different principles. Prafulla Kumar case [ (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609 : (1979) 2 SCR 229 ] has only reiterated what has been stated in Ramesh Singh case [ (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533 : (1978) 1 SCR 257 ]. In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into." 9.5 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and considering the scope of enquiry at the stage of framing of the charge under Section 227/228 if the CrPC, we are of the opinion that the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant on merits, at this stage, are not required to be considered. Whatever submissions are made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant are on merits are required to be dealt with and considered at an appropriate stage during the course of the trial. Some of the submissions may be considered to be the defence of the accused. Some of the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant on the conduct of the victim/prosecutrix are required to be dealt with and considered at an appropriate stage during the trial. The same are not required to be considered at this stage of framing of the charge. On considering the material on record, we are of the opinion that there is more than a prima facie case against the accused for which he is required to be tried. There is sufficient ample material against the accused and therefore the learned Trial Court has rightly framed the charge against the accused and the same is rightly confirmed by the High Court. No interference of this Court is called for.” 19. There is sufficient ample material against the accused and therefore the learned Trial Court has rightly framed the charge against the accused and the same is rightly confirmed by the High Court. No interference of this Court is called for.” 19. From the allegations made in the F.I.R. and also from the evidence collected by the I.O., it prima facie made out that it was the petitioner Kamini Mohan Mehra, the then Branch Manager of S.B.I. Murhu Branch, District Khunti who was instrumental in transfer of huge amount of Rs.35,00,000/- from the account of Mithila Sharan to the account of Sanjay Kumar Kundu for the purpose of purchasing the land from Sanjay Kumar Kundu and when this embezzlement was disclosed it was Kamini Mohan Mehra who himself deposited the whole of the amount in various installments and also through his messengers in the account of Mithila Sharan. As such while transferring the huge amount of Rs.35,00,000/- in the account of Mithila Sharan there was dishonest intention on the part of petitioner to embezzle the said amount. 20. Mere depositing the defalcated amount subsequently, does not exonerate the accused/petitioner from the charge of commission of offence which has been ultimately committed by him. 21. In view of the allegations made in the F.I.R., the cumulative evidence collected by the I.O. during investigation i.e., oral as well as documentary and the settled propositions of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, there are sufficient grounds to proceed with trial against the accused. As such, the impugned order dated 17th January, 2023 passed by the court below rejecting the discharge application needs no interference. 22. Accordingly, this criminal revision is, hereby, dismissed and the impugned order passed by the learned court below is hereby affirmed. 23. The interim protection granted to the petitioner vide order dated 27th June, 2023 stands vacated. 24. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the court concerned through ‘FAX’.