JUDGMENT : Rajesh Shankar, J. W.P.(S) No. 3127 of 2022 has been filed for the following reliefs : (i) For quashing the order with respect to the petitioner as contained in memo no. 83 dated 25.04.2022 (Annexure-15 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 2 – the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, Ranchi, whereby the said respondent has suo moto reviewed/revisited the order as contained in memo no. 3536 dated 24.12.2019 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 3 – the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Pargana Region, Dumka without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and has dismissed him from service with effect from the date of passing of the order of dismissal i.e., 25.04.2022. (ii) For quashing Jamtara District Order No. 440/2022 as contained in memo no. 755 (A) dated 29.05.2022 (Annexure-16 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 4 – the Superintendent of Police, Jamtara by which the order of dismissal of the petitioner from service has been made effective with effect from 25.04.2022 and order to delete his name from all the registers has been passed. (iii) For quashing the part of the order as contained in memo no. 3536 dated 24.12.2019 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 3 on the departmental appeal preferred by the petitioner, whereby his punishment of dismissal from service was reduced by revisiting him in his initial basic pay to the post of Constable (Driver) for three years as well as his salary for the period of dismissal was ordered to be forfeited on the basis of ‘no work no pay’ and his period of absence was considered as break in service which would adversely affect his seniority, fixation of pension and other financial benefits in future. (iv) For quashing the final order passed in Jamtara District Departmental Proceeding No. 03/17 as contained in memo no. 2751 dated 08.09.2019 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 4 – the Superintendent of Police, Jamtara whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service. (v) For issuance of direction upon the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith with all consequential benefits. 2. W.P.(S) No. 3573 of 2022 has been preferred for the following reliefs : (i) For quashing the order with respect to the petitioner as contained in memo no. (v) For issuance of direction upon the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith with all consequential benefits. 2. W.P.(S) No. 3573 of 2022 has been preferred for the following reliefs : (i) For quashing the order with respect to the petitioner as contained in memo no. 83 dated 25.04.2022 (Annexure-13 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 2 – the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Government of Jharkhand (the revisional authority), whereby the punishment of dismissal from service of the petitioner has been affirmed by dismissing his revision application. (ii) For quashing the order as contained in memo no. 548 dated 19.02.2018 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 4 – the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Pargana Region, Dumka, whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected. (iii) For quashing the final order passed in Jamtara District Departmental Proceeding No. 04/17 as contained in memo no. 4178 dated 06.11.2017 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 5 – the Superintendent of Police, Jamtara, whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service. (iv) For issuance of direction upon the respondents to forthwith reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits. 3. The factual background of the cases is that a First Information Report being Narayanpur P.S. Case No. 177/16 was lodged on 23.11.2016 by one Jai Prakash Bhagat under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code alleging that the owner of mobile No. 9572494035 had stolen Rs.82,000/- on 22.11.2016 from the dicky of his motor cycle. In course of investigation, it was found that the owner of the mobile no. 9572494035 was Deepak Mandal who upon his arrest, in his alleged confessional statement disclosed the name of the petitioners. Thereafter, a memo of charge as contained in memo no. 169 dated 21.01.2017 was issued to the petitioner of W.P.(S) No. 3127 of 2022 namely, Shiv Shankar Tudu (hereinafter referred to as ‘P1’) and a memo of charge as contained in memo no. 170 dated 21.01.2017 was issued to the petitioner of W.P.(S) No. 3573 of 2022 namely, Sanjay Rawani (hereinafter referred to as ‘P2’), whereby they were asked to file their explanations within one week and were also put under suspension with immediate effect. The departmental proceedings were also ordered to be initiated against them. 170 dated 21.01.2017 was issued to the petitioner of W.P.(S) No. 3573 of 2022 namely, Sanjay Rawani (hereinafter referred to as ‘P2’), whereby they were asked to file their explanations within one week and were also put under suspension with immediate effect. The departmental proceedings were also ordered to be initiated against them. The P2 submitted his reply on 07.02.2017, whereafter the enquiry officer submitted the enquiry report in departmental proceeding no. 04/17 relating to the P2 on 12.06.2017 holding him guilty of the charges levelled against him. The P1 also filed his detailed reply in connection with departmental proceeding no. 03/17 denying the allegations levelled against him. The enquiry officer, however, submitted the enquiry report in departmental proceeding no. 03/17 on 28.06.2017 holding him guilty of the charges levelled against him. The Superintendent of Police, Jamtara (disciplinary authority) served second show cause notice to the P2 vide letter as contained in memo no. 2237 dated 14.06.2017 in response to which the P2 submitted his reply on 21.06.2017. The P1 was also served second show-cause notice vide letter as contained in memo no. 3881 dated 12.10.2017 seeking explanation as to why his services be not terminated. The P1, vide letter dated 27.10.2017, sought some documents to file his explanation, however, the Superintendent of Police, Jamtara vide letter dated 15.11.2017 directed him to file his explanation within fifteen days whereafter the P1 filed his explanation on 28.11.2017. In the meantime, the disciplinary authority passed the order of dismissal of P2 vide order as contained in memo no. 4178 dated 06.11.2017 [Annexure-7 to W.P.