JUDGMENT : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. 1. Heard Ms. Mhabeni, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Ms. Livika, learned Government Advocate for the respondents. 2. Personal liberty of an individual is the most precious and prized right guaranteed under the Constitution in Part-III thereof. The State has been granted the power to curb such rights under criminal laws as also under the laws of preventive detention, which, therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution as well as upon a proper appreciation of facts as to whether such acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security of the State and its citizens or seeks to disturb public law and order, warranting the issue of such an order. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court take into consideration the facts involved. 3. The petitioner in the instant writ proceedings is the wife of one Mr. Talimbo Zeliang, who by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, has challenged the Detention Order dated 26.07.2023 passed by the District Magistrate cum Deputy Commissioner, Kohima; the Government Approval Order dated 07.08.2023 issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland and the Confirmation Order dated 17.10.2023 issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland. From a perusal of the writ petition, it appears that the husband of the petitioner, Mr. Talimbo Zeliang was arrested near Kidema Prayer Park area, under Kohima District on 05.07.2023 by Police personnel, while he was travelling from Dimapur to Phek in a taxi. The ground of arrest was on account of alleged possession and seizure of prohibited ammunitions containing 200 Nos. of SLR ammunitions. On the basis thereof, a case was registered, being Kezocha PS Case No. 005/23 under Section 25 (1A) of the Arms Act, 1959 (for short, the Act of 1959), read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Thereupon, the husband of the petitioner was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kohima on 06.07.2023, and the case being GR Case No. 95/2023 was registered. After the production of the husband of the petitioner, he was kept in Police remand for 10 (ten) days, after which he was remanded back to judicial custody and was kept in the District Jail, Kohima. After the production of the husband of the petitioner, he was kept in Police remand for 10 (ten) days, after which he was remanded back to judicial custody and was kept in the District Jail, Kohima. A Bail Application was filed through the uncle of the husband of the petitioner, one Shri Tahikambou Zeliang, before the District and Sessions Judge, Kohima on 27.07.2023. However, on that very date, it was informed to the Court that the Detention Order dated 26.07.2023 was passed by the District Magistrate cum Deputy Commissioner, Kohima against the husband of the petitioner for which the said Bail application was kept pending. 4. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of the circumstances which led to the passing of the Detention Order bearing No. DCK/CON/NSA/2023/01 (for short referred to as ‘the Detention Order) dated 26.07.2023. The records which have been produced before this Court reveals that on 24.07.2023, the Superintendent of Police, Kohima had submitted a proposal before the Deputy Commissioner cum District Magistrate, Kohima for detention under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980, (for short, the Act of 1980), in respect of the husband of the petitioner. From a perusal of the said document, it reveals that 2 persons were arrested including the husband of the petitioner and both the persons were produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 06.07.2023 and were remanded under Police custody for a period of 5 days. On completion of the Police remand period, on 10.07.2023, extension for another 5 days was prayed to the Court. The grounds of detention for which the proposal was made is that the husband of the petitioner had committed a serious crime, wherein he had intentionally abdicated all responsibilities of a government servant by indulging in the sinister act of facilitating the illegal procurement of government ammunition for the nefarious benefit of anti-social elements thereby posing grave threat to the security and peace of the State. The second ground was that 7.62 caliber ammunitions were transported by the husband of the petitioner, which was meant for lethal high power rifles, and the same reflects the complicit knowledge of the arrested husband of the petitioner in the potential damage it could have caused to the physical security of the citizens and the State security forces. The second ground was that 7.62 caliber ammunitions were transported by the husband of the petitioner, which was meant for lethal high power rifles, and the same reflects the complicit knowledge of the arrested husband of the petitioner in the potential damage it could have caused to the physical security of the citizens and the State security forces. It was also mentioned as one of the grounds that the activities of the husband of the petitioner were detrimental to the security and peace of the society and if bailed there was a likelihood of the husband of the petitioner committing breach of peace and tranquility of the State, thereby endangering the safety and security in the society. 5. On the basis of the said proposal, the Detention Order was passed on 26.07.2023, duly acknowledging that the petitioner was arrested by the Police in connection with Kezocha PS Case No. 005/23 under Section 25 (1A) of the Arms Act, read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. There was no mention, however, in the said Detention Order that the husband of the petitioner was likely to be released from custody in near future. Be that as it may, the Schedule appended to the said Detention Order reflects that keeping the accused at large (if bailed) is likely to endanger the safety and security of the State and the Union of India and also to prevent him from further indulging in activities, highly prejudicial to the maintenance of public security, peace and order. 6. The record further reveals that the petitioner was duly communicated with the Detention Order on 28.07.2023. The petitioner thereupon submitted a representation on 05.08.2023 to the Detaining Authority as well as to the State Government. On 08.08.2023, the petitioner’s husband received an order bearing No. CON/NSA/01/2023/41 dated 07.08.2023, issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, wherein it was reflected that the State Government of Nagaland was satisfied with the view taken by the District Magistrate, Kohima to prevent the husband of the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State of Nagaland and the maintenance of public order, for which the State Government of Nagaland approved the Detention Order of the District Magistrate, Kohima to detain the husband of the petitioner. It was also mentioned that in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 3(2) of the Act of 1980, the State Government of Nagaland ordered that the husband of the petitioner be detained and kept in Central Jail, Dimapur for an initial period of 3 months w.e.f. the date of detention till 25.10.2023 and within which period, the detention will be reviewed as required under the provisions of the Act of 1980. The said order was issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland on 07.08.2023 and is hereinafter referred as ‘the Approval Order’. The record also reflects that the said order was communicated to the Central Government on 07.08.2023 itself as is the requirement in terms with Section 3 (5) of the Act of 1980. 7. The records further reveals that the petitioner’s husband received an order bearing No. CON/NSA/01/2023/49 dated 14.08.2023, issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland whereby the husband of the petitioner was intimated that the representation submitted by the husband of the petitioner lacked merit, and accordingly, the same was not acceded to by the State Government. It is also seen from the records that the matter pertaining to the petitioner’s husband was referred to the Advisory Board, Nagaland. On 28.08.2023, the Advisory Board submitted the report opining that there was sufficient cause for detention of the husband of the petitioner. This Court has also duly perused the said report, which is Annexure-1 to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 4. The said report does not, in any manner, take into consideration that the petitioner is in judicial custody in connection with Kezocha PS Case No. 005/23 and that the husband of the petitioner is likely to be released from custody in the near future or for that matter, from the materials available with the detention authority, there is likelihood for the petitioner’s husband would be released on bail. 8. 8. It further reveals from that pursuant to the report submitted by the Advisory Board on 26.08.2023, an order was passed on 17.10.2023 bearing No. CON/NSA/01/2023/83 by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland wherein it was mentioned that the detention of the husband of the petitioner was referred to the NSA Advisory Board constituted by the Government of Nagaland and the opinion of the Advisory Board was that there was sufficient cause for detention of the husband of the petitioner under the Act of 1980 and the continued detention of the husband of the petitioner would be necessary in order to prevent him from further indulging in activities which are prejudicial to the security of the State of Nagaland and maintenance of public order warranting his detention under the preventive law. Thereby, vide the said order dated 17.10.2023, the State of Nagaland had, in exercise of powers conferred under Section 12 of the Act of 1980 confirmed the Detention Order issued against the husband of the petitioner and further ordered that the husband of the petitioner shall be detained for another period of 3 months, w.e.f. 26.10.2023 till 25.01.2024, within which period his detention will be reviewed as required under the provisions of the Act of 1980. The said order dated 17.10.2023 is hereinafter referred to as ‘the Confirmation Order’. 9. The petitioner, who is the wife of the detenue, has filed the instant writ petition challenging the Detention Order, the Approval Order as well as the Confirmation Order and has sought for immediate release of her husband for which the instant writ petition has been filed. The record reveals that an affidavit-in-opposition was filed by one Mr. Abhijit Sinha, the Principal Secretary to the Department of Home, Government of Nagaland on 06.12.2023. In the said affidavit-in-opposition, a reference was made that the detenue was arrested in connection with Kezocha PS Case No. 005/23 under Section 25 (1A) of the Act of 1959 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. In Paragraph 4, the grounds of detention were mentioned and stated that the Detaining Authority found the case fit to be booked under the Act of 1980 on the basis of the materials placed before the Detaining Authority. In Paragraph 4, the grounds of detention were mentioned and stated that the Detaining Authority found the case fit to be booked under the Act of 1980 on the basis of the materials placed before the Detaining Authority. It was mentioned that the representation submitted by the petitioner on 05.08.2023 was forwarded by the concerned jail authorities for consideration of the State Government, which was received by the Office of the deponent vide Speed Post and the said representation was duly rejected as there was no merit. Further to that, it was also mentioned that on 26.08.2023, the Advisory Board, Nagaland personally heard the detenue in Nagamese dialect, and on 28.08.2023 submitted report to the State Government, wherein it was opined that there existed sufficient cause for preventive detention of the detenue. Accordingly, the confirmation of the detention dated 7.10.2023 was issued thereby extending the detention by another 3 months from 26.10.2023 to 25.01.2024. This Court further finds it relevant that in the said affidavit-in-opposition, the various grounds alleged in the writ petition were dealt with. Be that as it may, this Court finds it relevant to take note of Paragraph 10 of the said affidavit-in-opposition, wherein it was mentioned that all documents relating to the case of the detenue were placed before the Detaining Authority, the District Magistrate, Kohima and after careful examination of the case, the Detaining Authority inferred that there is likelihood of the detenue to be released on bail, if not held under preventive detention. It was also stated that the Detaining Authority is competent enough to arrive at such a conclusion. 10. In the backdrop of the above, this Court has duly heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties, who contended in the lines of their respective pleadings. 11. The question of personal liberty of a person is sacrosanct and the State cannot be permitted to take it away without following the procedure prescribed by law, otherwise it would be violative of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, in the case of Ayya Alias Ayub vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1989) 1 SCC 374 observed that the law of preventive detention is based and could be described as “jurisdiction of suspicion” and the compulsion of values of freedom, of democratic society and of social order sometimes might compel a curtailment of individual’s liberty. The Supreme Court, in the case of Ayya Alias Ayub vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1989) 1 SCC 374 observed that the law of preventive detention is based and could be described as “jurisdiction of suspicion” and the compulsion of values of freedom, of democratic society and of social order sometimes might compel a curtailment of individual’s liberty. 12. The issue which arises in the instant proceedings amongst others is as to whether a person who is in jail can be detained under the detention laws, taking into account that the husband of the petitioner herein is already in judicial custody. In the case of Dharmendra Sugan Chand Chelawat vs. Union of India, (1990) 1SCC 746, it was observed that an order of detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that: (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenue was already in detention. (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenue is already in detention. The Supreme Court further clarified the expression “compelling reasons” in the context of making an order for detention on a person already in custody to mean that there must be cogent materials before the Detaining Authority on the basis of which it may satisfy that: (a) The detenue is likely to be released from custody in near future. (b) Taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenue, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. 13. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Amrit Lal vs. Union of India, (2001) 1 SCC 341 , wherein a similar issue arose as the Detaining Authority recorded its satisfaction for detention under the Act of 1980 in view of the fact that the person who was already in jail was going to move a bail application. This judgment is very pertinent for the purpose of the instant case taking into account the fact that the uncle of the petitioner’s husband had filed an application seeking bail on 27.07.2023, which is presently pending. This judgment is very pertinent for the purpose of the instant case taking into account the fact that the uncle of the petitioner’s husband had filed an application seeking bail on 27.07.2023, which is presently pending. The Supreme Court observed in the case of Amrit Lal (Supra) that although in the grounds of detention it has been mentioned that there was a likelihood of the detenue moving an application for bail, for which the detention was necessary, there must be cogent materials before the authority passing the Detaining Order that there was likelihood of his release on bail. 14. It is also pertinent to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Geetha vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 7 SCC 603 wherein the Supreme Court observed that the Detaining Authority should be aware that the detenue is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The conclusion that the detenue may be released on bail cannot be ipsi dixit of the Detaining Authority. 