JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. I.A. No. 10923 of 2023 The appellant has filed this interlocutory application under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 8 days in filing the present Letters Patent Appeal. 2. In view of the statements made in this interlocutory application, the delay of 8 days in filing this appeal is condoned. 3. I.A. No. 10923 of 2023 is, accordingly, allowed. LPA No. 566 of 2023 4. Sachidanand Singh who is the writ petitioner has challenged the writ Court’s order dated 19th July 2023 passed in WP(S) No. 6024 of 2015, he was dismissed from service. 5. Briefly stated, the appellant who was appointed as a constable on 8th September 1981 faced a departmental inquiry vide departmental proceeding No. 26 of 2003. The imputation of misconduct levelled against the appellant was that on 8th November 2003 he received a rifle and 50 rounds of bullets and after loading 5 bullets in the rifle went to the spot where other trainees were cleaning their rifles. The appellant requested Shyam Bahadur Thapa, who was also a trainee police, to hold the rifle. During cleaning the rifle, Shyam Bahadur Thapa put the full-through in the barrel and starting pulling away the full-through but, in the meantime, a bullet was fired from the rifle which hit him on his waist and caused bleeding injury. Shyam Bahadur Thapa was brought to a hospital at Hazaribagh for his treatment and was referred to RIMS at Ranchi for treatment but on the way to Ranchi he succumbed to the injury and passed away. A criminal case was registered vide Barhi (Padma) PS Case No. 216 of 2003 on 9th November 2003 against the appellant and a chargesheet was laid in the Court under section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. Simultaneously, the appellant was issued a charge memo on the aforesaid allegation and the inquiring officer submitted a report on 6th September 2004 rendering an opinion that on account of negligence of the appellant a shot was fired from the rifle which caused death of Shyam Bahadur Thapa. The Superintendent of Police at the Jharkhand Armed Police (Training Centre) Padma accepted the opinion rendered by the inquiring officer and awarded punishment of forfeiture of one annual increment equivalent to two black marks which shall not have any effect on the future increment. The Superintendent of Police at the Jharkhand Armed Police (Training Centre) Padma accepted the opinion rendered by the inquiring officer and awarded punishment of forfeiture of one annual increment equivalent to two black marks which shall not have any effect on the future increment. However, as the order dated 17th November 2008 reveals, the Director General of Police reviewed the punishment order and formed a tentative opinion that the punishment of forfeiture of one annual increment awarded to the appellant was grossly insufficient and, accordingly, issued a notice to him on 29th May 2008 affording 15 days’ time to him to respond to the said notice. It appears that on receiving the said notice, the appellant sought one month’s time through his letter dated 29th June 2008 for putting forth his defence but he did not submit his reply even after four months and therefore the punishment of dismissal from service was awarded by the Director General of Police which was issued by the Inspector-General of Police (Training) vide order dated 17th November 2008. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached the writ Court in WP(S) No. 2990 of 2009 and the writ petition was disposed of by an order dated 1st December 2014 with a direction to the Director General of Police to dispose of his representation dated 4th December 2008. The said representation of the appellant was dismissed on 23rd November 2009 which was communicated to him through letter dated 17th July 2015. In the meantime, GR Case No. 2658 of 2003 corresponding to TR No. 522 of 2007, arising out of Barhi (Padma) PS Case No. 216 of 2003, ended in acquittal of the appellant by the judgment rendered on 25th May 2007. 6. In the said judgment, the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, rendered the following opinion : “21. Let us see whether any rashness or negligence which is the essential requirement for the conviction u/s 304-A IPC has been proved by the prosecution witnesses. There are only two witnesses in the record, who have seen the occurrence. They are PWs. 1 and 2 but PW1 has nowhere said that there was any rashness or negligence on the part of the accused though he has said in para 1 that rifle of one person is not be cleaned by other person. There are only two witnesses in the record, who have seen the occurrence. They are PWs. 1 and 2 but PW1 has nowhere said that there was any rashness or negligence on the part of the accused though he has said in para 1 that rifle of one person is not be cleaned by other person. The question has been objected by the defence but no such law has been produced by the prosecution. In fact, it was a Training Centre and the deceased was a Trainee and the accused was also a Trainee. Under such circumstances, the position of the accused will be just like having a learner license and in S.C Cr. Ruling Vol. VI, page no. 377, Suleman Rahman Mulani and another vs. State of Maharastra, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that there is no presumption in law that a person, who possesses only a learner’s licence and possesses no license at all, does not know driving and in the absence of evidence, conviction u/s 304-A IPC can not be maintained. In the present case, no statement regarding the rashness or negligence on the part of the accused has been attributed by PWs1 and 2. In fact in para 8 PW1 has said that he cannot say whether the deceased has pulled the full through rifle of the accused and bullet got fired as he was not present. Similarly, at para 7 PW2 has said that he is unable to say that how the bullet got fired as he arrived after the occurrence. 22. In view of the discussed facts and law, I find and hold that the accused can not be held guilty for the offence u/s 304-A IPC and therefore, he is found and held not guilt and he is further ordered to be acquitted from the charges levelled against him. He and his bailors stand discharged from the liabilities of their respective bail bonds.” 7. The orders passed by the Director General of Police which are issued by the Inspector-General of Police (Training) were put to challenge by filing WP(S) No. 6024 of 2015 which has been dismissed. 8. The writ Court in the order dated 19th July 2023 passed in W.P.(S) No. 6024 of 2015 held as under : “8. The orders passed by the Director General of Police which are issued by the Inspector-General of Police (Training) were put to challenge by filing WP(S) No. 6024 of 2015 which has been dismissed. 8. The writ Court in the order dated 19th July 2023 passed in W.P.(S) No. 6024 of 2015 held as under : “8. Having heard the parties across the bar and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition. Admittedly petitioner has been held guilty of the charges by the Enquiry Officer. Agreeing with the finding of the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority has inflicted punishment which has been later on enhanced by the Appellate Authority and petitioner has been dismissed from services. 9. The petitioner was a trainee and was in the probation period. Utmost disciplined is expected from the members of police force. Due to the indiscipline behavior and approach of the petitioner, his action led to death of a fellow colleague which itself is a serious matter. This Court is in full agreement with the findings of Inspector General of Police-cum-Director General of Police that dismissal has rightly been awarded for the act done by the petitioner. Merely because petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case that does not give any special attention or room for interference. The Enquiry Officer has conducted the enquiry following the procedure and no procedural lacuna has been pointed-out by the petitioner and as such, it cannot be said that the enquiry was conducted in violation of principle of natural justice. Disciplinary Authority agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer has inflicted punishment and the same was enhanced by the Appellate Authority and affirmed by the Revisional Authority, who is fully empowered to do so under Rule 853-A of the Police Manual. The petitioner belongs to a disciplined force and he is required to maintain utmost discipline. 10. In the case of State of Bihar v. Phulpari Kumari, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 130 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that interference with the order passed pursuant to departmental enquiry can only be in case of ‘no evidence’. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 has held as under: “12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 has held as under: “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 11. The claim of the petitioner that since he has been acquitted in the criminal case, he should be reinstated into service after quashing the order of dismissal. Merely acquittal by the Criminal Court does not automatically give the petitioner right to be reinstated into service. 12. The claim of the petitioner that since he has been acquitted in the criminal case, he should be reinstated into service after quashing the order of dismissal. Merely acquittal by the Criminal Court does not automatically give the petitioner right to be reinstated into service. 12. This Court in case of Ashok Kumar Nonia Vs. M/s. BCCL & Ors., reported in 2021 (4) JBCJ 588 has held that, “merely acquittal in criminal case cannot be a ground for reinstatement after dismissal”. 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Narinder Mohan Arya v., reported in (2004) 6 SCC 713, has held as under : “39. Under certain circumstances, a decision of a civil court is also binding upon the criminal court although, converse is not true. (See Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India.) However, it is also true that the standard of proof in a criminal case and civil case is different. 40. We may notice that in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., this Court observed: ‘35. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case.’ 41. We may not be understood to have laid down a law that in all such circumstances the decision of the civil court or the criminal court would be binding on the disciplinary authorities as this Court in a large number of decisions points out that the same would depend upon other factors as well. See e.g. Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh and Manager, Reserve Bank of India v. S. Mani. Each case is, therefore, required to be considered on its own facts.” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of D.I.G. of Police & Anr. Vs. S. Samuthiram, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 , has held as under : 24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. Vs. S. Samuthiram, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 , has held as under : 24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame”, “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the 8 prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so. 27. We have also come across cases where the service rules provide that on registration of a criminal case, an employee can be kept under suspension and on acquittal by the criminal court, he be reinstated. In such cases, the reinstatement is automatic. There may be cases where the service rules provide that in spite of domestic enquiry, if the criminal court acquits an employee honourably, he could be reinstated. In other words, the issue whether an employee has to be reinstated in service or not depends upon the question whether the service rules contain any such provision for reinstatement and not as a matter of right. Such provisions are absent in the Tamil Nadu Service Rules. 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Krishnakali Tea Estate Vs. Akhil Bhartiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh, reported in JT 2004 (7) SC 333, it has been held that : “This Court was concerned with the validity of the termination of the services of workmen after acquittal by the Criminal Court. Dealing with a situation similar to the one in this case, where the acquittal was due to lack of evidence before criminal court and sufficient evidence was available before the Labour Court, this Court was of the opinion that the judgment in Captain M. Paul Anthony’s case (supra) cannot come to the rescue of the workmen.” 15. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Rajasthan Vs. B.K. Meena, reported in JT (1996) 8 SC 684, it has been held that “Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising the power to conduct departmental proceedings in accordance with the rules and regulations. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. B.K. Meena, reported in JT (1996) 8 SC 684, it has been held that “Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising the power to conduct departmental proceedings in accordance with the rules and regulations. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the Respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings, the question is whether the offences registered against him under the PC Act are established, and if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of inquiry and the rules governing inquiry and trial in both the cases are significantly distinct and different.” 16. In the instant case petitioner was given ample opportunity to respond to the notice for enhancement of punishment but the petitioner choose not to reply meaning thereby accepting the order. 17. In view of the aforesaid facts and also in view of settled principle of law, this Court is in agreement with view expressed by Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority. 18. Resultantly, no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed.” 9. Mr. Rajesh Kumar, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the order passed by the Director General of Police and issued by the Inspector-General of Police (Training) vide order dated 17th November 2008 is without jurisdiction. It is submitted that the statutory provisions under the Jharkhand Police Manual do not vest a power in the Director General of Police to review the punishment order suo motu in a case like the present one and, notwithstanding the fact that the appellant did not respond to the notice dated 29th May 2008, the order dated 17th November 2008 passed by the Director General of Police must be held without jurisdiction and illegal. 10. Rules 851, 852 and 853-A of the Jharkhand Police Manual which are relevant for the present purposes read as under : 851. (a) No appeal shall lie except in cases of major punishments enumerated in rule 828. 10. Rules 851, 852 and 853-A of the Jharkhand Police Manual which are relevant for the present purposes read as under : 851. (a) No appeal shall lie except in cases of major punishments enumerated in rule 828. (b) Against an order of dismissal, removal, reduction, withholding of promotion or periodical increment, suspension with loss of pay, removal from any office of distinction or special emolument there shall be one appeal in each case as follows : — Against an order passed by a Superintendent, to the Deputy Inspector-General; Against an original order passed by the Deputy Inspector-General to the Inspector-General; Against an original order passed by the Inspector-General to the State Government. (c) The orders of appellate authority shall be final subject to provisions of rule 853. (d) An order passed with the concurrence of any superior authority (other than the State Government) shall be considered to be an original order of such superior authority. 852. Procedure in appeals.—(a) Petitions of appeal or for revision of an order shall be presented to the officer against whose orders the appeal is preferred, within six months after the date on which the officer preferring the appeal was informed of the orders against which he appeals : Provided that the appellate authority may, at his discretion, for good cause shown, extend the period to 12 months. (b) Every petition of appeal or for revision of an order shall be accompanied by certified copies of the charges, the defence and the order otherwise it will at once be rejected. Court fee stamps are not to be affixed to such petitions and appeals. (c) It will be the duty of the officer against whose order appeal is filed and in whose office, the appeal petition is disposed of, that all the papers are forwarded at once to the superior officer but in those cases in which appeal does not lie these papers shall not be forwarded and the reasons shall be immediately intimated to the officer filing appeal. (d) The officer before whom an appeal is filed, shall keep a separate register concerning appeals in his office. It shall be kept in P. M. Form No. 115A. The disposal of appeal should be done within one month from the receipt of the file in the office and the information about the order should be given to the officer filing appeal. It shall be kept in P. M. Form No. 115A. The disposal of appeal should be done within one month from the receipt of the file in the office and the information about the order should be given to the officer filing appeal. (e) In the appeal register (which is necessary only for the offices of Deputy Inspector-General/Inspector-General), apart from the appeal received for orders, those appeals which have been received only for forwarding shall not be entered. Those representations which are received for orders, may be entered. These registers should be scrutinized from time to time by heads of offices so that the knowledge of pending matters may be available. (f) At the time of filing appeal, the charged officer shall specially see that their are no irrelevant and impertinent facts in the representation and that no baseless allegation has been made against any departmental officer. If such allegations are made, a separate departmental proceeding should be taken up against the officer concerned. ……………………………………………………………………….. 853-A. (a) Inspector-General may call for the file in any case even when no appeal lies and pass such order as he may deem fit. The Deputy Inspector-General may call for any file but he should refer it to the Inspector-General with his recommendation for his order. The above action should be taken within a reasonable time from the date of final order in departmental proceeding. (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules the State Government may call for the proceedings in any disciplinary case even when no appeal or memorial lies, and pass such order as it may deem fit. (c) When an appeal has been filed and the Inspector-General on applying his mind thinks that he should enhance the punishment, he can dismiss the appeal but must simultaneously mention in that order that as per powers Given in the rule 853A (a), he has decided to review it for enhancement and take action for obtaining a show cause, etc. where necessary. 11. The Jharkhand Police Manual provides an appeal under Rule 851(a) in cases of major punishments as mentioned in Rule 828. where necessary. 11. The Jharkhand Police Manual provides an appeal under Rule 851(a) in cases of major punishments as mentioned in Rule 828. Under Rule 824, the punishments of (a) dismissal (b) removal (c) compulsory retirement (d) reduction in rank (e) forfeiture of last increment(s) or future increment(s) and (f) black mark or marks are the major punishment which according to Rule 828 may be inflicted by an officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. 12. The punishment order dated 15th May 2006 of withholding of one increment equivalent to two black marks passed by the Superintendent of Police was reviewed by the Director General of Police and enhanced in purported exercise of the powers under Rule 853-A. The appellant was issued a notice for enhancement of the punishment on 28th December 2006 and 15 days’ time was granted to him to respond to the proposed punishment of dismissal from service. Mr. Jai Prakash, the learned Additional Advocate General refers to Rule 852 which provides a period of six months for filing appeal or revision. It is submitted that the exercise of powers by the Director General of Police in issuing the notice on 29th May 2008 for enhancement of the punishment after expiration of the period of limitation is in consonance with the statutory provisions under Rule 853-A. However, we find that proviso to Rule 852 gives discretion to the appellate authority to extend the period of limitation by another six months for good cause shown by the delinquent police officer. This is a well settled law that no action under a statute can be taken on speculation and such orders shall be improper and illegal. The submission made on behalf of the State of Jharkhand that on expiry of six months’ period the Director General of Police rightly exercised the powers under Rule 853-A is premised on a speculation that the appellant could not have filed an appeal or the appellate authority could not have condoned the delay and extended the period of limitation by another six months, as provided under proviso to Rule 852. This evinces no doubt that a statutory appeal is generally not dismissed on the ground that it was not filed within the period of limitation and except in very exceptional kind of cases the appellate authority is under a duty in law to deal on merits every appeal preferred against the punishment order. 13. Under clause (b) of Rule 851, it is provided that there shall be an appeal in each case of an order of dismissal, removal, reduction, withholding of promotion or periodical increment, suspension with loss of pay, removal from any office of distinction or special emoluments in the manner provided thereunder. Clause (b) provides that the Deputy Inspector-General of Police shall be the appellate authority to deal with an appeal filed against the order passed by the Superintendent of Police. It further provides that the Inspector-General of Police shall hear an appeal against the original order passed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police. Clause (c) provides that the orders of the appellate authority shall be final subject to the provisions under Rule 853, which deals with Memorials and Revision. The Jharkhand Police Manual therefore provides a right of filing the statutory appeal to the delinquent police constable to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police against the punishment order dated 15th May 2006 passed by the Superintendent of Police – no appeal was filed by the appellant. The appellant has also a statutory right to file a revision petition against the order passed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police had he preferred an appeal and was dismissed by the appellate authority. 14. The obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authority has been evolved to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice. This is also a well settled law that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all, and other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden [refer: Nazir Ahmad v. King-Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 (2)]. In “Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Abhilash Lal” (2020) 13 SCC 234 the Hon’ble Supreme Court while reaffirming “Nazir Ahmad” held that when a statute vests certain powers in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner the said authority has to exercise it only in the said manner and not otherwise. In “Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Abhilash Lal” (2020) 13 SCC 234 the Hon’ble Supreme Court while reaffirming “Nazir Ahmad” held that when a statute vests certain powers in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner the said authority has to exercise it only in the said manner and not otherwise. Rule 853-A provides that the Inspector-General may call for the records in any case even where no appeal lies and pass such order as he may deem fit. Under clause (c), the Inspector-General while dealing with any statutory appeal under Rule 853-A when forms an opinion that he should enhance the punishment after dismissing the appeal, he can do so but must simultaneously he shall mention in that order regarding exercise of powers under Rule 853-A(a). Therefore, the powers under clause (a) of Rule 853-A can only be exercised under two situations, namely, (i) when no appeal is provided to an order of punishment and (ii) while dealing with an appeal against the order of punishment the Inspector-General forms an opinion that the order of punishment should be enhanced. None of the aforementioned situations arise in the present case and while so, the exercise of powers by the Director General of Police was patently illegal. This is a matter of record that the order dated 17th November 2008 issued under the signature of the Inspector-General of Police (Training) was passed by the Director General of Police against which an appeal shall lie to the State Government but the order dated 17th November 2008 has been reviewed by the Director General of Police himself. A glance at the order dated 23rd November 2009 passed by the Director General of Police would indicate that the representation/memorial submitted by the appellant has been dismissed on merits. In the said order, the Director General of Police has also taken note of the judgment of acquittal of the appellant under section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code but came to a conclusion that there was no merits in the representation submitted by the appellant. 15. Sometimes a real difficulty arises in applying the principles guiding the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari but this was never in doubt that the power of interference under Article 226 can be exercised wherever it is found that the inferior tribunal acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. 15. Sometimes a real difficulty arises in applying the principles guiding the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari but this was never in doubt that the power of interference under Article 226 can be exercised wherever it is found that the inferior tribunal acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. In “Nagendra Nath Bora and Another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and Others” AIR 1958 SC 398 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that one of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the High Court on certiorari may be invoked is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. 16. In “Regina v. Liverpool Justices. (Ex parte W.) (1959) 1 WLR 149 the Court interfered with an order of adoption passed by the Liverpool Justices sitting as a Juvenile Court. The Queen’s Bench Division held that under section 2(2) of the Adoption Act, 1950 the Justices should make the order only in special circumstances and as an exceptional measure. In the absence of any indication in the order that the Liverpool Justice had considered the provisions of that sub-section, the order passed by the Juvenile Court was set aside. 17. Lord Parker C.J. held thus : “For those reasons, it seems to me that the justices exceeded their jurisdiction and an order of certiorari must go. I should add that, of course, nothing that I have said should be taken as going in any way to the merits of the case. It may well be that on a further application and hearing the justices would be abundantly justified in saying that Leigh should adopt the child. On the other hand, they may come to a different conclusion. Nothing I have said should be taken to prejudge the issue in any way.” 18. The power to reverse the order of punishment by the authority other than an appellate authority by a mere show cause notice to the delinquent government employee is not envisaged under the Jharkhand Police Manual. The power to enhance the punishment is vested in the appellate authority when seized with the appeal preferred by the delinquent employee or in cases where no appeal is provided. The Director General of Police is not the appellate authority who could have entertain the appeal had the delinquent employee preferred the one. The power to enhance the punishment is vested in the appellate authority when seized with the appeal preferred by the delinquent employee or in cases where no appeal is provided. The Director General of Police is not the appellate authority who could have entertain the appeal had the delinquent employee preferred the one. The error of jurisdiction committed by the Director General of Police is not a mere formal or technical error. The Director General of Police exercised a power which is legally not vested in him. 19. It is well settled that the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts is not confined only to see whether an inferior Court or Tribunal has proceeded within its parameters such jurisdiction shall also extend to correct an error apparent on the face of the record. In “Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai” (2003) 6 SCC 675 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder: (1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction — by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction — by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 20. Having regard to the illegal exercise of powers by the Director General of Police, we hold that the orders dated 17th November 2008 and 23rd November 2009 passed by the Director General of Police are without jurisdiction. 21. For the foregoing reasons, the order dated 19th July 2023 passed in W.P.(S) No. 6024 of 2015 is set-aside and the punishment order dated 17th November 2008 is quashed. In the result, the punishment order dated 15th May 2006 passed by the Superintendent of Police is restored. 22. LPA No. 566 of 2023 is allowed to the aforesaid extent and, consequently, the appellant shall be entitled for the consequential relief as prayed for in the writ petition.