JUDGMENT : Mohd. Faiz Alam Khan, J. Heard Ms. Pratibha Jaiswal, learned counsel for the appellants as well as learned Additional Government Advocate for the State only on the question of maintainability and jurisdiction of this Court and perused the record. 2. The instant appeal under Section 14-A (1) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 has been filed by the appellants, Rajendra Vishwakarma @ Rajendra Sharma and Kunti Devi with the prayer to quash the impugned cognizance/summoning order dated 6.1.2023 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (POCSO Act), Sonbhadra, impugned charge sheet dated 20.12.2022 as well as entire proceeding of Session Case No. 12 of 2023 (State Vs. Pradeep Kumar Vishwakarma), arising out of Case Crime No. 130 of 2022, under Sections 147, 504, 506 IPC and Sections 3(2)5 Ka & 3(1)Da & Dha of SC/ST Act, Police Station Pipri, District Sonbhadra, pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge/ Special Judge (POCSO Act), Sonbhadra. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appellants in this case are challenging the cognizance taken/ summoning order passed by the Additional Session Judge/ Special Judge POCSO Act of date 6.1.2023 passed on the charge sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer under the relevant provisions of the SC/ST Act and relevant provisions of POCSO Act. 4. Learned AGA at the outset submits that summoning order passed by the Special Court constituted under POCSO Act may not be challenged by filing an appeal under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act and the remedy which is available to the appellants is by challenging the summoning order by taking recourse to any other remedy available to them under the law. Having heard learned counsel for the parties the question which falls for consideration of this Court is when the charge sheet has been filed under the provisions of the Protection of Children from the Sexual Offences, Act 2012 (herein after called 'POCSO Act') as well as under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (herein after referred to as the SC/ST Act) and the cognizance has been taken by the Special Court constituted under the POCSO Act and the accused persons have been summoned, whether an appeal under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act would lie or the accused persons may take remedy having regard to the normal procedure provided under Cr.P.C., to challenge the summoning order passed by Special Court constituted under POCSO Act. 5. While considering the legal issue raised before this Court, it is to be borne in mind that if the provisions of POCSO Act would prevail then the appellants are entitled to challenge the summoning order passed by Special Court constituted under POCSO Act by adopting normal course and the procedure provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure and if the provisions of SC/ST Act would prevail then the summoning order passed may only be challenged by filing an appeal under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act. 6. A perusal of the SC/ST Act and POCSO Act would reveal that the SC/ST Act is enacted on 30.1.1990 while the POCSO Act was enacted on 19.6.2012. Section 20 of the SC/ST Act deals with overriding effect of the said statute, while Section 42 A of the POCSO Act introduced with effect from 3.2.2013 refers to the overriding effect of that statute. Section 31 of the POCSO Act provides for application of the Cr.P.C. Thus both statutes have provisions which provides an overriding effect. 7. The above provisions for ready reference are mentioned below:- Section 31 of the POCSO Act is as below: "Section 31. Application of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to proceedings before a Special Court. Section 31 of the POCSO Act provides for application of the Cr.P.C. Thus both statutes have provisions which provides an overriding effect. 7. The above provisions for ready reference are mentioned below:- Section 31 of the POCSO Act is as below: "Section 31. Application of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to proceedings before a Special Court. - Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (including the provisions as to bail and bonds) shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Court and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions and the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Court, shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor." Section 42A of the POCSO Act reads as follows: "Section 42A. Act not in derogation of any other law. - The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force and, in case of any inconsistency, the provisions of this Act shall have overriding effect on the provisions of any such law to the extent of the inconsistency." Section 20 of the SC/ST Act reads as below; "Section 20. Act to override other laws.—Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom or usage or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law." 8. The above provisions would reveal that both Acts have been given an overriding effect over the provisions of any other law to the extent of inconsistency. 9. Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court in Rinku vs. State of U.P. reported in MANU/UP/2193/2019; while challenging with the controversy at hand framed following questions and answers, these questions while considering the above provisions as under:- "(i) Whether the Special Court under the POCSO Act would have jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the Special Court under the SC/ST Act, to hear and determine the bail plea of an accused against whom offences, both under the POCSO Act and the SC/ST Act are charged, arising out of the same crime? (ii) Whether an order declining bail to an accused passed by the Special Court, POCSO Ac, in a crime where he is charged of committing offences, both under the POCSO Act and the SC/ST Act, is final and appealable under Section 14A(2) of the SC/ST Act?" "31. The Statement of the Objects and Reasons of the SC/ST Act, though not explicit in its reference, is no less revealing of its import to fulfill the Constitutional aspirations of removing social disabilities, that are encountered by a class of citizens: the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This object it seeks to achieve by not only proscribing and punishing actions derogatory to individuals hailing from these classes, but conferring certain benefits, in the event of an individual becoming victim of an offence envisaged under the Act; here affirmative action is limited to that kind of relief. 