JUDGMENT : Sunita Agarwal, J. Table of Contents I. The challenge II. The arguments of the counsels for the petitioners A. Judgements relied by the counsels for the petitioners B. Reliance on similar dispute decided C. Aid to the above arguments by other counsels in the bunch III. On factual aspect, arguments of learned counsels for the parties IV. Argument of the Respondent's counsel V. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) Record of the State and counter-affidavits Village Pachokra Village Achheja Bujurg Village Rampur Bangar Village Usmanpur Village Raunija Village Dungarpur Reelka Village Rustampur Village Kadarpur Village Dhanauri VI. A. (a) (b) (c) B. C. D. E. F. Analysis Nature, scope and ambit of Section 5-A of the Act' 1894 Constitutional Scheme Statutory Scheme The Precedence : Legal Position The procedure for invocation of Urgency Clause under Section 17(4) Scope of judicial review On Pre-Post Notification Delay On the Apex Court decisions relied by the rival parties Appreciation of the material on the facts of the instant case VII. A. B. Findings Noting from the record of the State VIII. Conclusion IX. Prejudice Caused X. Reliance on Shyroj Singh (supra) XI. Relief re: compensation XII. Order Heard Sri P.K. Chaurasia, Sri Anil Kumar Shukla, Sri Prem Chandra Saroj, Ms. Sarita Jhingan Shukla, Sri Anil Kumar Mehrotra, Sri Pankaj Dubey. No other counsel has appeared to argue on behalf of the petitioners in this Bunch. Sri Manish Goyal, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Kamaljeet Singh, Sri Suresh Singh, Sri Aditya Bhushan Singhal, Sri Shashi Prakash Rai has made his submissions on behalf of Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority. Sri Ajit Kumar Singh, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri Sudhanshu Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, Sri Amit Verma, Sri Apurva Hajela and Sri D.K. Mishra, learned Standing Counsels for the State respondents has adopted the arguments of Sri Manish Goyal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority. 2. The present bunch of writ petitions are arising out of the acquisition proceedings initiated by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act' 1894 (hereinafter referred as the Act' 1894) for acquisition of lands of nine villages vide acquisition notifications published under Section 4 and 6 read with Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act' 1894. 2. The present bunch of writ petitions are arising out of the acquisition proceedings initiated by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act' 1894 (hereinafter referred as the Act' 1894) for acquisition of lands of nine villages vide acquisition notifications published under Section 4 and 6 read with Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act' 1894. A bird's eye view of the status of acquisition of lands of nine villages in tabulation form is as under : S.No Village Date of Notification Total area acquired (as per Award) (Hect.) Area under litigation (Hect.) Date of Award U/s 4 U/s 6 U/s 11(1) U/s 11(2) 1 Usmanpur 04.11.2009 18.3.2010 149.516 31.3521 31.12.2013 23.02.2012 2 Dhanori 16.11.2010 22.3.2011 414.2312 59.8231 31.12.2013 09.05.2012 13.12.2013 3 Kadarpur 02.12.2010 22.3.2011 113.8074 6.0284 30.03.2014 11.04.2012 30.03.2014 4 Rustampur 26.02.2009 26.2.2010 336.1968 53.7582 31.12.2013 20.03.2012 13.12.2013 5 Doongarpur Reelka 02.12.2010 24.3.2011 172.6197 38.6439 31.12.2013 14.03.2012 31.12.2013 6 Raunija 02.11.2010 07.1.2011 236.686 56.2388 31.12.2013 09.05.2012 21.12.2013 7 Rampur Bangar 26.02.2009 01.2.2010 19.9990 1.1016 15.06.2013 09.02.2012 05.06.2013 19.04.2010 28.07.2010 100.8183 20.6686 31.12.2013 20.12.2013 25.07.2013 13.03.2012 8 Pachokra 26.02.2009 19.2.2010 41.6525 16.8728 29.06.2013 22.02.2012 29.06.2013 9 Accheja Bujurg 19.04.2010 28.7.2010 197.2842 46.9867 20.12.2013 30.06.2013 20.12.201 I. The Challenge : 3. The writ petitions have been filed with the main relief of quashing of the acquisition notifications issued under Section 4 and 6 read with Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act' 1894 and the main ground of challenge is the invocation of urgency clause to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act' 1894. 4. Amongst various grounds raised in the writ petitions, only issue pressed before us by the learned counsels for the petitioners was that there was no justification with the State Government for invocation of urgency clause and denial of opportunity of hearing to the tenure holders had resulted in deprivation of valuable rights of the tenure holders, which makes the entire exercise of acquisition arbitrary and illegal. The purpose of acquisition as stated in the notifications under challenge was 'planned development through Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority', for which urgency clause cannot be invoked in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Radhy Shyam(D) Thr. Lrs and others v. State of U.P.and others, 2011 (5) SCC 553 . 5. The purpose of acquisition as stated in the notifications under challenge was 'planned development through Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority', for which urgency clause cannot be invoked in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Radhy Shyam(D) Thr. Lrs and others v. State of U.P.and others, 2011 (5) SCC 553 . 5. The question, thus, is as to whether the invocation of urgency clause by the State Government, in the facts and circumstances of the instant writ petition, was an illegal exercise. In an effort to answer this question, we have conducted the hearing village wise and heard learned counsels for the parties on the facts of the acquisition of each village and also perused the original record produced by the State village-wise for each acquisition notification, so as to examine as to whether the exercise of power on the part of the State Government was such which would require interference in exercise of the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. At the outset, it may be noted that the dispossession of the petitioners from the acquired land had been stayed by this Court at the time of admission while calling for the counter-affidavit. Under various interim orders passed by this Court in the writ petitions in this bunch, parties were directed to maintain status-quo. One such order dated 12.5.2010 in Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 is noted hereinunder : ''Notices on behalf of respondent No. 1,2 and 3 have been accepted by the learned standing counsel and behalf of respondent No. 4 by Sri R.P.Singh learned counsel for the respondents. Let counter-affidavit be filed within a period of two weeks. List thereafter. In the meantime parties shall maintain status quo.'' 7. The interim order dated 28.9.2011 in Writ C No. 56629 of 2011 is also reproduced hereinunder: ''Issue notice pending admission. Notice on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has been accepted by learned Standing Counsel. Notice on behalf of respondent No. 3 has been accepted by Sri Suresh Singh, learned counsel for the said respondent. Therefore, no notice need to be sent to the respondents. Counter-affidavit on behalf of respondents may be filed within four weeks. Rejoinder-affidavit may be filed within three weeks thereafter. List before appropriate Bench after expiry of the aforesaid period. Heard on the question of grant of interim relief. Therefore, no notice need to be sent to the respondents. Counter-affidavit on behalf of respondents may be filed within four weeks. Rejoinder-affidavit may be filed within three weeks thereafter. List before appropriate Bench after expiry of the aforesaid period. Heard on the question of grant of interim relief. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and having considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, we direct that till the next date of listing, the parties shall maintain status quo as of the date in respect of nature and possession of the property in question.'' II. The arguments of the counsels for the petitioners : 8. Sri P.K. Chaurasiya and Sri Pankaj Dubey learned Counsels appearing for the petitioners in the bunch of writ petition relating to acquisition notification of Village Pachokra have extended arguments on behalf of the writ petitioners. 9. It was argued by the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners that there was no occasion for the State Government to invoke the urgency clause under Section 17 (1) of the Act to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act' 1894, in as much as, the acquisition notifications for Village Pachokra were dated 26.2.2009 and 19.2.2010 under Section 4 and 6 of the Act' 1894. The above dates themselves demonstrate that about one year time was taken for issuance of the declaration notification after the proposal under Section 4 of the Act was published. There was both pre and post notification delay which is to be taken into account to examine as to whether there was any justification to deprive the tenure holders of their right to file objection against the acquisition of their lands. Only 30 days time from the date of the publication of Section 4 notification is provided under the Act' 1894 to file objection to the acquisition and when the State Government itself had taken one year time to notify the declaration notification under Section 6, there cannot be any justification for dispensation of only 30 days time to file objection on the plea of urgency. This fact is sufficient to disbelieve existence of any urgency. 10. Further, no material was before the State Government to show existence of any unforeseen urgency to invoke the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Act to deny the rights of the land holders to file objections. This fact is sufficient to disbelieve existence of any urgency. 10. Further, no material was before the State Government to show existence of any unforeseen urgency to invoke the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Act to deny the rights of the land holders to file objections. Only 198 tenure holders were affected by acquisition of Village Pachokra for which acquisition notifications were published on 26.2.2009 and 9.2.2010 under Section 4 and 6; respectively. Moreover, the purpose of acquisition as stated in the notification under Section 4 and 6 was that the land was needed for planned development under Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (in short 'YEIDA') in District Gautam Budh Nagar. The urgency clause under Section 17(1) can be invoked only in the eventualities which are mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 17, i.e. if the immediate possession of the land is needed for the purpose of maintaining any structure or system pertaining to irrigation, water supply, drainage, road communication or electricity, or for reference, or any other unforeseen emergency such as sudden change in the channel of any navigable river. For publication of notice under sub-section (1) of Section 17, invoking urgency clause, previous opinion of the State Government is required. With the invocation of the urgency clause, though no award has been made, possession of the land needed for the public purpose can be taken after 15 days from the publication of notice under Section 9, and on such possession being taken, the land vests absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The consequence of acquisition by invocation of urgency clause being too harsh, much care and circumspection was required to exercise such power. 11. In the case at hands, the lands of Village Pachokra were to be utilized for commercial and residential purposes and the project has no relevance to the project of construction of Yamuna Expressway. For such development work, which obviously would take sufficient time in the planning and execution, there can be no justification for invocation of urgency though the purpose for which acquisition was made can still be treated as public purpose within the meaning of Section 4. A. Judgements relied by the counsels for the petitioners : (i) Radhy Shyam (supra) 12. For such development work, which obviously would take sufficient time in the planning and execution, there can be no justification for invocation of urgency though the purpose for which acquisition was made can still be treated as public purpose within the meaning of Section 4. A. Judgements relied by the counsels for the petitioners : (i) Radhy Shyam (supra) 12. Heavy reliance has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (supra) to argue that it was held therein that Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confer extraordinary power upon the State to acquire private property without complying with the mandate of Section 5-A. These provisions can be invoked only when the purpose of acquisition cannot brook the delay of even few weeks or months. Therefore, before excluding the application of Section 5-A, the concerned authority must be fully satisfied that time of few weeks or months likely to be taken in conducting inquiry under Section 5-A will in all probability, frustrate the public purpose for which land is proposed to be acquired. It was held therein that the acquisition of land for residential, commercial, industrial or institutional purposes can be treated as an acquisition for public purposes within the meaning of Section 4 but that, by itself, does not justify the exercise of power by the Government under Section 17(1) and/or 17(4). The Apex Court therein had taken judicial notice of the fact that planning, execution and implementation of the schemes relating to development of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional areas usually take few years. It was held that the private property, therefore, cannot be acquired for such purposes by invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1). In any case, exclusion of the rule of audi alteram partem embodied in Section 5-A (1) and (2) is not at all warranted in such matters. 13. The Apex Court having taken note of the pre-notification delay of more than one year time taken by the State Government to issue proposal under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and 17(4) has observed that it was not possible to accept the argument that four to five weeks within which the objections could be filed under Sub-section (1) of Section 5-A and the time spent by the Collector in making inquiry under Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A would have defeated the object of acquisition. The apprehension raised by the respondent therein that delay in the acquisition of land will lead to enormous encroachment was held totally unfounded, noticing that it was beyond comprehension of any person of ordinary prudence to think that the land owners would encroach their own land with a view to frustrate the project of planned industrial development of the district. 14. Post notification delay of about one year, the time consumed between the issuance of the notification Section 4 and 6 was noted to observe that the said delay would demonstrate that the State Government could complete the exercise under Section 5-A and Section 6 both in a shorter period. 15. With the above facts noted from the material on record, it was held therein that the only possible conclusion which could be drawn was that that there was no real and substantive urgency which could justify invoking of the urgency provision under Section 17(1) and, in any case, there was no warrant to exclude the application of Section 5-A. (ii) Dev Sharan and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2011 (4) SCC 769 . 16. Reference had been made to the decision of the Apex Court in Dev Sharan and others (supra) to submit that while answering the question therein whether, in the facts of that case, invoking the urgency clause under Section 17(4) was justified, the Apex Court having noted the post-notification delay, the time elapsed between publication of Section 4(1) and 17 notifications and Section 6 declaration of almost one year, has held that at the slow pace at which the Government machinery had functioned in processing the acquisition, clearly evinced that there was no urgency for acquiring the land so as to warrant invoking of Section 17 (4) of the Act. It was held therein that valuable rights of the tenure holder under Section 5-A of the Act cannot flattened and steamrolled on the 'ipsi dixit' of the executive authority while quashing the acquisition notification. The decision of the Apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Darius Shahpur Chennai and others, 2005 (7) SCC 627 , was noted therein [in Dev Sharan (supra)] to note that the right which is conferred under Section 5A has to be read considering the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution and, such right so construed, should be interpreted as being akin to a Fundamental Right. It was held that the same being the legal position, the procedures which have been laid down for depriving a person of the said right must be strictly complied with. (iii) Devendra Kumar Tyagi v. State of U.P., (2011) 9 SCC 164 . 17. In Devendra Kumar Tyagi (supra) post notification delay, the time of nearly two years taken in declaration under Section 6, after issuance of proposal under Section 4 of the Act, 1894 was viewed seriously to hold that the State Government was not justified to invoke urgency provision of Section 17(4) of the Act' 1894. It was observed that the lackadaisical attitude of the State Government or the lethargy on the part of the official does not exhibit or depict any kind of urgency. The dereliction of responsibility being on the part of the State Government, cannot be equated with urgency contemplated in the Act' 1894. It was argued that expropriatory legislation like the Land Acquisition Act' 1894 must be given strict consideration. Section 5-A is a substantial right and akin to fundamental right which embodies a principle of giving a proper and reasonable opportunity to the land loser to persuade the authorities against the acquisition of their lands which can be dispensed with only in exceptional cases of real urgency and not by side-wind. The decisions of the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (supra) and Dev Sharan (supra) were relied to arrive at the above noted conclusion. (iv) Devendra Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2011 (9) SCC 551 . 18. In another decision in Devendra Singh (supra) it was held that it is well-settled that acquisition of land for public purpose, by itself, shall not justify the exercise of power of eliminating enquiry under Section 5-A in terms of Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (4) of the Act. The decisions in Radhy Shyam (supra) and Dev Sharan (supra) and Devendra Kumar Tyagi (supra) were relied to hold therein that the pre-notification delay by itself cannot justify invocation of urgency clause for acquisition, but it only accelerates or increases the urgency of need of acquisition, only in case it already exists in the nature of public purpose. It was held that that the State Government was not justified, in the facts of the said case, to invoke the emergency provision of Section 17(4) of the Act. It was held that that the State Government was not justified, in the facts of the said case, to invoke the emergency provision of Section 17(4) of the Act. The land holders could not have been denied of their valuable right under Section 5-A of the Act. (v) Darshan Lal Nagpal and others v. Government of Nct of Delhi and others, 2012 (2) SCC 327 . 19. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Apex Court in Darshan Lal Nagpal (supra) to submit that the Apex Court therein taking note of a catena of decisions ranging from Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, ( 1977 (1) SCC 133 to Devendra Kumar Tyagi (supra), has noted that the acquisition of land by invoking the urgency provisions for the public purposes like, planned residential, commercial, industrial or institutional development has been disapproved in various decisions, noted therein ranging from 1977 to 2011. The judgement of the Apex Court in Anand Singh v. State of U.P., 2010 (11) SCC 242 , has been considered therein to note that pre and post notification delay will have a material bearing on the question of invocation of urgency power, particularly in a situation where no material has been placed by the appropriate Government before the Court justifying that urgency was of such nature that necessitated elimination of enquiry under Section 5-A. It was argued therein that the decision of the Government on the issue of urgency is a condition precedent to the exercise of power under Section 17(1) and the State must exercise this power with greater care and circumspection as compulsory acquisition of land is likely to make the owners landless. Compulsory acquisition of the property belonging to a private individual is a serious matter and has grave repercussions on their Constitutional right of not being deprived of his property without the sanction of law Article 300A and the legal rights. The degree of care required to be taken by the State is greater when the power of compulsory acquisition of private land is exercised by invoking the provisions of urgency under Section 17 of the Act as it results in depriving the owner of his property without being afforded an opportunity of hearing. Pre-notification delay was held fatal to the invoking of the urgency provision. Pre-notification delay was held fatal to the invoking of the urgency provision. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (supra) therein to hold that there was no justification to dispense with the application of Section 5-A, which represents two facets of the rule of hearing, i.e. the right of the land owner to file objection against the proposed acquisition of land and of being heard in the inquiry required to be conducted by the Collector. The scope of the rule of hearing i.e. audi alteram partem was noted to hold that it could not be established that the urgency was such that even few months time, which may have been consumed in the filing of objections by the land owners under Section 5A(1) and holding of inquiry by the Collector under Section 5A(2), would have frustrated the project. (vi) Hamid Ali Khan (D) Thr. Lrs. v State of U.P and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1115. 20. A recent decision of the Apex Court in Hamid Ali Khan (D) (supra) has been placed before us to assert that taking note of the above referred decisions, the Apex Court has held therein that the facts considered by the State for invocation of urgency, being specifically within the exclusive knowledge of the State must be laid before the Court on the basis of the principle in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The challenge to the notification under Section 17(4) must be approached in the matter of discharging the burden of proof. Existence of the exceptional circumstances justifying invoking of Section 17(4) must be established in the wake of a challenge on an appreciation of the evidence made available by all the parties, it is open to the Court to conclude that no occasion arose for resorting to the power under Section 17 (4) which indeed must be read as an exception to the general rule. The observation in paragraph No. 22' of the said decision has been placed before us, which is relevant to be extracted hereinunder : ''We may cull out the principles at play. What is required of the authority is to form a subjective opinion. This does not mean that the opinion can be whimsical or capricious. There must be materials before the authority. The materials must be relevant. The authority must apply his mind to the material. What is required of the authority is to form a subjective opinion. This does not mean that the opinion can be whimsical or capricious. There must be materials before the authority. The materials must be relevant. The authority must apply his mind to the material. This is apart from the requirement that action must not be mala fide. Undoubtedly the purpose must be a public purpose. But merely because the purpose of the acquisition is found to be a public purpose, the duty of the authority does not end. He must be satisfied that there is real agency such that the invaluable right vouchsafed to a person to ventilate his grievances against the acquisition is not unjustifiably extinguished. Section 5A of the Act guarantees a right to the person interested in the property which was the only statutory safeguard to stave off of a compulsory acquisition of his property. The power under Section 17 (4) is discretionary. Being a discretion it must be exercised with due care. It is true that if there is relevant material however meagre it may be and the authority has without being guided by extraneous considerations applied his mind and taken a decision, then the Court would adopt a hands-off approach. In the ultimate analysis as with any other decision a balancing of conflicting interests is inevitable. The authorities must remain alive and alert to the precious right created in favour of the citizens which is not meant to be a mere empty ritual''. (vii) Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra 21. The decision in Narayan Govind Gavate (supra) has been read over to vehemently argue that the burden of proving the existence of circumstances which could justify invocation of urgency clause was upon the State. It was held therein that the particular onus of proving facts and circumstances lying especially within the knowledge of the official who formed the opinion which resulted in the notification under Section 17(4) of the Act rests upon that official. The recital in the order or notification, if not defective, may obviate the need to record further. There may be circumstances in the case which impel the Court to look beyond it. And, at that stage, Section 106 Evidence Act can be invoked by the party assailing an order or notification. The recital in the order or notification, if not defective, may obviate the need to record further. There may be circumstances in the case which impel the Court to look beyond it. And, at that stage, Section 106 Evidence Act can be invoked by the party assailing an order or notification. It is most unsafe in such cases for the official or authority concerned to rests content with non-disclosure of facts especially within his or its knowledge by relying on the substantiality of a recital. Such an attitude may itself justify further scrutiny. It was held that if, in addition to the bare assertions made by the petitioners, that the urgency contemplated by Section 17(4) did not exist, there were other facts and circumstances including the failure of the State to indicate facts and' circumstances which it could have easily disclosed if they existed, the petitioners could be held to have discharged their general onus. Indeed, even if a recital in a notification is defective or does not contain the necessary statement that the required conditions have been fulfilled, evidence can be led to show that conditions precedent to the exercise of a power' have been actually fulfilled. It must be proved that the mind of the Officer or the Authority concerned had been applied to the question whether there was an urgency of such a nature that even the summary proceedings under Section 5A of the Act should be eliminated. It is not just the existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with an inquiry under Section 5A which has to be considered. It was observed that it offers no difficulty in applying Section 17(4) in public interest and the particulars of what is obviously to be done in public interest need not be concealed when its validity is questioned in a Court of justice. There may arise questions involving consideration of facts which are especially within the knowledge of the authorities concerned, and, if they do not discharge their special burden, imposed by Section 106 Evidence Act, without even disclosing a sufficient reason for their abstention from disclosure, they have to take the consequences which flow from the non-production of the best evidence which could be produced on behalf of the State if its stand was correct. 22. 22. It was, thus, held therein that the provision of Section 106 of the Evidence Act have to be applied to place the burden upon the State to prove those special circumstances, to discharge the burden of disclosure of the attendant facts and circumstances to show that some exceptional circumstances which necessitated the elimination of an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act were existing and the mind of the Competent authority/State was applied to this essential question. (viii) Ram Singh and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2012(3) ADJ 588 . 23. Reliance has further been placed upon the decision of this Court in Ram Singh (supra) to assert that the acquisition notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were quashed therein taking note that the pre-notification delay will have a material bearing on the question of invocation of urgency powers particularly when no material was produced by the appropriate Government to justify elimination of enquiry envisages under Section 5-A of the Act. B. Reliance on similar Dispute decided : (ix) Shyoraj Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2017 (Sup) ADJ 558. 24. After making the above noted submissions on the legal principles applicable to examine the question whether invocation of urgency clause, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is justified, it was urged by the learned counsels for the petitioners that in the similar facts and circumstances as that of the instant case, the acquisition notifications of Village Chandpur issued on 26.2.2009 and 19.2.2010 under Section 4 and 6; respectively, by invocation of the urgency clause with the aid of Section 17(1) & 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, have been held to be bad. (a) In the said case, the purpose of acquisition in the acquisition notifications of Village Chandpur, for 'Planned development of the area by YEIDA', was noted by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgement and order dated 24.4.2017, to hold that the purpose shown in the notification would itself, cannot justify invocation of urgency clause in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Radhy Shyam (supra). Further, the Court having gone through the original records pertaining to the notification in question had held therein that the grounds mentioned in the reports of the authorities placed on record, for recording satisfaction for invoking the power under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, for dispensing with the enquiry contemplated under Section 5-A of the said Act that : (a). there were chances of unauthorised occupations/encroachment of the land; (b). large number of farmers would be affected by the acquisition and hearing of such large number of farmers would delay the project, were untenable. It was further noted that the period of nearly one year taken in the publication of Section 6 notification after the proposal under Section 4 was published itself was sufficient to return a finding that there was absolutely no urgency which could have justified the invoking of power under Section 17 of the Act' 1894, so as to deprive the farmers of an opportunity of hearing under Section 5A. It is, thus, argued by the learned counsels for the petitioners herein that the findings returned by this Court in the aforesaid decision for discarding the justification given by the State for dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A, are binding on this Court being a Co-ordinate Bench of the same Court. As in the similar facts and circumstances, a decision has already rendered by another Division Bench holding the notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act as bad, this Court may not reach at any contrary opinion. Following binding precedent of the Co-ordinate bench of this Court, the acquisition notifications, in the instant bunch, pertaining to nine villages published between November 2009 to March 2011, cannot but be held to be bad for invoking the power under Section 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, 1894, without any material to justify the denial of hearing to the land holders. Further, on the operative portion of the order in Shyoraj Singh (supra) wherein the Court did desist from quashing the acquisition notifications, it was argued that the ultimate relief granted therein of providing higher compensation under the provision of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act' 2013, treating the date of the decision of the Writ Court as the date of acquisition, may not be followed, in as much as, with respect to the acquisitions before us, much development has not been carried out by the YEIDA subsequent to the acquisition notifications. It is vehemently argued that the petitioners are not interested in taking higher compensation, rather they want their land/property back, as most of them are having their dwelling units wherein they are residing with their families. (b) Similar judgments of this Court dated 29.5.2017, deciding Writ-C No. 46776 of 2010 with respect to the acquisition notifications dated 26.2.2009 and 1.2.2010 under Section 4 and 6 of the Act' 1894, pertaining to Village Rabupura; the judgment and in Kunwar Shlivahan Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2017(3) ADJ 678 , connected with other 68 petitions challenging acquisition notifications dated 13.5.2010 and 28.7.2010 under Section 4 and 6 of the Act' 1894 pertaining to Village Mirzapur; the judgement and order dated 22.11.2016 in Writ-C No. 44741 of 2010 (Harpal Singh and another v. State of U.P. and others) challenging acquisition notifications dated 26.2.2009 and 1.2.2010 under Section 4 and 6 of the Act' 1894 pertaining to Village Niloni Shahpur, have been placed before us to argue that once this Court decided that invocation of urgency clause with the help of Section 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act' 1894, in the similar facts and circumstances as that of the instant cases, was bad in law, no further deliberation in the instant matter is required. All the writ petitions deserve to be allowed in light of the above noted decisions of this Court and the acquisition notifications under challenge are liable to be quashed. C. Aid to the above arguments by other counsels in the bunch : 25. All the writ petitions deserve to be allowed in light of the above noted decisions of this Court and the acquisition notifications under challenge are liable to be quashed. C. Aid to the above arguments by other counsels in the bunch : 25. (i) Some of the counsels appearing for the writ petitioners, however, expressed the wish of the petitioners to whom they represent that the notifications under challenge in their cases be held bad in light of the above noted decisions of this Court in similar acquisitions made by YEIDA, with the help of urgency clause, but if higher compensation be directed to be paid as in the case of Shyoraj Singh (supra) to the petitioners, they would be more than satisfied. On legal principles, the other counsels appearing in the bunch for different villages have adopted the above noted arguments. (ii) One of the learned counsels for the petitioners Sri Pankaj Dubey has placed the decision of the Apex Court in Greater Noida v. Devendra Kumar and others, 2011(6) ADJ 480 , to assert that there was lack of bona-fides on the part of the State Government and the acquiring authority, which is evinced from the fact that Section 17(1) and (4) was invoked without any tangible emergency, which could justify the exercise of power under Section 17(1) and warrant exclusion of the inquiry envisaged under Section 5-A. The decision of this Court in Ram Singh (supra), has been placed to assert that invocation of urgency clause was found bad therein. (iii) The Division Bench of this Court in Rajeev and others v. State of U.P., 2019(9) ADJ 621 , has been placed to assert that even when this Court found that the challenge to acquisition was for a small piece of land, the Court had examined the validity of the decision of the State for invocation of urgency. It was held therein that mere acceptance of the compensation or transfer of their lands by the tenure holders, would not amount to waiver of rights by such person to challenge the acquisition proceedings. No inference of implied consent or acquiescence can be drawn unless the facts of the individual case are examined. In order to constitute waiver, there must be intentional relinquishment of right to challenge the acquisition. No inference of implied consent or acquiescence can be drawn unless the facts of the individual case are examined. In order to constitute waiver, there must be intentional relinquishment of right to challenge the acquisition. However, in order to balance the equities noticing that the major chunks of lands had been developed and allotted to third-party after possession of the land was delivered to the acquiring authority, balancing the statutory rights of the tenure holders and the rights of allottees, the Court had concluded therein that it would not be in public interest to topple the entire acquisition at the behest of those few petitioners. Without quashing the acquisition, it was directed therein that any of the person interested who had not accepted the compensation as per the Karar Niyamawali and was before the Court in that batch of petitions, notwithstanding the fact that the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act was held to be bad, would be entitled to the compensation according to the provisions of the Act' 1894 as per the rate prevailing on the date of the judgment as the awards in respect of the acquisition were made under the Act' 1894 before the enforcement of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Sri Pankaj Dubey learned counsel for the petitioners would lastly submit that the petitioners to whom he is representing, would be satisfied if they are awarded compensation at the market value of the land determined on the date of the judgement in the cases where award had been made during the pendency of this litigation before the enforcement of the Act, 2013. However, in cases where no award has been made, compensation under the Act, 2013 is liable to be determined. It was placed before us the aforesaid decision in Rajeev (supra) has been affirmed by the Apex Court vide judgement and order dated 9.5.2022 with the dismissal of the appeal filed by NOIDA, in Civil Appeal No. 3762 of 2022 arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 5863 of 2020. It was placed before us the aforesaid decision in Rajeev (supra) has been affirmed by the Apex Court vide judgement and order dated 9.5.2022 with the dismissal of the appeal filed by NOIDA, in Civil Appeal No. 3762 of 2022 arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 5863 of 2020. Sri Anil Kumar Shukla learned Advocate for the petitioner in writ petition, No. 20716 of 2010 pertaining to the acquired land of Village Usmanpur would submit that the invocation of urgency clause dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A, in the instant case, cannot be justified as the purpose of acquisition was for planned development, for which there cannot be any urgency. 