JUDGMENT : S.N. Pathak, J. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. Since common impugned order dated 9.5.2016 is under challenge in all these writ petitions, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment. Prayers 3. The petitioners have challenged the decision dated 9.5.2016, circulated by Memo No. 2306 dated 16.5.2016 (Annexure-17). Further prayer has been made to allow the petitioners to continue in service as they have worked for almost 25 years. It is also prayed that in view of observations by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Uma Devi, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 , the respondents be directed to reinstate the petitioners in service. A formal prayer for appropriate relief in the facts of the case has also been prayed for. Factual matrix 4. The facts of all these writ petitions are same and similar, save and except the formal dates of joining of petitioners and numbers of writ petitions, which were filed in the light of order dated 27.1.2014 in W.P.(C) No. 700 of 2013. As such, the facts of only lead case are dealt with. 5. The facts pleaded in the lead case, being W.P.(S) No. 4561 of 2016 are that these petitioners were working as Daily Wagers and they were engaged in between 1982-86. The Government of Bihar, Department of Forest and Environment, issued a notification with respect to trading of kendu leaves and the same was notified on 14.3.1987. With a view to achieve such object, the General Manager, Minor Forest Produce Project, Hazaribag issued instructions to Divisional Managers to appoint daily wagers, like the petitioners for working under the said project on the post of Forest Produce Overseer. In the light of such direction, the date of written test and interview were notified. The petitioners were directed to appear before the selection committee by order dated 3.5.1987. The petitioners faced selection process and subsequently declared successful on 10.5.1987 and the document to this effect has been brought on record as Annexure-4, wherein, the names of these petitioners finds place. This led to issuance of appointment letters on 14.5.1987 and 27.4.1988. The petitioners thereafter joined in between 8.6.1987 to 1.5.1988. The petitioners continued to work as such and in the meantime, the State of Bihar was bifurcated on 15.11.2000. This led to issuance of appointment letters on 14.5.1987 and 27.4.1988. The petitioners thereafter joined in between 8.6.1987 to 1.5.1988. The petitioners continued to work as such and in the meantime, the State of Bihar was bifurcated on 15.11.2000. Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation Limited (JSFDC) came into existence on 23.3.2002 and the services of petitioners fell within the jurisdiction of JSFDC. The petitioners have contended that in a reply to the query under RTI Act, the details of sanctioned and vacant posts of Forest Produce Overseer were supplied, which is at Annexure-7 & 7/1 of the writ petition. However, by order dated 22.03.2003, the Managing Director, Bihar State Forest Development Corporation Limited directed to terminate the service of petitioners along with others on the ground that these appointments were made for three months only and hence, the petitioners could not be retained in service. The petitioners challenged the said decision in W.P.(S) No. 6625 of 2006, which was dismissed on 6.11.2012 on the ground that similar matter preferred by one Prabhu Nath Dubey was dismissed. The letters patent appeal, being L.P.A. No. 481 of 2012 preferred thereagainst was also dismissed on 5.12.2012. The Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 13772 of 2013 was also dismissed on 10.5.2013. 6. The petitioners have further pleaded that a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was preferred before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was registered as W.P.(C) No. 700 of 2013. This writ petition was disposed of by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 27.1.2014 with observations that the petitioners should raise all the factual and legal issues available to them before the High Court. However, in the meantime on 5.1.2012, a Committee was constituted. This led to issuance of letter dated 13.5.2013, whereby it was stated that since the petitioners have worked for more than 25 years, their cases shall be considered. Finally when the case of the petitioners were not considered in the light of observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in W.P.(C) No. 700 of 2013, the petitioners preferred a writ petition, being W.P.(S) No. 1449 of 2014, which was disposed of on 16.10.2015, whereby this Court directed the respondent-Corporation to consider the case of petitioners for regularization. It is specific case of the petitioners that all the relevant facts have been discussed by this Hon’ble Court in the order dated 16.10.2015. It is specific case of the petitioners that all the relevant facts have been discussed by this Hon’ble Court in the order dated 16.10.2015. As per direction of this Hon’ble Court in W.P.(S) No. 1449 of 2014, the respondents have considered the case of the petitioners, but the same was rejected on 9.5.2016. This decision dated 9.5.2016 was communicated vide letter dated 26.5.2016 under the RTI Act, which is impugned in these writ petitions. 