(S) No. 3573 of 2022]. The P2 filed departmental appeal against the order passed by the disciplinary authority which was also rejected by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Pargana Region, Dumka on 19.02.2018. 4. Subsequently, all the accused persons including the petitioners were acquitted of the charges levelled against them in the said criminal case vide judgment dated 01.09.2018 passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Jamtara in G.R. No. 995/2016 (T.R. No. 1763/2018). Thereafter, the P2 filed a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2022 of 2018 assailing the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority, however, the same was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 13.06.2019 with liberty to him to file revision application before the competent authority. The P2 then filed revision application before the respondent no. Thereafter, the P2 filed a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2022 of 2018 assailing the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority, however, the same was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 13.06.2019 with liberty to him to file revision application before the competent authority. The P2 then filed revision application before the respondent no. 2 on 03.07.2019 which was rejected vide order dated 03.08.2019 on the ground that the same was barred by limitation. 5. Further, the P1 was also dismissed from service by the disciplinary authority vide order as contained in memo no. 2751 dated 08.09.2019 [Annexure-10 to W.P.(S) No. 3127 of 2022]. Thereafter, the P1 preferred a departmental appeal on 01.10.2019 (Annexure-11 to the concerned writ petition) before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Pargana Region, Dumka who vide order as contained in memo no. 3536 dated 24.12.2019 reduced the punishment of dismissal from service by reverting him in his initial basic pay to the post of Constable (Driver) for three years as well as his salary for the period of dismissal from service was ordered to be forfeited on the principle of ‘no work no pay’ and the period of absence was considered as break in service also observing that the same would affect his seniority, fixation of pension and other financial benefits in future. The Superintendent of Police, Jamtara was directed to immediately reinstate the P1 in service and thereafter the said authority directed him to give his joining vide letter as contained in memo no. 97 dated 16.01.2020 (Annexure-13 to the concerned writ petition). Consequently, the P1 immediately gave his joining which was duly accepted and he started discharging his duties. 6. The P2 preferred a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 5891 of 2019 against the order dated 03.08.2019 passed by the revisional authority which was disposed of by a Bench of this Court vide order dated 23.08.2021 quashing and setting aside the order dated 03.08.2019 as well as remanding the matter back to the revisional authority to consider his case afresh by excluding the period consumed between 19.02.2018 to 13.06.2019 in pursuing the writ petition while computing the limitation period. It was further observed that the revisional authority would also consider acquittal of the P2 i.e., the order dated 01.09.2018 passed in G.R. No. 995 of 2016 (T.R. No. 1763 of 2018) in pursuance of which one of the co-accused i.e., P1 had already been reinstated in service. Subsequent to the order dated 23.08.2021 passed in W.P.(S) No. 5891 of 2019, the respondent no. 2 reheard the matter and the order of dismissal passed against the P2 was confirmed vide order as contained in memo no. 83 dated 25.04.2022. Simultaneously, by the same order, the revisional authority exercised the suo moto power of revision conferred under rule 853A(a) of Jharkhand Police Manual and passed the order of dismissal of P1 from service. 7. Mrs. Ritu Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the P1 submits that no opportunity of hearing was granted to the said petitioner by the respondent no. 2 before enhancing the punishment already imposed on him. Moreover, since the P1 was dismissed from service only on the ground that he was involved in a criminal case instituted by one Jaiprakash Bhagat, the order of dismissal is liable to be set aside after the acquittal of the accused persons in the said criminal case vide judgment dated 01.09.2018 passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Jamtara in G.R. No. 995/2016 (T.R. No. 1763/2018). It is further submitted that the factum of acquittal in criminal case ought to be considered and the order of punishment passed in a departmental proceeding should be revisited if both the criminal case and departmental proceeding are based on the same set of charges. 8. It is also submitted that in the departmental proceeding no. 03/17 initiated against P1, his defence was not considered in its proper perspective as well as he was not given any opportunity to controvert the allegation levelled against him and as such the order of punishment is liable to be set aside on that ground also. It is further submitted that neither any independent witness was examined nor the P1 was given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses in the said disciplinary proceeding causing great prejudice to him. The respondent no. It is further submitted that neither any independent witness was examined nor the P1 was given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses in the said disciplinary proceeding causing great prejudice to him. The respondent no. 2 ought to have considered that P1 was neither named in the FIR nor the informant deposed anything against him as well as he did not enter any compromise with the informant for being acquitted of the charges levelled against him in the said criminal case. 9. It is further submitted that the respondent no. 2, while passing the order as contained in memo no. 83 dated 25.04.2022, has acted contrary to the order dated 23.08.2021 passed in W.P.