26. Reference has been made to the decision of the Apex Court in Munshi Singh v. Union of India and others, AIR 1973 SC 1150 , to submit that Section 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being or intended to be acquired should have an appropriate and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. The legislature has, therefore, made complete provisions for the persons interested to file objection against the proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their objection against the same. It is only in case of urgency that special powers have been conferred on the appropriate Government to dispense with the provision of Section 5-A. The submission is that no such case of urgency could be shown/established by the respondent justifying the invocation of urgency clause. (iv) Sri Anil Kumar Mehrotra, the learned Counsel for the petitioners appearing in Writ C No. 18539 of 2013 of Village Rampur Bangar and Writ Petition No. 20716 of 2010 of Village Usmanpur assailing the decision of the State Government for invoking urgency provision under the Act' 1894 would submit that there was pre-notification delay, which is evident from the facts that the proposal for acquisition was sent in the year 2006 by the development authority, three years time had been taken in finalizing the proposal. The land of village Ramapur Bangar was acquired in two phases, the first notification was issued in February-2009 and the second notifications were issued in the year 2010. The land of village Ramapur Bangar was acquired in two phases, the first notification was issued in February-2009 and the second notifications were issued in the year 2010. It was argued that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Devendra Singh (supra), the pre-notification delay of three years shows that there was no real urgency. The right of the tenure holders to file objection and hearing granted under the Act could not be dispensed with. Reference has been made to the decision of the Apex Court in Anand Singh (supra) to submit that pre and post notification delay would have a material bearing on the claim of the State justifying invocation of urgency clause. Reference has been made to the decision in Dev Sharan (supra) to place observation in paragraph 15' therein to urge that in the context of recent trends in land acquisition, the concept of public purpose has to be viewed from an angle which is consistent with the concept of a welfare State. No material particulars has been placed by the State to justify urgency. The land holdings of the poor villagers had been taken in violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Burden of proving urgency on the State has not been discharged. The material which was placed by the State in other matter was similar and had been considered by the Division Bench rejecting it as non-existent so as to justify invocation of urgency. It was urged that in the matter of dispensation of enquiry under Section 5 -A, the law laid down by the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (Supra) holds the field and in view of the law laid down therein in paragraph No. 77', 78', 79', there remains no scope of doubt that in an acquisition for residential purpose, invocation of urgency clause is not permitted. It was argued that it is an admitted case of the respondents in the counter-affidavit that the acquired lands would be used for residential purposes. It was argued that it is an admitted case of the respondents in the counter-affidavit that the acquired lands would be used for residential purposes. The attention of the Court is invited to a map appended with the affidavit filed on 15.10.2022 by the appellant at page No. 48' thereof to assert that the contention of the respondent in the counter-affidavit that the lands in question is required for the integrated development is misleading, in as much as, plot No. 152' adjacent to the Peripheral Road as indicated in the map at page No. 48' has been allotted to the tenure holders whose land has been acquired under the acquisition for YEIDA. The integrated plan cannot be executed if the land is being leased out to the villagers. The lands of the other tenure holders had been released on the premise that there exists Rural Abadi site, in view of the Greater Noida Industrial Development Rural Abadi Sites (Management and Regularization) Regulation, 2011 framed by the YEIDA for regularization of Rural Abadi sites. The leaseback policy to regularize Abadi of certain villagers is being practiced as per the whims and fancies of the officers. The development Authority (YEIDA), on the one hand, had acquired the lands of various villagers on the premise that the lands were needed for integrated development of the industrial area under the jurisdiction of the authority and, on the other, by permitting the lease back policy, pick and choose method has been adopted to release lands of certain villagers on the premise that the same were Rural Abadi sites. The mala fide intention of the Authority (YEIDA) to grab the agriculture lands and existing Abadi of poor farmers/villagers is writ large on the face of the record. About the scope of inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, 1894, it was argued by Sri Mehrotra that the proceeding of the inquiry under Section 5-A is a quasi-judicial proceeding which requires application of mind on each and every objection of the tenure holders, including that the land is not required for the purpose stated in the acquisition notification. Inspection can be directed to ascertain existence of Abadi. Inspection can be directed to ascertain existence of Abadi. The tenure holder can argue that the only right to file objection given to him under the Act' 1894, being a valuable right, hardship which would be caused to him by denial of the said right cannot be compensated in any terms. The provision of objection and hearing is compulsory being in the line of principles of natural justice. Thus, there could be no casual denial of such an opportunity by invocation of urgency clause in acquisition where the purpose stated is residential. It is submitted that the petitioners are in possession of the acquired lands and their claim for release of the same being Abadi site has to be considered. It is vehemently reiterated that a large chunks of lands beyond the village envisaged Yamuna Expressway has been leased out as rural Abadi site and left out from the award. The story set up by YEIDA that the lands in question are needed for integrated development of the area is wholly unbelievable. The acquisition is only for profiteering purposes. III. On factual aspects, arguments of learned counsels for the parties : 27. Sri Prem Chand Saroj learned advocate appearing for the petitioners in two connected Writ petition No. 19406 of 2011 and Writ petition No. 19408 of 2007 would submit that both the writ petitions relate to the acquisition of plot No. 484 area 0.2930 hectares and plot No. 486 area 0.3030 hectares situated at Village Dhanauri, Pargana Dankaur, Tehsil and District Gautam Budh Nagar. The petitioners herein are recorded tenure holders and they are utilizing the plots in question as Abadi. The assertion is that the land use of the lands in question in the revenue records before establishment of YEIDA is Abadi with respect to both the plots in question. The petitioners have constructed their houses and using them as Abadi for a long time. The development authority has illegally acquired the plots in question by invoking urgency clause denying opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. It was asserted that similarly situated plots adjacent to the lands in question had not been included in the acquisition notifications. Prayer has, thus, been made to quash the acquisition with respect to the plots in question. 28. The development authority has illegally acquired the plots in question by invoking urgency clause denying opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. It was asserted that similarly situated plots adjacent to the lands in question had not been included in the acquisition notifications. Prayer has, thus, been made to quash the acquisition with respect to the plots in question. 28. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, thus, is that the above referred facts indicate that the entire acquisition was mala fide in nature and there was no justification for acquisition of Abadi plots. 29. It was further submitted by Shri Prem Chand Saroj learned counsel for the petitioners in the above noted writ petitions that the petitioners are entitled for the relief as in respect to their lands neither possession had been taken nor award has been made. 30. Refuting to the above submissions, it was urged by Sri Manish Goyal learned Senior Advocate appearing for the YEIDA, inviting attention of the Court to the counter-affidavit of the State, that the possession of the acquired land has been handed over to the acquiring body on 28.6.2011. 86% of the total affected tenure holders had received compensation. Out of total acquired land of 442.3016, the possession of 414.2312 hectares of the land had been handed over to the development authority. The authority under Section 11(2) was declared on 9.5.2012 for an area of 282.5438 hectares, another award dated 20.12.2012 under Section 11(2) was declared for an area of 86.2005 hectares. The award under Section 11(1) dated 31.12.2013 has been declared for an area of 45.3834 hectares. The awarded amount of those tenure holders who have not received the same has been deposited in the Court by the Land Acquisition Officer. 31. As regards the claim of the petitioners with respect to their existing Abadi over the plots in question prior to their acquisition, the attention of the Court is invited to paragraph No. 11' of the counter-affidavit of the State to assert that a survey was conducted at the time of preparation of the proposal for acquisition and in Prapatra-16, the form for description of assets over the land in the proposal for acquisition, there was no description of Abadi, construction or trees over the plots in question. The petitioners though claim there exists Abadi over the plots in question, but no Khatauni or record of entry of Abadi has been annexed with the writ petitions. With regard to Gata No. 484, it is pointed out that the Khatauni appended at page 25' of the writ petition shows that the land in question is agriculture land and it was mortgaged by the petitioner for obtaining loan from the Oriental Bank of Commerce. With respect to the above noted plots, a categorical statement has been made in the counter-affidavit of the Authority (YEIDA) in both the writ petitions, that in the joint survey conducted on 20.10.2010, no construction for living purposes was found over the plots in question. With regard to the adjacent plot No. 483, 485, 487, which were not acquired, the explanation has been given in the counter-affidavit of the State that in the revenue records, plot No. 483, area 0.0180 hectares and plot No. 485 area 0.0270 hectares were recorded as Nali, Plot No. 487 area 0.1764 hectares was recorded as Rasta and, as such, these plots could not be acquired. IV. Argument of the Respondent's counsel : 32. Sri Manish Goyal learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Kamaljeet Singh, Sri Suresh Singh, Sri Aditya Bhushan Singhal, Sri Shashi Prakash Rai learned counsels appearing for the respondent Authority would submit that the acquisition in question was made for an integrated development of the Notified area which came within the jurisdiction of Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA), vide notification dated 11.7.2008 and the subsequent notifications for inclusion of Villages in District Agra, Gautam Budh Nagar, Aligarh, Mathura, Mahamaya Nagar (Hathras) within the jurisdiction of YEIDA. The YEIDA was authorized to perform various functions to secure planned development of the area including allocation and transfer by way of sale or lease or otherwise the plots of the lands for industrial, commercial, residential and other purposes. The Authority enjoys powers to sell, lease or transfer the land under Section 7 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act' 1976. For integrated development of the Notified area, a Master plan (phase-1-2031) for the Notified area of Gautam Buddh Nagar and Bulandshahr districts was prepared. For overall development of the area under the Master plan, total 22 acquisitions notifications for 16 villages were published between 22.6.2009 to 7.12.2010, within the span of 22 months, i.e. One year ten months. 33. For integrated development of the Notified area, a Master plan (phase-1-2031) for the Notified area of Gautam Buddh Nagar and Bulandshahr districts was prepared. For overall development of the area under the Master plan, total 22 acquisitions notifications for 16 villages were published between 22.6.2009 to 7.12.2010, within the span of 22 months, i.e. One year ten months. 33. The integrated development of the area under the Master plan-2031 is alongside Yamuna Expressway, for construction of which various notifications were issued earlier for acquiring the lands in the District of Gautam Buddh Nagar, Mathura, Aligarh, Mahamaya Nagar (Hathras) and Agra. The copy of Master plan phase-1-2031 has been placed before us to demonstrate that the acquired lands of the villages-in-question lie on both sides of Yamuna Expressway. Placing the counter-affidavit of the Development Authority in the leading case in Writ C No. 26767 of 2010, it was submitted that the development plan prepared by the Authority clearly lays down the land use. The land use within the industrial development area is not merely industrial as is sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner but, according to the development plan, the land use includes residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, greens, amenities, and such other usage as may be mentioned. With the issuance of the notification declaring the area as industrial development area, it became imminent that the acquired land would be put to such use as is set out in the plan prepared by the Authority (YEIDA). It needs to be emphasized that the acquisition is not being made for further development of the existing or old city. With the acquisition under the Master plan, an integrated newly planned city is being developed. Such development in accordance with the development plan prepared by the development Authority obviates haphazard growth and/or non-confirming use by the land owners. 34. The village wise details of acquisition, award made under the Karar Niyamawali' 1997 and contested awards, the details of lands under litigation as on the date of awards, details of compensation, development and land use for the acquired land as stated in the counter-affidavit filed by the Authority (YEIDA) and the State in the writ petitions in this bunch, has been placed before us during the course of arguments in the tabular form, giving statistical figures about acquisition and development. The said village-wise charts are being enclosed with this judgement as Addendum 'A'. 35. The Master plan placed on record, showing the position of the planned development Sector wise, is also made part of this judgement as Addendum-'B'. 36. We may refer, at this juncture, to the affidavit dated 4.10.2021 filed by the State respondents in Writ Petition No. 26767 of 2010 wherein under the directions issued by the Court, a chart has been given to indicate the position as to in how many cases the State has taken possession of the land and deposited estimated compensation of 80% in compliance of Section 17 of the Act' 1894. The Chart of the acquired lands of 14 villages acquired by 21 notifications admeasuring 2671.0871 hectares, disclosing the deposit of estimated compensation of 80% deposited under Section 17 and also the position of the transferred possession of land to YEIDA has been appended therein which is made part of the judgement as Addendum 'C'. 37. Placing the above noted facts brought on record, it was submitted by Sri Manish Goyal learned Senior Counsel for YEIDA that the nature and purpose of acquisition in question is to be taken into consideration to examine as to whether the declaration of the acquisition of land under Section 6 without giving opportunity to the tenure holders to raise objection to the purpose of acquisition under Section 5-A, was justified. 38. The area-wise breakup in order to show the land use of each area under the Master Plan-2031 Phase-1, District Gautam Buddh Nagar and Bulandshahr given in the above noted supplementary counter-affidavit dated 14.5.2018, has been placed before us to demonstrate that out of the total acquired area under the Master plan of 18450.43 hectares, namely urban area excluding Village Abadi, an area of 2480.24 hectares to the extent of 13.4% has been allocated for transport. Under the category of mixed use ''75% area shall be industrial/institutional/recreational as the main activity and the remaining area can be used for other support activities such as residential/Commercial and facilities''. 39. It was urged that the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority has been declared a Municipality within the meaning of Article 243-Q of the Constitution of India entrusting it for development and maintenance of the township. The development of the Village Abadi by YEIDA has been made compulsory. 39. It was urged that the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority has been declared a Municipality within the meaning of Article 243-Q of the Constitution of India entrusting it for development and maintenance of the township. The development of the Village Abadi by YEIDA has been made compulsory. The township having been conceived as an integrated project under the Phase-1 of the Master plan-2031, will be a newly planned city. The State is duty-bound to secure and ensure planned development and other facilities to all the residents and this can be achieved only when plan is permitted to be permeated in its fullest extent. 40. That under the YEIDA Phase-1, Master Plan-2021, area wise breakup is being given below in order to show the land use of each area. 41. Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority area breakup for Master Plan (Phase-1) District Gautam Buddha Nagar & Bulandshahr. Sr. No. Land Use Category Year 2021 @ @ Area (ha) % 1. Residential 4569.52 24.8 2. Commercial 1275.12 6.9 3. Industrial 2394.15 13 4. Institutional 1617.02 8.8 5. Greens 3751.59 20.3 6. Transport 2480.34 13.4 7. Mixed use 1219.82 6.6 8. SDZ 1142.87 6.2 Total (Urban Area excluding village abadi) 18450.43 100 Village abadi areas 1124.69 Urbanisable Area 19575.12 42. It was argued that with respect to the challenge to the acquisition of lands for construction of Yamuna Expressway and for interchange of Expressway, mainly on the ground that there was no urgency much less any special urgency for construction of road, to acquire fertile agricultural land, the Division Bench of this Court had considered all aspects of the project in Nand Kishore Gupta and others v. State of U.P. and others, Writ Petition No. 31314 of 2009, to examine as to whether there was justification for invocation of urgency. 43. It was placed that the Taj Expressway project conceived by the State Government in the year 2001 was an integrated project involving construction of Excess Control Expressway stretching over 160 k.m. from NOIDA to Agra and for development of 25 million square meters of land along the Expressway. The validity of the project was challenged in a Public Interest Litigation. The State Government, exercising power under the Commissioner of Inquiries Act, initiated an enquiry. The validity of the project was challenged in a Public Interest Litigation. The State Government, exercising power under the Commissioner of Inquiries Act, initiated an enquiry. The said project which was notified by the State under Built, Operate and Transfer (BOT scheme) came up under scrutiny in Balbir Singh v. State of U.P. and others, Writ Petition No. 48978 of 2008, wherein the acquisition was challenged on the ground that it was for the purposes of company and, thus, the provisions of Chapter VII of the Act were required to be followed. The allegations of mala fide in dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A were made. The notifications dated 15.10.2007 and 4.1.2008 under Section 4 and 6 of the Act' 1894 of the land situated in a Village in Mathura were subject-matter of consideration therein. The writ petition was dismissed vide judgement and order dated 5.10.2009 noticing that in order to provide infrastructural facilities for developing industries throughout the Yamuna belt, the project of National importance was taken up connecting various cities of Uttar Pradesh to the National Capital. 44. It was argued that considering the mammoth scale of the project, it was opined by the State Government that the integrated project which was to cover a large area of land would be stalled, in case, the State had undertaken an enquiry into the disposal of individual objection as contemplated under Section 5-A of the Act. The satisfaction formed by the State with regard to the exercise of power under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act had been found to be justified noticing that the exercise of power of judicial review is not concerned with the sufficiency of material, but with the issue as to whether there was material before the State justifying the formation of opinion in dispensing with the enquiry contemplated under Section 5-A of the Act. It was observed that there was sufficient compelling reasons existed in justifying the action of the State in dispensing with the enquiry under the Act. The said opinion was formed considering the statements in the counter-affidavit of the State as well as the Development Authority therein. By the notification dated 11.7.2008, the name of Taj Expressway Industrial Development Authority was amended and changed into the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA). 45. The said opinion was formed considering the statements in the counter-affidavit of the State as well as the Development Authority therein. By the notification dated 11.7.2008, the name of Taj Expressway Industrial Development Authority was amended and changed into the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA). 45. The submission is that in these facts and circumstances of the case in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra), where challenge was to the acquisition of land for construction of Expressway, the Court having examined the record of the State, the proposal justifying invocation of urgency, had opined that the record clearly demonstrated that after considering the project and making enquiries and spot inspection including the survey of the revenue records, the District Magistrate had recommended that looking to the purpose of acquisition and the large area involved, and further the fact that the land was needed for construction of road and interchange and planned development, as well as, the fact that in future, there was strong possibility of encroachment over the subject land, Section 17(4) was required to be invoked for dispensing with the enquiry. The pre-notification delay of five years from the date of Concession agreement till the publication of the proposal under Section 4 of the Act, 1894 was found to have been explained on account of intervention at every stage of the proceedings. It was noted that after dismissal of the PIL, the Board of the Authority started making surveys and the proposal for acquisition was, thereafter, submitted. The satisfaction of the State to invoke urgency clause had been found to be justified noticing that there was sufficient material and the project was in public interest. A minuscule number of the writ petitioners representing only a small piece of land were challenging the acquisition stalling a project of construction of a fast moving road. 46. The satisfaction of the State to invoke urgency clause had been found to be justified noticing that there was sufficient material and the project was in public interest. A minuscule number of the writ petitioners representing only a small piece of land were challenging the acquisition stalling a project of construction of a fast moving road. 46. It was placed before us that the Division Bench judgement of this Court in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) was upheld by the Apex Court in Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U.P. and others, 2010 (10) SCC 282 , wherein noticing the above noted findings of the High Court, the Apex Court had expressed complete agreement stating that there was necessity in the said project, considering the enormousness of the project, likelihood of the encroachment, number of tenure holders, who would have required to be heard and the time taken for that purpose as also the pre-notification delay on account of the above noted reasons where the project had lingered from 2001 till 2008, it was held that there was no reason to take a different view than what was taken by the High Court. The reason for invocation of urgency given by the District Magistrate that the delay may result in encroachment was considered to be a relevant factor for invocation of urgency. It was noted that a large chunk of land of 25 million square meters was liable to be acquired for the purpose of development of five land parcels. There was interlinking between the acquisition of land for the highway and acquisition of land for establishing five townships. 47. It was argued by the learned Senior Counsel for YEIDA that in the case of Radhy Shyam (supra) heavily relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners, while answering the issue of invocation of urgency clause under Section 17 (4) of the Act' 1894, for the acquisition of land for residential/commercial/or industrial purpose, the above decision in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) was distinguished noticing that the acquisition in the said case was upheld because the land was urgently needed for construction of Yamuna Expressway and by the time, the matter was decided by the Apex Court, huge amount had been spent on the project. 48. 48. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Radhy Shyam (supra) has been read over at length to submit before us that the entire judgement has to be read in light of the facts of that case to cull out the ratio and when the same is considered with Nand Kishore Gupta (supra), in light of the facts of that case and that of the instant case, the enormousness of the project, huge number of affected tenure holders as a result of acquisition for execution of the integrated project, the reasonable time taken in filing and disposal of objections followed by litigation that may arise of such decisions cannot be perceived to be irrelevant factors. The land in question, in the instant case was urgently needed for planned development of the area, with respect to which the lands parcels of Villages on both sides of the Expressway were being acquired for the purposes of development of the area alongside Expressway. 49. The decision of this Court in Narendra Road lines Limited v. State of U.P. and others, 2010(7) ADJ 329 , has been placed before us to submit that it was noted therein that the State had acquired 2500 hectares of land of 25 million square meters (for development at five locations along side Expressway) namely at ; Site-I Noida (Sultanpur) (500 hectares) Site-II between Greater Noida & Dankaur (500 hectares) Site-III between Dankaur and proposed TEZ (500 hectares) Site IV between proposed Airport and Tappal (500 hectares) and Site-V near Agra (500 acres). 50. The challenge in the said case was for the acquisition of the notified land for public purpose, namely ''for development under Yamuna Expressway Project through Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority''. The notifications were issued recording the opinion of the Governor that the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section (17) of the Act were applicable to the land, in as much as, the land was urgently required for development. In the said case, taking note of the factual aspects of the matter, for invoking urgency, it was noted in paragraph 96' as under : ''96. In the present case, we find that the land for development for 'Yamuna Expressway Project' through 'Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority' is an integrated project. In the said case, taking note of the factual aspects of the matter, for invoking urgency, it was noted in paragraph 96' as under : ''96. In the present case, we find that the land for development for 'Yamuna Expressway Project' through 'Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority' is an integrated project. The land was initially acquired for the expressway and thereafter the land has been acquired for developing five parcels, as townships, as an integrated plan of development, both for compensating the concessionaire for the cost of the expressway, as well as the development of the area. The agreement provides that the parcels shall be developed strictly in accordance with the plan prepared by the YEIDA, by adhering to the bye-laws of YEIDA, and other laws applicable to development. The Jaipee Infratech Ltd. will be developing these five parcels strictly in accordance with the concessionaire agreement. The State Government was, therefore, not required to particularise, or to specify the public purpose by pointing out to the nature of the development on each plot of the land acquired for 'Yamuna Expressway Project.'' 