7. Respondents 2 to 6 (Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation Limited) filed counter affidavit stating inter alia therein that the writ petition was devoid of any merit. It is contended that the petitioners moved this Court and ultimately lost upto the Hon’ble Apex Court. Of course, liberty was given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India to approach the High Court. This Court directed the respondents to consider the case of petitioners, but the same was rejected, which is valid and legal. The petitioners were engaged purely on temporary basis as stopgap arrangement or on ad hoc basis. Their services came to an end after expiry of three months. Though the petitioners continued for many years but that would not give or confer any legal right upon the petitioners to continue on the post. The petitioners were not a confirmed employee of Bihar State Forest Development Corporation Limited. After bifurcation, the petitioners continued until 23.03.2003 by virtue of the provisions enshrined in Section 65 of the Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000. Salary upto 23.3.2002 has also been paid. It is reiterated that the petitioners were appointed by letter nos. 264 and 265 dated 3.6.1982 and letter no. 51 dated 7.7.1987 for three months only for seasonal work. The claim of regularization of the petitioners has rightly been refused. Argument advanced by learned counsel for Petitioners. 8. Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, assisted by Ms. Neha Bhardwaj, Advocate argued that it is not in dispute that the petitioners worked for almost 25 years and hence, their services were required to be regularized. On the pointed query made by this Court as to whether the issue can be raised at this stage after the petitioners lost upto the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Mr. Neha Bhardwaj, Advocate argued that it is not in dispute that the petitioners worked for almost 25 years and hence, their services were required to be regularized. On the pointed query made by this Court as to whether the issue can be raised at this stage after the petitioners lost upto the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Mr. Tandon submits that the petitioners crossed such hurdle when the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India itself decided the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, being W.P.(C) No. 700 of 2013 decided on 27.1.2014. Learned counsel further submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court made specific observations that the petitioners are struggling for their continuation in service for last 25 years and therefore, the High Court was requested to decide the writ petition, if preferred within six months. It was further observed that both the parties were at liberty to raise factual and legal issues available for them before the High Court. It is further contended that after such direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the writ petition was preferred before this Court and the same was not only entertained, rather, it was directed to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioners, as is apparent from the order dated 16.10.2015 passed in W.P.(S) No. 2172 of 2014. Learned counsel submitted that this order attained finality, as the respondents did not challenge the same before the appellate Court. It is further contended that once the writ petition, being W.P.(S) No. 1449 of 2014 along with others was entertained and the respondents thereafter passed the appropriate orders as per the direction given by this Court, now this is not open for the respondents to contend that the writ petition is barred by the principle of res judicata. If the respondent-Corporation was aggrieved by the order passed in W.P.(S) No. 1449 of 2014, the respondents would have challenged such order. However, the respondents chose to pass the order by rejecting the claim of the petitioners for regularization. Learned counsel further argued that the order impugned, which is dated 9.5.2016, rejecting the claim of petitioners for regularization has been passed only on the ground that the petitioners were not working on sanctioned post. No other ground is mentioned in the impugned order. Therefore, the respondents cannot hurt to submit that the writ petitions are not maintainable in view of earlier round of litigation. 9. No other ground is mentioned in the impugned order. Therefore, the respondents cannot hurt to submit that the writ petitions are not maintainable in view of earlier round of litigation. 9. By referring to paragraph-18 of the writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that these petitioners were appointed on sanctioned and vacant post and from that time to time even increments were given to the petitioners that the petitioners were considered like permanent employee of the Corporation and even pay fixation was done as per the pay revision time to time. It is contended that paragraph-18 of the writ petition has been replied in paragraph-35 of the counter affidavit and these facts have not been denied by them. It is further argued on the basis of paragraph-25 of the writ petition that the petitioners were working against the sanctioned and vacant post, which is further evident from the fact that even a seniority list was prepared of the working employees where the names of these petitioners figured in the seniority list. Learned counsel further submitted that on query made by this Court by order dated 16.01.2017, the respondent-Corporation has come out with the supplementary counter affidavit dated 20.3.2017, wherein it has been mentioned that vide letter no. 5179 dated 16.11.1987, 172 posts of Forest Produce Overseers was sanctioned after taking over Kendu Leaf Project and prior to that, only 227 posts of Forest Guard, which is equivalent to Forest Produce Overseer was sanctioned