(S) No. 5891 of 2019, whereby the Court had not directed to review/revisit the matter of P1, rather the direction was to consider the matter of P2 afresh. 10. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the P2, submits that the said petitioner was not granted any opportunity by the enquiry officer to cross-examine the witnesses in departmental proceeding no. 04/17 initiated against him. The date on which the P2 submitted his reply, he was forced to put his signature on already recorded statements of four witnesses. The appeal preferred by the P2 was also rejected without considering the points raised by him in his defence. Moreover, for the same set of allegations, the P2 has been acquitted by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Jamtara vide judgment dated 01.09.2018 passed in the criminal case bearing G.R. No. 995/2016 (T.R. No. 1763/2018), however, in the said departmental proceeding, he has been punished for the reason best known to the authorities. A Bench of this Court vide order dated 23.08.2021 passed in W.P.(S) No. 5891 of 2019 has clearly observed regarding acquittal of P2 in the criminal case, however, the respondent no. 2 has literally reviewed the order of this Court holding that it will not amount to acquittal. 11. Mr. Indrajit Sinha puts reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors.” reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 and submits that enquiry officer of a departmental proceeding performs a quasi-judicial function and the charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. Indrajit Sinha puts reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors.” reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 and submits that enquiry officer of a departmental proceeding performs a quasi-judicial function and the charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The evidence collected by the investigating officer against the accused by itself cannot be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. Moreover, no independent witness was examined during enquiry to prove the charges against P2 and thus the impugned order imposing punishment of removal of the said petitioner from service is liable to be vitiated. 12. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that FIR being Narayanpur P.S. Case No. 177/2016 under Section 379 of the IPC was lodged by one Jaiprakash Bhagat against an un-named person who was the bearer of Mobile number 9572494035 alleging that the said person had stolen Rs.82,000/- from the dicky of his motorcycle by deceiving him to believe that his old currencies would be exchanged for new ones as it was the time of demonetization. In course of investigation, it was revealed that mobile no. 9572494035 belonged to one Deepak Mandal and he gave his confessional statement disclosing the involvement of Shiv Shankar Tudu (P1) and Sanjay Rawani (P2) in the said incident. 13. It is also submitted that the respondent no. 2 suo motu revised the order of appellate authority passed against P1 by exercising the power conferred under rule 853-A (a) of the Jharkhand Police Manual and passed an order of his dismissal from service vide memo no. 83 dated 25.04.2022 considering the fact that acquittal in the said criminal case was based on compromise petition filed by the parties and was not an honourable acquittal based on evidence. Since it is a well-established principle of law that yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal trial are different from that of a departmental proceeding, the order of reinstatement of the P1 was set aside under revisional jurisdiction and the order of dismissal from the service was passed against him. 14. It is further submitted that on plain reading of rule 853-A(a) of the Jharkhand Police Manual, it would appear that the action of the respondent no. 2 is in accordance with law. 14. It is further submitted that on plain reading of rule 853-A(a) of the Jharkhand Police Manual, it would appear that the action of the respondent no. 2 is in accordance with law. Though no revision was filed in the case of P1 after the order passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Pargana Region, Dumka, as per rule 853-A(a), the respondent no. 2 was well within his power to revise the order of reinstatement of P1. 15. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 16. The thrust of argument of learned counsel for the P1 is that the respondent no. 2 – the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, Ranchi has passed the order of dismissal of P1 in exercise of power conferred under rule 853-A(a) of the Jharkhand Police Manual without affording due opportunity of hearing to him which is a condition precedent for passing any order under the said rule and thus the same is liable to be vitiated on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice as also violation of rule 853-A(a) of Jharkhand Police Manual. 17. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the respondent no. 2 has suo motu power of revising any order passed in the departmental proceeding and has jurisdiction to pass any order as he thinks fit. It is also submitted that the petitioners were the members of the disciplined police force, however, they committed criminal offence due to which the image of the police department was tarnished and thus they have rightly been dismissed from service so as to give strong message to the other members of the police force. 18. Learned counsel for the respondents, in support of his argument, puts reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Sheo Narayan Singh” reported in (1997) 3 SCC 46 , wherein it has been held as under : 14. These provisions of Rule 853-A go to show that the Inspector General has been given suo motu power to pass such order as he may deem fit when an appeal lay and also when no appeal could be filed. Even when an appeal had been filed, the Inspector General could pass an order enhancing the punishment. These provisions of Rule 853-A go to show that the Inspector General has been given suo motu power to pass such order as he may deem fit when an appeal lay and also when no appeal could be filed. Even when an appeal had been filed, the Inspector General could pass an order enhancing the punishment. From this, it however, does not follow that the Inspector General could not pass any order under Rule 853-A unless and until an order of punishment had been passed by the authority. After the authority had erroneously passed an order exonerating the Sepoy of the charges levelled against him, the Inspector General could under sub-rule (a) of Rule 853-A call for the file and pass such order as he deemed fit. This wide power enables the Inspector General to inflict a punishment when such an order is called for and exonerate an officer of punishment when such punishment has been wrongly given. There is nothing in the wording of Rule 853-A to suggest that the Inspector General can act only when an order of punishment has been passed by the authority below him and not when an order has been passed exonerating an officer of the charge levelled against him. 15. The scope and purpose of Rules 853 and 853-A are quite different. Rule 853 deals with memorials and revision which were filed by a person against whom final orders of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank had been passed. The power under Rule 853-A is not to be exercised on the basis of a memorial or a revision filed by an aggrieved party. The power is to be exercised whenever the Inspector General is of the view that the impugned order calls for revision. The order contemplated under Rule 853-A need not be against a final order of “dismissal, removal or reduction in rank”. 19. Before coming to the merit of the respective contentions of learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to refer rule 853-A of the Jharkhand Police Manual, which reads as under : 853-A. (a) Inspector-General may call for the file in any case even when no appeal lies and pass such order as he may deem fit. The Deputy Inspector- General may call for any file but he should refer it to the Inspector- General with his recommendation for his order. The Deputy Inspector- General may call for any file but he should refer it to the Inspector- General with his recommendation for his order. The above action should be taken within a reasonable time from the date of final order in departmental proceeding. (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules the State Government may call for the proceedings in any disciplinary case even when no appeal or memorial lies, and pass such order as it may deem fit. (c) When an appeal has been filed and the Inspector-General on applying his mind thinks that he should enhance the punishment, he can dismiss the appeal but must simultaneously mention in that order that as per powers given in the Rule 853-A (a), he has decided to review it for enhancement and take action for obtaining a show cause, etc. where necessary. 20. Thus, rule 853-A(a) of the Jharkhand Police Manual provides for suo motu power of revision of any case by the Inspector General of Police subject to the condition that the said power is exercised within a reasonable time from the date of passing of the final order in a departmental proceeding. If the said power is exercised by the Deputy Inspector General by calling any file of a case, he shall refer the same with his recommendation to the Inspector General of Police for his order. Rule 853-A(b) is the suo motu power of revision by the State Government. Further, rule 853-A(c) states about the power conferred to the Inspector General of Police to enhance the punishment when an appeal has been filed. However, before exercising that power, the Inspector General shall dismiss the appeal and must simultaneously mention in the order that he has decided to review/revisit the order for enhancement of the punishment in exercise of power conferred under rule 853-A(a) and shall take action for obtaining a show cause etc. where necessary. 21. It appears from the record that the P1 had not filed any appeal/revision against the order dated 24.12.2019 passed by the appellate authority i.e., Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Pargana Region, Dumka who had reduced the punishment of dismissal from service by reverting him in his initial basic pay to the post of Constable Driver for three years as well as his salary for the dismissal period was ordered to be forfeited on the principle of ‘no work no pay’. It was further ordered that the period of absence would be considered as break in service which would affect his seniority, fixation of pension and other financial benefits in future. 22. The Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police – the respondent no. 2, while deciding the revision application of the P2 afresh pursuant to the direction of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court issued in W.P.(S) No. 5891 of 2019, has also exercised suo motu power of revision as conferred under rule 853-A(a) of Jharkhand Police Manual and has passed the order of dismissal of P1 from service. The contention of learned counsel for the P1 is that no opportunity of hearing was given to the P1 before exercising suo motu power of revision. In fact, the impugned order dated 25.04.2022 itself reveals that P1 was not given any opportunity of hearing before passing the order of his dismissal from service. 