ORDER : 1. The petitioner has filed present writ petition assailing the order dated 11.03.2020 by which services of the petitioner who is working as Assistant Teacher (LB) has been terminated on the count that the petitioner has secured appointment on the basis of forged marksheet of Higher Secondary School Certificate of the year 2004. 2. The facts projected in the writ petition in brief is as under: The petitioner was appointed as Siksha Karmi, Grade-III vide order dated 13.06.2006 passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat-Bilaigarh, District-Balodabazar (C.G.) thereafter, he was confirmed vide order dated 14.10.2009 and his services were regularised by the Chief Executive Janpad Panchayat and since then he is continued. The Government of Chhattisgarh has taken a policy decision on 30.06.2018 according to which, the Shiksha Karmi working in various school of the State of Chhattisgarh have been absorbed as Assistant Teacher (LB), Lecturer (LB) etc. Accordingly, the services of the petitioner was absorbed on 18.08.2018 thereafter vide memo dated 06.01.20202, respondent No. 02 issued memo to the petitioner asking him to submit explanation with regard to the complaint received against him that he has secured employment on the basis of forged marksheet of High Secondary School. 3. It is pertinent to mention here that in the said memo, the District Education Officer has mentioned about the information collected by him with regard to obtaining forged marksheet by the petitioner. In pursuance of the memo, the petitioner has submitted reply on 09.01.2020 (Annexure-P6) wherein he has denied the facts and also submitted that all original documents have already been submitted by him which can be verified. Thereafter, respondent No. 2 issued the impugned order dated 11.03.2020 (Annexure-P1) terminating the services of the petitioner. 4. He would submit that the impugned order has been passed in violation of the principle of the natural justice, no procedure prescribed under the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short “the Rules 1966”) has been followed as the imposition of penalty of termination of service, is a major penalty which can not be passed without complying the Rule 14 of the Civil Services. As the Rule 14 provides that no order imposing any of the penalty as specified in clause (v) to (ix) of Rule 10 shall be made except after any enquiry held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this rules and Rule 15 or in the manner provided by the Public Servant (Enquiries) Act, 1850, where such enquiry is held under that act. 5. On the other hand, learned Dy. Advocate General for the State/respondent would submit that the termination order dated 11.03.2020 is legal and justified as the petitioner has secured employment on the basis of forged marksheet, therefore, he can not be allowed to continue in the service and would submit that the termination order passed on 11.03.2020 is legal, justified and does not warrant any interference by this Court. He would further submit that the petitioner has alternate efficacious remedy to prefer an appeal against the termination order which the petitioner has not exhausted, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable and prayed for dismissing the writ petition. He would further submit that even if no enquiry is conducted then also no prejudice will cause to the petitioner as he has secured employment on the basis of forged marksheet. He would further submit that compliance of natural justice is merely a formality and no prejudice caused to the petitioner in absence of conducting departmental enquiry, therefore, the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is incorrect submission and deserve to be rejected. 6. In support of his submission, he has referred the judgments rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Mohd. Sartaj and Another vs. State of U.P. 2006 (2) SCC 315 wherein it has been held at paragraphs 20 and 21 as under: 20. In our opinion, on the above facts no prejudice has been caused to the appellants by not serving notice of giving hearing before the order of cancellation was issued. 21. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that State by various orders had given equivalence to the degree of Moallium-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh with that of Basic Teacher's Certificate, is not correct. In Government Order dated 28.1.85 the Governor was pleased to approve the candidates in State services who qualified Moallium-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh and who got experience of teaching Urdu at Higher Secondary Schools. In Government Order dated 28.1.85 the Governor was pleased to approve the candidates in State services who qualified Moallium-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh and who got experience of teaching Urdu at Higher Secondary Schools. This order did not provide for equivalence of Moallium-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh, to that of B.T.C. In another order dated 28.10.1988 issued by the Government, which was clarificatory in nature, to all heads of departments and Chief of Officials of U.P. Karmik Anubhag, directed that the candidates who have got degree of Moallium-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh and who had experience of teaching Urdu at Higher Secondary levels may be appointed in State services. This also does not indicate the equivalence of