by B.S.F.D.C. Ltd, Patna, as is evident from Annexure-F. Learned counsel submitted that seniority list is prepared only of those employees, who were appointed on sanctioned and vacant post and not otherwise. It is further contended that paragraph-25 has also been replied by the respondent Corporation in para-39 of the counter affidavit, but the same has not been denied. Learned counsel further submitted that on perusal of paragraph-39, it appears that the respondents have admitted that since the petitioners continued for quite long time, their names figured in the seniority list. Learned counsel also relied upon paragraphs-45 and 46 of the writ petition, whereby, there are specific pleadings with respect to 14 named persons, who were appointed in similar fashion as that of the writ petitions, but they have been allowed to continue. These two paragraphs have been answered in paragraph-52 of the counter affidavit. Learned counsel also relied upon paragraphs-45 and 46 of the writ petition, whereby, there are specific pleadings with respect to 14 named persons, who were appointed in similar fashion as that of the writ petitions, but they have been allowed to continue. These two paragraphs have been answered in paragraph-52 of the counter affidavit. Learned counsel submitted that these facts have not been denied by the respondents in the counter affidavit. On the basis of these materials on record, it is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned order which rejects the claim of petitioners for regularization on the ground that they have not been appointed against sanctioned post has no legs to stand and the same deserves to be dismissed with the direction to regularize the services of the petitioners. 10. Learned counsel further submits that pursuant to direction in the case of “Narendra Kumar Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand” reported in (2018) 8 SCC 238 , the State of Jharkhand has formulated the regularization policy on 13.02.2015. In the definition clause-2, it has been stated in clear terms that the irregular appointment means as has been said that it has been done by the competent authority but without the advertisement and the employee is having the educational qualification, open competition may not have taken place that is said to be regularized by the said regulation. For the regularization in the light of these rules, it has been stated in definition clause-3(ka)(v) in the said rules that there is no requirement of creating sanctioned post for regularization. Thus, the case of the petitioners in the light of these rules, is also fit to be considered for regularization. 11. In other connected matters, the respective learned counsel appearing for the petitioners adopted the same arguments, as argued by Mr. Tandon. Argument advances by learned counsel for Respondent-Corporation 12. Apart from the averments made in the counter affidavit, Dr. Ashok Kumar Singh, learned counsel representing the respondent-Corporation refuted the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners and submits that the matter of termination has travelled upto the Hon’ble Apex Court and they have lost. He further submitted that writ petition, letters patent appeal and special leave to appeal preferred by the petitioners were dismissed and hence, the present writ petitions are not maintainable. He further submitted that writ petition, letters patent appeal and special leave to appeal preferred by the petitioners were dismissed and hence, the present writ petitions are not maintainable. On merits, it is contended that the petitioners were not appointed on sanctioned post and hence, no relief can be granted to the petitioners in the matter of regularization. Specific argument was advanced by Mr. Rupesh Singh, learned counsel representing the respondent-Corporation in another connected matter that the present writ petitions are barred by the principle of res judicata. Another counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation, Mr. Prabhash Kumar also raised the similar plea contending inter-alia that since the petitioners have lostup to the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of termination, there is no question of regularization of the services of the petitioners. It is further contended by Dr. Ashok Kumar Singh that the petitioners were not appointed on sanctioned post and hence, regularization is not permissible. He further argued that appointment of the petitioners were only for three months and the same came to an end on expiry of three months and mere continuance for quite long years would not confer any right upon the petitioners to get their services regularized at this stage. It is, therefore, submitted that the writ petitions are meritless and hence, the same are fit to be dismissed. Findings of the Court 13. Having heard the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, this Court finds that the facts which are not in dispute are that against the order of termination, these petitioners have tried their best, but they have lost upto to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. But at the same time, it is also not in dispute that a writ petition, which was preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was decided on 27.1.2014, which is at Annexure-12 of the lead case. From perusal of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is very much clear that the petitioners were given liberty to approach the High Court. From perusal of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is very much clear that the petitioners were given liberty to approach