JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of instant petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, challenge has been laid to award dated 6.5.2019 passed by learned Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Kangra at Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh in Ref. No. 87/2015,, whereby claim petition preferred by the petitioner came to be dismissed with costs of Rs.3,000/-. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings are that appropriate Government, having taken note of demand notice raised by the petitioner, made following reference to learned Tribunal below: “Whether termination of the services of Shri Ramesh Kumar S/O Shri Brij Lal, R/O Village Bag, P.O. Rakol, Sub Tehsil Nihari, District Mandi, H.P. by the Divisional Forest Officer, Suner Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. during February, 2013 and changing his service conditions during his length of service as alleged by the worker, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation, the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?” 3. After receipt of the aforesaid reference a corrigendum was issued by the appropriate Government vide Notification dated 21.5.2018, to the following effect: “Whereas a reference has been made to the Ld. Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. vide notification of even no. dated 11.02.2015 for legal adjudication. However, inadvertently the correct facts could not be mentioned about the date of time to time termination of the said notification. Therefore, the same may be read as “July, 2004 to February, 2013”, instead of “February, 2013”. 4. Petitioner filed claim petition before the learned Tribunal below claiming that he was engaged as daily wage Beldar by the respondent in the year 2000 in Forest Range Jhungi and he worked till 2013. Petitioner further claimed that though work was available with the respondent, yet his services were terminated for no fault on his part in February, 2013. Petitioner claimed that at the time of termination of his service, respondent violated the principle of ‘first come last go’ because juniors of the petitioner were retained. He claimed that though at the time of his termination work and funds were available but yet he was not permitted to work and services of junior persons were ordered to be regularized. Petitioner claimed that at the time of termination of his service, respondent violated the principle of ‘first come last go’ because juniors of the petitioner were retained. He claimed that though at the time of his termination work and funds were available but yet he was not permitted to work and services of junior persons were ordered to be regularized. He claimed that respondents acted in violation of S.9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act by employing him on order/bill basis. He further claimed that his service conditions were changed by the respondent unilaterally. He further claimed that S.13-A of the Payment of Wages Act was violated as the record had not been maintained. 5. While refuting claim of the petitioner, respondent though admitted that petitioner was engaged in Forest Range, Jhungi in July, 2004 and had worked intermittently till April, 2015 but claimed that services of the petitioner were never terminated, rather he left the job of his own will. Respondent denied that juniors of the petitioner were retained. Respondents also denied that the services of the petitioner were engaged in the year 2000, rather the respondent set up a claim that casual labourers were being engaged as per requirement of work and funds and some fresh persons were required to be engaged due to heavy requirement and to finish the plantation and other related works during the rainy/winter seasons, when old daily wagers were not enough. Respondent stated that the petitioner was still working with the respondent intermittently and that the principle of ‘last come, first go’ was not violated by the respondent, rather the petitioner of his own volition, failed to join the work and as such, Department was compelled to engage new persons. 6. On the basis of pleadings of respective parties, learned Tribunal below framed following issues: “1. Whether termination of the services of the petitioner during Feb., 2013 and changing his service conditions during his length of service by the respondent is illegal and unjustified as alleged? OPP 2. If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? OPP 3. Whether the claim petition/reference is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? OPR 4. Whether the claim petition become infructuous as alleged. If so, its effect? OPR Relief:” 7. OPP 2. If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? OPP 3. Whether the claim petition/reference is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? OPR 4. Whether the claim petition become infructuous as alleged. If so, its effect? OPR Relief:” 7. Subsequently, on the basis of evidence led on record by respective parties, learned Tribunal below dismissed claim petition of he petitioner with costs. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set aside the award. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record, this court finds no illegality and infirmity in the award passed by learned Tribunal below as same appears to have been based on proper appreciation of facts and law. Though the petitioner claimed that he worked with the respondent till 2013 and thereafter his services were terminated by the respondent wrongly and illegally but the man days chart Exhibit. RW-1/B produced by respondent reveals that the petitioner had been working with the respondent till March, 2014. In March, 2014, petitioner worked for 08 days and after that worked for 23 days and 11 days in October and November, 2014 respectively. Man days chart further reveals that petitioner worked in February and March, 2015 with the respondent. Since the petitioner worked for a few months in 2014 and 2015, plea set up by him that he was terminated wrongly in February, 2013, falls to ground. 9. Perusal of statement of PW-1 clearly reveals that even after 2013, the petitioner has been working with respondent He admitted that he was never disengaged in 2014. Since he admitted factum with regard to his having worked with the respondent in the year 2014, very plea that his services were terminated in February, 2013 in violation of various provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, falls to the ground. Services of petitioner were never terminated in 2013 as alleged, rather he abandoned job himself and thereafter again joined services intermittently as per requirement. Since he himself abandoned the job, there was no occasion for the respondent to comply with the provisions of 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act. 10. Services of petitioner were never terminated in 2013 as alleged, rather he abandoned job himself and thereafter again joined services intermittently as per requirement. Since he himself abandoned the job, there was no occasion for the respondent to comply with the provisions of 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act. 10. Though petitioner claimed that the respondent violated S. 9 of the Act, as his service conditions were changed unilaterally but such plea never came to be proved in accordance with law by leading cogent and convincing evidence. 11. Hence, this Court, after carefully examining the Award passed by the Tribunal below, sees no reason to interfere in the findings recorded by the Tribunal, which are otherwise based on correct appreciation of evidence led on record by the parties, as such, impugned award deserves to be upheld. It is well settled law that the Courts while examining correctness and genuineness of award passed by Tribunal have very limited powers to re-appreciate the evidence led before the Tribunal below, especially the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal below. Apart from above, findings of fact recorded by learned Tribunal below on the basis of appreciation of evidence cannot be questioned in writ proceedings and writ court cannot act as an appellate court. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. M/s Hindalco Industries Ltd. 2014 AIR SCW 3157. It is profitable to reproduce paras 16, 17 and 18 of the judgment herein: “16. ………The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is no entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened for questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. 17. The judgments mentioned above can be read with the judgment of this Court in Harjinder Singh’s case (supra), the relevant paragraph of which reads as under: 21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: 10…. The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State. 18. A careful reading of the judgments reveals that the High Court can interfere with an order of the Tribunal only on the procedural level and in cases, where the decision of the lower Courts has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. The High Court shall interfere with factual aspect placed before the Labour Courts only when it is convinced that the Labour Court has made patent mistakes in admitting evidence illegally or have made grave errors in law in coming to the conclusion on facts. The High Court granting contrary relief under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution amounts to exceeding its jurisdiction conferred upon it. The High Court granting contrary relief under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution amounts to exceeding its jurisdiction conferred upon it. Therefore, we accordingly answer the point No. 1 in favour of the appellant.” [Emphasis added] 12. In view of above, this Court finds no illegality in the award passed by learned Tribunal below, which is upheld. However, the impugned award to the extent of imposition of costs of Rs.3,000/- is set aside. It is also made clear that the petitioner shall be at liberty to make himself available for seasonal work with the respondent. 13. In the light of aforesaid observations, the Award passed by learned Tribunal calls for no interference by this Court, which is accordingly upheld. The writ petition is dismissed. All pending miscellaneous applications also stand disposed of.