Moallium-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh to that of B.T.C. The aforesaid two orders only indicate that the persons who are having degree of Moallium-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh, can be appointed in the State services. The orders do not equate the degree of Moallium-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh to that of Basic Teacher's Certificate, Hindustani Teacher's Certificate, Junior Teacher's Certificate, Certificate of Teaching or any other training course, indicated in the Rule. As far as the training is concerned there is no equivalence of the Certificate of Moallium-e-Urdu. It is for the first time by Order dated 13.9.1994 the Government issued an order whereby the Governor granted a sanction that Moallium-e-Urdu degree for teaching Urdu in Junior/Senior basic schools is equivalent to B.T.C. It is settled law that the qualification should have been seen which the candidate possessed on the date of recruitment and not at a later stage unless rules to that regard permit it. The minimum qualification prescribed under Rule 8 should be fulfilled on the date of recruitment. Equivalence of degree of Moallium-e-Urdu, Jamia Urdu Aligarh with that of B.T.C. in the year 1994 would not entail the benefit to the appellants on the date they were appointed. The appellants could not have been appointed to the post of Assistant Teachers without having training required under Rule 8. That being the case, the appointments of the appellants were de hors the Rules and could not be treated to be continued. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any substance in the appeals and are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 7. That being the case, the appointments of the appellants were de hors the Rules and could not be treated to be continued. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any substance in the appeals and are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 7. He would also refer judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Aligarh Muslim University and Others vs. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 wherein it has been held at paragraph 21 as under: As pointed recently in M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237 , there can be certain situations in which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, interference under Article 226 is not necessary. 8. He would also refer the judgment of this Court reported in S.K. Patodia and Associates, through its Director, Pravesh Gadia vs. State of C.G. (2022) SCC Online Chh. 155 : AIR 2022 Chh. 70 wherein it has been held at paragraph 30 as under: 30. In Aligarh Muslim University and Others (supra), having regard to the fact that leave was sanctioned to the respondent-Mr. Mansoor Ali Khan only for two years and before expiry of the said period, he applied for extension of leave by 3 years. The University responded to him on 12/23.09.1981 granting extension only for one year categorically mentioning that he was required to resume duties by 18.4.1982 and that no further extension in the period of his leave would be possible and was advised to resume his duty positively by 18.04.1982. It was on the background of the aforesaid facts, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that absence of a notice to show cause as to why it would not be deemed that he had vacated the office under Rule 5(8)(i) of the Aligarh University Revised Leave Rules, 1969 does not make any difference as he was already told that if his further overstay is for continuing in the job in Libya, it was bound to be refused, and therefore, even if any response was given to the show cause notice, that would not have made any difference and would not have been treated as satisfactory explanation under Rule 5(8)(i) of the Rules. Thus, on the admitted or undisputed facts, only one view was possible. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraphs 24 and 25 observed as under: “24. The ‘useless formality’ theory, it must be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of “admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion” referred to above, there has been considerable debate of the application of that theory in other cases. The divergent views expressed in regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this Court in M.C. Mehta, 1999 AIR SCW 2754 : AIR 1999 SC 2583 , referred to above. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham, Megarry, J. and Straughton L.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, De. Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the Court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have said, that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via-media rules. We do not think it necessary, in this case to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on the facts of a particular case. 25. It will be sufficient, for the purpose of the case of Mr. Mansoor Ali Khan to show that his case will fall within the exceptions stated by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.C. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 , namely, that on the admitted or indisputable facts - only one view is possible. In that event no prejudice can be said to have been caused to Mr. Mansoor Ali Khan though notice has not been issued.” 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 10. It is not in dispute that earlier petitioner was a Shiksha Karmi and thereafter his services were regularised by the Chief Executive Officer in the year 2009 and thereafter his services were absorbed with the Government vide order dated 18.08.2018 thus he was a confirmed employee and the Rule 14 of the Rules, 1966 provides that any major penalty can not be imposed on the Government servant without conducting departmental enquiry. In this regard, the Government of Chhattisgarh has issued various circular providing the procedure or conducting of departmental enquiry. It is not in dispute that order of termination of the services of the petitioner was passed on the basis of the fact that the petitioner has secured employment on the basis of forged marksheet, which the petitioner has denied. Even the Rule provides imposition of major penalty by conducting departmental enquiry. The respondents have not produced any material which have been considered by them before terminating the service of the petitioner not to hold departmental enquiry. The termination from service is major penalty which can be imposed upon by following the procedure of Rule 14 only. 11. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case reported in Basudev Tiwary vs. Sidokanhu University, 1998 (8) SCC 194 wherein it has been held at paragraphs 9 to 13 as under: “9. The law is settled that non-arbitrariness is an essential facet of Article 14 pervading the entire realm of State action governed by Article 14. It has come to be established, as a further corollary, that the audi alteram partem facet of natural justice is the antithesis of arbitrariness. In the sphere of public employment, it is well-settled that any action taken by the employer against an employee must be fair, just and reasonable which are components of fair treatment. The conferment of absolute power to terminate the services of an employee is antithesis to fair, just and reasonable treatment. This aspect was exhaustively considered by a constitution Bench of this Court in Delhi Transport Corporation vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101 . 10. In ordered to impose procedural safeguards, this Court has read the requirement of natural justice in any situations when the statute is silent on this point. The approach of this Court in this regard is that omission to impose the hearing requirement in the statute under which the impugned action is being taken does not exclude hearing - it may be implied from the nature of the power - particularly when the right of a party is affected adversely. The justification for reading such a requirement is that the Court merely supplies omission of the legislature. [Vide: Mohinder Singh Gill and Another vs. The Chief Election Commissioner and Others, AIR 1978 SC 851 and S.L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan and Others, AIR 1981 SC 136 ]. 11. The justification for reading such a requirement is that the Court merely supplies omission of the legislature. [Vide: Mohinder Singh Gill and Another vs. The Chief Election Commissioner and Others, AIR 1978 SC 851 and S.L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan and Others, AIR 1981 SC 136 ]. 11. In the light of these principles of law, we have to examine the scope of provision of Section 35(3) which reads as follows: “35(3) Any appointment or promotion made contrary to the provisions of the Act, Statutes, rules or regulations or in any irregular or unauthorised manner shall be terminated at any time without notice.” 12. The said provision provides that an appointment could be terminated at any time without notice if the same had been made contrary to the provisions of the Act, statutes, rules or regulations or in any irregular or unauthorised manner. The condition precedent for exercise of this power is that an appointment had been made contrary to Act, Rules, Statutes and Regulations or otherwise. In order to arrive at a conclusion that an appointment is contrary to the provisions of the Act, statutes, rules or regulations etc. a finding has to be recorded and unless such a finding is recorded, the termination cannot be modern but to arrive at such a conclusion necessarily an enquiry will have to be made as to whether such appointment was contrary to the provisions of the Act etc. If in a given case such exercise is absent, the condition precedent stands unfulfilled. To arrive at such a finding necessarily enquiry will have to be held and in holding such an enquiry will the person whose appointment is under inquiry will have to be issued to him. If notice is not given to him then it is like playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark, that is, if the employee concerned whose rights are affected, is not given notice of such a proceeding and a conclusion is drawn in his absence, such a conclusion would not be just, fair or reasionable as noticed by this Court in D.T.C. Mazdoor Sabha's case. In such an event, we have to hold that in the provision there is an implied requirement of hearing for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion that an appointment had been made contrary to the Act, statute, rule or regulation etc. In such an event, we have to hold that in the provision there is an implied requirement of hearing for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion that an appointment had been made contrary to the Act, statute, rule or regulation etc. and it is only on such a conclusion being drawn, the services of the person could be terminated without further notice. That is how Section 35(3) in this case will have to be read. 13. Admittedly in this case notice has not been given to the appellant before holding that his appointment is irregular or unauthorised and ordering termination of his service. Hence the impugned order terminating the services of the appellant cannot be sustained.” 12. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of U.P. Warehousing Corporation vs. V.N. Bajpai, 1980 (3) SCC 459 has held at paragraph 14 as under: “14. The appellant is a Corporation constituted under the Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation (Act 28) of 1956, which was subsequently replaced by the Central Act 58 of 1962. It is a statutory body wholly controlled and managed by the Government. Its status is analogous to that of the Corporations which were under consideration in Sukhdev Singh's case (ibid). The ratio of Sukhdev Singh's case, therefore, squarely applies to the present case. Even if at the time of the dismissal, the statutory regulations had not been framed or had not come into force, then also the employment of the respondent was public employment and the statutory body, the employer, could not terminate the services of its employee without due enquiry in accordance with the statutory Regulations, if any in force, or in the absence of such Regulations, in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Such an enquiry into the conduct of a public employee is of a quasi-judicial character. The respondent was employed by the appellant-Corporation in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the statute which created it. The appellants' power to dismiss the respondent from service was also derived from the statute. The Court would therefore, presume the existence of a duty on the part of the dismissing authority to observe the rules of natural justice, and to act in accordance with the spirit of Regulation 16, which was then on the anvil and came into force shortly after the impugned dismissal. The Court would therefore, presume the existence of a duty on the part of the dismissing authority to observe the rules of natural justice, and to act in accordance with the spirit of Regulation 16, which was then on the anvil and came into force shortly after the impugned dismissal. The rules of natural justice in the circumstances of the case, required that the respondent should be given a reasonable opportunity to deny his guilt, to defend himself and to establish his innocence which means and includes an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses relied upon by the appellant-Corporation and an opportunity to lead evidence in defence of the charge as also a show-cause notice for the proposed punishment. Such an opportunity was denied to the respondent in the instant case. Admittedly, the respondent was not allowed to lead evidence in defence. Further, he was not allowed to cross-examine certain persons whose statements were not recorded by the Enquiry Officer (Opposite Party No. 1) in the presence of the respondent. There was controversy on this point. But it was clear to the High Court from the report of enquiry by the Opposite Party No. 1 that he relied upon the reports of some persons and the statements of some other persons who were not examined by him. A regular departmental enquiry takes place only after the charge-sheet is drawn up and served upon the delinquent and the latter's explanation is obtained. In the present case, no such enquiry was held and the order of dismissal was passed summarily after perusing the respondent's explanation. The rules of natural justice in this case, were honoured in total breach. The impugned order of dismissal was thus bad in law and had been rightly set aside by the High Court.” 13. Submission of learned counsel for the State that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner in absence of any regular departmental enquiry, is deserves to be rejected as the right of the petitioner to defend himself is being adversely affected in view of action of respondents terminating the services of the petitioner without enquiry. The other submission of learned Dy. The other submission of learned Dy. Advocate General that the petitioner has remedy of appeal, therefore, the present writ petition is not maintainable, is also deserves to be rejected on the count that action of the respondents terminating the services of the petitioner without enquiry is oppose to the principle of natural justice and there is no rider to entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when complaints about violation of principle of natural justice, is raised. 14. Now coming to the facts of the case and also considering the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court and also considering the rules governing the fields it is quite vivid that no enquiry has been conducted before termination of services of the petitioner. It is held that order dated 11.03.2020 is against the principles of natural justice, violation of Rule 14 of the Rules, 1966, as such, deserves to be quashed and accordingly, it is quashed. However liberty is granted to respondents to conduct enquiry in accordance with law and the same shall be carried out within 6 months from the dated of receipt of this order. In the meanwhile the petitioner shall be reinstated without backwages on the post of Assistant Teacher (LB) as services of the petitioners have already been absorbed in the School Education Department vide order dated 18.08.2018. 15. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed.