JUDGMENT : Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for direction upon the respondents to quash the order dated 08.06.2019, passed by the Commandant No. 106 Bn. RAF, CRPF, Jamshedpur as well as order dated 03.10.2019, passed by Deputy Inspector General of Police, CRPF (RAF), Dehradun, Uttarkhand. Further, the petitioner prays for quashing the order dated NIL of month January, 2020, passed by the Inspector General of Police, Rapid Action Force, CRPF (RAF), New Delhi. Petitioner has also prayed that after quashment of the aforesaid orders, a direction be given to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into services with all consequential benefits. 2. The case of the petitioner lies in a narrow compass. While the petitioner was working as Constable under the CRPF, show-cause notice was issued to him for the offence that he has solemnized 2nd marriage with one Reshma Devi during the lifetime of his 1st wife namely, Usha Devi. The petitioner submitted his reply stating therein that he was unaware of the provisions of Rule-11(1) of the CRPF and when he entered into an agreement of divorce from his 1st wife on 05.01.2016 he thought that now he is free to contract 2nd marriage and hence, he solemnized the marriage with his 2nd wife namely Reshma Devi. However, being not satisfied with grounds raised by the petitioner in his show-cause reply, the respondents have initiated departmental proceeding against the petitioner by appointing Enquiry Officer. In the departmental proceeding both oral as well as documentary evidences were produced and the petitioner was given opportunity to present his case and cross-examine the respondent’s witness which he has availed accordingly. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority by exercising the power of Section 11(1) of the C.R.P.F. Act, 1949 read with Rule-27 of the C.R.P.F. Rules, 1955 passed the order of punishment removing the petitioner from the services on the ground that petitioner has concealed the material fact that he has solemnized 2nd marriage during the lifetime of his 1st wife which is not permissible under the Hindu Marriage Act and amounts to gross misconduct. Being dissatisfied with the order of punishment, the petitioner preferred appeal but the same stood dismissed and the order of punishment has been affirmed. Being dissatisfied with the order of punishment, the petitioner preferred appeal but the same stood dismissed and the order of punishment has been affirmed. It is the further case of the petitioner that he has obtained decree of divorce by mutual consent under Section 13(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act against his 1st wife vide judgment dated 29.11.2018, passed in Matrimonial (Divorce) Suit No. 51 of 2018, which fact has not been considered by the respondents while removing the petitioner from service. Aggrieved by the said action of the respondents, the petitioner has been constrained to knock the door of this Court. 3. Mr. Amit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner assails the impugned orders on the ground that the respondents have not considered the material facts that petitioner has already obtained consent from his 1st wife by way of an agreement and thereafter, solemnized 2nd marriage and as such, he has not committed any offence as envisaged under CRPF Act and CRPF Rules. Learned counsel further argues that petitioner has rendered more than 14 years of unblemished service career and only on the basis of complaint lodged by her 1st wife that the petitioner has solemnized 2nd marriage, the respondents have inflicted major punishment of removal from service. Learned counsel submits that the appellate authority has also not considered the grounds raised by the petitioner in appeal and mechanically dismissed the same by affirming the order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority. Learned counsel accordingly submits that for the aforesaid facts and reasons, the impugned orders are fit to be quashed and set aside and petitioner be directed to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. 4. Per Contra, the Respondent have filed Counter Affidavit. Mr. Madan Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposes the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the Departmental Enquiry was conducted as per law and there is no folly in the same. The petitioner was given fair and unbiased hearing with sufficient opportunity to cross examine the respondents witness and as such, there is no violation of principles of natural justice. The Enquiry Officer found the charges levelled against the petitioner fully proved, then the Disciplinary Authority issued the order of removal. There is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders. The petitioner was given fair and unbiased hearing with sufficient opportunity to cross examine the respondents witness and as such, there is no violation of principles of natural justice. The Enquiry Officer found the charges levelled against the petitioner fully proved, then the Disciplinary Authority issued the order of removal. There is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders. The order of Disciplinary Authority was affirmed up to Appellate Authority and as such, the writ petition is fit to be dismissed outrightly. Learned counsel further argues that the petitioner has concealed the material facts that he has solemnized 2nd marriage during the lifetime of his 1st wife which is not permissible under the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act. 5. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties, this Court is of the considered view that admittedly petitioner has solemnized 2nd marriage which is not in dispute. The issue involved in the writ petition to be decided are : (I) Whether petitioner having solemnized 2nd marriage in complete violation of Rule 21 of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 warrants the order of removal from service? (II) Whether concealing the fact of 2nd marriage attracts major punishment of removal from service? (III) Whether on solemnizing 2nd marriage prior to decree of divorce even on an agreement with 1st wife, the removal from service is the only punishment? 6. From the documents brought on record it transpires that petitioner solemnized 2nd marriage. Solemnization of 2nd marriage was prior to decree of divorce but at the same time it cannot be rooted out that there was an agreement of divorce between 1st wife and the petitioner herein. 7. Now, the question as to whether effect of contracting plural marriage invite higher punishment of dismissal from service. Effect of contracting plural marriage may undoubtedly be violative of the statutory provisions pertaining to conduct of the person concerned, it may have no connection with the acts of disobedience, neglect of duty or remissness in discharge of any duty and/or other misconduct in his capacity as a member of the disciplined force. 8. As far as contracting a second marriage during service is concerned, that is governed by Rule 21 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 which are applicable to the BSF also and this rule reads as follows:- “21. 