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2023 DIGILAW 1489 (RAJ)

Bharat Lal Saini v. State of Rajasthan, Through Public Prosecutor

2023-08-04

BIRENDRA KUMAR

body2023
JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner has sought for quashment of FIR No. 288/2022 registered with Anti Corruption Bureau, Chowki, Tonk for offences under Sections 7 and 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act (in short P.C. Act) read with Section 120-B IPC. 2. The prosecution case is that respondent No.2 Hanish Mohammad lodged a complaint with Anti Corruption Bureau alleging therein that Khasra No. 765 area 2.04 Hectare is recorded in the name of mother of respondent No.2 situated in village Ratwai Patwar, Tehsil Todaraisingh District Tonk. Respondent No.2 was cleaning the land for developing as a residential colony by carving out different small plots to sale it to the willing person. On 15.7.2022, Dinesh Sainai, P.A. of the petitioner went there and asked not to proceed with the work unless they got permission of the petitioner who was Chairman of the Municipal Corporation, Todaraisingh at the relevant time. Thereafter, the complainant met the petitioner and the petitioner asked for Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rs. Five lacs) to not to interfere with the work of the informant. Since respondent No.2 was not willing to bribe the public servant, he lodged a complaint with the Anti Corruption Bureau and the Anti Corruption Bureau after verification of the allegation put a trap, wherein, co-accused Dinesh Saini was apprehended while accepting bribe of Rs. 1,50,000/- out of the agreed amount of Rs. 3,50,000/-. Accordingly, FIR was lodged alleging involvement of the petitioner as well. 3. Mr. Kapil Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that no matter of the complainant was pending before the petitioner nor there was any scope of coming before the petitioner the issue agitated in the FIR. This fact asserted in the petition has not been denied by the respondent including respondent No.2 in their counter-affidavit. Learned counsel next contends that to attract the offence under Section 7 of the P.C. Act, the demand etc. must be relatable to dishonest or improper performance or forbearance of public duty by the petitioner himself or with the assistance of any other public servant. Therefore, the most important ingredient of performance or non-performance of public duty is sine qua non to attract other allegations. If a public servant has cheated someone in some other manner having no connection with performance of his public duty, the offence under Section 7 of P.C. Act is not attracted. Therefore, the most important ingredient of performance or non-performance of public duty is sine qua non to attract other allegations. If a public servant has cheated someone in some other manner having no connection with performance of his public duty, the offence under Section 7 of P.C. Act is not attracted. The act of cheating cannot be said to have reasonable connection with the discharge of official duty. 4. Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Barala, learned counsel for the respondent contends that even if a public servant accepts bribe in any form through other person, that would attract the offence as in the present case. Even attempt to accept bribe is sufficient to constitute the offence if it is relatable to the official discharge of duty. On bare perusal of the allegations, it would make it clear that the allegations levelled against the petitioner was prima facie disclosing commission of a cognizable offence. 5. For better appreciation of facts, the provisions of Section 7 and 7A of the P.C. Act are being reproduced below: "7. Offence relating to public servant being bribed. Any public servant who,-- (a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any person, an undue advantage, with the intention to perform or cause performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause forbearance to perform such duty either by himself or by another public servant; or (b) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue advantage from any person as a reward for the improper or dishonest performance of a public duty or for forbearing to perform such duty either by himself or another public servant; or (c) performs or induces another public servant to perform improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear performance of such duty in anticipation of or in consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any person, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation 1.-- For the purpose of this section, the obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or has not been improper. Explanation 1.-- For the purpose of this section, the obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or has not been improper. Illustration.-- A public servant, 'S' asks a person, 'P' to give him an amount of five thousand rupees to process his routine ration card application on time. 'S' is guilty of an offence under this section. Explanation 2.-- For the purpose of this section,-- (i) the expressions "obtains" or "accepts" or "attempts to obtain" shall cover cases where a person being a public servant, obtains or "accepts" or attempts to obtain, any undue advantage for himself or for another person, by abusing his position as a public servant or by using his personal influence over another public servant; or by any other corrupt or illegal means; (ii ) it shall be immaterial whether such person being a public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the undue advantage directly or through a third party.' "7A. Taking undue advantage to influence public servant by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of personal influence. Whoever accepts or obtains or attempts to obtain from another person for himself or for any other person any undue advantage as a motive or reward to induce a public servant, by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of his personal influence to perform or to cause performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or to cause to forbear such public duty by such public servant or by another public servant, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.' 