51. The writ petition challenging invocation of urgency clause was dismissed therein noticing that the majority of the tenure holders had signed the settlement and had accepted the compensation. It was held that the acceptance of the compensation by the majority of the tenure holders was also a ground on which the challenge to the acquisition could not be interfered with. 52. In the Writ C No. 20585 of 2010 (Natthi v. State of U.P. and others) decided by this Court on 12.11.2010, in a challenge to the notifications dated 16.10.2009 and 1.12.2009, under Section 4 and 6 of the Act, 1894; respectively, on the plea that there was no material before the State Government for invocation of urgency, it was noted by this Court that the land acquired was for contiguous part of Yamuna Expressway. The land needed for road to connect Yamuna Expressway to residential sectors was urgently needed. The observations of the Apex Court in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) were noted therein to record that it was part of an integrated project covering a large area of land and being complimentary to the creation of the Expressway, the challenge was upturned. The land needed for road to connect Yamuna Expressway to residential sectors was urgently needed. The observations of the Apex Court in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) were noted therein to record that it was part of an integrated project covering a large area of land and being complimentary to the creation of the Expressway, the challenge was upturned. It was specifically noted therein that though the land-in-question was not for the purposes of Yamuna Expressway or five land parcels, as noted in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra), but the acquisition was for the planned development which included construction of approach road for linking Yamuna Expressway with the land parcels. The public purpose stated in the notification under Section 4 of the Act' 1894 therein be noted as under : ''Planned development in District Gautam Budh Nagar through Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority'', to record that : ''In notification under Section 4 of the Act the public purpose was mentioned as ''Planned Development in District Gautam Budh Nagar through Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority''. The planned development of the area is the object for which Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority has been constituted. In planned development providing for amenities is one of the functions of the Authority and it was not necessary to mention the details of the planned development in the notification under Section 4 of the Act. Mention of planned development in notification under Section 4 of the Act was sufficient to cover all categories of planned development including providing for construction of approach-road/road. Thus non mentioning of the construction of the approach road in the notification under Section 4 of the Act was not imperative.'' 53. Placing the said decision, it is argued by the learned Senior Counsel for YEIDA that the language of the notifications in the instant case, under consideration, being the same, it is also to be considered in this case that the acquisition of the lands-in-question being part of an integrated project of development of the Notified area alongside Expressway through Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA), the reasons given in the certificate in Prapatra-10 justifying urgency were sufficient to form opinion by the State Government that the proposed land was urgently needed and dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was necessitated. 54. 54. The Apex Court decision in Kedarnath Yadav, 2017 (11) SCC 601 , has been placed to submit that the purpose of acquisition in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) was noted therein and it was held that the acquisition of land for planned development of this otherwise industrial backward area with the construction of the Expressway will be complementary to each other and can be viewed as part of the integrated scheme and, thus, held to be a public purpose. 55. The Division Bench judgement of this Court in Dharmendra and others v. State of U.P. and others, PIL No. 40484 of 2012, dated 4.8.2021 had been placed before us to submit that in the similar facts and circumstances, this Court had refused to interfere in the acquisition of land in the writ petitions pending for a long time wherein award had been passed with tendering of compensation. It was submitted that the Special Leave Petition against the said judgement has been dismissed on 27.9.2021. 56. Reliance has further been placed upon the decisions in Meena Devi Jindal Medical Institute & Research Centre v. Lieutenant Governor, Delhi and others, 2017 (13) SCC 458 , to submit that noticing the decision in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra), that the purpose of acquisition ''for planned development through Yamuna Expressway'' in the said case was complimentary to the construction of Expressway and being a part of the integrated project. The Apex Court decision in Munshi Singh (supra) has been distinguished therein noticing that in the said case there was no master plat/zonal plat in vogue in the area. Thus, when there was no plan for the area, in that context, the Court has observed that mention in the notification that it was acquisition for the purpose of planned development of the area was vague. Whereas in the said case the Master plan was in existence and the development had taken place in accordance with the Master plan, the vagueness in the notification under Section 4 of the Act' 1894 was, thus, held to be of no consequence. 57. Whereas in the said case the Master plan was in existence and the development had taken place in accordance with the Master plan, the vagueness in the notification under Section 4 of the Act' 1894 was, thus, held to be of no consequence. 57. It was vehemently argued by the learned Senior Counsel that the Court has to be conscious of the purpose that when huge chunk of lands was acquired, time taken in identification and deciding the suitability of the land which caused pre-notification delay would have to be considered, to arrive at the decision as to whether the same would affect the statement of invocation of urgency. It was argued that the meticulous planning and preparation of Master plan had taken time in execution of the project. However, in the instant case, with the constitution of Yamuna Expressway Authority vide notification dated 11.7.2008, the Master plan was approved on 24.7.2009, the proposal for acquisition was prepared in the meantime, after survey to assess the suitability of the land for the purpose stated in the acquisition proposal. The acquisition proceedings had been commenced in the shortest possible time with the publication of the first notification on 26.2.2009. It was an acquisition for an integrated project where lands of different villages had been acquired with separate proposals, in each case, where satisfaction has been recorded by the State Government for invocation of urgency clause, for each of the acquisition proposal. 58. It is argued that the purpose of acquisition has substantially been achieved, in as much as, major area under the Master plan has already been developed. About 95% of the land owners are satisfied and received compensation, 90% did not approach this Court being satisfied. Reasons for invocation of the urgency clause had been spelled out, in each case, in the requisite form Prapatra-10. The statement in the reasons that there was likelihood of encroachment in the area in case of delay cannot be said to be extraneous consideration, in as much as, the construction of Yamuna Expressway had been completed by the time, the acquisition notifications for development of the surrounding area alongside the Expressway were issued. It is of common knowledge that around the Highways, encroachment do take place. It is of common knowledge that around the Highways, encroachment do take place. Expansiveness of the land required for execution of the project was a valid reason for dispensation of Section 5-A as hearing for such a huge number of tenure holders was not a viable option. 59. It was urged that sufficient material was on record and has already been placed before the Court in the shape of the original record by the State for each village, which demonstrated that there has been due application of mind at the level of the State Government and it was not a mechanical exercise. The Government has taken note of the reasons, spelled out reasons for dispensation of enquiry, justification of the same and, thereafter, granted approval/sanction. Pre-notification delay has been satisfactorily explained and noted in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra). There was practically no post notification delay, as in many cases, the declaration notification under Section 6 had been issued in a span of 3-4 months. Only in one or two cases in this bunch, acquisition notification was issued in a gap of approximately one year and in those cases, the State Government had taken a serious view calling for explanation over the delay. This shows that the State was conscious of the urgent need of the land for the project in question. 60. The post notification delay was, however, explained by bringing on record that the time taken had been consumed in arranging loan for deposit of 80% of the estimated compensation. Being a huge project, YEIDA needed thousand crores of money to deposit 80% of compensation and approached different banks. Lands of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA Authorities had been mortgaged as collateral security as banks were not ready to extend loan without security. The explanation, in this regard, can be found in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Development Authority and one such affidavit in Writ Petition No. 23542 of 2010 had been placed before us to substantiate the said submissions. 61. It was argued that the petitioners have failed to establish that;-(i) the land in question was not suitable for the project; (ii). the land was not required for public purposes; (iii) mala fide in acquisition, or; (iv) public purpose would be subserved by any other land. 62. 61. It was argued that the petitioners have failed to establish that;-(i) the land in question was not suitable for the project; (ii). the land was not required for public purposes; (iii) mala fide in acquisition, or; (iv) public purpose would be subserved by any other land. 62. No prejudice caused to the petitioners could have been shown by dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A. In absence of prejudice, no valuable rights of the petitioner can be said to have been violated. 63. It was further argued that Article 300-A will have no application in the present case, in as much as, the entire exercise of acquisition is in furtherance of the public policy for the public at large in accordance with the provisions of Article 39(b) saved by the protection of Article 31-C. 64. It was argued that right to compensation provided under the second proviso to Article 31-A stood duly balanced by giving a No-litigation incentive of 64.7%, grant of 7% of the Abadi Land (developed land) as also the relief granted to the tenure holders under the leaseback policy dated 10.10.2011 modified in 2011 who opted for it besides compensation for the land and superstructure computed under the award. The judgement of Radhy Shyam (supra), Anand Singh (supra), having been given in different set of facts, legal principles stated therein, if considered in the facts of the instant case, will have no application. The facts of the instant case, are identical to the case of Nand Kishore Gupta (supra), principle stated therein have even been followed in Radhy Shyam (supra) as on the fact of Radhy Shyam (supra), Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) was distinguished. 65. The decisions of this Court in Smt. Manju Lata Agarwala v. State of U.P., and Smt. Varsha Lakhmani v. Hitesh Wadhva, 2008(4) ADJ 207 (DB), have been relied to assert that the principle of prejudice stated therein in a case of invocation of urgency under Section 5-A, thus, would be attracted in the instant case. 66. It was urged that a categorical statement has been made in the affidavit filed in the leading writ petition noted above, to establish that before publication of Section 6 notification in each case (relating to each Village), due deposit of 80% of estimated compensation of the acquired land had been made. 66. It was urged that a categorical statement has been made in the affidavit filed in the leading writ petition noted above, to establish that before publication of Section 6 notification in each case (relating to each Village), due deposit of 80% of estimated compensation of the acquired land had been made. There is no violation of the procedure prescribed in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquisition of the lands in question. 67. As regards the submission of the learned counsels for the petitioners that the controversy, in the instant case, is covered by the decision of this Court in Shyoraj Singh (supra), in as much as, it has been held therein that the invocation of urgency for acquisition for public purpose ''planned development of area'' was bad in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (supra), it was argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the Authority (YEIDA) that the decision in the said case had been rendered ignoring the material brought on record in the shape of the counter-affidavit and rejoinder-affidavit. Further the fact that it was an integrated development for creation of a new township and not a development of existing or old city, was completely ignored, though the said fact was established from the record placed before the Court. The legal principle stated in Radhy Shyam (supra) were simply applied by this Court while rendering decision in Shyoraj Singh (supra) that there existed no facts before the State Government to invoke urgency. Even in Radhy Shyam (supra) while laying down the principle to examine the illegality and/or justification of the exercise of power under Section 17(1) and/or 17(4) for the acquisition of land for residential, commercial or industrial purpose, it was held that the Court has to scrutinize the relevant record before adjudicating upon the legality of such acquisition. Meaning thereby, in the facts of a given case, the records and all relevant material have to be considered to examine as to whether invocation of urgency clause was justified and the authorities concerned applied their mind to the relevant factors for taking such decision. The legal position stated in the Radhy Shyam (supra) has been mechanically applied by the Division Bench in Shyoraj Singh (supra) and, hence, the said decision cannot be applied to the dispute before us. The legal position stated in the Radhy Shyam (supra) has been mechanically applied by the Division Bench in Shyoraj Singh (supra) and, hence, the said decision cannot be applied to the dispute before us. It was argued that it cannot be said that the judgement in the case of Shyoraj Singh (supra) would squarely cover the dispute before us. It was vehemently argued that the position stated in the said case is distinguishable, in as much as, the aspect of integrated development of the area under Master plan was not placed and the wholesomeness of the project had not been brought before the Court. 68. The opinion expressed by the Court in the case of Shyoraj Singh (supra) for providing higher compensation to the tenure holders in view of the decision in the case of Sahara India (supra) had been termed as inapplicable in view of the subsequent decision of the Apex Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and others, AIR 2020 SC 1496 , wherein the applicability of Section 24 of the Act' 2013 has been considered. It was urged that in the acquisitions in question, award had been declared for the entire land, possession of which had been handed over to the development authority. The tenure holders who did not receive compensation under the award, the compensation amount had been deposited in the Court. However, for the land in question, subject-matter of challenge, in the instant bunch, award could not be declared on account of the interim order of status quo passed by this Court. The status quo order, as indicated above, was not confined to the possession only. The authority could not proceed with the acquisition with respect to the land-in-question because of the interference by this Court. Any delay in making the award because of the interim order of this Court cannot be attributed to the authorities. Acquisition proceedings on the dates of filing of the writ petitions were underway and having not been completed because of interference of this Court, Section 24 of the Act' 2013 will have no application. The provision of 2013' Act cannot be applied in these cases in the matter of determination of compensation. Acquisition proceedings on the dates of filing of the writ petitions were underway and having not been completed because of interference of this Court, Section 24 of the Act' 2013 will have no application. The provision of 2013' Act cannot be applied in these cases in the matter of determination of compensation. Further, No-litigation Incentive can only be granted to those persons who have accepted compensation without protest or have withdrawn their writ petition as per the statement in the policy under the Government order dated 29.8.2014 and 4.11.2015. 69. To counter the submissions of Sri Anil Mehrotra learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner in writ petition 18539 of 2013, the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the development authority therein has been placed before us to assert that 10% of the cost of acquisition and compensation was deposited on 17.2.2010 at the time of submission of the proposal, after which notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Act, 1894 was issued on 19.4.2010. The remaining 70% of the estimated compensation was deposited on 24.6.2010 before issuance of the declaration under Section 6(1) read with Section 17(1) of the Act, 1894 on 28.7.2010. The amount under the National Rehabilitation Policy was also deposited on 8.7.2010. It was submitted that the land of Village Rampur Bangar had been acquired through different notifications for different uses like Yamuna Expressway project, acquisition of which has been upheld by the Apex Court as also for residential scheme 2009 (1). 70. As regards the claim of the petitioner namely Narendra Kumar therein in paragraph No. 5' and 6' of the writ petition that the dwelling units/houses constructed by the petitioner on the aforesaid land exists and, as such, the petitioner is entitled for exemption of his property from acquisition, in the counter-affidavit of the respondent No. 3, while giving parawise reply to the said statement, it is submitted that under the leaseback policy, an area of 0.2100 hectares of land of plot No. 152, (area 0.8950 hectares) had been offered to the petitioner vide letter dated 4.6.2011 informing him that the said area can be excluded under the leaseback policy and the remaining area will be treated as acquired and under possession of the authority. 71. 71. In the rejoinder-affidavit, while replying to the above noted paragraph No. 33' of the counter-affidavit of YEIDA, it is stated that the averments in paragraph No. 33' of the affidavit of YEIDA itself disclose that the dwelling unit of the petitioner was found on the spot and the respondents themselves has agreed to withdraw the acquisition proceedings of the petitioner's land. 72. Reference has been made by the learned Senior Counsel for YEIDA to the decision of this Court dated 4.8.2021 in PIL No. 40484 of 2012, dismissing the petitions seeking for quashing of the similar notifications on the ground of wrongful invocation of urgency provision. It was placed before us from the affidavit dated 26.8.2012 filed, in the instant writ petition, that the said PIL has been dismissed as infructuous noticing that the award had been passed long back with acquisition of land with tender of compensation. The Special Leave Petition No. 14753 of 2020, arising out of the decision of this Court in PIL has been dismissed on 27.9.2021. Another Special Leave Petition No. 20352 of 2021 challenging the order of PIL has also been dismissed on 17.12.2021. 73. We may note, at this juncture, that the original record pertaining to the proposal of acquisitions of each notification, subject-matter of challenge herein, with regard to dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A, has been placed before us during the course of hearing and have been perused by us, carefully. V. Record of the State and counter-affidavits : 74. We are required to record at this juncture, the factual aspects of dispensation of Section 5-A noted by us from the record of the State tallied with the statement in the counter-affidavits of the respondent, village wise. (i) Village Pachokra : 75. In the counter-affidavit in Writ Petition No. 26767 of 2010 relating to acquisition of land for Village Pachokra, it was brought on record that the proposal for acquisition of 50.9390 hectares of land in revenue Village Pachokra, Tehsil Jewar, District Gautam Buddh Nagar was submitted by the Authority/Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Gautam Buddh Nagar, vide Office order No. 1383 dated 28.1.2009. In the said proposal, the acquiring body recommended for invoking urgency clause ''keeping in view the possibility of large time being consumed in the disposal of objections under Section 5-A of the Act' 1894, and the possibility of delay in implementation of the public interest project''. In the said proposal, the acquiring body recommended for invoking urgency clause ''keeping in view the possibility of large time being consumed in the disposal of objections under Section 5-A of the Act' 1894, and the possibility of delay in implementation of the public interest project''. vide letter No. 21 dated 13.2.2009, the said proposal was forwarded by the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition)/Special Executive Officer, Yamuna Expressway Authority to the Director Land Acquisition Directorate, Board of Revenue, U.P. Camp Greater Noida, Gautam Buddh Nagar, after obtaining required approval in the meeting of the Land Use Committee for acquisition of land and completion of requisite formalities. The Director, Land Acquisition Directorate, Board of Revenue, U.P. by the letter No. 219 dated 14.2.2009, sent the said proposal to the State Government with his recommendation for acquisition of the land. The report of the Collector in the requisite format Prapatra 10 for justification for invocation of urgency under Section 17 of the Act, 1894 reads as under : 76. The State Government found justification regarding urgency and recorded satisfaction that it found sufficient ground for invocation of urgency clause under Section 17 (4) of the Act' 1894. The proposal for acquisition was, thus, published on 26.2.2009. It may be noted that Village Pachokra came in the regulated area of the then Taj Expressway Authority, renamed as Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority, on 12.11.2007. 77. As regards the details of compensation paid to the tenure holders and development carried out by YEIDA during the pendency of the litigation, it may be noted that out of total 198 affected tenure holders, 151 had received compensation. Total number of 18 petitioners are before us, who are agitating for the correctness of the decision of the State Government in invocation of urgency clause. Out of the total area of 41.6525 hectares possession of which has been handed over to the development authority, the percentage of land in litigation is 40.50%. (ii) Vilage Achheja Bujurg : 78. From the counter-affidavit of the State filed in Writ-C No. 10785 of 2012, relating to acquisition of the land of Village Achheja Bujurg included in the Notified area on 24.4.2001, it may be noted that the State Government had taken a policy decision for planned development of the area identified as Special Development Zone vide Government Order dated 29.12.2007. From the counter-affidavit of the State filed in Writ-C No. 10785 of 2012, relating to acquisition of the land of Village Achheja Bujurg included in the Notified area on 24.4.2001, it may be noted that the State Government had taken a policy decision for planned development of the area identified as Special Development Zone vide Government Order dated 29.12.2007. For the said development, Taj Expressway Industrial Development Authority was created vide notification dated 24.4.2001. Clause 3.0 of the said Government Order prescribes for development of Special Development Zone (SDZ). The land use of Special Development Zone as provided therein is that the Core activity, roads and open spaces shall not be less than 35%. The complementary activities such as institutional, commercial, residential (group housing etc.) were complementary to the Core activity which was included in 35% of the total area planned for development. 79. In furtherance of the said object, the authority (YEIDA) sent a proposal on 30.12.2009, for acquisition of 217.6342 hectares of land situated at village Achcheja Bujurg, Pargana Dankaur, Tehsil Sadar, District Gautam Buddh Nagar for residential plot scheme. The 10% of the estimated acquisition cost and estimated compensation was deposited on 24.2.2010. For invoking the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act' 1894, dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A, justification contained in Prapatra-10 with the certificate of the Collector, Gautam Buddh Nagar, placed before the State Government, on record, reads as under : 80. The 70% of the estimated compensation was deposited on 17.7.2010 and after completing all the formalities, the proposal for issuance of notification under Section 6 read with Section 17 was sent on 14.7.2010 by the Director, Land Acquisition to the State Government. The notification under Section 6 read with Section 17 for an area of 209.7736 hectares was issued on 28.7.2010. 81. The acquisition for the land of village Achcheja Bujurg was made for extension of Sector 16, a residential sector, which was part of the same project. The acquisitions were made by different notifications for one project, which was for comprehensive development of the industrial township, as conceived by the State under the Development Policy dated 29.12.2007, through the then Taj Expressway Industrial Development Authority. Out of total area, notified under Section 6, the possession of an area of 197.2842 hectares had been handed over to the authority and compensation under Karar Niyamawali was disbursed for an area of 178.4222 hectares. Out of total area, notified under Section 6, the possession of an area of 197.2842 hectares had been handed over to the authority and compensation under Karar Niyamawali was disbursed for an area of 178.4222 hectares. The total area involved in the writ petitions pertaining to the acquisition of Village Achheja Bujurg, on the date of filing of the counter-affidavit, was approximately 17.2210 hectares. It was placed before us that the contiguous land to the parcel of the land acquired for the Expressway of Village Achheja Bujurg had been upheld by the Apex Court in the case of Nand Kishore Gupta (supra). We may record, at this juncture that we have perused the original record of the State regarding satisfaction for invocation of urgency clause, and the reasoning, noted here in above were found therein. (iii) Village Rampur Bangar : 82. The counter-affidavit of the Authority with respect to acquisition of Village Rampur Bangar in Writ C No. 23542 of 2010, shows that the acquisition in question was the second acquisition of Village Rampur Bangar. The total approximately 20 hectares of land of village Rampur Bangar proposed vide notification dated 26.2.2009 under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the Act, 1894, was to be utilized for construction of the approach roads passing through Village Rampur Bangar to connect Yamuna Expressway. 80% of the estimated compensation was deposited prior to the declaration notification dated 1.2.2010, issued under Section 6 read with Section 17 of the Act, 1894. The reason for delay in declaration of Section 6 notification has been explained in the counter-affidavit that the authority receives no financial grant from the State and it has to organize its own finances. It require more than 1000 crores for the project which was an integrated project and, as such, it had approached different banks who took time in processing the request. These banks demanded Collateral security in terms of the land and since the authority (YEIDA) had no land to be mortgaged, it approached the neighboring Authority namely the Greater NOIDA who had agreed to mortgage its land towards the security. The advance of 500 crores was then released by the Oriental Bank of Commerce on 24.4.2009, but still it was short. Amongst various proposals, the NOIDA had also agreed for creation of mortgage of its land located in Sector 94 valued at Rs. 600 crores. The advance of 500 crores was then released by the Oriental Bank of Commerce on 24.4.2009, but still it was short. Amongst various proposals, the NOIDA had also agreed for creation of mortgage of its land located in Sector 94 valued at Rs. 600 crores. The Oriental Bank of Commerce then agreed to release the remaining 500 crores. The time consumed in arranging finances was the reason for the delay in declaration of Section 6 notification, as without deposit of 80% of estimated compensation, it was not possible for the State Government to publish the declaration notification. It is demonstrated before us that the piece of land acquired under the notification in question was only for a part of the project which was an integrated project, and since contiguous land was needed to complete the project, it was not possible to give opportunity of hearing to the villagers, as in that eventuality, acquisition of Contiguous land was not possible. 83. The original record of Village Rampur Bangar pertaining to the acquisition in question had been placed before us and perused. The acquisition of another parcel of land of 104.9705 hectares of Village Rampur Bangar is subject-matter of challenge in Writ C No. 11839 of 2012. (iv) Village Usmanpur : 84. For village Usmanpur, justification for acquisition by invoking the urgency clause has been given in the affidavit of the State filed in Writ C No. 20716 of 2010. The original record has also been produced and perused by us. An area of 161.3900 hectares of Village Usmanpur was proposed to be acquired by notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(4) of the Act, 1894 dated 4.11.2009. 80% of the estimated compensation was deposited prior to the declaration notification under Section 6 read with Section 17(1) dated 18.3.2010. By possession memo dated 17.7.2010, possession of an area of 141.580 hectares and the possession memo dated 22.12.2010 for an area of 7.2630 hectares were prepared and possession was handed over to the Authority (YEIDA(. Out of the total area of 149.5160 hectares handed over to the development authority, the compensation of 86% of the land, i.e. 128.2950 hectares had been disbursed to the affected tenure holders till 19.5.2011. Out of the total area of 149.5160 hectares handed over to the development authority, the compensation of 86% of the land, i.e. 128.2950 hectares had been disbursed to the affected tenure holders till 19.5.2011. The land under the acquisition notification falling in Sector planning was needed urgently, justification for which has been given in Prapatra 10 alongwith Certificate of the Collector which was found in the record of the State as under : 85. The statement in the counter-affidavit of the State is that on consideration of all relevant factors and the documents including certificate of the Collector issued in Prapatra 10, the State Government recorded a satisfaction according approval to issuance of notification by invoking urgency clause keeping in view the urgent need of the 'Contiguous land for Planned Development' in District Gautam Budh Nagar through YEIDA. (v) Village Raunija : 86. For the acquisition of the land of Village Raunija, the counter-affidavit of the State and YEIDA Authority in Writ C No. 60651 of 2011 demonstrates that the land under the impugned notifications of the said village was needed for mixed use like residential, institutional, greens and recreational etc. under Sector 22-D and 22-E in the Master plan. In view of the policy decision of the State for development of SDZ vide Government Order dated 29.12.2007, a proposal was sent by the Authority to the competent authority on 31.8.2010 for acquisition of the land of Village Raunija. A revised proposal was sent on 16.9.2010 for acquiring the land admeasuring 255.4975 hectares of the said Village. 10% of the estimated compensation and the acquisition cost was deposited on 13.10.2010. It is stated in the counter-affidavit of the Authority, that with the establishment of the area as an Industrial Development Area, it has to be assured physical, social and economic integration of the existing Village Abadi and its population. The State Government had sufficient material before it for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, 1894. There is no allegation of mala fide nor malice can be attributed to the acquisition proceedings. The land has been acquired for the purpose of planned development for which it is being used. The notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) and 17(4) was issued on 2.11.2010 after completion of the necessary formalities. There is no allegation of mala fide nor malice can be attributed to the acquisition proceedings. The land has been acquired for the purpose of planned development for which it is being used. The notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) and 17(4) was issued on 2.11.2010 after completion of the necessary formalities. After deposit of 70% of the estimated compensation and the compensation towards a National Rehabilitation Policy on 6.12.2010, the proposal for issuance of notification under Section 6 read with Section 17 was sent by the Director, Land Acquisition vide letter dated 13.12.2010 to the State Government and ultimately, the declaration notification under Section 6 read with Section 17 was published on 7.1.2011. 87. It was submitted before us that No pre-or post notification delay can be attributed to the entire exercise completed by the Authority therein. Placing the averments in the counter-affidavit, it was urged that the acquisition of different parcels of land for development for industries, residence, amusement etc was complimentary to the creation of Yamuna Expressway. The present scheme is also of mixed use around the Expressway and it cannot be viewed in isolation. Development of an area alongside Expressway would be complementary to each other. Out of the total area of 255.1185 hectares acquired through the Notifications-in-question of Village Raunija, the possession of 236.6860 hectares had been transferred to the YEIDA Authority. Out of 492 persons/tenure holders affected by the acquisition under the notifications in question, 476 tenure holders had received compensation under Karar Niyamawali/agreement Rules, 1997, award of which was made on 9.5.2012. The award for the remaining area, of which possession had been taken, under Section 11(1), was declared on 31.12.2013. It was, thus, submitted that the challenge to the acquisition, in piecemeal, cannot be entertained and the comprehensive scheme has to be seen to decide the question of urgency. The land of Village Raunija acquired through the acquisition-in-question forms part of Sector 22-E and Sector 22- D which are contiguous to Yamuna Expressway. A small part of this Village falls in planning of Sector 22-D and has been utilized for creation of approach roads to the Expressway. Being strategically located, the acquisition of land of Village Rauniza is demonstrated to be part of the integrated scheme of development of the Townships conceived by YEIDA, complimentary to the construction of Yamuna Expressway. (vi) Village Dungarpur Reelka : 88. Being strategically located, the acquisition of land of Village Rauniza is demonstrated to be part of the integrated scheme of development of the Townships conceived by YEIDA, complimentary to the construction of Yamuna Expressway. (vi) Village Dungarpur Reelka : 88. In the counter-affidavit of the State in Writ C No. 6666 of 2011 for acquisition of the land of Village Dungarpur Reelka vide Notifications dated 1.12.2010 and 24.3.2011 under Section 4 and 6 of the Act, 1894; respectively. It is stated that the proposal for acquisition of 198.6320 hectares of land of the said village in furtherance of the object of development of Special Development Zone, conceived by the State Government under the Government Order dated 29.12.2007, was sent to the competent authority on 4.11.2010. 10% of the estimated cost of acquisition and compensation was deposited on 30.10.2010. The justification of urgency as disclosed in Prapatra-10, the certificate dated 4.11.2010 submitted by the Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar, can be found in Annexure CA-'4' to the counter-affidavit, which was relatable to the original record of the State placed before us. The justification in Prapatra-10 reads as under : 89. From a perusal of the statement in Form 10, it can be seen that the acquisition was proposed for the integrated project, to provide basic infrastructural facilities and the need for contiguous land was pressed with the assertion that in case of grant of opportunity of hearing to the land holders, there was likelihood of non-availability of the contiguous land for the proposed project which may frustrate the project itself. Total 80% of the estimated compensation was deposited on 2.2.2011, out of total 612 affected tenure holders, 437 tenure holders for a total area of 96.1808 hectares had received compensation under Karar Niyamawali/agreement rules, 1997 and the award for the said area under Section 11(2) of the Act, 1894 had been declared on 14.3.2012, copy of which is appended as Annexure 6' to the said affidavit. (vii) Village Rustampur : 90. The counter-affidavit of the State in Writ C No. 61244 of 2011 for acquisition of land of Village Rustampur by the notifications dated 26.2.2009 and 26.2.2010 under Section 4 and 6 of the Act, 1894; respectively, shows that it was an acquisition for a large area of land admeasuring 360.6642 hectares. (vii) Village Rustampur : 90. The counter-affidavit of the State in Writ C No. 61244 of 2011 for acquisition of land of Village Rustampur by the notifications dated 26.2.2009 and 26.2.2010 under Section 4 and 6 of the Act, 1894; respectively, shows that it was an acquisition for a large area of land admeasuring 360.6642 hectares. The copy of the Certificate/report of the Collector, Gautam Buddh Nagar in Prapatra-10 shows that it was mentioned therein that the village-in-question being in the Notified area of Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority, its development in a planned manner as per the Master Plan was to be made. About suitability of the land, it was specifically stated therein that no other land was available for the purpose of acquisition. From the original record of the State in the matter of invocation of urgency of Village Rustampur, it could be noted that the delay in sending papers for issuance of declaration under Section 6 before the State Government, in the instant acquisition, was viewed seriously by the State and direction was given to fix the accountability of the officer concerned. It was urged that this fact demonstrated from the record shows the sensitivity of the State Government to the fact that on account of dereliction of the official in-charge of the proceedings, lapse of acquisition of such a large area would hamper development of the whole project. (viii) Village Kadarpur : 91. For village Kadarpur, the counter of the State and the records pertaining to recording satisfaction by the State shows that it was an acquisition for a large area of 120.8221 hectares. On the proposal submitted on 29.10.2010 before the State carrying a certificate of the Collector, the copy of the office noting on which approval of the State Government for invocation of urgency clause was given has been appended with the counter-affidavit as Annexure 10'. The material brought before the State namely a certificate of the District Level Committee regarding grant of consent for acquisition of the land, the certificates that total 175 families will be affected by the proposed acquisition and that 10% of the estimated compensation as well as 10% of the acquisition cost submitted alongwith the proposal, and a statement that no land except the proposed agriculture land was available, which was required for development as per the Master Plan of the area, could be found. It was stated in the counter that the land was required immediately to complete the development plan for Green belt Area to be maintained on either sides of the Expressway. It was brought before the State that, in case of grant of opportunity of hearing to the farmers/tenure holders, there was likelihood of the acquisition being entangled in litigation and the apprehension was that the authority may not be able to procure 'Contiguous land', needed for integrated development of the area. The statement in paragraph 19' of the said affidavit are relevant to be extracted hereunder : ''19.That it will not out of place to mention here that the State Government was satisfied by looking at enormity of the number of tenure holders, the disposal of objections will cause a delay of years. Hence, the acquisition of land possession was of paramount importance. It was accordingly satisfied that the provisions of Section 5-A need to be dispensed with. A true copy of the noting of the State Government evidencing application of mind by the State Government is being annexed herewith and marked as Annexure CA-10 to this counter-affidavit.'' 92. It may further be noted that 80% of the estimated compensation for the acquired land was deposited before the publication of Section 6 notification. Out of total 120.8221 hectares, possession of 113.8074 hectares was given to YEIDA. Out of total 561 affected tenure holders, 503 tenure holders had received compensation under the Agreement rules. It has further been stated in the counter-affidavit that under three writ petitions filed by the tenure holders with respect to acquisition of land of village Kadarpur, out of total six petitioners, three had received compensation. The affected area under litigation is only 5.592 hectares which comes to about 4.91% of the total acquired and possessed area. We may further note that at the time of hearing of this bunch, only two writ petitions of Village Kadirpur comprising of three petitioners remained for consideration and it seems that the other three petitioners who had received compensation had withdrawn their petition. (ix) Village Dhanauri : 93. We may further note that at the time of hearing of this bunch, only two writ petitions of Village Kadirpur comprising of three petitioners remained for consideration and it seems that the other three petitioners who had received compensation had withdrawn their petition. (ix) Village Dhanauri : 93. For acquisition of village Dhanauri, vide notification dated 16.11.2010 and 22.3.2011 under Section 4 and 6 of the Act, 1894; respectively, in the counter-affidavit of the State it was brought on record that the justification for acquisition by invocation of urgency clause had been given in Prapatra-10 in the proposal submitted by the development authority upon which satisfaction had been recorded by the State. From the record of the State and the copy of Prapatra-10 appended with the counter-affidavit as Annexure C.A.-'3', we find justification as under : 94. It is stated therein that the land in question was required for the purpose of development, complimentary to the Expressway, for structural and foundational purposes of the planned development, which cannot be said to be alien to the concept of invocation of urgency. Out of total 1983 affected tenure holders under the impugned notifications, 618 tenure holders for an area 232.1773 hectares had received compensation under Karar Niyamawali, award of which under Section 11(2) was made. (VI) Analysis : 95. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, on the issues raised before us, the questions before us to examine in the instant case, is (i) Whether for the acquisition of lands of nine villages made between 26.2.2009 to 2.12.2010, for the integrated development of the township by YEIDA under the Master plan-2031 (Phase-1), as alleged herein, there was any justification before the State Government for invocation of urgency clause under Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Act' 1894, to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act' 1894, denying opportunity of hearing to the tenure holders/land holders. (ii) Whether denial of opportunity of hearing to the tenure holders would be an illegal exercise on the part of the State which would render the entire acquisition proceedings bad in law. 96. (ii) Whether denial of opportunity of hearing to the tenure holders would be an illegal exercise on the part of the State which would render the entire acquisition proceedings bad in law. 96. To answer these questions, while entering into the merits of the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, at the beginning, we would be required to examine the legal aspects relating to the Scope and Object of Section 5-A. (A) Nature, scope and ambit of Section 5-A of the Act, 1894 : (a) Constitutional Scheme : 97. It was argued by Sri Manish Goyal learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent-YEIDA that for understanding the scope and object of Section 5-A, we must look to the Constitutional scheme, right to property enshrined in Article 300-A which provides that ''no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law''. The word ''law'' is defined in Article 13(3)(a) which includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law. 98. Article 31-A saves the law providing for acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein. Article 31-A(1) starts with a Non-obstante clause and provides that no such law shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19. The Second proviso to Article 31-A, however, provides that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land, as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him, under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof. 99. 99. Article 31-C saves the law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV of the Constitution and states that it shall not be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19. It further provides that no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy. 100. Article 39(b), containing in Part IV ''Directive Principles of the State Policy'' mandates the State to direct its policy, in particular, towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to sub-serve the common good.'' Sovereign power of Eminent domain of the State has, thus, been exercised by the State for framing policy for development of Special Economic Zone by the Government Order dated 29.12.2007. 101. The decision of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka and another etc. v. Ranganatha Reddy and another etc., AIR 1978 SC 215 , has been placed before us to submit that in a challenge to the State Act namely Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, it was held therein that the Act was brought into force to implement Directive principles contained in Article 39(b), the infraction of Article 14 is, thus, cured by Article 31-C. It was noted that Article 39(b) and (c) enjoins upon the State to see that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth to the Common detriment. 102. Reference has been made to the observations of the Apex Court in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited and another, (1983) 1 SCC 147 , to bring before us as to what would be the valid exercise of Eminent domain. It was observed therein that the law seeking the immunity afforded by Article 31-C must be a law directing the policy of the State towards securing a Directive Principle, where Article 31-C comes in Article 14 goes out. It was observed therein that the law seeking the immunity afforded by Article 31-C must be a law directing the policy of the State towards securing a Directive Principle, where Article 31-C comes in Article 14 goes out. There is no scope for bringing in Article 14 by a side-wind as it were, that is, by equating the rule of equality before the law of Article 14 with the broad egalitarianism of Article 39(b) or by treating the principle of Article 14 as included in the principle of Article 39(b). To insist on nexus between the law for which protection is claimed and the principle of Article 39(b) is not to insist on fulfillment of the requirement of Article 14. They are different concepts and in certain circumstances, may even run counter to each other. That is why the need for the immunity afforded by Article 31-C is there. The argument that any law seeking the protection of Article 31-C must not be a law founded on discrimination, had been turned down therein. The submission that the law founded on arbitrariness and discrimination could never be said to be a law to further the Directive Principles in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39, had been held untenable. It was held that the expression 'material resources of the community' in Article 39(b) is not confined to natural resources; it is not confined to resources owned by the public; it means and includes all resources, natural and man-made, public and private-owned. 103. The purport, significance, scope, ambit and rationale of Article 31-C has been discussed by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu and others v. L. Abu Kavur Bai and others, (1984) 1 SCC 515 , it was observed in paragraphs 19, 20' and 21' as under : ''19. Thus, it would appear from a combined reading of Bharati's and Minerva Mills cases as also of the subsequent decisions that the undisputed position is that Article 31C, as introduced by the twenty fifth amendment, is constitutionally valid in all respects and has survived the stormy decision of Bharati's case. 20. Similar observations were made in Waman Rao and others etc. v. Union of India and others, where one of us (Chandrachud, CJ) observed thus: ''...Article 31 is now out of harm's way. 20. Similar observations were made in Waman Rao and others etc. v. Union of India and others, where one of us (Chandrachud, CJ) observed thus: ''...Article 31 is now out of harm's way. In fact, far from damaging the basic structure of the Constitution, laws passed truly and bona fide for giving effect to directive principles contained in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 will fortify that structure.'' (Emphasis supplied) 21. In the latest Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and another, it has been emphasised that the constitutional validity of Article 31C is now beyond challenge and in this connection one of us (Reddy, J.) speaking for the Court made the following observations: In the second place, the question of the constitutional validity of Article 31C appears to us to be concluded by the decision of the Court in Kesavananda Bharati case.'' 104. It was further observed therein that another important facet of Article 31-C which has been emphasized by the Apex Court, is that there should be a close nexus between the Statute passed by the legislature and the twin objects mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39, so as to make the protection of Article 31-C complete and irrevocable. By close nexus, what is meant is that there must be a reasonable connection between the Act passed and the objects mentioned in Article 39(b) and (c) before the Article 31-C can apply. The observation in paragraph 26' of the said decision, noticing the earlier decision in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company (supra), adverting to the conflict of Article 31-C and Article 14 is relevant to be extracted hereinunder : ''In a later decision in Sanjay Coke Manufacturing Co.'s case (supra), adverting to this very point, one of us (Reddy, J.) made the following observations: ''We are firmly of the opinion that where Article 31C comes in Article.14 goes out. There is no scope for bringing in Article 14 by a side wind as it were, that is, by equating the rule of equality before the law of Article 14 with the broad egalitarianism of Article 39 (b) or by treating the principle of Article 14 as included in the principle of Article 39 (b).'' 105. There is no scope for bringing in Article 14 by a side wind as it were, that is, by equating the rule of equality before the law of Article 14 with the broad egalitarianism of Article 39 (b) or by treating the principle of Article 14 as included in the principle of Article 39 (b).'' 105. In State of Maharashtra and another v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan and others, (1986) 2 SCC 516 , taking note of the above decisions, the interplay of Article 300-A & Article 31-C had been noticed. Relying upon the Constitution Bench decision in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company (supra), it was held therein that the Act was brought into force to implement the Directive Principle contained in Article 39(b) and hence even if there is any infraction of Article 14, it is cured by Article 31-C which gives protection to the Act, even if it enshrined the protection granted by the then Article 31(1) of the Constitution which was couched in the same language as that of Article 300-A, which came into force after enactment of the Act challenged therein. It was observed that even if the action of acquiring private properties should satisfy new Article 300-A because the proceedings to acquire the land started after Article 300-A came into force, the law cannot be tested on the standards of principles of fairness and reasonableness enshrined in Article 14. It was held that the purpose for which the lands were acquired was the public purpose. All the requirements of valid exercise of the power of Eminent domain had been fulfilled under the Act, the High Court, therefore, fell in error in holding that the impugned provisions of the Act were required to be struck down as they were neither just nor fair nor reasonable though they are protected from challenge under Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution due to the applicability of Article 31-C of the Constitution. 106. On the arguments based on Article 21 of the Constitution of the respondent, it was observed that it has little to do with the right to own property as such. Land ceiling laws, laws providing for acquisition of land for providing housing accommodation, laws imposing ceiling on urban property etc. cannot be struck down by invoking Article 21 of the Constitution. 107. Land ceiling laws, laws providing for acquisition of land for providing housing accommodation, laws imposing ceiling on urban property etc. cannot be struck down by invoking Article 21 of the Constitution. 107. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for YEIDA, in the instant case, thus, is that the acquisition of the lands in question by the notifications under Section 4 readwith Section 17 and Section 6/17 of the Act, 1894 is a matter of public policy and it is to be left to the legislative wisdom, the State to decide as to how a development policy is framed and whether a particular scheme of development, to take over the land, should be undertaken. The preparation of Master plan by the State for development of the area being governed by Article 39(b) contained in Chapter IV of the 'Directive Principles of State Policy', the decision of the State to develop the area by creation of Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority and preparation of Master plan being an Act of the State under the constitutional mandate would be saved by Article 31-C. Challenge to the law which includes the notifications issued by the State under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on the plea of discrimination or lack of public purpose or against the public policy cannot be sustained. 108. Once the acquisition of land is made in exercise of power of Eminent domain of the State, infraction of Article 14 shall not be attracted. Individual grievances cannot be raised to assail the acquisition being made by the law of the State which is saved by Article 31-C of the Constitution. The scope of objection under Section 5-A and challenge to the deprivation of it is covered under the statutory scheme. (b) Statutory Scheme : 109. As regards the invocation of urgency clause, dispensation of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it was urged that the legislative scheme of the Act, 1894 has to be considered. Section 16 provides that after the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances. Section 17 is in the nature of exception. Section 16 provides that after the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances. Section 17 is in the nature of exception. Section 17(1) provides that in case of urgency, though no award has been made, on expiration of fifteen days from the publication of notice under Section 9(1), it can take possession of any land needed for a public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances. Section 17(2) also empowers the Collector to enter upon and take possession of such land, immediate possession of which is needed for the purposes prescribed therein, in the opinion of the State Government and on such action of the Collector with the previous sanction of the State, the land shall vest absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances. Sub-section (3) of Section 17 provides the damages which is to be offered by the Collector to the persons interested as compensation for the Standing Crops and trees or any other damage sustained by them caused by the sudden dispossession. In case, the offer is not accepted, the value of such crops and trees and such damages shall be incorporated in the award made under the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (3A) further protects interest of the tenure holders to the extent that before taking possession under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 17, the Collector has to tender 80% of the estimated compensation to the persons interested entitled thereto. In case of refusal, or any dispute relating to the entitlement of the person interested, the compensation has to be deposited in accordance with the provisions of Section 31 of the Act, 1894. 110. Sub-section (4) of Section 17, however, provides that where the State Government has formed opinion that the provisions of Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) are applicable, it may direct for dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A and if it does so, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time, after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894. Section 5-A is the stage of making objection by the person interested in any land after the intention of the State to acquire the land has been notified under Section 4(1). Section 5-A is the stage of making objection by the person interested in any land after the intention of the State to acquire the land has been notified under Section 4(1). The Collector is obliged to make an enquiry on the objections made to him in writing and submit his recommendations on the objections together with the record of the proceedings held by him for the decision of the State Government, approval of which on the objections of the person interested/tenure holders shall be final. 111. The Land Acquisition Act is a complete Code in itself. Being an expropriatory legislation, it is settled that its provisions are to be strictly followed. The procedure for acquisition prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act shall be subject to strict interpretation by the Court of law, whenever there is a challenge raised to any of the proceedings conducted under it. Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act are independent. In case of a notification issued under Section 17(1), it is not necessary to issue notification under Section 17(4) as well. The enquiry under Section 5-A is dispensed with only when the notification both under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) are issued. With the issuance of the notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and 17(4), the expression of intention of the State Government to take possession of the land without making an award is notified. In the legislative scheme, the State Government is empowered to issue notification to notify that in view of Section 17(1), in its opinion, invocation of Section 17(4) is needed, with the result that enquiry under Section 5-A or opportunity of hearing to the tenure holder under the said provision stands dispensed with. 112. In the constitutional scheme, the right to property is protected under Article 300-A, to the extent, that no one can be expropriated of its property saved by authority of law. Article 31-A and 31-C contained in Part III of the Constitution are in the nature of exception to Article 14 or Article 19. The acquisition notifications under Sections 17(1) and 17(4), invocation of urgency and dispensation of enquiry, being under the statutory scheme of the Act, 1894 are saved by the Constitution, if they confirm to the requirements of Article 31-A and 31-C, contained in Part III of the Constitution. The acquisition notifications under Sections 17(1) and 17(4), invocation of urgency and dispensation of enquiry, being under the statutory scheme of the Act, 1894 are saved by the Constitution, if they confirm to the requirements of Article 31-A and 31-C, contained in Part III of the Constitution. With the exclusion of Article 14 and Article 19 from the purview of Article 31-A and 31-C, right of the tenure holder to object to the acquisition provided under Section 5-A of the Act, 1894 cannot be said to be a fundamental right or a right akin to fundamental right protected by the Constitution. Section 5-A is a statutory right conferred on the tenure holders/person interested to object in writing to the acquisition of the land within the time provided therein. Deprivation of it by invocation of urgency clause vide notifications under Section 17(1) and 17(4) being within the statutory scheme, thus, is not hit by the Article 300-A of the Constitution. The expropriation of land by invocation of urgency clause, by itself, cannot be said to be in violation of Article 300-A. The act of the Government in deprivation of statutory right of hearing while notification issued under Section 17(4), cannot be challenged on the ground that fundamental rights of the tenure holders under Articles 14 and 19 have been violated or it amounts to violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution, without any challenge to the procedure adopted by the State Government in issuance of the notification under Section 17(4). Indeed, there cannot be a quarrel that the notifications under Section 17(1) readwith 17(4) of the Act, 1894 can be challenged and validity can be tested on all legal parameters as is available under law, on the ground that it amounts to violation of Statutory scheme or contrary to it. 113. ''Eminent domain'' is the right or power of a sovereign State to appropriate the private property within the territorial sovereignty to public uses or purposes. It is exercise of strong arm of Government to take property for public uses without the owner's consent. It requires no constitutional recognition; it is an attribute of sovereignty and essential to the sovereign Government. The power of Eminent domain, being inherent in the Government, is exercisable in the public interest, general welfare and for public purpose. It is exercise of strong arm of Government to take property for public uses without the owner's consent. It requires no constitutional recognition; it is an attribute of sovereignty and essential to the sovereign Government. The power of Eminent domain, being inherent in the Government, is exercisable in the public interest, general welfare and for public purpose. Acquisition of private property by the State in the public interest or for public purpose is nothing but an enforcement of the right of Eminent domain. The Act, 1894 provides directly for acquisition of particular property for public purpose. Though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right but Article 300-A of the Constitution mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. [Reference paragraphs 40' and 41' of Anand Singh and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2010) 11 SCC 242 ] 114. As held by the Apex Court in Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others, (2000) 7 SCC 296 , a person interested can file objections under Section 5-A, substantially on the following grounds : (i) The purpose for which the land is acquired is not a public purpose; (ii) That even if the purpose is a public purpose, the land of the objector is not necessary to be taken as the purpose could be served by other land already proposed or some other land to which the objector may refer; or (iii) In any event, even if the land is necessary for the public purpose, in the special facts and circumstances, in which the objector is placed, it is a fit case for omitting his land from acquisition. (c) The Precedence : Legal Position : 115. There has been a long debate on the nature of right conferred on the land holders to file objection under Section 5-A to the acquisition of their property in exercise of power of Eminent domain of the State. The discussion of various decisions of the Apex Court beginning from the year 1964, at this juncture, will throw some light on the same. 116. In Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1217 , it was observed that the right to file objections under Section 5-A is a substantial right when a person's property is being threatened with acquisition and that right cannot be taken away as if by a side-wind. 116. In Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1217 , it was observed that the right to file objections under Section 5-A is a substantial right when a person's property is being threatened with acquisition and that right cannot be taken away as if by a side-wind. 117. While noticing the above observations in Nandeshwar Prasad (supra), it was held in Munshi Singh and others v. Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 337 , in paragraph 7' that: ''7. Section 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. xxxxxxx............... '' 118. Noticing the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A of the Act, it was held in Munshi Singh that : ''7. ...........xxxxxxxxxxx.... The legislature has, therefore, made complete provisions for the persons interested to file objections against the proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their objections. It is only in cases of urgency that special powers have been conferred on the appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions of Section 5-A.'' 119. In Union of India and others v. Mukesh Hans, etc. etc., 2004 (8) SCC 14 , noticing the earlier decisions of the Apex Court, it was held that : ''36. ......Right of representation and hearing contemplated under Section 5-A of the Act is a very valuable right of a person whose property is sought to be acquired and he should have appropriate and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that the acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. Therefore, in our opinion, if the appropriate Government decides to take away this minimal right then its decision to do so must be based on materials on record to support the same and bearing in mind the object of Section 5-A''. 120. In Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai and others, AIR 2005 SC 3520 , while dealing with the nature of right under Section 5-A, noticing the observations in the above noted decisions, it was observed by the Apex Court in paragraphs 7' and 10' as under : ''7. 120. In Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai and others, AIR 2005 SC 3520 , while dealing with the nature of right under Section 5-A, noticing the observations in the above noted decisions, it was observed by the Apex Court in paragraphs 7' and 10' as under : ''7. It is not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable right in favour of a person whose lands are sought to be acquired. Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution of India, the State in exercise of its power of 'eminent domain' may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid. 10. It is trite that hearing given to a person must be an effective one and not a mere formality. Formation of opinion as regard the public purpose as also suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind as regard consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The State in its decision making process must not commit any misdirection in law. It is also not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable important right and having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution of India has been held to be akin to a fundamental right. '' 121. In Anand Singh (supra), it was observed that : ''42. When the Government proceeds for compulsory acquisition of particular property for public purpose, the only right that the owner or the person interested in the property has, is to submit his objections within the prescribed time under Section 5A of the Act and persuade the State authorities to drop the acquisition of that particular land by setting forth the reasons such as the unsuitability of the land for the stated public purpose; the grave hardship that may be caused to him by such expropriation, availability of alternative land for achieving public purpose etc. Moreover, right conferred on the owner or person interested to file objections to the proposed acquisition is not only an important and valuable right but also makes the provision for compulsory acquisition just and in conformity with the fundamental principles of natural justice. 43. Moreover, right conferred on the owner or person interested to file objections to the proposed acquisition is not only an important and valuable right but also makes the provision for compulsory acquisition just and in conformity with the fundamental principles of natural justice. 43. The exceptional and extraordinary power of doing away with an enquiry under Section 5A in a case where possession of the land is required urgently or in unforeseen emergency is provided in Section 17 of the Act. Such power is not a routine power and save circumstances warranting immediate possession it should not be lightly invoked. The guideline is inbuilt in Section 17 itself for exercise of the exceptional power in dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A. Exceptional the power, the more circumspect the Government must be in its exercise. The Government obviously, therefore, has to apply its mind before it dispenses with enquiry under Section 5A on the aspect whether the urgency is of such a nature that justifies elimination of summary enquiry under Section 5A.'' 122. The right of property is now considered to be not only a Constitutional or Statutory right but also a human right. [Reference P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59 and State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar and others, (2011) 10 SCC 404 . 