the High Court. The order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reads thus:- “As the matter remained pending before this Court for quite some time and the petitioners’ claim that they are struggling for their continuation in the department of the respondent-authority for the last 25 years, if such a petition is filed before the High Court, we request the High Court to decide the petition as early as possible preferably within a period of six months. Both parties are at liberty to raise all factual and legal issues available to them before the High Court” (emphasis supplied) 14. From perusal of the order of Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is evident that after considering the position of the petitioners, the Hon’ble Supreme Court requested the High Court to decide the petition, if so filed, as early as possible preferably within six months. Not only this, the parties were also granted the liberty to raise the factual as well as legal issues available to them before this Court. When the writ petition was filed before this Court in W.P.(S) No. 2172 of 2014 and other analogous cases, this Court entertained such writ petitions in the light of the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which is evident from the order dated 16.10.2015. This Court was conscious of the facts that the matter has earlier travelled upto the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of termination. In fact, the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India has also been quoted in para-2 of the order. Considering the nature of dispute and after narrating the factual aspects of the matter, this Court concluded in para-9, which reads as follows:- “9. Counsel for the respondent State and the Corporation are not able to dispel the course proposed for consideration of individual cases of petitioners and similarly situated persons for regularization in terms of 2015 Rules framed by the State Government. Whether individual petitioners fulfill the stipulated conditions laid down therein on merits after due application of mind and consideration, is another question on which this Court is not inclined to make any comments. Whether individual petitioners fulfill the stipulated conditions laid down therein on merits after due application of mind and consideration, is another question on which this Court is not inclined to make any comments. However, the fact remains that the services of the petitioners and similarly situated persons have been taken whether on daily wage or temporary basis continuously in the individual cases for more than two decades; whether their engagement would entitle them a claim for regularization, is something which is required to be considered by the duly constituted committee in accordance with law. 10. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, it would be appropriate that the petitioners may be given a window of hope in view of specific observations made by the Apex Court in WPC No.700/2013 to stake their claim for regularization before the respondent Corporation by filing individual detailed representation duly supported with all necessary facts and documents. Needless to say, due consideration should be accorded to such a claim in accordance with law and the Rules of 2015 by the respondent Corporation within a reasonable time, preferably within a period of six months.” 15. Following the aforesaid directions of this Court, the respondents have passed the order on 9.5.2016 communicated by letter dated 16.5.2016 rejecting the claim of the petitioners on the ground that they have not been appointed on sanctioned post, which is under challenge in the present writ petitions. 16. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case coupled with the facts that the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed this Court to decide the issue and this Court directed the respondents to consider the cases of the petitioners and in fact, the respondents have considered their cases and passed the impugned order, the present writ petitions cannot be dismissed on the ground of principle of res judicata. As is well-nigh settled that principle of res judicata applies only in case where the issue has finally been decided between the parties. The question of regularization was never under question in the earlier round of litigations. Since the Hon’ble Apex Court had directed and the same was followed by this Court and then the respondents have passed the fresh order with respect to regularization, which gives a new cause of action for the petitioners to challenge the same before this Hon’ble Court. The question of regularization was never under question in the earlier round of litigations. Since the Hon’ble Apex Court had directed and the same was followed by this Court and then the respondents have passed the fresh order with respect to regularization, which gives a new cause of action for the petitioners to challenge the same before this Hon’ble Court. It has been rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in fact, the principle of estoppel applies against the respondent-Corporation. From perusal of both the orders i.e. the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India as well as the order passed by this Court in W.P.(S) No. 2172 of 2014, it appears that the respondent-Corporation were parties in those writ petitions. Instead of challenging the order passed by this Court in W.P.(S) No. 2172 of 2014, the respondent-Corporation passed the order impugned, which was not subject matter of writ petition at earlier point of time. Therefore, the respondents cannot be permitted to contend at this stage that the present writ petitions are barred by the principle of res judicata. 