8. As far as contracting a second marriage during service is concerned, that is governed by Rule 21 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 which are applicable to the BSF also and this rule reads as follows:- “21. Restrictions regarding marriages- (1) No Government servant shall enter into, or contract, a marriage with a person having a spouse living; and (2) No Government servant, having a spouse living, shall enter into, or contract, a marriage with any person: Provided that the Central Government may permit a Government servant to enter into, or contract, any such marriage as is referred to in Clause (1) or Clause (2), if it is satisfied that- (a) such marriage is permissible under the personal law applicable to such Government servant and the other party to the marriage; and (b) there are other grounds for so doing. (3) A Government servant who has married or marries a person other than of India Nationality shall forthwith intimate the fact to the Government.” Sub-rule (2) of Rule 21 clearly provides that no Government servant, having a spouse living, shall enter into, or contract, a marriage with any person. The proviso to this rule like the proviso to Rule 7 of the BSF Rules also empowers the Central Government to permit a Government servant to enter into, or contract a second marriage, if it is satisfied that such marriage is permissible under the personal law and there are grounds for entering into the second marriage.” So far as the instant case is concerned, relatively minor punishment may serve the ends of justice, because it would be in the ends of justice to reinstate the petitioner and to give him a chance. After all, the question of livelihood is involved. In the circumstances, relatively minor punishment may serve the ends of justice. Another fact, which cannot be lost sight of, is the human problem, whether a person should be meted out with such a severe punishment for not obtaining the prior permission for 2nd marriage, will have to be determined by this Court, taking into account the consequences that will be visited on both the 1st wife as well as 2nd wife and children. As far as the misconduct is concerned, this is an open and shut case. As far as the misconduct is concerned, this is an open and shut case. However, the folly committed by the petitioner, was that he did not disclose the factum of 2nd marriage to the authorities, therefore, it can be safely said that the punishment of removal from service will leave both the wives and the child shattered and in a state of penury and destitution. 9. Similar issue fell for consideration before this Court in case of Manoj Kumar Mandal Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2014 SCC Online Jhar. 18. 10. This Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution normally does not interfere in the punishment order which has been proved by the Authorities. Normally, this Court should not re-appreciate the evidences which has already been appreciated in the departmental proceeding and a finding has been derived but if the findings are perverse and the punishment order socks the judicial conscience, he Court has every power to interfere in the same. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force v. Rajendra Kumar Dubey, reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 954; at paragraphs-33 and 34 has held thus:- “33. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, a three judge bench of this Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is not the function of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may, however interfere where the departmental authority which has held the proceedings against the delinquent officer are inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, where the findings are based on no evidence, which may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry, or the authorities were actuated by some extraneous considerations and failed to reach a fair decision, or allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations, or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. If however the enquiry is properly held, the departmental authority is the sole judge of facts, and if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a writ petition.” “34. These principles were further reiterated in the State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The court exercises the power not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal on the appreciation of evidence, are not re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ court, but not an error of fact, however grave it may be. A writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the finding of fact, the tribunal has erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence. A finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the material evidence adduced before the tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a pint, and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal. Further in case of Union of India & Ors. vs. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly observed that, “High Court in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 cannot venture into appreciation of evidence or interfere with conclusions in enquiry proceedings if the same are conducted in accordance with law, or go into reliability/ adequacy of evidence, or interfere if there is some legal evidence on findings are based, or correct error of fact however grave it may be, or go into proportionality of punishment unless it shocks conscience of court”. In case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down certain ingredients to be looked into by the High Courts for interfering in the departmental proceeding, which reads as under : “12. In case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down certain ingredients to be looked into by the High Courts for interfering in the departmental proceeding, which reads as under : “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.” 12. In the instant case, the 1st wife and the petitioner were separated long back and an Agreement was entered into for seeking divorce though divorce was decreed after solemnization of 2nd marriage. For that reason, the removal order dated 03.10.2019 is disproportionate to the charges. The Disciplinary Authority as well as Appellate Authority lost sight of that decree of divorce was issued and the same could have been taken into consideration before passing impugned order. Respondents did not show any consideration that decree of divorce has come into existence and there was a judicial separation. The Disciplinary Authority as well as Appellate Authority lost sight of that decree of divorce was issued and the same could have been taken into consideration before passing impugned order. Respondents did not show any consideration that decree of divorce has come into existence and there was a judicial separation. As the punishment of removal from service will leave both the wives and the child shattered and in a state of penury and destitution, the order of dismissal socks judicial conscience and as such, comfortably it can be inferred that it is disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner. 13. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines and legal propositions, the impugned orders dated 08.06.2019 (Annexure-4) and dated January, 2020 (Annexure-8) are hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted back to the respondents to reconsider the same afresh and pass any other punishment other than dismissal/ removal or compulsory retirement. 14. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition stands disposed of.