15. Further to the above, we find it apt to note the judgment in the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh vs. State of Manipur and Others, (2012) 7 SCC 181 , wherein the Supreme Court culled out the three propositions as to when a person, who is in jail can be detained under the detention laws. Paragraph 9 of the said judgment being relevant is quoted herein-below: “9. In view of the above, it can be held that there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order in respect of a person who is already in custody in respect of criminal case. However, if the detention order is challenged the Detaining Authority has to satisfy the Court the following facts: (1) The authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was actually in custody. (2) There was reliable material before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there was real possibility of his release on bail and further on being released he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order. (3) In view of the above, the authority felt it necessary to prevent him from indulging in such activities and therefore, detention order was necessary.” 16. (3) In view of the above, the authority felt it necessary to prevent him from indulging in such activities and therefore, detention order was necessary.” 16. In the said judgment, i.e. in the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh (Supra), the Supreme Court also observed that merely because somebody else in similar cases had been granted bail, there could be no presumption that in that case also if the detenu applied for bail could have been released on bail. Paragraph 15 of the said judgment being relevant is reproduced herein-below: “15. In the instant case, admittedly, the said bail orders do not relate to the co-accused in the same case. The accused released in those cases on bail had no concern with the present case. Merely, because somebody else in similar cases had been granted bail, there could be no presumption that in the instant case had the detenu applied for bail could have been released on bail. Thus, as the detenu in the instant case has not moved the bail application and no other co-accused, if any, had been enlarged on bail, resorting to the provisions of the Act was not permissible. Therefore, the impugned order of detention is based on mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention and cannot be sustained in the eye of the law.” 17. In the backdrop of the above, we would like to revert to the facts already delineated supra. The proposal which was sent by the Superintendent of Police, Kohima on 24.07.2023 to the Deputy Commissioner cum District Magistrate, Kohima do not, in any manner, state that there were reliable materials on the basis of which one could have reasons to believe that there was a real possibility of the detenue to be released on bail and further, on being released he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order. The Detention Order was passed on 26.07.2023. In the schedule to the Detention Order, there is no mention that there are materials available with the authorities on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there was a reasonable possibility of release on bail. In the Schedule it was stated that keeping the accused at large (if bailed) was likely to endanger the safety and security of the State and the Union of India. In the Schedule it was stated that keeping the accused at large (if bailed) was likely to endanger the safety and security of the State and the Union of India. There is no mention of any cogent materials on the basis of which there were reasons to believe that the husband of the petitioner had a likelihood of being released on bail. 18. At this stage, this Court also finds it relevant to take note that the Detaining Authority, although being a party to the instant proceedings, had not filed any affidavit-in-opposition stating the materials on the basis of which there was likelihood for the husband of the petitioner to be released on bail. This Court, at this stage, finds it relevant to refer to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Adam Ali @ Adil Ali vs. Union of India and Others, 2021 (3) GLT 564, wherein it was observed that the authority who had detained the person had to explain his or her subjective satisfaction before the Court and an affidavit filed by any other person, save and except the person who had passed the detention order, is not explanation of the subjective satisfaction. In the instant case, the affidavit has been filed by the Principal Secretary to the Department of Home, Government of Nagaland, who was not a Detaining Authority. It was the District Magistrate and the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima who passed the Detention Order and therefore, the explanation so given at paragraph 10 of the said affidavit that the Detaining Authority inferred that there is likelihood of the detenue to be released on bail if not held under preventive detention cannot be taken as an explanation of the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. 19. 19. This Court has also taken note of the Approval Order dated 07.08.2023, the order by which the representation of the husband of the petitioner dated 14.08.2023 was rejected, the Advisory Board’s opinion dated 28.08.2023 as well as the Confirmation Order dated 17.10.2023 and in neither of these orders and opinions there is any material that mention that these authorities were fully aware of the fact that the detenue was actually in custody; that there were reliable material before the Detaining Authority on the basis of which the Detaining Authority had reasons to believe that there was real possibility of the detenue, i.e., the husband of the petitioner would be released on bail. Under such circumstances, this Court, therefore, is of the opinion that the Detention Order, the Approval Order as well as the Confirmation Order are based upon mere ipsi dixit statement in the grounds of detention and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 20. Accordingly, the said Detention Order, Approval Order as well as the Confirmation Order are all set aside and quashed. 21. The records, which were produced during the course of hearing, is hereby returned.