17. From perusal of the order dated 9.5.2016, which is impugned in all these writ petitions, it appears that the cases of the petitioners were rejected on the sole ground that their appointments were made not on sanctioned post and as such, their cases do not fall within the ambit of clause 2(2) of the Regularization Policy dated 13.2.2015 within the category of irregular appointed employees. The constituted Committee on the aforesaid ground rejected the claim of the petitioners. 18. The contentions of learned counsel for the respondents that the services of the petitioners were terminated and they have lost upto the Hon’ble Apex Court and the present writ petitions are filed for regularisation have now become irrelevant because the same was duly considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court and thereafter by this Court in W.P.(S) No. 2172 of 2014 and other analogous writ petitions. 19. Now coming to the merit of the case, the following issues are now left over for deciding the instant matters:- (i) Whether after working continuously for more than 25 years, the issue regarding sanction of posts and their appointments can be raised at this juncture or their cases ought to have been considered for regularization? 19. Now coming to the merit of the case, the following issues are now left over for deciding the instant matters:- (i) Whether after working continuously for more than 25 years, the issue regarding sanction of posts and their appointments can be raised at this juncture or their cases ought to have been considered for regularization? (ii) Whether allowing the petitioners to continue for more than 25 years gives a clear picture that the Department was in need of their services and therefore, they were considered and benefits of salary, pay fixation, increments etc. were given to them? (iii) Whether after 25 years of regular services and after getting all the in-service benefits, their appointments can be termed to be contractual appointment which comes to an end as they were appointed only for three months? (iv) Whether the case of the petitioners has been discriminated for regularization? (v) Whether the duly constituted Committee has decided the case of the petitioners as per the guidelines of the Regularization Policy dated 13.2.2015? (vi) Whether the said Regularization Policy was considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in (2018) 8 SCC 238 and thereafter a direction was issued to consider the cases of the employees in view of the guidelines and directions issued thereunder? (vii) Whether while rejecting the cases of the petitioners, the respondent-authorities have at all considered the observations and directions given in the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari (supra)? (viii) Whether while passing the order, the duly constituted Committee considered the catena of judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court giving a guidelines and directions for consideration of the cases for regularization? 20. Before delving deep into the matter, it would be apposite to mention here that this Court had occasion to deal with the similar view in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, in Narendra Kumar Tiwari & Ors. Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., decided on 22.12.2022, reported in 2023 (1) JBCJ 501. Re-Issue Nos. (i), (ii) & (iii) 21. The only ground on which the claim of regularization of these petitioners has been rejected is that the petitioners were not appointed on sanctioned post. From perusal of the impugned order, it appears that no reason has been supplied to state as to how the petitioners were not appointed on sanctioned post. Re-Issue Nos. (i), (ii) & (iii) 21. The only ground on which the claim of regularization of these petitioners has been rejected is that the petitioners were not appointed on sanctioned post. From perusal of the impugned order, it appears that no reason has been supplied to state as to how the petitioners were not appointed on sanctioned post. The reason, if any, is only mentioned in the counter affidavit. It is well settled that the respondents cannot be permitted to supply the reasons in the counter affidavit. The reason has to be mentioned in the order itself. Reference in this context may be made to the judgment in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 . Para-8 thereof reads as under:- "8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji: Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older." 22. Therefore, this Court holds that save and except the ground that the petitioners have not been appointed on sanctioned post, the respondents are not allowed to raise any other ground by supplying the reasons in the counter affidavit. 23. As against the contention of the respondents that these petitioners were not appointed on sanctioned post, it has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioners by placing reliance on the undisputed facts. 23. As against the contention of the respondents that these petitioners were not appointed on sanctioned post, it has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioners by placing reliance on the undisputed facts. The petitioners have pleaded in paragraph-18 that they were granted admissible increments also like permanent employees. It is further pleaded that pay fixation of the petitioners were also undertaken at the time of pay revision. It is well settled that increments and pay fixation are done only in respect of employees who are appointed on sanctioned and vacant posts and not otherwise. If any person is not appointed on sanctioned post, then there is no question of granting increments. Para-18 of W.P.