123. In Babu Ram and another v. State of Haryana and another, (2009) 10 SCC 115 , the observations made by the Apex Court in Om Prakash and another v. State of U.P. and others, (1998) 6 SCC 1 , were noted to emphasize that a right under Section 5-A is not merely statutory but also has a flavour of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. It was noted therein that such observation in Om Prakash (supra) were made in light of the observations of the Apex Court in earlier decision in State of Punjab and another v. Gurdial Singh and others, (1980) 2 SCC 471 . 124. In Om Prakash (supra), the Apex Court referring to the observations in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (supra), about the nature of right under Section 5-A, itself noted that right to property has no longer remained a fundamental right and is saved by Article 300-A of the Constitution. 124. In Om Prakash (supra), the Apex Court referring to the observations in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (supra), about the nature of right under Section 5-A, itself noted that right to property has no longer remained a fundamental right and is saved by Article 300-A of the Constitution. It was, however, noted that the observation in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (supra) regarding Article 14 vis-a-vis Section 5-A of the Act would remain apposite. 125. The relevant observations in paragraph 21' in Om Prakash (supra) with reference to the statement in paragraph 16' of State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (supra) is noted hereinunder : ''21. Our attention was also invited by shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appellants to a decisions of a two Judge Bench of this Court in the case of State of Punjab and another v. Gurdial Singh and others [ (1980) 2 SCC 471 ] wherein Krishna Iyer, J. dealing with the question of exercise of emergency powers under Section 17 of the Act observed in para 16 of the Report that save in real urgency where public interest did not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Articles 14 and 19 burke an inquiry under Section 17 of the Act. Thus, according to the aforesaid decision of this Court, inquiry under Section 5-A is not merely statutory but also has a flavour of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution though right to property has now no longer remained a fundamental right, at least observation regarding Article 14, vis-a-vis, Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act would remain apposite.'' 126. Simultaneously, the observations in paragraph 16' in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (supra) are also noted hereinunder : ''Without referring to supportive case-law it is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man's property is a serious matter and the smaller the man the more serious the matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and preemptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons. Save in real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Articles 14 (and 19), burke an enquiry under Section 17 of the Act. Save in real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Articles 14 (and 19), burke an enquiry under Section 17 of the Act. Here a slumbering process, pending for years and suddenly exciting itself into immediate forcible taking, makes a travesty of emergency power.'' 127. A careful and conjoint reading of both the above observations of the Apex Court makes it clear that the analogy to Articles 14 and 19 had been drawn in the case of State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (supra) to borrow the principles of reasonableness and administrative fairness in the acquisition proceedings, to observe that save in real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing, the Land Acquisition Authorities should not, having regard to Articles 14 (and 19), burke an enquiry under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. 128. The abovenoted observations in Gurdial Singh (supra) cannot be read to mean that the right of hearing under Section 5-A of a tenure holder has been elevated to fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution from that of a statutory right as sought to be contended by the learned counsels for the petitioners. 129. In view of the above discussion, it is evident that objections under Section 5-A of the Act, if filed, have to be dealt with in accordance with law by providing opportunity of effective hearing to every objector, as it cannot be said to be an empty formality and, in case, such a hearing is not provided, the subsequent proceedings would stand vitiated. The enquiry required under Section 5-A of the Act can be dispensed with in exercise of the power under Section 17(4) of the Act, only in grave urgency and in exceptional circumstances, and the decision of the State must be based on material on record to support the same, otherwise, it would amount to arbitrary exercise of power and denial of administrative fairness would be a constitutional anathema. The exercise of power of 'Eminent domain' may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same, but it should be made only for public purpose and should not violate the constitutional rights guaranteed under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The exercise of power of 'Eminent domain' may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same, but it should be made only for public purpose and should not violate the constitutional rights guaranteed under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Denial of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, without any justifiable cause, could be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as it cannot withstand the test of fairness and reasonableness required in the administrative process. In absence of real and genuine urgency, it would not be appropriate to deprive a land holder (aggrieved person) of a fair and just opportunity of putting forth his objection for due consideration of the Authority concerned. [emphasis be made to the observations of the Apex Court in the above noted decisions] B. The Procedure for invocation of Urgency Clause under Section 17(4) : 130. Now the question would be as to what procedure is required to be followed by the State for invoking the urgency clause under Section 17(4) to dispense with the enquiry required under Section 5-A of the Act. 131. In Union of India and others v. Mukesh Hans (supra), there is a discussion with regard to the procedure which is required to be followed by the State while invoking the provisions of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, 1894. 132. It was observed that Section 17(1) only contemplates that the authorities may take possession of the land even before passing of an award after expiration of 15 days of publication of Section 9(1) notice. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 contemplates a different type of urgency, which should be an unforeseen emergency. Under this Section, if Appropriate Government is satisfied that there is such unforeseen emergency, it can take possession of the land even without waiting for 15 days period contemplated under Section 9(1), as against the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 17. Section 17(4), however, can be invoked in cases, where the Appropriate Government has come to the conclusion that there exists an urgency or unforeseen urgency as required under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 17; respectively, and, thus, may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply. On issuance of such direction, the enquiry under Section 5-A can be dispensed with. On issuance of such direction, the enquiry under Section 5-A can be dispensed with. It is, held that Section 17(4) is an exception to the normal mode of acquisition contemplated under the Act and that mere existence of urgency or unforeseen urgency though is a condition precedent for invoking Section 17(4), but that by itself is not sufficient to direct the dispensation of 5-A enquiry. It is observed that mere existence of an urgency under Section 17(1) or unforeseen emergency under Section 17(2) would not by themselves be sufficient for dispensing with 5-A enquiry. The existence of urgency or unforeseen emergency provision in Section 17(1) and (2) would not automatically dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A. 133. The result is that there would be requirement of application of mind by the appropriate Government while dispensing with 5-A enquiry and it is possible that in a given case the urgency noticed by the Appropriate Government under Section 17(1) or the unforeseen emergency under Section 17(2), itself may be of such decree that it could require the Appropriate Government on that very basis to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A. But the need for application of mind by the Appropriate Government that such an urgency for dispensation of 5-A enquiry is inherent in the two types of urgencies contemplated under Section 17(1) and (2) of the Act. The nature and right under Section 5-A, thus, has been explained in paragraphs 34' and 35' as under : ''34. A careful reading of the above judgment shows that this Court in the said case of Nandeshwar Prasad's case (supra) has also held that there should an application of mind to the facts of the case with special reference to this concession of 5A inquiry under the Act. 35. At this stage, it is relevant to notice that the limited right given to an owner/person interested under Section 5A of the Act to object to the acquisition proceedings is not an empty formality and is a substantive right, which can be taken away for good and valid reason and within the limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Act. At this stage, it is relevant to notice that the limited right given to an owner/person interested under Section 5A of the Act to object to the acquisition proceedings is not an empty formality and is a substantive right, which can be taken away for good and valid reason and within the limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Act. The object and importance of 5A inquiry was noticed by this Court in the case of Munshi Singh and others v. Union of India { (1973) 2 SCC 337 where this Court held thus : ''Section 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. The legislature has made complete provisions for the persons interested to file objections against the proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their objections. It is only in cases of urgency that special powers have been conferred on the appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions of Section 5-A.'' 134. It was further held that formation of opinion and application of mind on invocation of urgency cannot be assessed except by looking into the proceeding which culminated in the impugned order. The records of the State is, thus, required to be looked into. 135. The extract of paragraph 32' of Union of India v. Mukesh Hans (supra) noted in Anand Singh (supra) reads as under : ''34.........xxxxxxx 32. A careful perusal of this provision which is an exception to the normal mode of acquisition contemplated under the Act shows that mere existence of urgency or unforeseen emergency though is a condition precedent for invoking Section 17(4), that by itself is not sufficient to direct the dispensation of the Section 5-A inquiry. It requires an opinion to be formed by the Government concerned that alongwith the existence of such urgency or unforeseen emergency there is also a need for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry which indicates that the legislature intended the appropriate Government to apply its mind before dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry. It also indicates that mere existence of an urgency under Section 17(1) or unforeseen emergency under Section 17(2) would not by itself be sufficient for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry. It also indicates that mere existence of an urgency under Section 17(1) or unforeseen emergency under Section 17(2) would not by itself be sufficient for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry. If that was not the intention of the legislature then the latter part of sub-section (4) of Section 17 would not have been necessary and the legislature in Sections 17(1) and (2) itself could have incorporated that in such situation of existence of urgency or unforeseen emergency automatically Section 5-A inquiry will be dispensed with. But then that is not the language of the section which in our opinion requires the appropriate Government to further consider the need for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry in spite of the existence of unforeseen emergency. This understanding of ours as to the requirement of an application of mind by the appropriate Government while dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry does not mean that in each and every case when there is an urgency contemplated under Section 17(1) and unforeseen emergency contemplated under Section 17(2) exists that by itself would not contain the need for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry. It is possible in a given case the urgency noticed by the appropriate Government under Section 17(1) or the unforeseen emergency under Section 17(2) itself may be of such degree that it could require the appropriate Government on that very basis to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5-A but then there is a need for application of mind by the appropriate Government that such an urgency for dispensation of the Section 5-A inquiry is inherent in the two types of urgencies contemplated under Sections 17(1) and (2) of the Act.'' C. Scope of Judicial review : 136. As to the scope of judicial review, in Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. (supra) it is held that the conclusiveness contained in Section 6 of the Act indisputably is attached to a need as also the purpose and in this regard ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited but it is equally true that when an opportunity of being heard has expressly been conferred by a Statute, the same must scrupulously be complied with. For the said purpose, ''the Court in a case, where there has been total non-compliance or substantial non-compliance of the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act, cannot fold its hands and refuse to grant a relief to the writ petitioner. For the said purpose, ''the Court in a case, where there has been total non-compliance or substantial non-compliance of the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act, cannot fold its hands and refuse to grant a relief to the writ petitioner. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act renders a declaration to be a conclusive evidence. But when the decision making process itself is in question, the power of judicial review can be exercised by the Court in the event the order impugned suffers from well-known principles, viz., illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Moreover, when a statutory authority exercises such enormous power it must be done in a fair and reasonable manner''. 137. From Anand Singh (supra), relevant discussion in paragraphs 45', 46' and 47' are to be noted hereinunder : ''45. It is true that power conferred upon the Government under Section 17 is administrative and its opinion is entitled to due weight, but in a case where the opinion is formed regarding the urgency based on considerations not germane to the purpose, the judicial review of such administrative decision may become necessary. 46. As to in what circumstances the power of emergency can be invoked are specified in Section 17(2) but circumstances necessitating invocation of urgency under Section 17(1) are not stated in the provision itself. Generally speaking, the development of an area (for residential purposes) or a planned development of city, takes many years if not decades and, therefore, there is no reason why summary enquiry as contemplated under Section 5A may not be held and objections of land owners/persons interested may not be considered. In many cases on general assumption, likely delay in completion of enquiry under Section 5A is set up as a reason for invocation of extraordinary power in dispensing with the enquiry little realizing that an important and valuable right of the person interested in the land is being taken away and with some effort enquiry could always be completed expeditiously. 47. The special provision has been made in Section 17 to eliminate enquiry under Section 5A in deserving and cases of real urgency. The Government has to apply its mind on the aspect that urgency is of such nature that necessitates dispensation of enquiry under Section 5A. We have already noticed few decisions of this Court. 47. The special provision has been made in Section 17 to eliminate enquiry under Section 5A in deserving and cases of real urgency. The Government has to apply its mind on the aspect that urgency is of such nature that necessitates dispensation of enquiry under Section 5A. We have already noticed few decisions of this Court. There is conflict of view in the two decisions of this Court viz.; Narayan Govind Gavate and Pista Devi. In Om Prakash this Court held that decision in Pista Devi must be confined to the fact situation in those days when it was rendered and the two-Judge Bench could not have laid down a proposition contrary to the decision in Narayan Govind Gavate. We agree.'' 138. In an earlier decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and others v. Praveen Gupta and others, AIR 1997 SC 170 , it is held that the ''language'' of the notification is not conclusive but the Court is required to consider the material whether there is any urgency to exercise the power under Section 17(4) of the Act. It is settled legal position that decision on urgency is an administrative decision and is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Appropriate Government on the basis of the material available on record. Therefore, there was no need to pass any reasoned order to reach the conclusion that there is urgency so as to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A in exercise of power under Section 17(4). 139. In Rajasthan Housing Board and others v. Shri Kishan and others, (1993) 2 SCC 84 , the Apex Court has explained as to what kind of material was required for forming an opinion for invoking the urgency powers. It was noted therein that the Division Bench of the High Court therein was impressed more by the fact that the notification did not state that the Government was of the opinion that it was a case where the inquiry under Section 5-A ought to be dispensed with under Section 17(4). The material placed before the Court in the said case, however, disclosed the reasons for invocation of urgency clause that the Government, on due verification, found that holding an inquiry under Section 5-A would have resulted in uncalled for delay endangering the entire scheme and time schedule of the Housing Board. The material placed before the Court in the said case, however, disclosed the reasons for invocation of urgency clause that the Government, on due verification, found that holding an inquiry under Section 5-A would have resulted in uncalled for delay endangering the entire scheme and time schedule of the Housing Board. In the context of material placed before the Court therein, it was observed that : ''It must be remembered that the satisfaction under Section 17(4) is a subjective one and that so long as there is material upon which the Government could have formed the said satisfaction fairly, the Court would not interfere nor would it examine the material as an appellate authority. This is the principle affirmed by decisions of this Court not only under Section 17(4) but also generally with respect to subjective satisfaction.'' 140. In Om Prakash (supra), the Apex Court has referred to the material placed before it, as was available to the Government therein for forming opinion under Section 5-A of the Act and then concluded that the action of dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A in the said case was not based on any real and genuine subjective satisfaction, depending upon any relevant data available to the State Authorities at the time, when they issued the impugned notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and dispensed with Section 5-A enquiry by resorting to Section 17(4) thereof. 141. In Om Prakash (supra) the Apex Court has referred to an earlier decision in A.P. Sareen and others v. State of U.P. and others, (1997) 9 SCC 359 , to observe that the observation with regard to existence of urgency in a case of acquisition for planned development of the city or town etc. therein [A.P. Sareen (supra)], was made on the facts of that particular case. It was further observed that it only mean that, in appropriate cases, when acquisition is needed for planned development of any city or town, the urgency provision can be invoked, which is legislatively recognized by the enactment of Section 17(1-A) by the U.P. Legislature. However, it cannot be read to mean that in every case of planned development of city or town, necessarily and almost automatically the urgency clause has to be invoked and enquiry under Section 5-A is to be dispensed with. 142. It was, thus, held : ''23. However, it cannot be read to mean that in every case of planned development of city or town, necessarily and almost automatically the urgency clause has to be invoked and enquiry under Section 5-A is to be dispensed with. 142. It was, thus, held : ''23. ........xxxxxxxx.....It will all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The aforesaid observations cannot be held to be laying down any absolute proposition that whenever any acquisition is to take place for planned development of city or town, Section 5-A should be treated to be almost otiose or inoperative. Such is not the ratio of the aforesaid decision and nothing to that effect can even impliedly be read in aforesaid observation which is of a general nature. It only suggests that in appropriate cases, the urgency clause can be invoked when the land is proposed to be acquired for planned development of city or town. 143. The Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Manju Lata Agrawal v. State of U.P. and others, 2007(9) ADJ 447 , while considering the law laid down in the abovenoted decisions of the Apex Court has held that : ''39. It is a settled legal proposition that the scope of judicial review is limited to the decision making procedure and not against the decision of the authority The Court could review to correct errors of law or fundamental procedural requirements, which may lead to manifest injustice and can interfere with the impugned order in exceptional circumstances. In judicial review, the Court cannot trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and arrive at its own conclusion as it is not an appeal from a decision. Review of the decision is not permissible where the findings are recorded by an authority on the basis of legal evidence and the said findings are not based either on ipsi dixit or conjectures or surmises. The Court cannot interfere on the ground that the matter requires appraisal of evidence. ''Between appraisal of evidence and total lack of evidence, there is an appreciable difference which could never be lost sight of.'' 144. It was observed therein that the power of judicial review of the Writ Court is limited, but it has competence to examine as to whether there was material to form such an opinion as required by law or the findings recorded by the authority concerned are perverse. It was observed therein that the power of judicial review of the Writ Court is limited, but it has competence to examine as to whether there was material to form such an opinion as required by law or the findings recorded by the authority concerned are perverse. It is settled law that non-consideration of relevant material renders an order perverse. A finding is said to be perverse when the same is not supported by evidence brought on record or they are against the law or where they suffer from the vice of procedural irregularities. 145. On the question of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, it was observed in Smt. Manju Lata Agrawal (supra) that a review on the merits of the decision making process is fundamental to the Court's jurisdiction. The power of review may even extend to a decision on a question of fact. The error sought to be corrected must be undeniably a significant factor in the decision making process. It was further observed that : ''43. The question whether inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act is necessary or not is a question of fact and it requires to be determined by the Government in the facts and circumstances of each case for the reason that no straight jacket formula can be evolved as under what circumstances the urgency clause should be invoked. The role of the Court is very limited and it can only see as to whether there was any material to form an opinion about invoking the urgency clause or whether the Government exercised the power in a mala fide manner. The question as to whether urgency exists or not, is primarily a matter for determination of the Government subject to the scope of judicial review by the Courts of law. '' 146. As to the scope of judicial review in a matter where the decision is based on subjective satisfaction of the Government, the observations of the Apex Court in Rajasthan Housing Board (supra) was noted in Smt. Manju Lata Agrawal (supra) as under : ''44. '' 146. As to the scope of judicial review in a matter where the decision is based on subjective satisfaction of the Government, the observations of the Apex Court in Rajasthan Housing Board (supra) was noted in Smt. Manju Lata Agrawal (supra) as under : ''44. In Rajasthan Housing Board (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue involved herein, held as under: ''It must be remembered that the satisfaction under Section 17(4) is a subjective one and so long as there is material upon which the Government could have formed the said satisfaction fairly, the Court would not interfere nor would it examine t e material as an appellate authority. This is the principle affirmed by decisions of this Court not under Section 17(4) but also generally with respect o subjective satisfaction.'' 147. It was further noted in paragraph 45' as under : ''45. The adequacy and reliability of the material on the bask, of which the conclusion is reached, cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ jurisdiction. vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration Through Secretary (Labour) and others, (1984) 4 SCC 635 ; The General Court Martial and others v. Col. Aniltej Singh Dhaliwal, AIR 1998 SC 983 and R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and others, (1999) 8 SCC 90 '' 148. In paragraphs 47', 48', 49', 50', 51', 53', 55', 56' and 57', it was noted that: ''47. In Bombay Dyeing & MFG Co. Aniltej Singh Dhaliwal, AIR 1998 SC 983 and R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and others, (1999) 8 SCC 90 '' 148. In paragraphs 47', 48', 49', 50', 51', 53', 55', 56' and 57', it was noted that: ''47. In Bombay Dyeing & MFG Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action Group and others, AIR 2006 SC 1489 , the Apex Court considered the scope of judicial review in a case of urban development, maintaining the ecological balance and after considering all aspects of town planning, came to the conclusion that in case of an executive action, the Court can look into and consider several factors, namely: (i) whether the discretion conferred upon the statutory authority had been properly exercised; (ii) whether exercise of such discretion is in consonance with the provisions of the Act; (iii) whether while taking such action, the executive Government had taken into consideration the purport and object of the Act; (iv) whether the same subserved other relevant factors which would affect the public at large; (v) whether the principles of sustainable development which have become part of our constitutional law have been taken into consideration; and (vi) whether in arriving at such a decision, both substantive due process and procedural due process had been complied with. 48. In Sawarn Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 232 while dealing with such a issue, the Court held as under: ''In view of this, the deficiency or reference to some irrelevant matters in the order of the Commissioner, had not prejudiced the decision of the case on merit either at the appellate or revisional stage. There is authority for the proposition that where the order of a domestic tribunal makes reference to several grounds, some relevant and existent, and others irrelevant and non-existent, the order will be sustained if the Court is satisfied that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the relevant and existing ground, and the exclusion of irrelevant or non-existing ground could not have affected the ultimate decision.'' (Emphasis added) 49. A similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dwarka Das Bhatia v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1957 SC 164 ; State of Orissa and others v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779 ; The State of Maharashtra v. Babulal Kriparam Takkamore and others, AIR 1967 SC 1353 ; Binny Ltd. v. Their Workmen and another, AIR 1972 SC 1975 and P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India and others, AIR 2006 SC 2064 50. In view of the above, it is apparent that if the order assed by an Authority is based on a consideration of certain relevant material and some other irrelevant and non-existing material, the order can be sustained, provided the relevant existing material was sufficient for formation of such an opinion. Thus, if the order can be passed on relevant and existing grounds, the consideration of irrelevant or non-existent material becomes immaterial. 51. However, the aforesaid legal proposition applies only in a case where the Authority has to pass an order on objective satisfaction. It carves out an exception that such a proposition would not apply where the decision is to be taken by the Authority on subjective satisfaction. 53. In Zora Singh v. J.M. Tandon, AIR 1971 SC 1537 , the Court considered a similar issue and held as under: ''The principle that if some of the reasons relied on by a Tribunal for its conclusion turn out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable, its decision would be vitiated, applies to cases in which the conclusion is arrived at not on assessment of objective satisfaction. The reason is that whereas in cases where the decision is based on subjective satisfaction if some of the reasons turn out to be irrelevant or invalid, it would be impossible for a superior Court to find out which of the reasons, relevant or irrelevant, valid or invalid, had brought about such satisfaction. But in a case where vie conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, such a difficulty would not arise. If it is found that there was legal evidence before the Tribunal, even if some of it was irrelevant, a superior Court would not interfere if the finding can be sustained on the rest of the evidence. But in a case where vie conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, such a difficulty would not arise. If it is found that there was legal evidence before the Tribunal, even if some of it was irrelevant, a superior Court would not interfere if the finding can be sustained on the rest of the evidence. The reason is that in a writ petition for certiorari, the superior Court does not sit in appeal, but exercises only supervisory jurisdiction, and therefore, does not enter into question of the sufficiency of evidence.'' (Emphasis added) 55. Thus, in case where the order is based on subjective satisfaction, consideration of irrelevant or non-existent material becomes fatal and vitiates the order itself. Such a view stands fortified by the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Keshav Talpade v. Emperor, AIR 1943 FC 1 ; Shibban Lal v. State of Utter Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 179 ; Rameshwar Lal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 1303 ; Puspadevi v. M.L. Wadhavan, AIR 1987 SC 1748 ; and Vashisth Narain v. State of Utter Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 1272 . 56. Same remains the position where the Authority fails to consider the vital facts, for the reason that if the material or vital facts which would influence the mind of the Authority one way or the other, are not placed or are not considered by the Authority, it would vitiate the subjective satisfaction. The Authority must exercise due care and caution and act fairly and justly in exercise of its powers. However what is a vital fact would depend on the facts of each case. Therefore, only those matters alone should be regarded as vital which are reasonably likely to affect the decision of the Authority. Non-consideration of the vital fact may taint the satisfaction of the Authority. (Vide Tushar Govindji v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 511 ; Sitaram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1986 SC 1072 ; and Ahmed Nissar v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1999 SC 3897 ). 57. In Swadeshi Cotton Hills Co. Non-consideration of the vital fact may taint the satisfaction of the Authority. (Vide Tushar Govindji v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 511 ; Sitaram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1986 SC 1072 ; and Ahmed Nissar v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1999 SC 3897 ). 57. In Swadeshi Cotton Hills Co. Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, U.P. and others, AIR 1961 SC 1381 , a Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court considered a case where forming the opinion after considering the material was not recited in the order and held as under: ''...The validity of the order therefore does not depend upon the recital of the formation of the opinion in the order but upon the actual formation of the opinion and the making of the order in consequence. It would therefore follow that if by inadvertence or otherwise the recital of the format on of the opinion is not mentioned in the preamble to the order the defect can be remedied by showing by other evidence in proceedings where challenge is made lo the validity of the order, that in fact the order was made after such opinion had been formed and was thus a valid exercise of the power conferred by the law. The only exception to this course would be where the statute requires that there should be a recital in the order itself before it can be validly made. ...The presumption as to the regularity of public acts would apply in such a case; but as son as the order is challenged and it is said that it was passed without the conditions precedent being satisfies the burden would be on the authority to satisfy by other means (in the absence of recital in the order itself) that the conditions precedent had been complied with....'' (Emphasis added). 149. The distinction in exercise of power of judicial review of an order based on objective assessment and another order based on subjective consideration had been considered therein to note that the principle, if an order wherein some of the reasons relied for its conclusion turn out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable, its decision would be vitiated, applies to cases in which conclusion is arrived at not on assessment of subjective satisfaction. The reason is that in cases where the decision is based on subjective satisfaction, if some of the reasons turn out to be irrelevant or invalid, it would be impossible for a Superior Court to find out which of the reasons, relevant or irrelevant, valid or invalid, had brought about such satisfaction. Thus, in cases where the order is based on subjective satisfaction, consideration of irrelevant or non-existent material becomes fatal and vitiates the order itself. However, in a case, where the conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, such difficulty would not arise, inasmuch as, there if the order of the Court or Tribunal is based on some legal evidence, even if some of it was irrelevant, a Superior Court would not interfere if the finding can be sustained on the rest of the evidence. The reason being that in a writ petition for Certiorari, the superior Court does not sit in appeal but exercises only supervisory jurisdiction and, therefore, does not enter into question of the sufficiency of evidence. 150. Another Division Bench of this Court in Sudhir Chandra Agarwala v. State of U.P. and others, 2008(3) ADJ 289 , considered the law laid down in Smt. Manju Lata Agrawal (supra) in the matter of recording subjective satisfaction and the scope of judicial review to hold that: ''25. The sufficiency or insufficiency of the material, and the names of industries, which may have applied with concrete proposals for establishment of industrial units, is not material for the purposes of judicial review of the subjective satisfaction of the State Government. When there exists material before the State Government, in the shape of recommendations and that material is relevant for applying the mind for recording subjective satisfaction of invoking the urgency clause for acquisition of the land, the law does not permit the Court to consider the material as it was weighing the evidence for the purposes of recording subjective satisfaction of invoking the urgency clause for acquisition of the land. If the material is relevant, on which competent authority, as reasonable person may invoke the urgency clause for acquisition of the land, the Court would not put such material on the scales, to weigh or measure such urgency. The Court is not competent to carry out judicial review of the sufficiency or insufficiency on the material placed before it. If the material is relevant, on which competent authority, as reasonable person may invoke the urgency clause for acquisition of the land, the Court would not put such material on the scales, to weigh or measure such urgency. The Court is not competent to carry out judicial review of the sufficiency or insufficiency on the material placed before it. What the Court required to see is; whether such material is relevant, and that the competent authority in the State Government could have formed an opinion without their being any motive or ill will for invoking the urgency clause. In the present case the State has given in the counter-affidavit, the material on which it had placed reliance and has produced the material before us, which we find to be relevant for the purpose of invoking urgency clause. Even if we may, after perusing the record arrive on different conclusion, we would restrain ourselves from interfering, as in such case we would be substituting our opinion in place of opinion of the competent authority in the State Government. If we do so, we would be sitting in appeal over the subjective satisfaction recorded by the State Government. The legal position obtained from the judicial precedents restrain us from doing so. 151. The principle to exercise the power of judicial review in the matter of dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, 1894, within the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution, thus, can be summarized as under : (i) In exercise of discretion conferred upon the statutory authority, while arriving at a decision under Section 5-A, both substantive due process and procedural due process has to be complied with. (ii) The question whether enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act is necessary or not is a question of fact which would be required to be examined by the State Government in the facts and circumstances of each case before invocation of urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Act. No straight jacket formula, as such, can be evolved as to under what circumstances, the urgency clause should be invoked. (iii) The role of the Court is limited and it can only see as to whether there was any material to form an opinion about invoking the urgency clause or whether the Government exercised the power in a mala fide manner. (iii) The role of the Court is limited and it can only see as to whether there was any material to form an opinion about invoking the urgency clause or whether the Government exercised the power in a mala fide manner. (iv) The question as to whether urgency exists or not, is primarily a matter for determination of the Government, subject to the scope of judicial review by the Court of law. (v) The satisfaction under Section 17(4) is a subjective one and, so long as, there is material upon which the Government could have formed the said satisfaction fairly, the Court would not interfere nor would it examine the material as an appellate authority. (vi) The adequacy and reliability of the material on the basis of which the conclusion is reached, cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ jurisdiction. The truth or correctness of the material will not be questioned by the Court. (vii) In a case where the order is based on subjective satisfaction, consideration of irrelevant or non-existent material becomes fatal and vitiates the order itself. (viii) Same remains the position where the authority fails to consider the vital facts, for the reason that if the material or vital facts which would influence the mind of the authority, one way or the other, were not placed or were not considered by the authority, it would vitiate the subjective satisfaction. (ix) What is vital fact would depend on the fact of each case. (x) The authority must exercise due care and caution and act fairly and justly in exercise of its powers. (xi) Non-consideration of the vital fact may taint the satisfaction of the authority. (xii) The validity of the order does not depend upon the recital of the formation of the opinion in the order but upon the actual formation of the opinion and the making of the order in consequence. 152. As in a case of subjective satisfaction, authority is not required to pass a reasoned order, there is no need to pass any reasoned order to reach at the conclusion that there is urgency so as to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5A in exercise of power under Section 17(4). 152. As in a case of subjective satisfaction, authority is not required to pass a reasoned order, there is no need to pass any reasoned order to reach at the conclusion that there is urgency so as to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5A in exercise of power under Section 17(4). The power of judicial review in a matter of invocation of urgency under Section 17(4) in dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A is limited to the extent as to whether there is any fault in the decision making process, to examine that the opinion of the State is not guided by any irrelevant or non-existent material, rather is based on relevant material to record its satisfaction. The Court can interfere, in a case, where there was no material at all or the material relied upon was irrelevant or non-existent. The adequacy and reliability of the material on the basis of which conclusion is arrived is beyond the scope of power of judicial review. The Court can also look into as to whether in formation of opinion, the Government has exercised the power in a mala fide manner. The question as to whether urgency exists or not is primarily a matter for determination of the Government, subject to the scope of judicial review by the Court of law. D. On Pre-Post Notification Delay : 153. On the issue whether the pre or post notification delay would be fatal to the exercise of power by the State in invocation of urgency clause, there is no consistency in the decisions of the Apex Court. 154. In Union of India and others v. Krishan Lal Arneja and others, AIR 2004 SC 3582 , the Apex Court has held that while applying the urgency clause, the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility. Invoking urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State Administration. 155. In First Land Acquisition Collector and others v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli and another, AIR 2002 SC 1314 , the Apex Court has observed that the post notification delay, i.e. delay in making declaration under Section 6 after invocation of urgency clause dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A would not be fatal, specially when no mala fide on the part of the Government or its officers are alleged. Opinion of the State Government can be challenged in a Court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that action of the State Government is mala fide. 156. In Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, AIR 1984 SC 1721 , the Apex Court had rejected the argument that pre-notification delay would render the invocation of the urgency provisions void. 157. It was held that : ''The other ground of attack is that if regard s had to the considerable length of time spent on interdepartmental discussion before the notification und, Section 4(1) was published, it would be apparent that there was no justification for invoking the urgency clause under Section 17(4) and dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A. We are afraid, we cannot agree with this contention. Very often persons interested in the land proposed to ha acquired make various representations to the concerned authorities against the proposed acquisition. This is bound to result in a multiplicity of enquiries, communications and discussions leading invariably to delay in if execution of even urgent projects. Very often the delay makes the problem more and more acute and increases the urgency of the necessity for acquisition. It is, therefore, net possible to agree with the submission that mere pre-notification delay would render the invocation of the urgency provisions void. We however wish to say nothing about pos notification delay. In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, this Court pointed out the fact that the State Government or the party concerned was lethargic at an earlier stage is not very relevant for deciding the question whether o the date on which the notification was issued, there was urgency or not. In Kasireddy Papaiah v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, it was held, ''...delay on the part of tardy officials to take the further action in the matter of acquisition is not sufficient to nullify the urgency which exited at the time of the issue of the notification and to hold that there was never any urgency. (Emphasis added)'' 158. In Kasireddy Papaiah v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, it was held, ''...delay on the part of tardy officials to take the further action in the matter of acquisition is not sufficient to nullify the urgency which exited at the time of the issue of the notification and to hold that there was never any urgency. (Emphasis added)'' 158. Having discussed the legal position with regard to invocation of urgency clause under Section 17(4), dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A and the scope of judicial review in exercise of power of writ jurisdiction by this Court, we are now required to discuss the legal position in the decisions relied upon by the counsels for the writ petitioners. E. On the Apex Court decisions relied by the rival parties : (i) Radhy Shyam (supra) : 159. Heavy reliance has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (Dead) Through LRs. and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2011) 5 SCC 553 , to vehemently argued that in any eventuality, the urgency clause cannot be invoked in an acquisition made for planned development. The statement in the acquisition notifications under Section 4 pertaining to the villages in question have been read and re-read to assert that from the statement therein itself, it is evident that the land was needed for planned development of the area through the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority. The issue as to whether the exercise of power under Section 17(1) and/or 17(4) for the acquisition of land for residential, commercial or industrial purpose was legal and justified has been answered by the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (supra), wherein it is categorically held in paragraph 77(viii) that : ''77 (viii). The acquisition of land for residential, commercial, industrial or institutional purposes can be treated as an acquisition for public purposes within the meaning of Section 4 but that, by itself, does not justify the exercise of power by the Government under Section 17(1) and/or 17(4). The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that planning, execution and implementation of the schemes relating to development of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional areas usually take few years. Therefore, the private property cannot be acquired for such purpose by invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1). The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that planning, execution and implementation of the schemes relating to development of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional areas usually take few years. Therefore, the private property cannot be acquired for such purpose by invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1). In any case, exclusion of the rule of audi alteram partem embodied in Section 5-A (1) and (2) is not at all warranted in such matters.'' 160. It was vehemently argued that in view of the mandate of the Apex Court, the acquisition of land for planned development through Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority, in the instant case, for residential, commercial, industrial or institutional purpose cannot be said to urgent. There cannot be any real or grave urgency in the nature of the proposed use of the land, the dispensation of enquiry, exclusion of hearing to the land holders was, thus, unwarranted in the instant matter. The submission, thus, is that on this ground itself, the acquisition notifications are liable to be quashed. 161. We are afraid to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, having gone through the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Radhy Shyam (supra), wherein all the above noted points in the matter of acquisition by invocation of urgency clause, culled out from the decisions of the Apex Court noted, in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, has been reiterated. 162. While reading sub-para (viii) of para 77', we are further required to note the principles noted in sub-paras (iii), (vi) and (ix) of Para 77' as under : ''(iii) Though, in exercise of the power of eminent domain, the Government can acquire the private property for public purpose, it must be remembered that compulsory taking of one's property is a serious matter. If the property belongs to economically disadvantaged segment of the society or people suffering from other handicaps, then the Court is not only entitled but is duty bound to scrutinize the action/decision of the State with greater vigilance, care and circumspection keeping in view the fact that the land owner is likely to become landless and deprived of the only source of his livelihood and/or shelter. (vi) The satisfaction of the Government on the issue of urgency is subjective but is a condition precedent to the exercise of power under Section 17(1) and the same can be challenged on the ground that the purpose for which the private property is sought to be acquired is not a public purpose at all or that the exercise of power is vitiated due to mala fides or that the concerned authorities did not apply mind to the relevant factors and the records. (ix) If land is acquired for the benefit of private persons, the Court should view the invoking of Section 17(1) and/or 17(4) with suspicion and carefully scrutinize the relevant record before adjudicating upon the legality of such acquisition.'' 163. The statement in sub-para (viii) has to be seen in the context of the statements in sub-paras (vi) and (ix) of Para 77'. 164. The legal position which can be understood from the discussion of law in the Radhy Shyam (supra) is that : (i) the satisfaction of the Government on the issue of urgency is subjective, but is a condition precedent, to the exercise of power under Section 17(1); (ii) the same can be challenged on the ground that (a) the purpose for which the private property is sought to be acquired is not a public purpose at all; (b) that the exercise of power is vitiated due to mala fides; (c) The authorities concerned did not apply their mind to the relevant factors and records; (iii) if the land is acquired for the benefit of private persons, the Court is required to view the invocation of urgency clause with suspicion and carefully scrutinized the relevant record before adjudicating upon the legality of such acquisition. 165. The principle stated in sub-para (viii) of Para 77', thus, requires the Court to make a strict scrutiny of the record upon which the State has proceeded to acquire private property without complying with the mandate of Section 5-A. The enquiry, thus, has to be made in the facts of the particular case. The Court has to exercise the power of judicial review by carefully scrutinizing the relevant record, to adjudicate upon the legality of the acquisition. 166. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-YEIDA tries to draw a distinction from the case of Radhy Shyam (supra) on factual aspects on the present case. The Court has to exercise the power of judicial review by carefully scrutinizing the relevant record, to adjudicate upon the legality of the acquisition. 166. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-YEIDA tries to draw a distinction from the case of Radhy Shyam (supra) on factual aspects on the present case. It was argued that the entire decision of the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (supra) has to be carefully read to cull out the ratio of the case. It (Radhy Shyam) was a case where only a substantially small area of 205.0288 hectares of a village situated in the Notified area of Greater NOIDA was acquired for planned industrial development in District Gautam Budh Nagar through Greater NOIDA. 167. The appellants therein (Radhy Shyam) had challenged the acquisition on several grounds, noted in paragraph 4' therein, extracted as under : ''4. The appellants challenged the acquisition of their land on several grounds including the following: (i) That the land cannot be used for industrial purposes because in the draft Master Plan of Greater NOIDA (2021), the same is shown as part of residential zone. (ii) That they had already constructed dwelling houses and as per the policy of the State Government, the residential structures are exempted from acquisition. (iii) That the State Government arbitrarily invoked Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Act and deprived them of their valuable right to raise objections under Section 5-A. (iv) The acquisition of land is vitiated by arbitrariness, mala fides and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as lands of the Member of Legislative Assembly and other influential persons were left out from acquisition despite the fact that they were not in abadi, but they were not given similar treatment despite the fact that their land was part of abadi and they had constructed dwelling units.'' 168. We are required to note that the plea of arbitrariness of the State Government in invoking urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Act to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A, depriving the tenure holders of their valuable rights, was examined on the objections of the tenure holders noted therein which were (i) the land in question falls in part of a residential zone in the draft Master plan of Greater NOIDA and cannot be used for industrial purposes; (ii) there existed dwelling houses and as per the policy of the State, the residential structures were exempted from acquisition. 169. The High Court therein negatived the challenge of the appellants, at the threshold, mainly on the ground that the averments contained in the writ petition were not supported by proper affidavit. The petitioners therein had neither pleaded that there existed no material before the State Government to come to the conclusion that the enquiry under Section 5-A should be dispensed with by invoking Section 17(4) of the Act nor the learned counsel for the petitioners therein could place before the Court any such averment in the writ petition. Even counter-affidavit of the respondents was not called upon to see as to whether there existed any material for exercising power under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act by the High Court, saying that the question of requiring of respondents to produce the original record did not arise in view of the statements made in the writ petition which were not sworn in the affidavit at all. 170. The Apex Court, however, granted time to the respondents to file counter and had examined the record of the State and, in the facts and circumstances of that case, having noted the factors which were cited in justification of invoking the urgency provision therein, it has been observed in paragraph 79' that none of the factors noted therein furnished legally acceptable justification for the exercise of power by the State Government under Section 17(1) because the acquisition was primarily meant to cater private interest in the name of industrial development of the district. Even if, planned development of the District was treated as public purpose within the meaning of Section 4, there was no urgency which could justify exercise of power by the State Government under Sections 17(1) and 17(4). Even if, planned development of the District was treated as public purpose within the meaning of Section 4, there was no urgency which could justify exercise of power by the State Government under Sections 17(1) and 17(4). The conclusion arrived therein that there was no real and substantive urgency which could justify invoking of the urgency provisions under Section 17(1) and, in any case, there was no warrant to exclude the application of Section 5-A, to deny the opportunity of hearing to the land holders, was in the facts and circumstances of the said case. 171. On a careful reading of the decision of the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (supra), it cannot be accepted that on the mere statement made in the notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) and (4) that the land in question is needed ''for planned development of the area through YEIDA'', it can be concluded that there was no urgency, much less real and substantive urgency, to invoke the provisions of Section 17(1) and 17(4). 172. We may remind ourselves to the decisions of the Apex Court noted above that the statement in the notification is not a determinative factor, the language of the notification is not conclusive, nor there is any need to give any reason in the notification itself for invocation of urgency. The Court has to see the record, to examine as to whether there exists material on record, upon which the State Government had formed subjective satisfaction, to arrive at a conclusion that urgency clause be invoked and enquiry under Section 5-A be dispensed with. We cannot quash the notifications merely by the statement contained therein without looking to the record of the State and the relevant material which has weighed the mind of the State in exercise of its inherent power of Eminent domain to acquire the land in question, denying opportunity of hearing to the land holders. [emphasis Union of India and others v. Praveen Gupta (supra)] (ii) Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) : 173. As noted above, the acquisition-in-question is part of an integrated project. For contiguous land to the parcels of land acquired for Yamuna Expressway, acquisition has been upheld by this Court and the Apex Court in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra). The project for construction of Expressway was conceived by the State in the year 2001. As noted above, the acquisition-in-question is part of an integrated project. For contiguous land to the parcels of land acquired for Yamuna Expressway, acquisition has been upheld by this Court and the Apex Court in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra). The project for construction of Expressway was conceived by the State in the year 2001. It was an integrated project involving construction of Excess Controlled Expressway, stretching over 160 kilometers from NOIDA to Agra and for development of 25 million sq. mtrs. of land alongside Expressway. Bids were invited but before the construction could commence, the validity of the project was challenged in a Public Interest Litigation. The State Government exercising power under the Commission of Enquiries Act, 1956 appointed a Commission in the name of Justice Siddheshwar Narain Commission. The Civil Misc. Writ Petition (PIL) No. 30322 of 2007 (Ashutosh Srivastava v. State of U.P. and others) was dismissed vide judgment and order 14th March, 2008, reported in 2008(3) ADJ 427 (DB). 174. The State Government, thereafter, issued various notifications acquiring the lands in the Districts of Gautam Budh Nagar, Mathura, Aligarh, Mahamaya Nagar (Hathras) and Agra for the purposes of Expressway. The notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act dated 15.10.2007 and 4.1.2008 acquiring land situated in a Village in District Mathura came up for consideration in Balbir Singh and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2009(10) ADJ 441 , on the grounds that the actual purpose of acquisition was for the benefit of the Company and, therefore, the invocation of the provision under Section 17(4), dispensation of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act was illegal. By the judgment and order dated 5.10.2009, the Court had dismissed the writ petition with the findings that the acquisition for construction of Expressway was otherwise for the benefit of the public at large. It was noted therein that there is tremendous growth in the population and that the roads and other facilities available to the public are seriously lacking. In order to provide infrastructural facilities for developing industries throughout the Yamuna belt, the project of National importance was taken up connecting various cities of Uttar Pradesh to the national capital. The acquisition was, thus, held to be for public purpose. 175. In order to provide infrastructural facilities for developing industries throughout the Yamuna belt, the project of National importance was taken up connecting various cities of Uttar Pradesh to the national capital. The acquisition was, thus, held to be for public purpose. 175. In the third round of litigation before this Court in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra), the land holders of Mathura and Agra had challenged the acquisition of land for construction of Expressway and for interchange of Expressway, mainly on the ground that there was no urgency much less special urgency, for construction of road, to acquire fertile land. The writ petitions were filed agitating that the petitioners were owners of the lands since long and had raised constructions and were using part of land for business and Abadi purposes after declaration as Abadi. The notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act had been challenged having been issued in colourable exercise of power, that there was no urgency and since no project had been specified, the notifications being vague, the action of the State in dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A was mala fide. It was brought before the Court in the case of Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) and noted therein that ''the Taj Expressway'' Project conceived by the State Government in 2001 is an integrated project involving construction of Excess Controlled Expressway project spread over 160 kilometers from NOIDA to Agra for development of 25 million sq. mtrs. of the land alongwith the Expressway. 176. This Court has noted therein that from the material on record it was reflected that the entire development was being carried out by the State Government through Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA) which is an instrumentality of the State. On a challenge to the acquisition by the petitioners on the ground that Delhi was connected with Agra by National Highway No. -2 and that the need for another road connecting the two great cities at a little faster speed is not a public purpose. The development of 25 million sq. mtrs. of land by the company on the selected sites along the Expressway is for the purposes of profits of Public Limited Company and, therefore, it cannot be said that the land was needed for public purpose. The development of 25 million sq. mtrs. of land by the company on the selected sites along the Expressway is for the purposes of profits of Public Limited Company and, therefore, it cannot be said that the land was needed for public purpose. In any case, there was no such urgency to acquire the land, to dispense with the enquiry and to take away the valuable right of the petitioners and farmers to object to the acquisition. It was argued that the right to property may not be a fundamental right, it is a Constitutional right and has now been recognised as human right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, should be protected by the Court. Where large tracts of fertile land with constructions used for business purpose and agriculture as source of livelihood of the citizens is being acquired for building an alternate road, the urgency of the purpose cannot be assumed. The project was already delayed from the year 2001 till 2008 and therefore, there was no such urgency to invoke Sub-section (4) of Section 17 for acquisition of the land, dispensing with the valuable right of the citizens to have a say in the matter. 177. In order to verify whether there was any material with the State Government to form an opinion and to exercise its powers under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, and that the State Government had applied its mind on such material, the records of three notifications under challenge were summoned by the Court. 178. Having recorded the material of the State found from the record, it was held therein that : ''the record clearly demonstrates that after considering the project and making enquiries and spot inspections including the survey of the revenue records, District Magistrate had recommended that looking into the purpose of the acquisition and the large area involved, and further the fact that the land is needed for construction of road and interchange and planned development, as well as the fact that in future there is strong possibility of encroachments over the subject land, Section 17(4) was required to be invoked for dispensing with the enquiry''. 179. 179. With regard to the plea of pre-notification delay of about five years, it was noted therein that : ''The pre-notification delay of about five years from the date of agreement i.e. 7.2.2003 to the date of Notification under Section 4 of the Act dated 28.2.2009 has been sufficiently explained in the country affidavit of the State Government and YEIDA. The State Government was conscious of its accountability and referred the matter for enquiry under the Commission of Enquiry Act, 1956 appointing Justice Siddheshwari Narain, a retired judge of Patna/Calcutta High Court in the year 2003. The report was submitted on 12.10.2006 and was thereafter subjected to a public interest litigation. In Ashutosh Srivastava v. State of U.P. (Supra) the writ petition was dismissed by the Court on 14th March, 2008. The State Government, thereafter, started making surveys and that the District Magistrate made proposals for acquisition of the land for the project dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act.'' 180. It was further noted that : ''The record produced before us by the State Government enclosing the material of invoking urgency clause and the satisfaction of the State Government on the said material, has satisfied us that the State Government had sufficient material and had applied its mind to record its opinion that there was urgency to acquire the land and to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. The writ petition filed in public interest was dismissed and that the Court has also rejecting the challenge on the ground that acquisition was made for the company. The requisite 80% of the cost of acquisition of the land under the agreement was deposited in the year 2007. Out of 12282 land owners of the area of 1604 hects., 11397 have accepted the compensation. In these 9 writ petitions, there are 35 petitioners representing only 21.03 hects. The cost of project according to Shri Navin Sinha, Sr. Advocate has increased from initially 1700 crore in the year 2001, to 9700 crore and is going on increasing per day. The road has been laid from Noida to Greater Noida and the work is going on, on the entire road except on a small portions on which the Court had passed orders to maintain status quo. Advocate has increased from initially 1700 crore in the year 2001, to 9700 crore and is going on increasing per day. The road has been laid from Noida to Greater Noida and the work is going on, on the entire road except on a small portions on which the Court had passed orders to maintain status quo. According to Shri Navin Sinha in addition to thousands of tourists, who visit Agra from all over the world every day, there is likely to be great influx of sports tourists visiting India at the time Commonwealth games. They all need a fast moving road connection to reach Agra to cut down the travelling time. The National Highway No. 2 on the western bank of Yamuna passes through busy areas in the State of Haryana and Rajasthan, through the cities of Faridabad, Ballabhgarh and Palwal. The fast moving road on the eastern side of Yamuna crossing through the areas falling only in the State of U.P., with modern facilities is a felt necessity in public purpose. The construction is on the verge of completion. It will be ironical for the tourism sector and residents of the area looking for development and opportunity for employment, to be deprived of the project at such an advance stage.'' 181. On pre-notification delay, it was concluded that : ''The respondents have fully explained the pre-notification delay. The pendency of the proceedings of the Commission holding enquiry and the public interest litigation, is sufficient explanation of the delay in issuing notifications, after the agreement was signed. The fact situation as exists today, also leaves us with no choice to exercise discretion. Out of 12282 land owners 11397 have received compensation under agreement, and that the land owners of only 21.03 hectares out of 1604 hectares are aggrieved by the acquisition of their land. The scales of justice must tilt towards the right to development, of the millions, who will be benefited from the road and the development of the area, as against the human rights of 35 petitioners, who have approached the Court complaining that they were not heard before the declaration under Section 6 of the Act acquiring the land was issued on 15.6.2009.'' 182. In the Special Leave Petition filed before the Apex Court to challenge the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, the findings returned by this Court on the pre-notification delay was noted to record its approval by the Apex Court for the fact that the project had lingered from 2001 to 2008 and the material before the State Government to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act had been mechanically examined by the High Court and there was no reason to take a different view. 183. The factors for invocation of urgency clause which weighed in the mind of the State, noted with approval by the Apex Court, in the said case were : (i) enormousness of the project; (ii) likelihood of the encroachments; (iii) large number of appellants who would have required to be heard; (iv) the time taken for that purpose; and (v) the fact that the project had lingered already from 2001 till 2008. 184. The legal position stated in Tika Ram and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2009) 10 SCC 689 , was discussed by the Apex Court therein to note as under : ''94. This situation was considered, firstly, in Satendra Prasad Jain and others v. State of U.P. and others, 1993 (4) SCC 369 . It was held therein that once the possession is taken as a matter of fact, then the owner is divested of the title to the land. The Court held that there was then no question of application of even Section 11-A. Commenting upon Section 11-A, it was held that that Section could not be so construed as to leave the Government holding title of the land without an obligation to determine the compensation, make an award and pay to the owner the difference between the amount of the award and the amount of the 80% of the estimated compensation. The three Judges' Bench of the Court took the view that even where 80% of the estimated compensation was not paid to the land owners, it did not mean that the possession was taken illegally or that the land did not vest in the Government. In short, this Court held that the proceedings of acquisition are not affected by the non-payment of compensation. In short, this Court held that the proceedings of acquisition are not affected by the non-payment of compensation. In that case, the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, for which the possession was made, sought to escape from the liability to make the payment. That was not allowed. The Court, in para 17, held as under : ''17. In the instant case, even that 80% of the estimated compensation was not paid to the appellants although Section 17(3-A) required that it should have been paid before possession of the said land was taken but that does not mean that the possession was taken illegally or that the said land did not thereupon vest in the first respondent. It is, at any rate, not open to the third respondent, who, as the letter of the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated June 27, 1990 shows, failed to make the necessary monies available and who has been in occupation of the said land ever since its possession was taken, to urge that the possession was taken illegally and that, therefore, the said land has not vested in the first respondent and the first respondent is under no obligation to make an award.'' 95. Further, in a judgment of this Court in Pratap and another v. State of Rajasthan and others etc. etc., 1996 (3) SCC 1 , similar view was reported. That was a case under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1987, under which the acquisition was made using Section 17 of the Act. The Court took the view that once the possession was taken under Section 17 of the Act, the Government could not withdrew from that position under Section 18 and even the provisions of Section 11-A were not attracted. That was of course a case where the award was not passed under Section 11-A after taking of the possession. A clear cut observation came to be made in that behalf in Para 12, to the effect that the non-compliance with Section 17 of the Act, insofar as, payment of compensation is concerned, did not result in lapsing of the land acquisition proceedings. The law laid down by this Court in Satendra Prasad Jain and others v. State of U.P. and others (cited supra) was approved. The law laid down by this Court in Satendra Prasad Jain and others v. State of U.P. and others (cited supra) was approved. The Court also relied on the decision in P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P., 1994 (5) SCC 486 and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1995 (6) SCC 31 , where similar view was taken regarding the land acquisition proceedings not getting lapsed. The only result that may follow by the non-payment would be the payment of interest, as contemplated in Section 34 and the proviso added thereto by 1984 Act. In that view, we do not wish to further refer the matter, as suggested by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel and Shri Qamar Ahmad, Learned Counsel for the appellants. Therefore, even on the sixth question, there is no necessity of any reference.'' 185. It was further noted in paragraph 96' therein that the arguments based on the decision of the Apex Court in Om Prakash (supra) that the encroachment issue was not a relevant factor for invocation of urgency, was not convincing, inasmuch as, actual scenario in that case [Om Prakash (supra)] was different. 186. It was noted that in Om Prakash (supra), the Apex Court was considering the acquisition of area of about 500 acres comprising of 437 plots, whereas in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra), the area to be acquired for the Expressway alone was more than 1600 hectares, apart from the 25 million square meters of land which was liable to be acquired for the purposes of development of 5 land parcels. It was held that ''there was interlinking between the acquisition of land for the Highway and the acquisition of land for establishing five townships. The post notification delay in Om Prakash (supra) held to be a relevant factor vital to the decision of the State for invocation of urgency clause, had been distinguished therein in the following manner : ''96. We are not impressed by the argument that the encroachment issue was not a relevant factor. This argument was based on the reported decision in Om Prakash and another v. State of U.P. and others (cited supra). It must be said that the actual scenario in that case was different. We are not impressed by the argument that the encroachment issue was not a relevant factor. This argument was based on the reported decision in Om Prakash and another v. State of U.P. and others (cited supra). It must be said that the actual scenario in that case was different. In that case, the Court was considering the acquisition of area of about 500 acres comprising of 437 plots, whereas, in the present case, the area to be acquired for the Expressway alone was more than 1,600 hectares. This is apart from the 25 million square meters of land which was liable to be acquired for the purposes of development of 5 land parcels. There was interlinking between the acquisition of land for the highway and the acquisition of land for establishing the 5 townships.. '' ''97. In Om Prakash and another v. State of U.P. and others (cited supra), there was unexplained delay after issuance of Section 4 notification, which is not the case here. Therefore, we do not think that what has been said in Om Prakash and another v. State of U.P. and others (cited supra) would be apposite here. Every case has to be decided on its own facts. This is apart from the fact that it is not specifically laid down in Om Prakash and another v. State of U.P. and others (cited supra) that the encroachment was never a relevant factor for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A. Again we hasten to add that this was not the only factor considered by the State Government and even the High Court has not held the same to be the only factor for dispensing with the enquiry'' 187. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Tika Ram (supra), the challenge to the acquisition on the ground that there was no urgency and, therefore, the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act should not have been dispensed with, has been turned down. 188. In an Apex Court decision in Meena Devi Jindal Medical Institute and Research Centre v. Lieutenant Governor, Delhi and others, (2017) 13 SCC 458 , the Apex Court has noted the nature of acquisition in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) in the context of the concept of public purpose under Section 3(f) of the Act, 1894 and observed that : ''14. In an Apex Court decision in Meena Devi Jindal Medical Institute and Research Centre v. Lieutenant Governor, Delhi and others, (2017) 13 SCC 458 , the Apex Court has noted the nature of acquisition in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) in the context of the concept of public purpose under Section 3(f) of the Act, 1894 and observed that : ''14. This Court in Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U.P., (2010) 10 SCC 282 , has also considered the concept of public purpose under Section 3(f) of the Act and it has been discussed that a purpose complementary to public purpose is also a public purpose. When the land had been acquired for construction of Yamuna Expressway which itself was of public importance, the acquisition of the land for Yamuna Expressway for development of the same for commercial, amusement, industrial, institutional and residential purposes was held to be complementary to the creation of expressway, hence, amounted to acquisition for public purpose. ....xx.....'' F. Appreciation of the material on the Facts of the Instant Case : 189. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-YEIDA has taken us to the decision in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) extensively to vehemently urge that the project in question, ''for planned development of the parcels of the lands of different villages alongside Yamuna Expressway'', is part of an integrated project under the Master plan, Phase-1, 2031. The contiguous lands in the circumference of 2 kms. on both sides of the Expressway have been acquired to complete the project which was one project for construction of Expressway and development of land parcels for establishment of townships. The Apex Court in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) has noted that there was interlinking between the acquisition of land for the Highway and the acquisition of land for establishing five townships. The acquisitions were though made by different notifications, village-wise and it was neither for Expressway nor for five land parcels as in the case of Nand Kishore Gupta (supra), but are part of the same integrated project. The land parcels of Village Accheja Bujurg and Rampur Bangar etc., were already included in the project for development of Taj Expressway, renamed as Yamuna Expressway. The land parcels of Village Accheja Bujurg and Rampur Bangar etc., were already included in the project for development of Taj Expressway, renamed as Yamuna Expressway. The statement in the counter-affidavits, noted in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, were reiterated to assert that the acquisition of the land parcels of the Villages-in-question was indispensable for planned development of the area for integrated Township. There was also a need for providing basic infrastructural facilities to the Villages falling in the Notified area of YEIDA and the need for contiguous land for development which was likely to be frustrated by the delay which would have occurred, in case, the opportunity of hearing was afforded to the villagers of such a large number of lands of nine villages. The enormousness of the project is one of the factors which has weighed in the mind of the State to invoke the urgency clause. (VII). Finding : A. 190. About the nature of project-in-question, we are required to note that a perusal of the Master plan and the facts brought before us establish that the land for development for Yamuna Expressway Project, 'planned development through Yamuna Expressway' is an integrated project, the land was initially acquired for the Expressway and, thereafter, for developing land parcels alongside Expressway as townships. The development is strictly being made in accordance with the Master plan prepared by YEIDA. The planned development of the area is the object for which YEIDA has been constituted. The lands of nine villages, subject-matter of acquisition herein, were acquired through different notifications issued in a span of two years between 26.2.2009 to 22.3.2011. Most of the declaration notifications were issued in a gap of 3 to 4 months barring three declaration notifications of Village Rustampur, Village Rampur Bangar and Village Pachokara, where time span of approximately one year had been spent between Section 4 and Section 6 notifications. It was specifically mentioned in the Certificate of the Collector in Prapatra-10 that the acquisition of different parcels of land was being proposed as contiguous part of the project and, in case, of providing opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A, which may eventually result in legal proceedings, there was likelihood of non-availability of contiguous land which would hamper the execution of the project as an integrated time bound project. The original record of the State and the material placed on record with the counter-affidavit with respect to each Village in this bunch, contains a categorical statement of the State that the State Government, after scrutinizing the record, had accepted the proposal applying mind to the fact that, in case, objections under Section 5-A of the Act, 1894 were invited, it would adversely affect and cause delay in execution of the public interest project which is an integrated project. The said decision was taken looking to the enormousness of the project for acquisition of the lands spread over a large area of approximately 18 thousand and odd hundreds acres of lands comprising of 16 villages. The development of village and village Abadi by YEIDA is also linked to the development of land alongside Expressway. The acquired land lies within 2 kms. of the periphery of the Expressway. 191. We may note from the counter-affidavit of the State in Writ Petition No. 11839 of 2012, pertaining to the acquisition of land of Village Rampur Bangar for an area of 104.9705 hectares that the Master plan of Phase-1 of the area in question of the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority is a duly approved Master plan. The NCR Planning Board has revised the Regional Plan 2021 and has accepted the YEIDA Phase-1 Master Plan of 2031 as a part of U.P. Sub-Regional Plan-2031. The proposal letter dated 26.12.2009 of the acquisition appended as Annexure 'C.A.-3' to the counter-affidavit includes a certificate issued under the Government Order dated 21.12.2006 which contains report on 14 points and undertaking given by YEIDA to implement National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of 2003. The original record shows that Prapatra-1 is an application for acquisition of land for public purpose made under Appendix 1' of Para 14' of the Land Acquisition Manual. The preliminary enquiry report contains a statement regarding non-inclusion of any Gram Sabha land in proposed area and declaration that no Banjar or Non-Agriculture land equivalent to the proposed area was available for the project. In Prapatra-5, a calculation of estimated compensation payable on the agreement on the rate prevailing at that time, a certificate of District Land Use Committee regarding grant of consent for acquisition of the said land, a certificate that total 285 families will be affected by the proposed acquisition has been appended, the treasury deposit of Rs. In Prapatra-5, a calculation of estimated compensation payable on the agreement on the rate prevailing at that time, a certificate of District Land Use Committee regarding grant of consent for acquisition of the said land, a certificate that total 285 families will be affected by the proposed acquisition has been appended, the treasury deposit of Rs. 16,79,52,800/- in respect of 10% of the estimated compensation as well as 10% of the acquisition charges are on record. The certificate in Prapatra-7 issued under the Government Order dated 12.1.2009 to the effect that for the project in question, no land except the proposed agricultural land is available, was annexed with the proposal. The Prapatra-9 contains information on 7 points required for grant of consent by the Land Use Board of U.P. Lucknow before publication of the notification, wherein it is categorically mentioned that the land is required for development plan prepared as per the Master Plan of the area and that the land for said project is required immediately. The statements to the effect that no suit is pending in respect of the proposed land, total 285 tenure holders will be affected, the proposed land will be developed as per Master Plan and on either side of the Road, Plantation will be done, the greens belt area will be maintained by the Authority is found in Prapatra-9. The Prapatra-10 is the certificate issued by the Collector in accordance with the provisions of the Government Order dated 6.8.2004 to the effect that the land proposed for acquisition is urgently required and, therefore, urgency clause, i.e. Section 17(4) of the Act, 1894, was required to be invoked for immediate completion of the project. The possession of the proposed land is urgently required by dispensing the provisions of Section 5-A. The District Collector was fully agreed to dispense with the opportunity of hearing to the affected tenure holders. 192. The said certificate is followed by the note on justification for invoking Section 17(4) of the Act, 1894, some of which has been extracted hereinabove with regard to different villages. The justification with respect to Village Rampur Bangar shows that it was noted therein that in the residential plots scheme of YEIDA, the land of appropriately 2042 hectares of 13 villages has already been notified. The justification with respect to Village Rampur Bangar shows that it was noted therein that in the residential plots scheme of YEIDA, the land of appropriately 2042 hectares of 13 villages has already been notified. The land of village Rampur Bangar for an area of 104.9705 hectares was contiguous to the land parcel of the said village already notified and was required for expansion of the Sector planning. Being part of an integrated project, in case of opportunity to the tenure holders was given, there was likelihood of non-availability of contiguous land to complete the project in a time bound manner. 193. Prapatra-13 contains certificate to the effect that there was no dues upon the authority, Prapatra-14 is a certificate which was issued regarding non-existence of any temple, mosque and graveyard on the proposed area. Prapatra-15 is a certificate certifying that out of the total estimated compensation of the land proposed for acquisition to the tune of Rs. 83,97,64,000/-, the Authority had already deposited Rs. 16,79,52,800/-. It is further mentioned in the certificate that the proposed area could not be purchased by private negotiations and within ½ Mile radius of the area, no Banjar/Non-Agriculture land equivalent to the proposed area is available. The land proposed for acquisition is indispensable for planned development. Prapatra-16 is a list of assets found on the proposed plots prepared by the Officers of Development Authority and verified by the Revenue Officers after making spot inspection of the proposed area. 194. A report on 23 points was appended alongwith the proposal, which contains a declaration that the compensation of the assets found on the proposed land will be paid to the concerned tenure holders after getting valuation of the said property by the concerned department, and that, in case, payment of the compensation is made in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Rules, 1997, there was no probability of any objection. It is stated therein that the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) after reconciliation of the documents from the revenue records and completing necessary formalities, annexing certificate in Prapatra-10 regarding urgent need of planned development, sent the said proposal vide letter dated 11.3.2010 to the Director, Land Acquisition, Directorate with the request to forward the same to the State Government and the Directorate, thereafter, forwarded the same to the State Government, with the request to issue notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and also ensure compliance of National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy-2003 within stipulated period by issuing direction to the District Collector. The letter of the Additional District Collector (Land Acquisition) is appended with the counter-affidavit. 195. It is categorically stated in the counter-affidavit of the State that the State Government having considered all the documents including the certificate of the District Collector issued in Prapatra-10 and note on justification for invoking Section 17(4) alongwith the proposal under Section 4(1) and, after being subjectively satisfied, accorded approval to issue notification by invoking the provisions of Section 17(4) alongwith Section 4(1), keeping in view the urgent need of the land for planned development in District Gautam Budh Nagar through YEIDA. 196. It is further stated therein that the State Government was satisfied by looking at the enormity of the number of tenure holders that the disposal of objections would cause delay of years. The acquisition of land and possession was found of paramount importance. The State was, accordingly, satisfied that the provisions of Section 5-A need to be dispensed with. It cannot be said that the satisfaction of the State Government was arrived at on extraneous or irrelevant considerations. The decision of the State cannot be assailed on the ground that there was no material dispensing with the enquiry or that the order suffered from malice. It is further sought to be clarified by the State that things have to be viewed holistically. Each notification may not be viewed in seclusion. The land is being acquired through several notifications to implement the integrated scheme formulated by the Authority. It is being executed gradually and in phases. B. Noting from the Record of the State : 197. It is further sought to be clarified by the State that things have to be viewed holistically. Each notification may not be viewed in seclusion. The land is being acquired through several notifications to implement the integrated scheme formulated by the Authority. It is being executed gradually and in phases. B. Noting from the Record of the State : 197. We have carefully perused the original record produced by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State-respondents pertaining to the decision for invocation of urgency clause under Section 17(4) while granting approval of acquisition proposal under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. 198. From the record, we have noted that on receipt of the proposal, queries were made with regard to the information contained in the documents appended with the proposal. A noting dated 26.3.2010 of the concerned Secretariat, with respect to Village Rampur Bangar, for acquisition of an area of 104.9705 hectares shows that the direction was issued to provide Khasra and Khatauni alongwith the proposal. On receipt of the same, all the points pertaining to the proposal were carefully extracted in the Note-sheet, indicating therein that the requirements of submission of proposal for acquisition, as prescribed in different formats on all aspect of the matter, had been fulfilled. With regard to the invocation of urgency clause, the justification given by the District Magistrate for issuance of the notification under Section 17 in the prescribed format, and the justification note was extracted in the Note-sheet. The reasons given for invocation of Urgency clause as reflected from the Note-sheet was inspected at different levels of the State and lastly, the approval of the State Government was granted with the signature of the Special Secretary, Chief Minister, Government of U.P. 199. Similarly, a perusal of the record of the acquisition of land of Village Pachokra, for an area of 50.9390 hectares indicates that the Minutes of the meeting of the District Land Use Committee under the Chairmanship of the District Magistrate dated 11.2.2009 has been appended therein, which shows that the acquisition proposal of Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority, Gautam Budh Nagar for planned development of the area with respect to 10 villages namely Niloni Shahpur, Mirzapur, Parsaul, Achcheypur Chandpur, Rampur Bangar, Raunija, Pachokara, Rustampur and Raghupura, within the limits of District Gautam Budh Nagar, had been considered. On the Agenda for acquisition of the land of these villages submitted by the Additional District Magistrate, Land Acquisition, the Land Use Committee made deliberations and gave consent subject to the conditions mentioned in the resolution, which is under the signature of the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar. The certificate under the signature of the District Magistrate/Chairman, District Land Use Committee, Gautam Budh Nagar is appended with the proposal wherein approval for acquisition of 50.939 hectares of land of Village Pachokra for planned development of the area through Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority had been given. It is noted therein that by the acquisition, 63 farmers/land holders would be affected. On the justification submitted by the District Magistrate for invocation of urgency clause in the prescribed format and the Note appended with the proposal in the note-sheet, extracting all relevant points pertaining to fulfillment of requirements of the proposal for acquisition, the proposal was duly perused at different levels on different dates and lastly on 26.2.2009, the approval of the State Government was recorded by the Special Secretary, Chief Minister, Government of U.P. 200. On perusal of the record of the acquisition of land of Village Dungarpur Reelka, of area 198.6320 hectares, on the proposal for invocation of urgency while issuing notification under Section 4/17 of the Act, 1894, we find that on receipt of the proposal forwarded by the Directorate to the State, queries were made on 11.11.2010 that the details in the justification for invocation of Urgency clause submitted by the Collector had not been given in the proposal and the approval of the District Land Use Committee was not appended. The noting in the Note-sheet dated 11.11.2010 indicates that the matter was deferred for submission of the proposal by completion of the necessary requirements. Fresh noting was, thereafter, prepared on the Note-Sheet when all the requirements have been fulfilled and a perusal of the noting therein indicates that the justification given by the District Magistrate for invocation of urgency clause had been duly extracted and the reasoning given therein were noted. It was noted therein that in case opportunity of hearing was granted to the villagers, there was likelihood of delay in the acquisition of the land, which would adversely affect the execution of the project, inasmuch as, contiguous land may not be available in such a situation. It was noted therein that in case opportunity of hearing was granted to the villagers, there was likelihood of delay in the acquisition of the land, which would adversely affect the execution of the project, inasmuch as, contiguous land may not be available in such a situation. The said proposal was duly inspected/enquired at different levels of the State and, lastly on 28.11.2010, the approval of the State through the Special Secretary, Chief Minister, Government of U.P. was recorded. 201. Similar is the position we found on the inspection of the original record of the State with respect to the acquisition of lands of other villages, subject-matter of consideration herein. (VIII). Conclusion : 202. On perusal of the record, thus, it cannot be accepted that the entire exercise for invocation of urgency clause was mechanical or there was no material for recording subjective satisfaction of the State. It cannot be said that it was an exercise which was conducted without application of mind. 203. Having gone through the record and noticing the statement in the counter-affidavit of the State, looking to the Master Plan and the area of land acquired under the notifications in question, there remains no doubt that the State Government had duly applied its mind to relevant factors available on the record before it, to reach at the conclusion of dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A. The factors of (i) integrated plan for development; (ii) expensiveness of the land or enormousness of the project; (iii) need for contiguous land for the integrated project; (iv) likelihood of encroachment of land by the outsiders being contiguous to the Expressway; (v) development project being complimentary to the development of Yamuna Expressway, were the reasons spelled out in Prapatra-10 which weighed in the mind of the State to approve the proposal of the Authority for issuance of notification under Section 17(4) alongwith Section 4 of the Act, 1894. 204. A careful perusal of the record and the material brought alongwith the counter-affidavit of the State shows that there has been due application of mind at the level of the State Government and it was not a mechanical exercise. The Government had taken note of the reasons spelled out for dispensation of enquiry in the justification for the same, with respect to each notification individually, and granted approval on each file pertaining to the acquisitions-in-question of 9 villages, subject-matter of challenge herein. The Government had taken note of the reasons spelled out for dispensation of enquiry in the justification for the same, with respect to each notification individually, and granted approval on each file pertaining to the acquisitions-in-question of 9 villages, subject-matter of challenge herein. It is brought on record that lands of Village Rampur Bangar of approximately 20 hectares, subject-matter of acquisition by the notification dated 26.2.2009, Village Usmanpur of an area of 161.3900 hectares, Village Raunija falling part of Sector 22-E and 22-D were needed for construction of approach roads passing through the Villages to connect the Expressway and the Sector road and, thus, were integral part of the Sector planning. 205. We may be alive of the situation that it was not an acquisition for expansion of already existing city or developed area. With the creation of Taj Expressway Authority, the project for construction of Taj Expressway was conceived in the year 2001 which could not be implemented on account of the litigations in the Court. The Apex Court in the case of Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) had noted that : ''57. The Expressway is a work of immense public importance. The State gains advantages from the construction of an Expressway and so does the general public. Creation of a corridor for fast moving traffic resulting into curtailing the traveling time, as also the transport of the goods, would be some factors which speak in favour of the Project being for the public purpose. Much was stated about the 25 million square meters of land being acquired for the five parcels of land. In fact, in our opinion, as has rightly been commented upon by the High Court, the creation of the five zones for industry, residence, amusement etc., would be complimentary to the creation of the Expressway. 58. It cannot be forgotten that the creation of land parcels would give impetus to the industrial development of the State creating more jobs and helping the economy and thereby helping the general public. There can be no doubt that the implementation of the Project would result in coming into existence of five developed parcels/centers in the State for the use of the citizens. There shall, thus, be the planned development of this otherwise industrially backward area. There can be no doubt that the implementation of the Project would result in coming into existence of five developed parcels/centers in the State for the use of the citizens. There shall, thus, be the planned development of this otherwise industrially backward area. The creation of these five parcels will certainly help the maximum utilization of the Expressway and the existence of an Expressway for the fast moving traffic would help the industrial culture created in the five parcels. Thus, both will be complimentary to each other and can be viewed as parts of an integral scheme. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is not a public purpose.'' 206. It was noted by the Apex Court therein that looking to the enormousness of the area, the land acquired for the Expressway alone, apart from 25 millions meters of land which was liable to be acquired for the purposes of development of five land parcels, it cannot be argued that the encroachment issue was not a relevant factor. The interlinking between the acquisition of land for the highway and the acquisition of land for establishing five townships has been noted with approval by the Apex Court. 207. In a bunch of writ petitions [Nathi v. State of U.P. (supra)] decided on 12.11.2010 by a Division Bench of this Court challenging the acquisition notifications dated 16.10.2009 and 1.12.2009 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 read with 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, 1894; respectively, it was noted by the Division Bench that planned development of the area through Yamuna Expressway is part of an integrated project which would cover a large area of land. The acquisition would also include construction of approach road for linking Yamuna Expressway with the land parcels. 