JUDGMENT : Goutam Bhaduri, J. 1. Heard. 2. The present appeal is against the order dated 30.8.2019 passed by the learned Single Bench in W.P.(L) No.2940 of 2007, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. 3. The brief facts of the case are that pursuant to a cancellation of registration of the Trade Union of the appellant on 20.2.2007, an appeal was filed before the Industrial Court under Section 11 (1) (aa) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (for short 'the Act, 1926'). 4. The State Industrial Court, Raipur dismissed the appeal by an order dated 26.4.2007 and the same was subject of challenge in the writ petition before the learned Single Bench. The learned Single Bench by the impugned order dated 30.8.2019 dismissed the writ petition. Hence, this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that facts of this case would show that a show cause notice was issued to the appellant by the Registrar, Trade Union, State of C.G. on 23.1.2007. The notice was issued in exercise of powers under Section 10 (b) of the Act, 1926 and two months time was given to reply to the same. However, before expiry of period of two months, on 20.2.2007, an order was passed whereby the registration of the Trade Union was cancelled. He would further submit that though the order was passed by the Industrial Tribunal, but, since there was violation of the fundamental rights, the nature of petition would be under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the writ petition would be maintainable for the reason that there has been a gross violation of rules of natural justice. He placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh and Others Vs. Visan Kumar Shiv Charan Lal reported in [ (2008) 15 SCC 233 ] to submit that nature of relief sought for and the grounds raised in the petition would decide the course of nature of petition. It is stated that admittedly in this case since there was violation of rules of natural justice, the writ petition would directly lie before the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is stated that admittedly in this case since there was violation of rules of natural justice, the writ petition would directly lie before the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is stated that it shows that both the Courts below have failed to consider those facts by referring to the earlier notices, consequently, the registration and the impugned order cannot be sustained. 6. Per contra, learned State counsel would submit that petition itself was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India invoking supervisory jurisdiction of this High Court, therefore, any order passed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction would be not appealable as per the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006, as per Section 2 (1) proviso Clause. He also placed reliance upon the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in [ (2015) 9 SCC 1 ] and Ram Kishan Fauji Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in [ (2017) 5 SCC 533 ]. He would further submit that on the date of filing of the petition, the Union was derecognized and had no entity to file any petition, therefore, the order of the learned Single Bench is well merited and does not call for any interference. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the records of the learned Single Bench as also the impugned order. 8. The initial journey for dispute started from the issuance of notice by the Registrar, Trade Union under Section 10 (b) of the Act, 1926. For ready reference Section 10 (b) of Act, 1926 is reproduced hereunder:- “10. Cancellation of registration.- A certificate of registration of a Trade Union may be withdrawn or cancelled by the Registrar- (a) XXX XXX XXX (b) if the Registrar is satisfied that the certificate has been obtained by fraud or mistake, or that the Trade Union has ceased to exist or has wilfully and after notice from the Registrar contravened any provision of this Act or allowed any rule to continue in force which is inconsistent with any such provision, or has rescinded any rule providing for any matter provision for which is required by Section 6; (c) XXX XXX XXX” 9. The copy of show cause notice issued on 23.1.2007 would show that certain information and enquiry was called for and on the second part of the notice, two months time was given to reply to the same. Before such expiry of two months on 20.2.2007, an order was passed by the Registrar, Trade Union, whereby the registration of the appellant was cancelled. 10. The said order was subject of appeal under Section 11 (1) (aa) of the Act, 1926. For ready reference Section 11 (1) (aa) is reproduced hereunder:- “11. Appeal.-(1) Any person aggrieved by any refusal of the Registrar to register a Trade Union or by the withdrawal or cancellation of a certificate of registration may, within such period as may be prescribed, appeal- (a) XXX XXX XXX [(aa) where the head office is situated in an area, falling within the jurisdiction of a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal, to that Court or Tribunal, as the case may be;] (b) XXX XXX XXX” 11. The State Industrial Court, Raipur by its order dated 26.4.2007 dismissed the appeal. Perusal of the order of the Industrial Court purports that the issue of preponement of date of hearing followed by the judgment, before prescribed period of two months was considered, but, the Court held that prior to issuance of show cause, certain notices were issued, therefore, subsequent notice of 23.1.2007 would be of no consequence. We are unable to affirm such finding. Without going into merits of case, prima facie, it is obvious that if notices are issued to a party calling upon the show cause to reply and certain time is given then in such case, if any preponement of date is made and orders are passed the aggrieved party is necessarily required to be noticed as otherwise it would amount to passing an order behind the back without giving any opportunity of hearing to a litigant. 12. The said order of the Industrial Court was subject of challenge in the writ petition. In the writ petition, the petitioner categorically highlighted the issue that before expiry of the notice period, registration could not have been cancelled and it amounts to defeat the Rules of natural justice. The learned Single Bench dismissed the writ petition on merits by observing that prior to 23.1.2007, another notice was served to appellant on 07.10.2004. In the writ petition, the petitioner categorically highlighted the issue that before expiry of the notice period, registration could not have been cancelled and it amounts to defeat the Rules of natural justice. The learned Single Bench dismissed the writ petition on merits by observing that prior to 23.1.2007, another notice was served to appellant on 07.10.2004. The learned Single Bench did not deliberated the issue that what would be an effect if any orders are passed by preponement of date of hearing without notice to parties. Admittedly, the facts in this case would show that the grounds were taken that before the date of show cause, the Registrar, Trade Union adjudicated the issue. 