6. Thus, it is evident that to attract the mischief of Section 7 of the Act, the act of demand etc. must have connection with the discharge of public duty by the public servant. If the public servant has not been assigned with the public duty as claimed by the complainant, the offence under Section 7 of the Act would not be attracted. Likewise to attract the offence under Section 7A, there must be allegation of exercise of personal influence for performance/forbearance in improper and dishonest manner of public duty by some other public servant. Likewise to attract the offence under Section 7A, there must be allegation of exercise of personal influence for performance/forbearance in improper and dishonest manner of public duty by some other public servant. The expression 'public duty' implies that the public servant must be enjoined with the responsibility/duty to discharge in the matter alleged by the prosecutor. 7. It is evident from the record that above-referred plot is recorded in Zamabadni/Khewat/Khatoni as an agricultural land, vide Annexure-2. An inquiry was conducted by the Department after institution of the FIR just to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, and in that inquiry report, it is mentioned that the said plot is outside the municipal area. Respondent No.2 also made an assertion that the plot is outside the municipality area. It is further mentioned that no colony has been developed on the said land rather, farming was going on the said land, a report is available at Annexure-3. Section 90A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 provides that an agricultural land cannot be used for non-agricultural purposes unless permission of the State Government is obtained beforehand. The said provision details how the application along with requisite fee for the said conversion would be submitted and only the Collector of the District is competent to grant such permission on behalf of the State Government. Respondent No.2 has not produced any material on record nor the Investigating Officer has collected such evidence that respondent No.2 had already taken/obtained permission of the Collector for such conversion. Therefore, respondent No.2 was himself indulged in an illegal act of conversion of an agricultural land into a residential land without permission of the competent authority. Since the petitioner was in no way competent or authorised to grant such permission, it cannot be said that the act alleged against the petitioner is in the garb of discharge of his public duty. Moreover, admittedly the land was beyond the municipal area, hence, respondent No.2 was conscious of the fact that municipality had no role in the matter of such conversion which has statutorily been empowered to some other authority. It is not the prosecution case that the petitioner was demanding money for getting the work performed by any other public servant. Explanation 1 to Section 7 is explicit that acceptance of undue advantage would be sufficient to constitute an offence even if the public duty was performed properly. It is not the prosecution case that the petitioner was demanding money for getting the work performed by any other public servant. Explanation 1 to Section 7 is explicit that acceptance of undue advantage would be sufficient to constitute an offence even if the public duty was performed properly. However, when there is no public duty assigned to perform or not to perform, nor there was case of any pendency of any work of the complainant with the petitioner of the nature alleged in the FIR or otherwise, the criminal prosecution of the petitioner would amount to abuse of the process of law. Section 7A of the P.C. Act is attracted in quite different facts and circumstances of the case and not in the present case. There is no material that the petitioner did what is alleged to get favour of any other public servant to improperly or dishonestly discharge his public duty. 8. Thus, it is an evident fact that the petitioner was not a public servant enjoined with a public duty to perform anything in the matter as is asserted in the FIR. Therefore, unless the demand, etc. has some reasonable nexus to the dishonest and improper performance of the public duty by the public servant himself or by any other public servant, the offences under Section 7 or 7A of the P.C. Act are not made out. Once the substantive offence is not made out, the allegation of conspiracy to commit that offence does not stand, therefore, this Court holds that the ingredients of offence alleged in the FIR are not made out against the petitioner. As such, the criminal prosecution of the petitioner would be an abuse of the process of law. 9. Mr. Gupta has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajiv Thapar vs. Madan Lal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330 wherein earlier judgments were noticed and following guidelines were laid down for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.:- 'Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: (i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? (ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. (iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? (iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.' 10. From the factual narration above, it is evident that the material relied upon by the petitioner i.e. statutory provisions wherein the petitioner is not having any role to grant permission to develop a colony on agricultural land, some different authority is vested with such power coupled with other materials to substantiate that on the date of FIR, the land in question was an agricultural land having no permission to develop residential colonies and non denial of the aforesaid fact makes out claim of the petitioner reasonable and indubitable against the prosecution case. Similarly, the material relied upon by the petitioner rules out assumption of the prosecution that the petitioner was demanding something for undue performance of his official duty. As discussed above, the material relied upon by the petitioner has not been refuted by respondent No.2. Thus, there is complete lack of material that there was any nexus between the demand and undue performance of public duty by the petitioner. 11. Therefore, the entire criminal proceeding against the petitioner is vitiated in law. As discussed above, the material relied upon by the petitioner has not been refuted by respondent No.2. Thus, there is complete lack of material that there was any nexus between the demand and undue performance of public duty by the petitioner. 11. Therefore, the entire criminal proceeding against the petitioner is vitiated in law. Accordingly, the impugned FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising out of the said FIR stands hereby quashed qua the petitioner and this petition is allowed. 12. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.