208. The plan of Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority for providing basic amenities such as roads, water supply, street lighting and power supply, sewerage, drainage, collection, treatment and disposal of industrial waste and town refuse and other community facilities, services or conveniences under Section 2 (a) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act. 208. The plan of Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority for providing basic amenities such as roads, water supply, street lighting and power supply, sewerage, drainage, collection, treatment and disposal of industrial waste and town refuse and other community facilities, services or conveniences under Section 2 (a) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act. 1976 is to be considered to further note the statement from the record that the acquisition was being proposed of the contiguous land parcel as part of the integrated project, the satisfaction of the State Government for invoking Section 17(4) of the Act cannot be said to be vitiated by arbitrariness or non-application of mind. 209. As noted above, the integrated development plan through Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority of District Gautam Budh Nagar and Bulandshahar under the Master Plan, Phase-1-2031 is part of the policy decision of the State providing for development of Special Development Zone, Core activity zone. Amongst the complimentary activities of the Core activity of Special Development Zone, more than 35% of land was to be utilized for Core activity, approach road and open space. The total area (Urban area excluded Village Abadi) targeted for development under the Master Plan (Phase-1), Gautam Budh Nagar and Bulandshahar is 18450.43 hectares. By excluding the Village Abadi areas of 1124.69 hectares, the Urbanisable area is 19575.12 hectares which includes the area earmarked for residential, commercial, industrial, institutional use apart from the Greens, transport and mixed use. 210. There is no post-notification delay, inasmuch as, in 2 or 3 acquisition notifications, subject-matter of challenge before us, wherein almost 1 (one) year time has been consumed in issuance of the Section 6 notification, delay has been explained by making a categorical statement in the counter-affidavit that about one thousand crores of money was needed for deposit of 80% of estimated compensation for which collateral security was arranged by the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority through the authorities like NOIDA and Greater NOIDA who had mortgaged their land for sanction of loan. The deposit of 80% estimated compensation is pre-requisite condition for issuance of Section 6 notification and only on the deposit of money with the competent authority towards 80% of estimated compensation, the process of issuance of the declaration under Section 6 was undertaken. The deposit of 80% estimated compensation is pre-requisite condition for issuance of Section 6 notification and only on the deposit of money with the competent authority towards 80% of estimated compensation, the process of issuance of the declaration under Section 6 was undertaken. The explanation offered by the Authority (YEIDA) for issuance of Section 6 notification on the eve of last date of the year, just before the expiry of one year from the date of Section 4 notification, is found to be a valid justification. Moreover, in all other acquisition notifications under challenge, there is no delay as Section 6 notification had been issued in a time gap of 3 to 4 months from Section 4 notification. 211. We are, therefore, not impressed with the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the acquisition notifications under challenge suffered from unexplained post-notification delay and it has to be treated as a factor to conclude that there was no urgency. 212. It was placed before us that the first phase of the Master plan' 2031 was to be completed by the year 2021. We may also note that the purpose of acquisition has been achieved as the major acquired area has already been developed. About 95% of the land owners have already received compensation and 90% of them have not approached any Court. The factors which were to be considered to be relevant in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) for Yamuna Expressway project are found to be relevant in the acquisition in question as well. 213. In Radhy Shyam (supra), heavily relied by the learned counsels for the appellant, the decision in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) was noted in paragraphs 72' and 76' in the following manner : ''72. In Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 10 SCC 282 , the acquisition of land for construction of Yamuna Expressway was upheld and challenge to the decision of the State Government to dispense with the inquiry was negatived by making the following observations: ''We have deliberately quoted the above part of the High Court judgment only to show the meticulous care taken by the High Court in examining as to whether there was material before the State Government to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. We are completely convinced that there was necessity in this Project considering the various reasons like enormousness of the Project, likelihood of the encroachments, number of appellants who would have required to be heard and the time taken for that purpose, and the fact that the Project had lingered already from 2001 till 2008. We do not see any reason why we should take a different view than what is taken by the High Court. 76. In Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U. P. (supra), the acquisition was upheld because the land was urgently needed for construction of Yamuna Expressway and by the time the matter was decided by this Court, huge amount had been spent on the project. As against this, the exercise of power under Section 17(1) and/or 17(4) for the acquisition of land for residential, industrial and commercial purposes, construction of sewage treatment plant and district jails was held to be legally impermissible in Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra (supra), Om Prakash v. State of U.P. (supra), Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja (supra), Esso Fabs Private Limited v. State of Haryana (supra), Babu Ram v. State of Haryana (supra) and Anand Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra).'' 214. The observations in paragraph 93' in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra) noted in Radhy Shyam (supra) that there was necessity to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act considering various reasons like enormousness of the Project, likelihood of the encroachments, number of appellants who would have required to be heard and the time taken for that purpose, the reasons for invocation of urgency clause noted from the material before the State Government, were neither touched nor held to be irrelevant, rather the invocation of urgency clause in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra), on the above noted reasons, was distinguished, while proceeding in paragraph 73' to examine the legality and/or justification to exercise under Section 17(1) and/or 17(4) for the acquisition of land for residential, commercial or industrial purpose. 215. 215. The reliance placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (supra) by the counsels for the petitioners simply on the ground that urgency clause cannot be invoked in a project ''for planned development of an area'', from the statement in the acquisition notifications under challenge, is of no help to the petitioners, inasmuch as, this Court cannot ignore the nature of project in question, the material brought on record available before the State Government to invoke urgency. This is not a case where it can be said that there was no material before the State Government justifying invocation of urgency clause or there has been no application of mind of the State on the material brought before it. No fault in the decision-making process could be demonstrated. It is not a case of non-application of mind. The recital of formation of opinion by the Government, in its decision, was not necessary nor would vitiate the order on the ground that reasons have not been recorded. 216. As noted above, it is a case of subjective satisfaction of the Government and once the Government forms the opinion and dispenses with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, the Court, in its limited jurisdiction of judicial review, cannot declare the acquisition proceedings bad. For the elaborate discussion made above, in the present matter, we do not find any error or infirmity in the decision-making process and hence no case is made out for invoking the powers of judicial review, to quash the notifications for acquisition. (IX). Prejudice Caused : 217. It would not be out of place to mention here that the petitioners in the bunch of writ petitions are aggrieved by the denial of opportunity of hearing, to record their objection for the purpose of acquisition, which is found to be public purpose. In many of the writ petitions before us, it is stated that the land of the petitioners was not necessary to be taken as it was either Abadi or was being used for the purposes other than agriculture. In the facts and circumstances stated in the writ petition, in which the petitioner has been placed, it is fit case for omitting his land from acquisition. 218. In the facts and circumstances stated in the writ petition, in which the petitioner has been placed, it is fit case for omitting his land from acquisition. 218. In one of the Writ Petition No. 11839 of 2012, five petitioners namely Bane Singh, Smt. Sheela Devi, Smt. Suman Devi, Khoob Chand and Narendra Kumar have raised a dispute with regard to acquisition of their plots in Gata Nos. 228, 144, 459 and 452 of Village Rampur Bangar, Pargana Dankaur, Tehsil Sadar, District Gautam Budh Nagar, on the ground that the plots in question were recorded as Abadi and further that, in the survey report prepared at the time of preparation of proposal for acquisition, it was admitted fact that the aforesaid plots were being used as Abadi. The statement in the writ petition is that the petitioners are interested only for exemption of their lands, mentioned above, for the area to the extent of existing Abadi and want compensation for the rest of the acquired area as per law. The statement is also to the effect that the petitioners were ready to pay development charges and other expenses chargeable by the Authority namely Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority but without giving any opportunity of hearing and without deciding their representation for exemption of land, the respondents were bent upon to take possession of the constructed house/disputed land. The area of the plots-in-question recorded as Abadi and being used, as such, could not have been included in the acquisition under challenge. The prayer in the writ petition is to quash the acquisition notification in respect of the petitioners' land, decide their application to regularize the Abadi site and further not to dispossess from their respective land, has been made. The challenge by the petitioners has been disputed in the counter-affidavit with the contention that there exist no Abadi at the time of survey of the land in question. The award in respect of plot Nos. 228, 144, 452 had been declared under Section 11(2) under Karar Niyamawali, 1997 as the recorded tenure holders of the said plots had entered into an agreement with the acquiring body and accepted compensation under Karar Niyamawali. The award in respect of plot No. 459 has been declared under Section 11(1) and since recorded tenure holders did not receive the same, it has been deposited in the District Court. The award in respect of plot No. 459 has been declared under Section 11(1) and since recorded tenure holders did not receive the same, it has been deposited in the District Court. A categorical statement has been made in the counter-affidavit of the State that the affected tenure holders including the petitioners had received compensation under the Agreement Rules after signing the agreement without any protest or dispute. It is also stated in the counter-affidavit that plot No. 452 is not recorded in the name of any of the petitioners in the revenue record. The recorded tenure holder of Plot No. 452 had already received compensation. No rejoinder to the said counter-affidavit has been filed. 219. Similar facts have been noticed from the statements made in other writ petitions where the petitioners sought exclusion of their plots, on the premise, that there exists Abadi over the acquired plots at the time of preparation of the proposal and the said fact had been indicated in the survey report. 220. We are not entering into the merits of the claim of the petitioners for exclusion of their Abadi in individual cases. However, the fact remains that the petitioners herein are challenging the acquisition of their plots on the ground that, had the opportunity of hearing been provided to them, they could have prayed for exclusion of their lands from acquisition by placing the material on record that it was a fit case for omitting their lands from acquisition. The prejudice caused to the petitioners, on account of the decision of the State Government to dispense with the enquiry, has been agitated only to the above extent. 221. In this regard, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the YEIDA that there exists a Regulation namely the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority Rural abadi sites (Management and Regularization) Regulation 2011, which has been framed for providing lease back of Abadi plots to the affected tenure holders under the lease back policy of Noida, 7% Abadi land is being allotted to those whose land had been acquired. By the Government Order dated 29.8.2014 and 4.11.2015, it was decided that 64.7% of additional compensation would be paid to the affected tenure holders as ''No Litigation Incentive''. By the Government Order dated 29.8.2014 and 4.11.2015, it was decided that 64.7% of additional compensation would be paid to the affected tenure holders as ''No Litigation Incentive''. The Board of the Authority has also approved the same policy and, as such, additional compensation as ''No Litigation Incentive'' is being given to the affected tenure holders in accordance with the terms and conditions enumerated therein. By the Government Order dated 4.11.2015, the condition of payment of 64.7% additional compensation as ''No Litigation Incentive'' has been relaxed wherein initial condition of the withdrawal of the writ petition has been relaxed to the extent that in those acquisition notifications of Villages where 80% of the writ petitions have been withdrawn, payment of additional compensation as ''No Litigation Incentive'' shall be made. 222. From the scheme of the Government Order dated 29.8.2014, it is evident that even those tenure holders who sold their lands by consent are also entitled for additional compensation as ''No Litigation Incentive''. 223. We may also note that in one of the Writ Petition No. 18539 of 2013 pertaining to Village Rampur Bangar, Pargana Dankaur, Tehsil Sadar, District Gautam Budh Nagar, the acquisition of Gata No. 152 area 0.8950 hectares has been subjected to challenge on the ground that the plot of the petitioner is completely surrounded by Abadi on all sides on which the residential house of the petitioner had been constructed and the petitioner is living therein with his family. There is no other residential house for the petitioner and his family members. In reply to the same, in the counter-affidavit of the Development Authority, a categorical statement has been made that the Authority has decided to lease back plot No. 152 to the extent of 0.2100 hectares and the said decision was already communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 4.6.2011. The statement therein is that the possession of plot No. 152 area 0.7950 hectares had been handed over to the authority on 3.11.2010 and the possession of an area 0.1000 hectares has not been given to the authority. 224. The statement therein is that the possession of plot No. 152 area 0.7950 hectares had been handed over to the authority on 3.11.2010 and the possession of an area 0.1000 hectares has not been given to the authority. 224. The prejudice said to have been caused to the petitioners on account of acquisition of their Abadi plots allegedly and prayer to exempt the same being recorded Abadi at the time of preparation of the proposal for acquisition under Section 4 of the Act, 1894, thus, can very well be addressed by the Authority as per the terms and conditions of the above noted scheme. 225. However, in view of the acquisition of enormous area of lands of the village-in-question, the acquisition notifications cannot be quashed as there was material before the State to invoke the urgency clause. As noted above, the decision of the State recording subjective satisfaction on the material before it cannot be interfered with on the ground of adequacy and reliability of the material on the basis of which the conclusion is reached. The truth or correctness of the material cannot be questioned by the Court nor the same has been questioned before us, in that context. None of the material placed before the State can be said to be irrelevant or non-existent material which could be said to be fatal so as to vitiate the order itself. 226. The petitioners have failed to establish that their lands was not suitable for the project; the land was not needed for any public purpose. There is no allegation of mala fide in the acquisition in question. It could not be demonstrated nor it could be argued that the public purpose behind the acquisition would be sub-served by any other land. The stand of the authority giving justification for invocation of urgency clause that the lands under acquisition was contiguous, and was indispensable, could not be disputed or denied by the petitioners. 227. We, therefore, find that apart from the contention that some of the petitioners are entitled to exemption of their Abadi land, no other plausible objection to the acquisition in question could be agitated by the petitioners. The prejudice caused to the petitioners by dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A could not be shown or demonstrated. 228. 227. We, therefore, find that apart from the contention that some of the petitioners are entitled to exemption of their Abadi land, no other plausible objection to the acquisition in question could be agitated by the petitioners. The prejudice caused to the petitioners by dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A could not be shown or demonstrated. 228. The expropriation of the lands of the petitioners in conformity with the Constitutional scheme under Article 300-A and in furtherance of the policy framed for development of the area for the public at large, under Article 39(b) of the Directive Principles of the State policy, is saved by the provisions of Article 31-C of the Constitution of India. The right to compensation provided under the second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution, stands duly balanced by giving ''No Litigation Incentive'' of 64.7% besides the compensation computed under the Act, 1894; grant of 7% of Abadi land (developed land) and the lease back policy framed by YEIDA dated 10.10.2011 (modified in 2014). 229. On the facts of the instant case, in light of the legal principles stated by the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (supra), we find that invocation of urgency under Section 17(4) for dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is not fatal to the acquisitions-in-question. (X) Reliance on Shyroj Singh (supra) 230. In so far as the reliance placed by the counsel for the petitioners on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Shyoraj Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, Writ-C No. 30747 of 2010 and other similar decisions noted above, we are of the considered opinion that the relevant aspect of the matter, as noted by us hereinabove, to test the merits of the contentions of the rival parties, relevant to challenge the acquisitions in question, had not been noted nor examined by the Division Bench therein. The Division Bench has not been dealt with the arguments of the counsel for the Development Authority therein that looking to the large number of farmers, the hearing would have delayed the project. The Division Bench has not been dealt with the arguments of the counsel for the Development Authority therein that looking to the large number of farmers, the hearing would have delayed the project. It has simply gone to the record of the State, noticing the justification in Prapatra-10 to record the reasons mentioned therein for invoking the power under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, dealt and rejected the same only on the ground that the post-notification delay of one year was sufficient to conclude that there was absolutely no urgency which could have justified the invocation of the powers under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, so as to deprive of farmers from an opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A. 231. Noticing the observations of the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (supra), it was held therein that the invocation of urgency clause in the matter of land to be acquired for planned development for the Development Authorities has been considered therein, and the decision heavily relied upon by the Counsel for the Development Authority in Nand Kishore Gupta (supra), had been distinguished. 232. The Court in Shyoraj Singh (supra) did not consider the fact that it was an integrated project, acquisition for a portion of which has already been upheld by the Apex Court in the case of Nand Kishore Gupta (supra). The reasons given for justification in invocation of urgency clause had not been examined, in the context, in which in they were made. The said case having been decided on the material placed before the Court at the time of the argument by the learned counsels therein, cannot be a guiding factor to uphold the only argument of the counsels for the petitioners herein that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (supra), the acquisition for ''planned development through Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority, cannot be upheld. The crux of the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners simply relying upon the observations of the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (supra), without anything beyond that, has been dealt with hereinabove. 233. The crux of the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners simply relying upon the observations of the Apex Court in Radhy Shyam (supra), without anything beyond that, has been dealt with hereinabove. 233. The reliance placed upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the acquisition of land of Village Chandpur, Pargana Dankaur, Tehsil and District Gautam Budh Nagar for Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority, in the case of Shyoraj Singh (supra) is, thus, of no help to the petitioners herein. (XI) Relief re: compensation : 234. Lastly, we are required to deal with the arguments of some of the learned counsels for the petitioners that the petitioners would be satisfied, in case, instead of quashing the acquisition, they are provided compensation under the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 for illegal deprivation of their landed property. As noted above, on a challenge made by the petitioners in the writ petitions, in this bunch, at the admission stage, the interim orders have been passed directing the parties to maintain status quo with respect to the lands-in-question. The result was that the possession of the lands, subject-matter of acquisition herein has not been handed over to the Development Authority. No award has been made with respect to the land, subject-matter of acquisition in the instant bunch. The question is as to whether by applying the decision of the Apex Court in Sahara India Commercial Corporation Limited and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2017) 11 SCC 339 , we can grant compensation to the petitioners herein under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. 235. In Sahara India Commercial Corporation Limited (supra), the Apex Court while relying upon the earlier decision in Om Prakash (supra) has held that on identical grounds, with the same purpose of acquisition, the Apex Court in the case of Om Prakash (supra) had found invocation of urgency clause bad and held that the notifications under Sections 4 and 6, without holding the enquiry/hearing of objection under Section 5-A of the Act, 1894 were not justified and the acquisition proceedings as a whole would be open for interference. However, while granting relief, the Court has concluded therein that since the scheme, for which the land in question was acquired, had been implemented and on parts of the land constructions under different schemes had come up, though the acquisition had been found to be legally fragile, requiring the acquiring authority to return the land to the land owners, at that stage, would have the effect of jeopardizing the housing and other projects, which either had been completed or had reached completion. While moulding the relief, it was, thus, held therein that there will be no obligation on the part of the acquiring authority to return any part of land to any of the land owners. In case, the acquiring authority decided to retain the entire land acquired by the notifications in question, only with respect to the lands of the appellants before the Apex Court therein, the date of the order of the Apex Court would be deemed to be the date of fresh notification for acquisition of the land of the appellant. It was further held therein that in respect of the land owners who might have received any part of compensation, aforesaid directions would have no application. The compensation which was to be determined with respect to the appellants therein with reference to the date of the deemed notification, was directed to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. 236. The principles on which the relief was granted to the appellants in Sahara India Commercial Corporation Limited (supra), however, are not attracted in the facts of the instant case. Firstly, as we did not find any infirmity in the acquisition process. And secondly, for the reason that in the instant case, interim orders directing the authorities to maintain status quo granted on the admission of the writ petition, are operating. On behalf of the acquiring authority, it was submitted that the period spent during the interim stay or injunction by which the authority has not been able to take possession or declare award to make payment of compensation, has to be excluded from the period prescribed in Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Section 24(1)(a) prescribes that in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where no award under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 has been made, then, all provisions of the Act, 2013 relating to the determination of compensation shall apply. 237. Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 further provides that in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Act, 1894, where an award under Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act, but the physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. 238. While dealing with the impact of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, in a case, where land acquisition proceedings had been initiated prior to the enforcement of 2013 Act by publication of the notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Apex Court in Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Dedelopment Corporation Ltd. and others v. Mr. Deepak Aggarwal and others, SLP(C) Nos. 16631-16632/2018] decided on 28th July, 2022, has held that for the purposes of Sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act shall be treated as initiated on the publication of a notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act and clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act is applicable in such matter only for the determination of compensation amount. It is pertinent to note that in the said matter, the notification for proposal under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act alone had been issued before enforcement of the 2013' Act. 239. In Indore Development Authority (supra), the Apex Court has dealt with the effect and implication of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. While considering the arguments of the acquiring authority therein for exclusion of the period spent during the interim order or injunction by which the authority have not been able to take possession or make payment of compensation, it was concluded in paragraph 289' that it is not the intendment of the 2013' Act that those who have litigated should get benefits of higher compensation as contemplated under Section 24 of the Act, 2013. 240. 240. It was observed that ''It is not intended of the provisions that in piecemeal the persons who have litigated and have obtained the interim order should get the benefits of the provisions of the 2013 Act''. ''It is not the intendment of the law to deliver advantage to relentless litigants''. 241. In Union of India and another v. Mohiuddin Masood and others, (2020) 14 SCC 760 , the judgments in Sahara India Commercial Corporation Limited (supra) and Radhy Shyam (supra) were considered and it was held that those cases were decided in the facts and circumstances therein. It was further observed therein that the invocation of the urgency clause therein cannot be said to be bad on appreciation of the material on record and, as such, there was no justification for setting aside the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, 1894. Further, on the submission of the writ petitioners therein that they have not been paid any compensation, it was noted that the acquiring authority had deposited 80% of the estimated compensation much earlier, but the land holders had refused to take the same. It was further held that it was not open for the original writ petitioners to make the grievance that they had not been paid any compensation, as it was still open to them to withdraw the compensation. The final award had already been published before the writ petitions was filed and the land holders themselves did not accept compensation. 242. For the above discussion, the prayer made by the learned counsels for the petitioners that by applying Sahara India Commercial Corporation Limited (supra), in view of the provisions of Section 24(1)(a), the petitioners herein are entitled to higher compensation, to be determined under the Act, 2013, is turned down. 243. However, it is directed that the award for the acquired lands pertaining to nine villages, subject-matter of consideration herein, if not prepared in view of the interim orders passed by this Court, the same shall be declared strictly in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of two months from today and the compensation shall be paid or deposited immediately thereafter. 244. 244. With regard to other beneficial schemes framed by the Authority (YEIDA) such as : (1) regularization of rural Abadi sites known as ''Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority Rural abadi sites (Management and Regularization) Regulations 2011'', (amended vide First Amendment Regulations 2014); (ii) The scheme of allotment of 7% Abadi land to the affected tenure holders in lieu of acquisition; (iii) 64.7% of additional compensation under the Government Order dated 29th August, 2014, relaxed by the Government Order dated 4th November, 2015, it is provided that the writ petitioners herein shall be entitled to consideration of their claims for the benefits of the aforesaid schemes of YEIDA, which are applicable to the affected tenure holders of the Notified area of YEIDA; i.e. whose lands have been acquired for the development project of YEIDA. It is, therefore, directed that the claim of each of the writ petitioners, in this bunch, shall be considered in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Scheme. 245. We may further noted that as regards the grant of additional compensation of 64.7% to the petitioners herein, which was initially offered as ''No Litigation Bonus'' to the tenure holders who either did not challenge the acquisition or withdrew their writ petitions at any stage, the language of the Government Order dated 4th November, 2015 is to be considered. The said Government Order provides for relaxation in the condition for grant of 64.7% additional compensation. It is provided therein that, in cases in respect to the Villages or acquisition proposals, where 80% of the writ petitions have been withdrawn, payment of additional compensation as ''No Litigation Bonus'' shall be made. 246. Drawing clue from the said Government Order dated 4th November, 2015, we provide that all the writ petitioners herein, who though have contested the matter before this Court till the final stage, are entitled for 64.7% of additional compensation, which was otherwise granted to the tenure holders affected by the acquisition-in-question, as an Incentive not to litigate with the Development Authority/YEIDA. We may make it clear that we did not find any justification for denying benefit of additional compensation of 64.7% to the affected farmers, who have approached this Court and did not relent or surrender before the Authority (YEIDA). They cannot be punished or discriminated only because of the exercise of their legal rights, to challenge the action of the State or the Authority. They cannot be punished or discriminated only because of the exercise of their legal rights, to challenge the action of the State or the Authority. In any case, 64.7% additional compensation has been granted to all the affected tenure holders, even those who had withdrawn their writ petitions during the course of hearing, before the judgment, in this bunch, was reserved. Parity be applied to all the affected tenure holders in the matter of grant of 64.7% additional compensation. Further, at the cost of repetition, it is provided that all other incentives, such as, the regularization of Rural Abadi sites under the relevant regulations and 7% developed Abadi plots under the Scheme of YEIDA shall be provided to the writ petitioners, after due consideration of the merits of their claims by adopting due process, as per the terms and conditions of the scheme. (XII). Order : 247. Subject to the above observations and directions, while turning down the challenge to the acquisition notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 readwith Section 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, we dismiss all the writ petitions in this bunch. No order as to cost.