23. Learned counsel for the respondents has tried to justify the impugned order by contending that rule 853-A(a) of Jharkhand Police Manual does not provide for giving opportunity of hearing to any delinquent employee before exercising suo motu power of revision and thus the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police has not committed any infirmity while passing the order of dismissal of P1 from service. On the other hand, learned counsel for P1 has submitted that the principles of natural justice demands that any order prejudicial to the interest of any person is required to be passed after providing due opportunity of hearing to that person. 24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Mangilal Vs. State of M.P.” reported in (2004) 2 SCC 447 has held as under : 10. Even if a statute is silent and there are no positive words in the Act or the Rules made thereunder, there could be nothing wrong in spelling out the need to hear the parties whose rights and interest are likely to be affected by the orders that may be passed, and making it a requirement to follow a fair procedure before taking a decision, unless the statute provides otherwise. The principles of natural justice must be read into unoccupied interstices of the statute, unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. No form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant's defence or stand. The principles of natural justice must be read into unoccupied interstices of the statute, unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. No form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant's defence or stand. Even in the absence of a provision in procedural laws, power inheres in every tribunal/court of a judicial or quasi-judicial character, to adopt modalities necessary to achieve requirements of natural justice and fair play to ensure better and proper discharge of their duties. Procedure is mainly grounded on the principles of natural justice irrespective of the extent of its application by express provision in that regard in a given situation. It has always been a cherished principle. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice where substantial rights of parties are considerably affected. The application of natural justice becomes presumptive, unless found excluded by express words of statute or necessary intendment. (See Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [ (1981) 1 SCC 664 ].) Its aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. Principles of natural justice do not supplant the law, but supplement it. These rules operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They are a means to an end and not an end in themselves. The principles of natural justice have many facets. Two of them are: notice of the case to be met, and opportunity to explain. 25. It may thus be construed that where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice where substantial rights of parties are considerably affected unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. Every tribunal/court of a judicial or quasi-judicial character is required to comply the principles of natural justice and fair play to ensure better and proper discharge of its duties. Its prime aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. 26. In the present case, though rule 853-A(a) of Jharkhand Police Manual is silent about providing opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee before exercising suo motu power of review, it does not expressly exclude the compliance of natural justice. Its prime aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. 26. In the present case, though rule 853-A(a) of Jharkhand Police Manual is silent about providing opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee before exercising suo motu power of review, it does not expressly exclude the compliance of natural justice. Thus, it was incumbent upon the respondent no. 2 to issue show cause notice to the P1 before passing the order of dismissal from service which was highly prejudicial to his interest. That apart, rule 853-A(c) which is a simultaneous power of review/revision when an appeal is filed, speaks about giving show cause notice to the delinquent employee before enhancing the punishment. Thus, I am of the view that the respondent no. 2 has violated the principles of natural justice before passing the order of dismissal of P1 from service. 27. The other limb of argument of learned counsel for the P1 is that suo motu power of revision can only be exercised by the Inspector General of Police within a reasonable period from the date of final order passed in the departmental proceeding, however, in the present case, the respondent no. 2 has exercised that power after an inordinate delay of 2 years 4 months. The said contention of learned counsel for the P1 has been countered by learned counsel for the respondents by putting reliance on the judgment rendered by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of “Lok Nath Singh Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.” reported in 2015 SCC OnLine Jhar 3426. In the said case, show cause notice was issued in exercise of power under rule 853-A(a) of Jharkhand Police Manual after five years of the order passed in the departmental proceeding. The Bench declined to interfere with the show cause notice issued to the petitioner of that case by the Inspector General of Police, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi invoking the provisions as contained in rule 853-A(a) observing that exercise of power within a reasonable time as mentioned in the said rule, is a directory provision and the same, if properly construed, would mean that reasonable time should be as far as possible or as far as practicable. It has further been held that the circumstances may vary as to what should be the ‘reasonable time’ in a particular case. It has further been held that the circumstances may vary as to what should be the ‘reasonable time’ in a particular case. As has been defined in Advanced Law Lexicon, in determining what is a reasonable time or an unreasonable time, regard being had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade or business, if any, with respect to such instruments, and the fact of the particular case. 28. In the case of P1, the fact suggests that the Inspector General of Police had not exercised the power conferred under rule 853-A(a) of Jharkhand Police Manual suo motu, rather the said authority has exercised that power while hearing the revision application of the P2 pursuant to the order of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court passed in W.P.