JUDGMENT DR.K.MANMADHA RAO, J. - The Appellant herein is the 3rd opposite party before the Commissioner for Workmen Compensation Act and Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Kakinada (in short 'learned tribunal') filed the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal before this Court. Aggrieved by the order dtd. 3/6/2010 in W.C.No. 2 of 2008, which was filed seeking compensation of Rs.4, 00, 000.00 for the injuries sustained by the 1st respondent/ applicant in an accident that occurred on 24/11/2007. The learned Tribunal after hearing both sides, awarded compensation of Rs.2, 33, 872.00. Assailing the same, the present C.M.A came to be filed. 2. Heard Mr.Naresh Byrapaneni, learned counsel for the appellant/ 3rd opposite party and Mr.Josyula Bhaskara Rao, learned counsel for the 1st respondent/ applicant. The C.M.A is dismissed against the respondents 2 and 3, vide this court order dtd. 9/3/2015. 3. During hearing learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the learned tribunal ought to have considered that the appellant/ insurer is not liable to pay any compensation due to the reason that the risk of the applicant is not covered under Ex.B1 policy. It is further contended that the learned tribunal ought to have considered that the applicant was claiming as cleaner on the vehicle involved in the accident and no premium was paid to cover the risk of the cleaner under Ex.B1 policy. As such, the appellant is not liable to be paid any compensation. It is also further contended that as per policy the name of the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident was 'Ch.Dasu'. But one 'Janaki Bhaskar' was impleaded as 2nd respondent showing him as owner of the vehicle involved in the accident. As and when insured was not impleaded and liability was not fixed on the insured, indemnifying the liability of the insured by the insurer/ appellant does not arise. Therefore the C.M.A is liable to be allowed. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the court below has rightly considered the facts and circumstances and rightly awarded compensation in accordance with law. It is further contended that during the course of employment, the accident was occurred and the applicant has sustained grievous injuries and his right hand was amputated up to elbow. Therefore, the C.M.A is liable to be dismissed. 5. Perused the record. 6. It is further contended that during the course of employment, the accident was occurred and the applicant has sustained grievous injuries and his right hand was amputated up to elbow. Therefore, the C.M.A is liable to be dismissed. 5. Perused the record. 6. During hearing learned counsel for the appellant placed on record the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in "Ramashray Singh v. New India Assurance Co., Ltd., and Others", (2003) 10 SCC 664 . wherein it was held as follows: "6. Chapter XI of the Act covers the subject "Insurance of Motor Vehicles Against Third-Party Risks" under Sec. 146(1) of which no person shall use a motor vehicle in public unless there is a valid policy of insurance which complies with the requirements of the Chapter. The mandatory requirements of such insurance policy have been provided in Sec. 147. 7. The relevant extract of Sec. 147 is reproduced with emphasis on the words on which the appellant's case rests: "147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.-(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which (a) * * * (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-sec. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.-(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which (a) * * * (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-sec. (2)- (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place: Provided that a policy shall not be required- (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee - (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability." (emphasis supplied) 8. Over and above the risks which are covered by this statutory provision, parties may of course enter into a contract by which the insurer agrees to cover additional risks. It is not the appellant's case that apart from the policy of insurance there was any contract between the appellant and the Insurance Company. The policy has a clause which defines the limits of liability in respect of death or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the a use of the motor vehicle under Sec. II(1) of the terms and conditions of the policy. The policy has a clause which defines the limits of liability in respect of death or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the a use of the motor vehicle under Sec. II(1) of the terms and conditions of the policy. In proviso (b) to Sec. II(1), it has been expressly stated that "Except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Company shall not be liable in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person in the employment of the insured arising out of and in the course of such employment." 7. Learned counsel for the respondents placed on record the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in "North East Karnata Road Transport Corporation v. Sujatha", (2019) 11 SCC 514 . wherein it was held as follows: "21. As early as in 1975, a four-Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata, (1976) 1 SCC 289 : 1976 SCC ( L&S) 52: AIR 1976 SC 222 . speaking through Singhal, J has held that an employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workman in the accident which arose out of and in the course of employment. It was accordingly held that it is the date of the accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim, which is material" So also, he relied on another decision of the Apex Court in "New India Assurance Co., Ltd., v. Shanti Bopanna and Others", AIR 2017 SC 2857 . wherein it was held as follows: "8. We thus find that the claim of the widow and the adopted son is fully covered by the clause in the insurance contract, i.e the policy and there is no scope for acceding to the submission made on behalf of the appellant- company that the claim is excepted by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 147(1) of the Act in this case. We, therefore, reject the contention made on behalf of the appellant that the deceased was not a third party because he was an employee sitting in the case. It is obvious from the circumstances that the deceased was indeed a third party being neither the insurer nor the insured." In "National Insurance Company Limited v. Velpula Rajeswari and 5 others", 2022 LawSuit(TS) 1385. It is obvious from the circumstances that the deceased was indeed a third party being neither the insurer nor the insured." In "National Insurance Company Limited v. Velpula Rajeswari and 5 others", 2022 LawSuit(TS) 1385. wherein the High Court for the State of Telangana held as follows: "6. Learned counsel for the appellant would also argue that except the insurer and the insured all the other persons come under the category of third party, for which he relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED V/s SHANTI BOPANNA 2017 AIR (SC) 2857. He would also advocate that statutory third-party insurance policy covers liability in respect of death or bodily injury during the course of employment and it covers the employees engaged in driving the vehicle. If it is a public service vehicle, other than the driver, the person engaged as a conductor is also covered. If it is a goods carriage, there is no exclusion in respect of any class of employees. All employees in respect of whom liability arises under Act of 1923 would be covered. The policy would also cover contractual liability." 8. It is undisputed fact that the applicant suffered with injury during the course of his employment. But as per terms of insurance policy it covers third party risk only but it was not cover the risk of the cleaner. Further the insured owner of the lorry Mr. Ch. Dasu, S/o Neelamaram, but not Janaki Bhaskar, S/o Sankara Rao and further the said policy was transferred in the name of 2nd opposite party. Therefore it is the contention of the appellant that in view of above stated reasons, the policy is not applicable to the applicant and that the appellant is not liable to pay compensation. It is further contended that if any claim made by the applicant, the owner of the lorry is held responsible for the act and is liable to pay compensation to the applicant. Therefore the opposite parties 1 and 2 i.e respondents 2 and 3 herein are held liable to pay whatever the compensation awarded to the applicant/ 1st respondent. 9. Upon perusal of the decisions relied by the learned counsel for the respondents, it is made clear that the insurance policy covers liability in respect of bodily injury during the course of employment. 9. Upon perusal of the decisions relied by the learned counsel for the respondents, it is made clear that the insurance policy covers liability in respect of bodily injury during the course of employment. Therefore no technicalities can be finding when there is settled law and that the claim cannot be denied. In view of the aforementioned circumstances, there is some force in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents. The decision relied upon by the appellant is not applicable to the facts of this instant case. 10. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and considering the submissions of learned counsel, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall also stand closed.