JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Shireesh Kumar the counsel for the petitioner, Mohd. Zafar Khan and Sri Gaush Beg, the counsel for the respondents. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 13.04.2023 whereby the services of the petitioner as Principal, Army Public School, Nehru Road, Lucknow have been terminated. The contention is that the order of termination is in defiance of the Army Welfare Education Society Rules and is also in violative of the terms and conditions of the appointment order dated 24.03.2022. The said order is also challenged as being arbitrary and in violation of the principles of natural justice. 3. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the school in question is being run by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act in the name of Army Welfare Education Society, which according to the petitioner, is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner had applied in terms of the advertisement issued by the respondents and finding her to be qualified, was issued an appointment order on 24.03.2022 appointing the petitioner on probation for a period of two years from the date of joining which could be extended at the discretion of the Chairman, Board of Administration, Central Command. The said appointment order provides that the period after probation can be extended, however in absence of any such communication, the services shall be deemed to be terminated. The appointment order in paragraph 18 provided as under : "18. You will redress grievances, if any, through Chairman, SAMC. The decision of the Appointing Authority shall be final and binding on you. It may be noted that Army Public School Nehru Road, Lucknow comes under the category of 'Unaided Private School' and it is not a 'Government Institute'." 4. In pursuance of the said appointment letter, the petitioner joined and started to discharge her duties. The petitioner, after joining the services, raise an issue with regard to pay protection, which the petitioner was getting as a Principal, posted at Binnaguri, Jalpaiguri, West Bengal, prior to the petitioner joining the present services. 5. In pursuance of the said appointment letter, the petitioner joined and started to discharge her duties. The petitioner, after joining the services, raise an issue with regard to pay protection, which the petitioner was getting as a Principal, posted at Binnaguri, Jalpaiguri, West Bengal, prior to the petitioner joining the present services. 5. It is argued that the respondents were not happy with the said claim of the petitioner, as such, an order came to be passed dismissing her services, although the same was passed after issuance of a show cause notice alleging certain infractions against the petitioner. 6. In sum and substance, the counsel for the petitioner argues that the order impugned terminating the services of the petitioner is contrary to the agreement and is in violation of the principles of natural justice, as such, liable to be quashed and the petitioner should be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. 7. A pointed query was raised by the counsel for the petitioner with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition against the school run by a Society as well as for enforcement of the contract of service, the counsel for the petitioner raised substantial arguments in support of his claim that the respondents are a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and further in any case, the respondents are discharging public functions and in any case it comes within the phrase 'other authority' as they are discharging the public function of imparting education and thus, are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 8. The counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, argues that the writ petition is not maintainable against the society, as is being argued by the petitioner, and it is not a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. He further argues that in any case, petition for enforcement of a contract of service is not maintainable. He argues that in terms of the manual, the petitioner has made a representation in which the prayer is similar to the one made in the writ petition. He, thus, argues that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 9. He further argues that in any case, petition for enforcement of a contract of service is not maintainable. He argues that in terms of the manual, the petitioner has made a representation in which the prayer is similar to the one made in the writ petition. He, thus, argues that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 9. In terms of the submissions made by the counsel for the respondents with regard to the representation filed by the petitioner, the petitioner has filed a supplementary affidavit stating that although the petitioner had filed a representation, he has proceeded to withdraw the same and exercising his power to election, the petitioner chooses to elect the remedy of writ petition and thus, this court should hear and decide the matter on merits. The supplementary affidavit is taken on record. 10. This court after hearing the parties at some length had framed a preliminary issue with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition for the cause of action and for the reliefs claimed in the writ petition. 11. In support of the submissions, the counsel for the petitioner argues that the society in question is run by a society established by the Army Welfare Society. He argues that the management of the said society comprises of serving officer of the Army, the land for school building, construction of school building and other allied matters are managed by the finance provided by the Army and thus, the governmental authorities are in control of the school in question and thus, it is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. He further argues that in any event, the school is imparting education, which is a public function and thus, it falls within the phrase 'other authority' as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. He places reliance on the following judgments : i. R.D. Shetty vs. IAAI [ 1979 (3) SCC 489 ] ii. Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Shohravardi [ 1981 (1) SCC 722 ] iii. Vijay Bihari Srivastava vs. U.P. Postal Primary Cooperative Bank [ 2003 (1) UPLBEC 1 ] iv. Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. Vs. Mysore Paper Mills Officers Association [ 2002 (2) SCC 167 ] v. Unnikrishnan J.P. vs. State of Andra Pradesh [1993 91) SCC 645] vi. State of U.P. vs. Radhey Shyam Rai [ 2009 (5) SCC 577 ] 12. Vijay Bihari Srivastava vs. U.P. Postal Primary Cooperative Bank [ 2003 (1) UPLBEC 1 ] iv. Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. Vs. Mysore Paper Mills Officers Association [ 2002 (2) SCC 167 ] v. Unnikrishnan J.P. vs. State of Andra Pradesh [1993 91) SCC 645] vi. State of U.P. vs. Radhey Shyam Rai [ 2009 (5) SCC 577 ] 12. He further argues that if the argument of the counsel for the respondents is to be accepted, the petitioner would have no alternative judicial forum to agitate her grievances, as such, in any case the writ petition is maintainable. In support of the said submission, he places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Mukta Jee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani & Ors [ 1989 (2) SCC 691 ]. He also places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Janet Jeyapaul vs. SRM University and others [ (2015) 16 SCC 530 ] wherein the Supreme Court had held the University in question, governed by the UGC Act, as an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. He lastly argues that as the order impugned has been passed contrary to the principles of natural justice, which is well settled, renders the entire order passed as a violation of Article 14 and thus, to that extent, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 13. The counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, argues that the Army Public School is not a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, as has been decided by this court in the case of Manoj Kumar Rawat vs. Union of India and others [2020 (1) ALJ (NOC) 33 (All) (Lucknow Bench)]. He argues that the issue with regard to violation of a contract was also considered and decided by this Court in the said judgment, which is binding on this court and thus, the petition is liable to be dismissed. He also placed reliance on the earlier judgment of this Court in the case of Army School Kunraghat vs. Smt. Shilpi Paul [(2004) ALJ 4077] wherein this court had held that the Army School is not a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. He also placed reliance on the earlier judgment of this Court in the case of Army School Kunraghat vs. Smt. Shilpi Paul [(2004) ALJ 4077] wherein this court had held that the Army School is not a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. He further argues that the Supreme Court in the case of St. Mary's Education Society and another vs. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava and others [ (2023) 4 SCC 498 ] had extensively considered the arguments similar to the one raised by the petitioner herein and the Supreme Court has summed up as under : 75.1. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public. 75.2. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element. 75.3. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element. 75.3. It must be consequently held that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a constitutional court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may perform myriad functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal sphere. While such of those functions as would fall within the domain of a “public function” or “public duty” be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service. 75.4. Even if it be perceived that imparting education by private unaided school is a public duty within the expanded expression of the term, an employee of a non-teaching staff engaged by the school for the purpose of its administration or internal management is only an agency created by it. It is immaterial whether “A” or “B” is employed by school to discharge that duty. In any case, the terms of employment of contract between a school and non-teaching staff cannot and should not be construed to be an inseparable part of the obligation to impart education. This is particularly in respect to the disciplinary proceedings that may be initiated against a particular employee. It is only where the removal of an employee of non-teaching staff is regulated by some statutory provisions, its violation by the employer in contravention of law may be interfered with by the Court. This is particularly in respect to the disciplinary proceedings that may be initiated against a particular employee. It is only where the removal of an employee of non-teaching staff is regulated by some statutory provisions, its violation by the employer in contravention of law may be interfered with by the Court. But such interference will be on the ground of breach of law and not on the basis of interference in discharge of public duty. 75.5. From the pleadings in the original writ petition, it is apparent that no element of any public law is agitated or otherwise made out. In other words, the action challenged has no public element and writ of mandamus cannot be issued as the action was essentially of a private character." 14. He also places reliance on the judgments in the following cases : i. Ms. Geeta Pushp vs. Union of India [2018 (2) SCC ALJ 292]. ii. Ashok Kumar Upadhyaya vs. Union of India [2004 SCC Online All 1044] iii. V. K. Walia vs. The Chairman Army School [2004 ALJ 530] iv. Union of India and others vs. Dileep Kumar Pandey [(2010) SCC Online All 1247] v. Shivli Dhillon vs Managing Director, Army Welfare Education Society (AWES) and others [2015 SCC online Del.10655] vi. Ravi Khokhar and others vs. Union of India and others [(2023) SCC online Del 540] vii. Union of India and another vs. Chote Lal and others [ (1999) 1 SCC 554 ]. viii. Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and others [ (2002) 5 SCC 111 ] ix. K. K. Saxena vs. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage and others [ (2015) 4 SCC 670 ]. 15. In the light of the said judgments, the counsel for the respondents argues that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 16. In sum and substance, the counsel for the petitioner emphasises that as the society which runs the school in question is under control and guidance of the Army Officer, it could be amenable to writ jurisdiction as they are public functionaries. In any case, the schools are discharging a public function of imparting education, which is essentially a 'State' function and thus, it would fall within the phrase 'other authority' used in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 17. In any case, the schools are discharging a public function of imparting education, which is essentially a 'State' function and thus, it would fall within the phrase 'other authority' used in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 17. To analyse the judgments referred, this Court need not labour much as the issue raised in the present writ petition are squarely covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of St. Mary's Education Society and another vs. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava and others (supra) wherein in paragraph 75, the Supreme Court has concluded and held that the functions of an educational institution touch various facets of public life and if such functions fall within the domain of a public function or public duty, undisputedly they are open to challenge under scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, however, the actions or decisions taken within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force of backing, cannot be recognized as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in absence of any service condition being controlled or governed by any statutory provisions, the same would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service. The same was further explained in paragraph 75.4 to explain that only in the cases where the contract is regulated by any statutory provisions and it is demonstrated that there is violation of said statutory provisions, can at best constitute a ground for breach of law and not on the basis of interference in discharge of public duty. 18. In the present case, the challenge is to a contract of service, the services of the petitioner are not controlled or regulated under Article 311 or by any statute, thus, no writ would lie for challenging an action based upon a contract of service having no statutory force. Thus, following the said judgment, which in turn, has considered most of the judgments as raised before this Court, I have no hesitation in holding that the writ petition for enforcement of a contract of service is not maintainable and thus, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 19. The writ petition is dismissed. Thus, following the said judgment, which in turn, has considered most of the judgments as raised before this Court, I have no hesitation in holding that the writ petition for enforcement of a contract of service is not maintainable and thus, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 19. The writ petition is dismissed. However, although the petitioner has withdraw her application / representation made challenging the dismissal order, the petitioner would be at liberty to file a fresh representation, if so advised in accordance with law and she is also at liberty to take such remedies as may be available under law including the remedy for damages by filing appropriate proceedings.