(S) No. 5891 of 2019. The Bench had not directed the respondent no. 2 to revisit the case of the P1, rather the Bench had directed the said authority to decide the matter of P2 afresh looking to the factum of his acquittal in criminal case as well as the order passed in appeal preferred by P1, however, the respondent no. 2 acted contrary to the order of the Bench and exercised the power under rule 853-A(a) of the Jharkhand Police Manual to dismiss the P1 which does not appear to have been passed in consonance with the direction issued in W.P.(S) No. 5891 of 2019. If the matter of the P2 had not come before the respondent no. 2, he might not have exercised the power of revision conferred under rule 853-A(a) of Jharkhand Police Manual in the case of P1. Moreover, after the order of appellate authority, the Superintendent of Police, Jamtara had reinstated the P1 in service and after 2 years 4 months, he was again dismissed from service. Thus, looking to the fact of the present case, I am of the considered view that the respondent no. 2 has not exercised the power of suo motu revision within a reasonable time. 29. Learned counsel for the respondents has also contended that acquittal of the petitioners in the criminal case is not an honourable acquittal, rather the same has been passed on the basis of compromise arrived at between the informant and one of the accused persons namely, Deepak Mandal. Thus, on that basis, the petitioners cannot claim exoneration from the charges levelled in the disciplinary proceeding. 30. Thus, on that basis, the petitioners cannot claim exoneration from the charges levelled in the disciplinary proceeding. 30. The learned counsel for the respondents has put reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs. Heem Singh” reported in (2021) 12 SCC 569 wherein it has been held as under : J. The effect of an acquittal 38. In the present case, we have an acquittal in a criminal trial on a charge of murder. The judgment of the Sessions Court is a reflection of the vagaries of the administration of criminal justice. The judgment contains a litany of hostile witnesses, and of the star witness resiling from his statements. Our precedents indicate that acquittal in a criminal trial in such circumstances does not conclude a disciplinary enquiry. In [Southern Railway Officers Assn. v. Union of India, (2009) 9 SCC 24 ], this Court held : (SCC p. 40, para 37) “37. Acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The High Court did not say that the said fact had not been taken into consideration. The revisional authority did so. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official had been acquitted of the criminal charge.” (emphasis supplied) 39. In [State v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 ], a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that unless the accused has an “honourable acquittal” in their criminal trial, as opposed to an acquittal due to witnesses turning hostile or for technical reasons, the acquittal shall not affect the decision in the disciplinary proceedings and lead to automatic reinstatement. But the penal statutes governing substance or procedure do not allude to an “honourable acquittal”. Noticing this, the Court observed: (SCC pp. 609-10, paras 24-26) “Honourable acquittal 24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal, (1994) 1 SCC 541 . In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. 609-10, paras 24-26) “Honourable acquittal 24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal, (1994) 1 SCC 541 . In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame”, “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 25. In [R.P. Kapur v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787 ] it was held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In [State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari, 1972 SLR 44 (SC)] this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in [Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor, 1933 SCC OnLine Cal 369] which is as follows : ([State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari, 1972 SLR 44 (SC)], SLR p. 47, para 8) ‘8. … The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extra-judicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term “honourably acquitted”.’ ([Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor, 1933 SCC OnLine Cal 369], ILR pp. 188-89) 26. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term “honourably acquitted”.’ ([Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor, 1933 SCC OnLine Cal 369], ILR pp. 188-89) 26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so.” 31. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that on bare perusal of the judgment passed in the criminal case i.e., G.R. No. 995/2016 (T.R. No. 1763/2018), it would transpire that the order of acquittal of the petitioners has not been passed only on the basis of compromise, rather the same has been passed on merit as well and as such the acquittal of the petitioners is honourable acquittal. 32. Learned counsel for the P2 has put reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Ram Lal Vs. 32. Learned counsel for the P2 has put reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Ram Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.” reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1618 wherein it has been held that expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honorably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. The court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not to go by the form of expression used. 33. To appreciate the contention of learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to refer the relevant part of the judgment dated 01.09.2018 passed in G.R No. 995 of 2016 (T.R. No. 1763/2018) which reads as follows : 9. PW1 (Jaiprakash Bhagat) have stated that he is the informant of the present case. He identified his signature over written application which is exhibited as Ext. 1. He also submits that on 22.11.2016 he had gone to pabia and he suspected that holder of mobile no. 9572494035 have taken away the money from him. During cross examination he stated that case have been compounded with Deepak Mandal. He does not want to proceed with this case. He stated that he has no complaint against Deepak Mandal and he filed a written compromise. He also submits that he has not seen Deepak Mandal taking away the amount. 10. On bare perusal of the case record I find that the informant-cum-victim of the present case have implicated the accused to the crime on the basis of suspicion but there is no substantial evidence against him. Moreover, the case has been compromised between the parties and compromise petition is there on the record. Therefore, it appears that the accused have been implicated in the present case on the basis of suspicion and suspicion cannot form the basis of conviction. Moreover, the case has been compromised between the parties. 11. Therefore, in the light of testimony of informant as well as compromise petition filed by the parties, I am of the opinion that the prosecution story is not proved and accordingly accused persons Deepak Mandal, Shiv Shankar Tudu and Sanjay Rawani are hereby acquitted from the charges levelled against them. Bailors are discharged from their respective liabilities, if any. 34. Therefore, in the light of testimony of informant as well as compromise petition filed by the parties, I am of the opinion that the prosecution story is not proved and accordingly accused persons Deepak Mandal, Shiv Shankar Tudu and Sanjay Rawani are hereby acquitted from the charges levelled against them. Bailors are discharged from their respective liabilities, if any. 34. It appears that in the said criminal case, the prosecution examined the informant as PW-1 who deposed that he had not seen Deepak Mandal taking away the amount and he made the holder of mobile no. 9572494035 as accused on the basis of suspicion. PW-1 further deposed that he made compromise with accused Deepak Mandal. The court observed that the informant implicated the accused in the crime on the basis of suspicion, but there was no substantial evidence against him. Finally, the trial court acquitted all the accused persons in the light of testimony of informant as well as the compromise petition filed by the parties. 35. It would thus be evident that the accused persons were acquitted from the charges levelled against them not only on the basis of compromise petition, but also looking to the fact that there was no substantial evidence against them. If the argument of learned counsel for the respondents that the order of acquittal of the accused persons was passed only on the basis of compromise is accepted, then in view of Section 320(8) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the order of acquittal could have been passed only with respect to Deepak Mandal and not with respect to the present petitioners since the compromise was arrived at between the informant and Deepak Mandal and not with the present petitioners. Thus, I find no substance in the argument of learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioners were acquitted in the criminal trial only on the basis of compromise. 36. So far the case of P2 is concerned, I have perused the order dated 23.08.2021 passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 5891 of 2019, the operative part of which is quoted hereinbelow : 6. Having heard the submission of the parties, this Court is of the view that as the Revisional Authority has not considered the aforesaid aspect and hence the order dated 03.08.2019 is not tenable in the eyes of law and is hereby quashed and set aside. Having heard the submission of the parties, this Court is of the view that as the Revisional Authority has not considered the aforesaid aspect and hence the order dated 03.08.2019 is not tenable in the eyes of law and is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Revisional Authority to consider the case of the petitioner afresh by excluding the period spent by the petitioner between 19.02.2018 to 13.06.2019 in pursuing the writ application for computation of limitation period. The Revisional Authority shall also consider the acquittal of petitioner in G.R. Case No. 995 of 2019/T.R No. 1763 of 2018 dated 01.09.2018, in pursuant to which one of the co-accused has already been reinstated in services. The Revisional Authority is directed to consider all the aforesaid aspects and pass a reasoned order, in accordance with law, within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 37. Thus, vide aforesaid order, the respondent no. 2 was directed to decide the revision application filed by P2 afresh looking into his acquittal in the criminal case as well as the fact that one of the co-accused persons i.e., P1 was reinstated in service. However, the respondent no. 2 has passed the order of dismissal of P1 from service observing that the acquittal on the basis of compromise will not affect the decision taken in the disciplinary proceeding on the basis of evidence. It has further been observed that police force is a disciplined force and the petitioners have committed the act of indiscipline as well as of criminal nature tarnishing the image of the police department. It has also been observed that keeping the petitioners in service will have wrong impact on other police personnel and hence, there is no reason to keep them in service. Thus, the respondent no. 2 has acted contrary to the observation made in W.P.(S) No. 5891 of 2019. 38. Learned counsel for the respondents has put reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “State Bank of India & Anr. Vs. K.S Vishwanath” reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 667 and has submitted that the writ court has limited power of judicial review to examine the order passed by the disciplinary authority. 38. Learned counsel for the respondents has put reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “State Bank of India & Anr. Vs. K.S Vishwanath” reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 667 and has submitted that the writ court has limited power of judicial review to examine the order passed by the disciplinary authority. I have perused the said judgment wherein it has been held that the writ court will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor will interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the basis of material available on record. The question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be a ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, may lead to different results in the two proceedings involving the same charges and evidence i.e., finding of guilt in departmental proceeding and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceeding. In the same judgment, it has further been held that the writ court, however, may interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters if the principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, malafide or based on extraneous considerations. 39. In the present case, the petitioners were not given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses in the disciplinary proceedings. Moreover, though the appellate authority in the case of P1 had appreciated the said fact and passed the order of his reinstatement in service, the respondent no. 2 has failed to take into consideration the said aspect of the matter. Further, the said respondent while exercising the power under rule 853-A(a) of Jharkhand Police Manual failed to issue any show cause notice to P1 so as to give him opportunity to explain his case. 2 has failed to take into consideration the said aspect of the matter. Further, the said respondent while exercising the power under rule 853-A(a) of Jharkhand Police Manual failed to issue any show cause notice to P1 so as to give him opportunity to explain his case. Since there is a violation of the principles of natural justice while conducting the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners as well as while revisiting the order of the respondent no. 3 by the revisional authority i.e., the respondent no. 2, the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents cannot be applied in the peculiar facts of the present case. 40. Now, the question before this Court is as to whether it would be appropriate to remand the matter to the respondent no. 2 to decide it afresh in the present circumstance. 41. The accused persons have been acquitted in the criminal case and earlier when the matter of P2 was remanded, the respondent no. 2 i.e., the revisional authority acted contrary to the observation made by a Bench of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 5891 of 2019 and the conduct of the revisional authority suggests that he somehow wants to punish the petitioners. Under the said circumstance, rehearing of the matter will be an empty formality as it will merely be an act of knocking one’s head against the impenetrable wall of prejudged opinion. 42. In view of the aforesaid discussion, so far the case of Shiv Shankar Tudu (P1) is concerned, the order as contained in memo no. 83 dated 25.4.2022 passed by the respondent no. 2 – the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, Ranchi and consequential order of his dismissal from service issued under the signature of the Superintendent of Police, Jamtara vide Jamtara District Order No. 440/2022 as contained in memo no. 755(A) dated 29.5.2022 is hereby quashed and set aside. Further, the order as contained in memo no. 3536 dated 24.12.2019 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Pargana Region, Dumka is modified to the extent that the period of absence of P1 will not affect his seniority, fixation of pension and other financial benefits in future. Consequently, the respondents are directed to forthwith reinstate the P1 in service, however, he will not be entitled to the salary for the period he remained out of duty. 43. Consequently, the respondents are directed to forthwith reinstate the P1 in service, however, he will not be entitled to the salary for the period he remained out of duty. 43. So far the case of Sanjay Rawani (P2) is concerned, the order passed by the respondent no. 2 – the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, Ranchi as contained in memo no. 83 dated 25.04.2022, the appellate order as contained in memo no. 548 dated 19.02.2018 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Pargana Region, Dumka as well as the order passed by the Superintendent of Police, Jamtara as contained in memo no. 4178 dated 06.11.2017 are hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to forthwith reinstate the P2 in service. The P2 will not be entitled for the salary for the period he remained out of duty, however, the same shall not affect his seniority, fixation of pension and other financial benefits in future. 44. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed with the aforesaid directions.