(S) No. 4561 of 2016 has been replied by the respondents in paragraph-35 of the counter affidavit filed on 16.1.2017. It is the case of the respondents as pleaded in paragraph-35 that since the petitioners continued in service for long time, the salary of the petitioners were fixed as per admissible increments and other benefits during the service period. Therefore, the fact, that increments were granted and pay fixation was made in respect of the petitioner, has been admitted by the respondent-Corporation. The petitioners further pleaded in paragraph-25 of W.P.(S) No. 4561 of 2016 that even the seniority list of the employees were prepared in which the names of petitioners appeared at appropriate position. The said paragraph-25 has also been replied in paragraph-39 of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent-Corporation. The respondent-Corporation have not denied that in the seniority list, the names of the petitioners do not figured. On the contrary, it is stated in paragraph-39 that the petitioners continued in service for long time and their names were included in the seniority. Law is well settled that seniority list / gradation list are never prepared for those who are appointed purely on contractual basis. The very preparation of the seniority list and the position of the petitioners mentioned therein connote that the petitioners were appointed on sanctioned post. Since the respondents have admitted the fact that there is seniority list of the petitioners, this Court can comfortably be inferred that these petitioners were working on sanctioned posts. Even otherwise, the respondents have brought on record the letter no. Since the respondents have admitted the fact that there is seniority list of the petitioners, this Court can comfortably be inferred that these petitioners were working on sanctioned posts. Even otherwise, the respondents have brought on record the letter no. 5179 dated 16.11.1987 by way of supplementary counter affidavit dated 20.3.2017 that 172 posts of Forest Produce Overseers were sanctioned after taking over kendu leaf project and prior to that also, 227 posts of Forest Guard, which is equivalent to Forest Produce Overseer were sanctioned by the respondent Corporation. Admittedly, the petitioners were appointed on 14.5.1987 and 27.4.1988 on the post of Forest Produce Overseer. Therefore, the aforesaid issues are decided in favour of the petitioners. Re : Issue:-(iv) 24. It is further pleaded in paras-45 and 46 of the writ petition that there were many persons who were appointed in the same manner and fashion as that of these petitioners. It is further pleaded that the petitioners were similarly situated like Ganesh Tiwary, Nagendra Tiwary, Krishna Kumar Pandey and Bhuwan Narayan Pandey. It is further case of the petitioners that these persons were retained by the respondent-Corporation, but none of the petitioners have allowed to continue. Even these paragraphs have been answered by the respondent-Corporation in their counter affidavit in para-52. The respondents have not denied that the persons named in these two paragraphs are continued in service. What has been stated is that the case of Ganesh Tiwary and others stands on different footings. As to why the case of these petitioners different from that of those persons mentioned in these paragraphs has not been explained. Therefore, this Court holds that there is a clear cut case of discrimination as several persons who are similarly situated have been retained in service, but the case of the petitioners for regularization has been denied by the respondents arbitrarily. This issue also goes in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents. Re: Issue No. (v) 25. It is not in dispute that the State of Jharkhand has framed Regularization Policy, which was notified by Notification dated 13.2.2015. As per which, even a person who has worked for more than ten years, his case was required to be considered accordingly. Admittedly, these petitioners have worked for more than 25 years. Re: Issue No. (v) 25. It is not in dispute that the State of Jharkhand has framed Regularization Policy, which was notified by Notification dated 13.2.2015. As per which, even a person who has worked for more than ten years, his case was required to be considered accordingly. Admittedly, these petitioners have worked for more than 25 years. It is also not a case that the petitioners’ case has not been considered as there was any misconduct against the petitioners. Therefore, the cases of these petitioners require to be considered in the light of the provisions framed by the Government of Jharkhand by Notification dated 13.2.2015 as the petitioners were working on the sanctioned and vacant posts. This issue is decided in favour of the petitioners. Re: Issue Nos. (vi), (vii) & (viii) 26. The Hon’ble Apex Court was very much aware that the persons working continuously for more than ten years, claiming regularisation on the ground that their initial appointments were never challenged rather they continued to work for several years and many of them are at the verge of retirement and in some of the case they have crossed their age of retirement, which clearly speaks that they were allowed to continue on the said posts because the State was in need of their services. Once the State is in need of services and employees are allowed to continue on the said posts, plea is not with the respondents to come with a finding that their appointments were illegal. Time and again the Hon’ble Apex Court has said that if the appointments are irregular, they can be considered for regularisation. These appointments were never illegal rather by flux of time they ought to have been regularised as their appointments were irregular and not illegal. The respondents ought to have considered the observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in (2018) 8 SCC 238 , wherein it has been held thus:- “8. The respondents ought to have considered the observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in (2018) 8 SCC 238 , wherein it has been held thus:- “8. If a strict and literal interpretation, forgetting the spirit of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753], is to be taken into consideration then no irregularly appointed employee of the State of Jharkhand could ever be regularised since that State came into existence only on 15-11-2000 and the cut-off date was fixed as 10-4-2006. In other words, in this manner the pernicious practice of indefinitely continuing irregularly appointed employees would be perpetuated contrary to the intent of the Constitution Bench. 9. The High Court as well as the State of Jharkhand ought to have considered the entire issue in a contextual perspective and not only from the point of view of the interest of the State, financial or otherwise — the interest of the employees is also required to be kept in mind. What has eventually been achieved by the State of Jharkhand is to short circuit the process of regular appointments and instead make appointments on an irregular basis. This is hardly good governance. 10. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the Regularisation Rules must be given a pragmatic interpretation and the appellants, if they have completed 10 years of service on the date of promulgation of the Regularisation Rules, ought to be given the benefit of the service rendered by them. If they have completed 10 years of service they should be regularised unless there is some valid objection to their regularisation like misconduct, etc.” 27. Similar issue fell for consideration before this Court also in case of Pankaj Kumar & Anr. Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. in W.P.(S) No.6524/2017 and this Court vide order dated 18.01.2018 reiterated the same as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 28. In the case of Sheo Narain Nagar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2018) 13 SSC 432, this factum has clearly been decided. The objective of the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uma Devi (Supra) has not been followed rather used to defeat the very purpose of regularisation. 28. In the case of Sheo Narain Nagar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2018) 13 SSC 432, this factum has clearly been decided. The objective of the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uma Devi (Supra) has not been followed rather used to defeat the very purpose of regularisation. The contention of the petitioners have not been met with by the respondents and only a formal denial has been made which clearly envisaged that just to frustrate their claim, plea of Article 14 of the Constitution of India has been taken. Regarding sanction of posts and advertisement for appointment, the issue has already been answered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nihal Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Others (2013) 14 SCC 65. Para-20 of the said Judgment reads as under : “20. But we do not see any justification for the State to take a defence that after permitting the utilisation of the services of a large number of people like the appellants for decades to say that there are no sanctioned posts to absorb the appellants. Sanctioned posts do not fall from heaven. The State has to create them by a conscious choice on the basis of some rational assessment of the need.” 29. The Hon’ble Apex Court recently in the case of State of Gujarat and others Vs. R.J. Pathan and others reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 354 has observed in Para-19 which reads as under : “19. Even in the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari (supra) also, it was a case of irregularly appointed employees. Even otherwise, in view of the facts and circumstances of Narendra Kumar Tiwari (supra), the said decision shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The case before this Court was with respect to the employees working with the State of Jharkhand which was created only on 15.11.2000 and therefore it was contended on behalf of the irregularly appointed employees that no one could have completed ten years of service with the State of Jharkhand on the cut-off date of 10.04.2006, which was the cut-off date fixed under the relevant rules of the State of Jharkhand.” 30. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari (supra) was a case of irregular appointment and not illegal appointment. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari (supra) was a case of irregular appointment and not illegal appointment. Such observations are binding upon all concerned in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and it clearly gives a message that the State of Jharkhand has erred in holding contrary to the provisions. 31. In the case of Manish Gupta and another Vs. President, Jan Bhagidari Samiti and others reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 485, it has been observed in para-12 as under : “12. … … … It is settled principle of law that an ad hoc employee cannot be replaced by another ad-hoc employee and he can be replaced only by another candidate who is regularly appointed by following a regular procedure prescribed. Reliance in this respect can be placed on the Judgment of this Court in the case of Rattan Lal v. State of Haryana [ (1985) 4 SCC 43 ] and on the order of this Court in the case of Hargurpratap Singh v. State of Punjab [ (2007) 13 SCC 292 ].” 32. From aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as of this Court in different cases, it can comfortably be said that if petitioners are continuing to work for more than ten years without any objection and the respondents – State is in need of their work, they cannot be replaced by another set of employees solely on the ground that they were not appointed against sanctioned posts without any advertisement. 33. The aforesaid issues have been duly considered and accordingly answered in the case of Sheo Narain Nagar and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another reported in (2018) 13 SCC 432 . The Hon’ble Court was very conscious and aware of the fact that “the employment cannot be on exploitative terms, whereas Judgment passed in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Umadevi (3) reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 laid down that there should not be back door entry and every post should be filled by regular employment, but a new device has been adopted for making appointment on payment of paltry system on contract/ adhoc basis or otherwise. This kind of action is not permissible when we consider the pith and substance of true spirit in the case of Umadevi (Supra)”. This kind of action is not permissible when we consider the pith and substance of true spirit in the case of Umadevi (Supra)”. None of the instant cases are the case of backdoor entry. At that very point of time there were no rules in place of offering such appointments. Thus appointments cannot be said to be illegal and in contravention of the rules as there were no such rules available at the relevant point of time. 34. In plethora of Judgments, some of them have already been cited hereinabove, the law has been laid down and clear-cut observation has been made for consideration of cases of the petitioners in light of observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari (supra). With the aforesaid observations and directions, the aforesaid issues are decided against the respondents and in favour of the petitioners. Discussions 35. From the aforesaid judgments cited above and taking into consideration, it can comfortably be averred that none of the directions, guidelines and observations have at all been considered by the duly constituted Committee while passing the impugned order. Since the petitioners have been discharging their duties for last 25 years and the respondents were in need of their services and they were allowed to continue on the said post, it is not open for the respondents to return a finding that their appointments were not irregular, meaning thereby they were not legally appointed employees. These appointments were never termed to be illegal. They were appointed by duly constituted Committee. They continued for more than 25 years. The appointments were on a fixed salary. Later on, getting all the benefits like regular / permanent employees, they ought to have been considered for regularization. It is binding on the respondents to give the benefits of services rendered by them. The employees are not like animals as to take work from them till they are useful and thereafter when they become old of no use, they should be thrown out. Such type of tendency of the State-authorities cannot be appreciated; after all they were employees of the respondent-Government. Meaning thereby, the Department was in need of their services, they could not be thrown out taking into consideration the several guidelines as given in the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari (supra). Such type of tendency of the State-authorities cannot be appreciated; after all they were employees of the respondent-Government. Meaning thereby, the Department was in need of their services, they could not be thrown out taking into consideration the several guidelines as given in the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari (supra). The findings of the constituted Committee does not spell out that any of the guidelines have been taken into consideration, as discussed above. On this score itself, the impugned order dated 9.5.2016 is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Conclusions 36. In view of the aforesaid rules, regulations, guidelines and judicial pronouncements, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order dated 9.5.2016 is not tenable in the eyes of law and as such, it is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to consider the case of each individual petitioners and thereafter pass order for regularization of their services from the date they have been stopped from working, with all consequential benefits. Let it be made clear that as the matter remains pending for several years before the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as before this Court, if any of the employees has retired or died, he is also entitled for the benefits which are likely to be extended to other similarly situated persons with fixation of pensionery benefits and extending the retiral benefits, if they come within the purview and regularisation. 37. Resultantly, all the writ petitions stand allowed. Pending interlocutory applications stand closed.