32. Both the Acts are without doubt penal statutes. They operate almost in the same field, to achieve the same end, but with different subjects: in one case the child; and, in the other, members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. As noticed in the opening part of this order, the issues involved and the questions framed, have arisen in the context of that class of citizens, who are subject to the regime of both the statutes, that is to say, the POCSO Act and the SC/ST Act. They are children who are members of one or the other Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and happen to become victims of offences separately punishable under both legislation. Both legislations being special laws, carrying non obstinate clauses already detailed herein-before, the problem also noticed in the opening part of this order arises. It has been said there that when a conflict of this kind arises between two statutes operating in the same field, the most dependable test is to look at the objects of the two legislations and find out where the legislative priority lies. Here, in the most tangible terms, what has to be determined is whether the interest of the child vis-à-vis his status as a child is placed higher in legislative priority, or is it subordinated to his status as a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. Here, in the most tangible terms, what has to be determined is whether the interest of the child vis-à-vis his status as a child is placed higher in legislative priority, or is it subordinated to his status as a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. This Court thinks, that the legislative priority is in favour of the child, for childhood is native to human development and requires common traits, needs and aspirations to be attended to, irrespective of the social class to which the child may belong. Childhood emanates from human nature, whereas the social class is a byproduct of social conditions, historical, geographical etc. It is but logical that the legislature has accorded priority to the subject that is an inseparable part of human development, and is common to all classes of citizens. 33. The intention of the Legislature to give overriding effect to the POCSO Act to the extent it is inconsistent with the SC/ST Act, or for that matter any other law for the time being in force is very clearly pronounced by the provisions of Section 42A, that have been introduced by Act 13 of 2013 w.e.f. 03.02.2013. The said provision clearly indicates that in the first place the POCSO Act is in addition to the existing provisions of any other law for the time being in force, and not in derogation thereof. The provision, however, limits this supplementary role for the POCSO Act vis-à-vis other statutes to all situations where the provisions of the other law are not inconsistent with the said Act, and mandates that in case of any inconsistency between the provisions of the POCSO Act and any other law for the being in force, the provisions of the Act under reference, shall have overriding effect. The provisions of Section 42-A of the POCSO Act, therefore, makes allowance for the operation of any other law alongside itself so long as there is no inconsistency between the two. By contrast, the provisions of Section 20 of the SC/ST Act, carries a non obstante clause in unqualified terms, giving overriding effect to the provisions of the said Act over any other law for the time being in force, or any custom or usage or any instrument, having effect by virtue of any other law. By contrast, the provisions of Section 20 of the SC/ST Act, carries a non obstante clause in unqualified terms, giving overriding effect to the provisions of the said Act over any other law for the time being in force, or any custom or usage or any instrument, having effect by virtue of any other law. Notwithstanding the unqualified exclusion of any other law for the time being in force under Section 20 of the SC/ST Act, bearing in mind the higher priority of the object of the POCSO Act, that is welfare of children cutting across all barriers of caste and creed, would give it overriding effect over the SC/ST Act that is designed to cater to the needs of a class of citizens, identifiable by their caste, that is a byproduct of social conditions. Generally speaking, a legislation that caters to the needs of a class horizontally oriented (as the terms horizontal and vertical are understood in the law relating to reservation), would always have a higher object to achieve, when pitted against legislation that has for its object, the interest of a class vertically oriented, inasmuch as, both kinds of classifications being permissible under Article 15 of the Constitution, a horizontally oriented class that is the subject of legislation, is closer to the fundamental rule of equality before law and equal protection of laws, enshrined in Article 14. 34. The overriding effect given to the provisions of the POCSO Act vis-à-vis the SC/ST Act is also the inevitable conclusion going by the reputed canon of statutory construction that while construing the provisions of two legislations, the later enactment in point of time, is to be presumed as one that the legislature has enacted with knowledge of the provisions of the former, and, therefore, a non obstante clause in the subsequent legislation, may be regarded as overriding in effect, over a similar clause in the subsequent legislation. The SC/ST Act was enacted in the year 1989, whereas the POCSO Act was enacted in the year 2012. Section 42-A that has given the POCSO Act overriding effect over all other laws for the time being in force to the extent of inconsistency with its provisions, but otherwise to supplement the existing laws operating in the same field. This clearly shows that the legislature has enacted it, intending to give it overriding effect vis-à-vis the SC/ST Act. Section 42-A that has given the POCSO Act overriding effect over all other laws for the time being in force to the extent of inconsistency with its provisions, but otherwise to supplement the existing laws operating in the same field. This clearly shows that the legislature has enacted it, intending to give it overriding effect vis-à-vis the SC/ST Act. The fact that SC/ST Amendment Act, while amending the SC/ST Act did not further provide to give the said Act, overriding effect vis-à-vis laws operating at that time, clearly shows that the overriding effect given by the non obstante clause introduced in the POCSO Act vide Act No. 13 of 2013, was legislatively intended to prevail over the SC/ST Act. 62. In view of what has been said above, the questions as set out in paragraph 7 (supra), are answered thus: (A) Question No.