13. Though the writ petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was dismissed but the question of defeating the rules of natural justice remained an issue. It is settled that nature of nomenclature of the petition would not decide the fate of a petition. 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (Supra) by referring to various judgment has reiterated that to evaluate the nature of order whether it is under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, the nature of order and the relief granted are required to be seen. The Court is also required to see that mainly or principally the jurisdiction was invoked under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court at paragraph 4 of the said judgment while elaborating the principle has held as under :- “4. “7. XXX XXX XXX 8. XXX XXX XXX 9. XXX XXX XXX 10. XXX XXX XXX 11. In Sushilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha [1993 Supp (1) SCC 11] this Court with reference to an unreported judgment in Ratnagiri Distt. Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Watve [1993 Supp (1) SCC 9], held as follows : (Sushilabai case [1993 Supp (1) SCC 11], SCC pp. 12-13, para 1) ‘1. … “Even when in the cause-title of an application both Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution have been mentioned, the learned Single Judge is at liberty to decide, according to facts of each particular case, whether the said application ought to be dealt with only under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12-13, para 1) ‘1. … “Even when in the cause-title of an application both Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution have been mentioned, the learned Single Judge is at liberty to decide, according to facts of each particular case, whether the said application ought to be dealt with only under Article 226 of the Constitution. For determining the question of maintainability of an appeal against such a judgment of the Single Judge the Division Bench has to find out whether in substance the judgment has been passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the event in passing his judgment on an application which had mentioned in its cause-title both Articles 226 and 227, the Single Judge has in fact invoked only his supervisory powers under Article 227, the appeal under Clause 15 would not lie. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent expressly bars appeals against orders of Single Judges passed under revisional or supervisory powers. Even when the learned Single Judge's order has been passed under both the articles, for deciding the maintainability against such an order what would be relevant is the principal or main relief granted by the judgment passed by learned Single Judge and not the ancillary directions given by him. The expression ‘ancillary’ means, in the context, incidental or consequential to the main part of the order. Thus, the determining factor is the real nature of principal order passed by the Single Judge which is appealed against and neither the mentioning in the cause-title of the application of both the articles nor the granting of ancillary orders thereupon made by learned Single Judge would be relevant. Thus, in each case, the Division Bench may consider the substance of the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the Single Judge has mainly or principally exercised in the matter his jurisdiction under Article 226 or under Article 227. In the event in his judgment the learned Single Judge himself had mentioned the particular article of the Constitution under which he was passing his judgment, in an appeal under Clause 15 against such a judgment it may not be necessary for the Appellate Bench to elaborately examine the question of its maintainability. In the event in his judgment the learned Single Judge himself had mentioned the particular article of the Constitution under which he was passing his judgment, in an appeal under Clause 15 against such a judgment it may not be necessary for the Appellate Bench to elaborately examine the question of its maintainability. When without mentioning the particular article the learned Single Judge decided on merits the application, in order to decide the question of maintainability of an appeal, against such a judgment, the Division Bench might examine the relief granted by the learned Single Judge. When more than one relief are granted by the learned Single Judge, for maintainability of an appeal, the determination would be the main and not the ancillary relief. When a combined application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is summarily dismissed without reasons, the appeal court may consider whether the facts alleged, warranted filing of the application under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution.” Thereafter this Court explained the ratio laid down in Umaji case [1986 Supp SCC 401 : AIR 1986 SC 1272 ] and expressed thus : (Sushilabai case [1993 Supp (1) SCC 11], SCC p. 14, para 4) ‘4. … In Umaji case [1986 Supp SCC 401 : AIR 1986 SC 1272 ] it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles in fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned Single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned Single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned Single Judge.’ 12. In Mangalbhai v. Dr. Radhyshyam [ (1992) 3 SCC 448 : AIR 1993 SC 806 ] it was inter alia observed as follows : (SCC p. 452, para 7) ‘7. The learned Single Judge in his impugned judgment dated 11-12-1987 nowhere mentioned that he was exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge examined the matter on merit and set aside the orders of the Rent Controller as well as the Resident Deputy Collector on the ground that the aforesaid judgments were perverse. The findings of the Rent Controller and Resident Deputy Collector were set aside on the question of habitual defaulter as well as on the ground of bona fide need. Thus in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, the pleadings of the parties in the writ petition and the judgment of the learned Single Judge leaves no manner of doubt that it was an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and in that view of the matter the letters patent appeal was maintainable before the High Court. After taking the aforesaid view one course open was to set aside the order of the Division Bench and to remand the matter for being disposed of on merits by the Division Bench of the High Court. However, taking in view the fact that this litigation is going on for nearly a decade and also the fact that even the learned Single Judge in his impugned order dated 11-12-1987 had remanded the case to the Rent Controller, we considered it proper in the interest of justice to hear the appeal on merits against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length on the merits of the case.’ 13. In Lokmat Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Shankarprasad [ (1999) 6 SCC 275 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1090] it was observed as follows : (SCC pp. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length on the merits of the case.’ 13. In Lokmat Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Shankarprasad [ (1999) 6 SCC 275 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1090] it was observed as follows : (SCC pp. 295-96, para 16) ‘16. It is, therefore, obvious that the writ petition invoking jurisdiction of the High Court both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution had tried to make out a case for the High Court's interference seeking issuance of an appropriate writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Basic averments for invoking such a jurisdiction were already pleaded in the writ petition for the High Court's consideration. It is true, as submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, that the order of the learned Single Judge nowhere stated that the Court was considering the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is equally true that the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by observing that the courts below had appreciated the contentions and rejected the complaint. But the said observation of the learned Single Judge did not necessarily mean that the learned Judge was not inclined to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India only. The said observation equally supports the conclusion that the learned Judge was not inclined to interfere under Articles 226 and 227. As seen earlier, he was considering the aforesaid writ petition moved under Article 226 as well as Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Single Judge had refused to interfere only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India when he dismissed the writ petition of the respondent. In this connection, it is profitable to have a look at the decision of this Court in Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai [1986 Supp SCC 401 : AIR 1986 SC 1272 ]. In that case O. Chinnappa Reddy and D.P. Madon, JJ., considered the very same question in the light of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court. Madon, J., speaking for the Court in para 107 of the Report at p. 473, made the following pertinent observations: “107. Petitions are at times filed both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Madon, J., speaking for the Court in para 107 of the Report at p. 473, made the following pertinent observations: “107. Petitions are at times filed both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The case of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque [ AIR 1955 SC 233 ] before this Court was of such a type. Rule 18 provides that where such petitions are filed against orders of the tribunals or authorities specified in Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Appellate Side Rules or against decrees or orders of courts specified in that Rule, they shall be heard and finally disposed of by a Single Judge. The question is whether an appeal would lie from the decision of the Single Judge in such a case. In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Such was the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Aidal Singh v. Karan Singh [ AIR 1957 All 414 ] and by the Punjab High Court in Raj Kishan Jain v. Tulsi Dass [AIR 1959 Punj 291] and Barham Dutt v. Peoples’ Coop. Transport Society Ltd. [AIR WA No. 498 of 2019 1961 Punj 24] and we are in agreement with it.” The aforesaid decision squarely gets attracted on the facts of the present case. It was open to the respondent to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Once such a jurisdiction was invoked and when his writ petition was dismissed on merits, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge had exercised his jurisdiction only under Article 226 (sic 227) of the Constitution of India. Once such a jurisdiction was invoked and when his writ petition was dismissed on merits, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge had exercised his jurisdiction only under Article 226 (sic 227) of the Constitution of India. This conclusion directly flows from the relevant averments made in the writ petition and the nature of jurisdiction invoked by the respondent as noted by the learned Single Judge in his judgment, as seen earlier. Consequently, it could not be said that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was not attracted for preferring appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. It is also necessary to note that the appellant being the respondent in letters patent appeal joined issues on merits and did not take up the contention that the letters patent appeal was not maintainable. For all these reasons, therefore, the primary objection to the maintainability of the letters patent appeal as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant, has to be repelled. Point 1 is, therefore, answered in the affirmative against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. It takes us to the consideration of points arising for our decision on merits.” 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Radha Krishan Industries Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in [ (2021) 6 SCC 771 ] has laid down that the power under Article 226 of Constitution of India can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well. The Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 27 of its judgment has held as under:- “27. The principles of law which emerge are that: 27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well. 27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 27.3. 27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where : (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or ( d) the vires of a legislation is challenged. 27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law. 27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion. 27.5. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.” 16. The principle as laid down by the Supreme Court when there is violation of rules of natural justice, the Court is require to exercise the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in the instant case, when petition was filed before the learned Single Bench, wherein the grounds were taken that the rules of natural justice were not followed as prior to the cut off date shown in show cause, the case was decided. The learned Single Bench failed to exercise its jurisdiction under the Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the nature of grounds and facts would bring the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 17. The learned Single Bench failed to exercise its jurisdiction under the Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the nature of grounds and facts would bring the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 17. Accordingly, we are of the view that there has been a gross violation of rules of natural justice which has caused prejudice to the appellant as prepondement of the date was made behind the back of the appellant by the Registrar, Trade Union, which resulted in miscarriage of justice and has defeated the valuable rights of the appellant. 18. In view of above observation, we deem it proper to allow the appeal and set-aside the orders passed by the learned Single Bench dated 30.8.2019 and the Registrar, Trade Union dated 20.2.2007. The issue is remanded back to the Registrar, Trade Union who would further be obliged to adjudicate the issue on merits afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties.