JUDGMENT : 1. Heard the parties. 2. This writ petition has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with the following prayers:- (a) issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing and/or setting aside the award dated 25.10.2016 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad, in Complaint Case No.12 of 2015 by which, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1 set aside the punishment imposed on the complainants/respondents illegally. (b) and other reliefs incidental or consequential to the said relief. 3. The brief facts of the case is that the respondents were awarded punishment by two separate punishment orders, the copies of which have been kept at page nos. 65-70 and 71-72 of the brief. The respondent no.1 was imposed with the penalty of withholding of two increments for one year without cumulative effect and the respondent no.2 was imposed with the penalty of total recovery of Rs.50,000/- from the pay in ten installments. In the punishment order itself, it has been mentioned that an appeal lies to the General Manager (R), Food Corporation of India, Regional Office at Patna and such appeal can be filed within 45 days from the date of receipt of the punishment order. A reference in respect of the respondents and others vide Reference No. 138 of 1997 was made by the appropriate government. The respondents who are the applicants of complaint case no. 12 of 2015 filed a petition under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 claiming that Reference No. 138 of 1997 was still pending before the Tribunal on 24.08.2015 when the said application under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 bearing complaint case no. 12 of 2015 was filed before the Tribunal for adjudication. Undisputedly, as is evident from annexure-8, the Award in respect of the said Reference No. 138 of 1997 was passed on 24.03.2015 by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad; hence no reference was pending before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal as on 24.08.2015. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad, failed to consider this fact that as on filing of the complaint no. 12 of 2015 on 24.08.2015, the reference no. 138 of 1997 was not pending before the Tribunal and by overlooking the said fact, held that the complaint filed under Section 33A of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 vide complaint case no. 12 of 2015 on 24.08.2015, the reference no. 138 of 1997 was not pending before the Tribunal and by overlooking the said fact, held that the complaint filed under Section 33A of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 vide complaint case no. 12 of 2015 is maintainable. The tribunal also overruled the objection of this writ petitioner who was the opposite party before it; to the effect that as there was an alternative remedy of filing the appeal, the application under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not maintainable and passed the said award. 4. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the tribunal committed perversity by holding that the complaint case no. 12 of 2015 filed invoking the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33A of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 was maintainable because of the pendency of the reference case no. 138 of 1997 is a perverse one and is a manifest error apparent on the face of the record as is evident from the annexure-8, which categorically establishes that reference case no. 138 of 1997 was disposed of on 24.03.2015 much prior to the filing of the application of complaint case no. 12 of 2015 on 24.08.2015. Hence, it is submitted that as the Industrial Tribunal was not having the jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 33A of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 in the absence of any proceeding before it; apart from the said complaint, at the time of filing complaint case no. 12 of 2015, therefore, the impugned award is a perverse one passed with a wrong notion of having jurisdiction to entertain such an application. It is lastly submitted that the prayer as made by the petitioner be allowed. 5. 12 of 2015, therefore, the impugned award is a perverse one passed with a wrong notion of having jurisdiction to entertain such an application. It is lastly submitted that the prayer as made by the petitioner be allowed. 5. The learned counsel for the respondents submits that so far as the punishment order of the respondent no.1 is concerned, withholding of two increments for one year is a wrong punishment order because as in one year, two increments can never becomes due to an employee, such a punishment order could not be implemented and the same amounts to non-application of mind and subsequent correction of the said order by the appellate court of the disciplinary authority was without jurisdiction because this petitioner was never in appeal before the appellate authority and straightway went to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal and such punishment order, which was passed without application of mind; thus the same has rightly been set right by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad. It is therefore submitted that as the impugned award dated 25.06.2016 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad, in Complaint Case No. 12 of 2015 is not suffering from any illegality, therefore this writ petition being without any merit be dismissed. 6. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that since the respondents have not availed the statutory remedy of appeal, in case, this Court is inclined to issue writ of certiorari quashing the impugned award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, then the respondents be given the liberty to avail the remedy of the statutory appeal and according to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the delay can be condoned by the appellate authority as the respondents were bonafidely agitating their dispute before the wrong forum prescribed in law. 7. 7. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after going through the materials in the record, it is pertinent to refer to Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which reads as under:- 33-A. Special provision for adjudication as to whether conditions of service, etc., changed during pendency of proceedings.—Where an employer contravenes the provisions of Section 33 during the pendency of proceedings before a conciliation officer, Board, an arbitrator, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, any employee aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed manner,— (a) to such conciliation officer or Board, and the conciliation officer or Board shall take such complaint into account in mediating in, and promoting the settlement of, such industrial dispute; and (b) to such arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint, the arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit his or its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly. On plain reading, makes it abundantly clear that inter-alia a labour court or tribunal can exercise the power under Section 33A of the said Act, if the employer contravenes the provision of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 during the pendency of the proceeding before inter-alia such labour court or tribunal; upon any employee aggrieved by such contravention making a complaint in writing to such Labour Court or Tribunal. Thus it is crystal clear that the sine-qua-non for entertaining the application under Section 33A of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 is the pendency of the proceeding before the labour court or tribunal or conciliation officer, board, an arbitrator or national tribunal by the concerned conciliation officer, board, arbitrator, tribunal or national tribunal. Perusal of annexure-8 - the veracity of which has not been disputed by the respondent, makes it abundantly clear that the reference no. 138 of 1997 was answered by passing an award on 24.03.2015. So, undisputedly on 24.08.2015 - when the complaint case no. Perusal of annexure-8 - the veracity of which has not been disputed by the respondent, makes it abundantly clear that the reference no. 138 of 1997 was answered by passing an award on 24.03.2015. So, undisputedly on 24.08.2015 - when the complaint case no. 12 of 2015 was filed before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, no other proceeding relating to the petitioners were pending before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal and certainly by way of a manifest error in the record, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal in para-12 has observed that reference no. 138 of 1997 was pending before it on the date of filing of the complaint case no. 12 of 2015 i.e. on 24.08.2015. 8. It is a settled principle of law that Section 33A was introduced in the Industrial Disputes Act for providing for speedy determination of disputes and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings by giving complete relief to the workmen in relation to their grievances arising out of the action taken by the employer in contravention of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of The Automobile products of India ltd and others vs. Rukmaji Bala and others, reported in AIR 1955 SC 258 . It is also a settled principle of law as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of English Electric Co. of India v. V. Manohara Rao and others, reported in (2001) 9 SCC 739 , that Section 33A makes out clear that it is only during the pendency of any proceeding in respect of any industrial dispute provisions of Section 33A would be attracted and not otherwise and in that case where no industrial dispute but only a claim petition under Section 33C(ii) was pending, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that labour court erred in entertaining the complaint under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 9. In view of this settled principle of law and in view of the undisputed fact that no industrial dispute was pending before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal on 24.08.2015 or for that matter anywhere else; when the complaint case no. 9. In view of this settled principle of law and in view of the undisputed fact that no industrial dispute was pending before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal on 24.08.2015 or for that matter anywhere else; when the complaint case no. 12 of 2015 was filed before it, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal committed a perversity by entertaining the application under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 because of the manifest error apparent on the face of the record under some wrong notion that reference no. 138 of 1997 was pending before it on 24.08.2015. 10. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that this is a fit case where a writ of certiorari be issued for quashing and setting aside the award dated 25.10.2016 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad, in Complaint Case No. 12 of 2015 by which, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1 set aside the punishment imposed on the complainants/respondents illegally but since this Court is holding that the tribunal was not having the jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 33A of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 as no industrial dispute was pending before it involving the petitioner on the date of filing of the complaint case no. 12 of 2015. Hence, the respondents may approach the appellate authority subject to the limitation to be decided by the appellate authority. 11. Hence, issue a writ of certiorari for quashing and setting aside the award dated 25.10.2016 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad, in Complaint Case No. 12 of 2015 by which, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1 set aside the punishment imposed on the complainants/respondents illegally. 12. Order accordingly. 13. The writ petition is allowed.