(i) stands answered in the affirmative in terms that where in a case, offences both under the POCSO Act and SC/ST Act are charged arising out of the same crime, that under the Code may be tried at the same trial, the Special Court, POCSO Act, would have jurisdiction to determine the bail plea of an accused to the exclusion of the Special Court, SC/ST Act; (B) Question No.(ii) stands answered in the negative in terms that where an order declining bail to an accused is passed by the Special Court, POCSO Act, in a crime involving offences, both under the POCSO Act and the SC/ST Act, that order would not be final, and appealable under Section 14A(2) of the SC/ST Act; an application under Section 439 of the Code would alone be maintainable before the High Court." 10. Hon'ble Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Pramod Yadav Vs. The State of Mahdya Pradesh and others reported in MANU/MP/0649/2021 framed the following questions and while considering the relevant principles for interpretation of Statutes and the Law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Solidaire India Ltd. Vs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. reported in MANU/SC/0009/2001 and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sharvan Sing Vs. Kastoori Lal reported in MANU/SC/0071/1976, answered these questions in paragraphs no. 29 and 30 as under:- "29. In view of the above discussions, the question no.1 is answered in the terms that the trial of a case instituted under the provisions of two special Acts viz. Kastoori Lal reported in MANU/SC/0071/1976, answered these questions in paragraphs no. 29 and 30 as under:- "29. In view of the above discussions, the question no.1 is answered in the terms that the trial of a case instituted under the provisions of two special Acts viz. Atrocities Act and POCSO Act, shall e conducted by the Special Courts constituted under the POCSO Act. 30. That in a case involving trial of the accused for the offences under both the Atrocities Act and POCSO Act shall be conducted by the Special Court constituted under Section 28 of the POCSO Act and remedy of the accused against the order of rejection of bail under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. by the such Special Judge, would be by filing the bail applications under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court. Question No.2 is answered accordingly." 11. Hon'ble Single Judge of Hon'ble Kerala High Court in Renoj R.S. vs. State of Kerala and others reported in MANU/KE/3024/2022 has also opined as under:- "14. When a conflict between two statutes arises, the first task is identifying the special statute. If both are special statutes, the later of the two statutes will prevail. The principles relating to resolution of conflicting statutes are clearly delineated in several decisions, including Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. and Others { (2001) 3 SCC 71 ], KSL and Industries Limited v. Arihant Threads Limited and Others [ (2008) 9 SCC 763 ] and Sharat Babu Digumarti v. Government (NCT of Delhi) [ (2017) 2 SCC 18 ]. In the last of the above referred judgment, the Supreme Court referred to the following observation extracted from the judgment in Solidaire India Ltd. (supra); "Where there are two special statutes which contain non obstante clauses, the later statute must prevail. This is because at the time of enactment of the later statute, the legislature was aware of the earlier legislation and its non obstante clause. If the legislature still confers the later enactment with a non obstante clause it means that the legislature wanted that enactment to prevail. If the legislature does not want the later enactment to prevail then it could and would provide in the later enactment that the provisions of the earlier enactment continue to apply." 15. If the legislature still confers the later enactment with a non obstante clause it means that the legislature wanted that enactment to prevail. If the legislature does not want the later enactment to prevail then it could and would provide in the later enactment that the provisions of the earlier enactment continue to apply." 15. With the aforesaid principle in mind, when we peruse the provisions of section 42A of POCSO Act, it is evident that the said statute clearly indicates that the provisions of the POCSO Act will prevail over all other laws in the event of any inconsistency. Therefore the statutory provision itself is clear in respect to the law that will prevail whenever there is an inconsistency." 12. Hon'ble Single Judges of Chhattisgarh High Court, Bombay High Court, Kerala High Court and Patna High Court have also adopted the similar view in Ram Swarup Rajwade Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others reported in MANU/CG/0556/2020, Suraj S. Paithankar Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in MANU/MH/2441/2020, Harisankar R.C. Vs. State of Kerala reported in MANU/KE/0450/2023, Guddu Kumar Yadav Vs. The State of Bihar reported in MANU/BH/2246/2019 and Ashish Bansal and others Vs. State of C.G. reported in MANU/CG/0789/2021. 13. For the reasons given in the law reports referred herein before and the above mentioned provisions contained under SC/ST Act and POCSO Act, I am in agreement with the view adopted by Hon'ble Single Judges of this Court as well as by the Hon'ble Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court and by the Hon'ble Single Judges of different High Courts and thus to my understanding the summoning order passed by the Special Court constituted under POCSO Act with regard to the charge sheet submitted under relevant provisions of the POCSO Act as well as under penal provisions of the SC/ST Act may not be challenged by filing an appeal under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act and the remedy which is available to an aggrieved person is to approach the competent court having regard to the procedure provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure and not under SC/ST Act. 14. Thus for reasons mentioned herein before instant appeal appears to be not maintainable and is dismissed as such. The appellants/accused persons are free to avail other remedies which may be available to them under Code of Criminal Procedure. 15. 14. Thus for reasons mentioned herein before instant appeal appears to be not maintainable and is dismissed as such. The appellants/accused persons are free to avail other remedies which may be available to them under Code of Criminal Procedure. 15. Certified copies of the documents filed by the appellants may be returned to learned counsel for the appellants by the office, while retaining photocopy of the same on record.