JUDGMENT : B. SYAMSUNDER, J. 1. The defendant Nos. 1 to 3 in O.S. No. 159 of 1988 on the file of District Munsif, Kota of Nellore District are the appellants. The 2nd appellant died, and then the appellant Nos. 4 to 8 brought on record as legal representatives of the deceased-2nd appellant. The 1st respondent is the plaintiff in the suit. Originally, the suit was instituted by the 1st respondent/plaintiff against the appellant Nos. 1 to 3 for declaration of her title over plaint schedule property, and also for possession of the same from the appellants/defendants. 2. The appellant Nos. 1 to 3, 2nd respondent, 3rd respondent and the 1st respondent hereinafter referred to as defendant Nos. 1 to 5 and plaintiff as arrayed before the trial Court. 3. The plaintiff instituted the suit against the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 for declaration of her title over plaint schedule property, and also for possession. The plaint schedule property as shown in the plaint, which reads as under: SCHEDULE Nellore District Registration - Kota - Sub-Registration house site of 30 ankanams with 3 ankanams, thatched house in Chendodu village, Kota mandal, Nellore District within the following boundaries: East: Garden land of Vasudevarao West: House of Malli Sundaraiah South: Lane leading to plaintiff’s house to some extent and house of Alla Bhakshu North: Garden land of Ogilli Seetharamaiah. Market value Rs. 1,250/-. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the plaint schedule property occupied by her long back, which is a Gramakantam site. The plaintiff submits that prior to that her father was in occupation of the same, and in the year 1979 she constructed 3 ankanams of thatched house in that site, and she had been in possession and enjoyment of the same. The plaintiff submits that in the year 1981, the sons of the 2nd defendant, and brothers of 1st and 2nd defendants by name Mr.Dhananjaya Reddy and Mr.Narayana Reddy with active support of the then Revenue Minister tried to occupy the plaint schedule property accompanied by the Taluk Surveyor, and then she filed suit before the District Munsif Court, Gudur in OS No. 107 of 1981 to protect her possession, which was decreed on 02.11.1981 restraining the defendants therein and the Government to interfere with her possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. It is also the contention of the plaintiff that when herself and her family members along with her father went to her relatives house in the first week of January, 1988, in her absence, the defendants with the active support of Mr.Konduru Narayana Reddy and Mr. Dananjaya Reddy entered into the plaint schedule site and thrown-out her articles in front of her father’s house, which the plaintiff questioned the defendants about their high-handed behaviour, but the defendants gave an adamant reply and refused to vacate the house taking advantage of her helpless condition, due to that she got issued legal notice, dated 11.06.1988, who gave reply with false allegations. Hence, the plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of her title and for recovery of possession from the defendant Nos. 1 to 3. 4. The 3rd defendant filed written statement resisting the claim of the plaintiff, which also adopted by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. It is the contention of the 3rd defendant that they are not aware of the previous suit filed by the plaintiff against Mr.Dananjaya Reddy and Mr. Narayana Reddy. She also submits that the 2nd defendant is in possession and enjoyment of house site since long time, due to that on 25.04.1981 the Government granted patta for the site to an extent of Ac. 0.6 1/3 cents equivalent to 38 ankanams, which house plot is described as plot No. 16B and Block No. 155 under patta bearing No. RCA 5/245/75, and thereafter the 2nd defendant constructed a thatched house, wherein all her family members living, but due to misunderstandings between the family of the plaintiff and her family, the plaintiff filed the suit with malafide intention to grab the property. She prays to dismiss the suit. 5. The trial Court at the time of pronouncing Judgment felt that the Government is a proper and necessary party to decide the actual question involved in the suit with regard to granting of patta in favour of the 2nd defendant, directed the plaintiff to implead the Government also as party to the suit, and thereafter the plaintiff added the defendant Nos. 4 and 5 as defendants in the suit. 6. The 5th defendant/Mandal Revenue Officer filed written statement, which adopted by the 4th defendant by filing a memo. 4 and 5 as defendants in the suit. 6. The 5th defendant/Mandal Revenue Officer filed written statement, which adopted by the 4th defendant by filing a memo. It is the contention of the 5th defendant/Mandal Revenue Officer that the plaint schedule site is a Gramakantam site, which was not in occupation of any person prior to granting of patta in favour of the 2nd defendant. They submit that prior to granting of patta to the 2nd defendant, the Taluk Surveyor measured the extent of the site, prepared a plan and submitted the report to the Tahsildar, Gudur, and after considering the actual possession of the sit and report of the Revenue Inspector and Taluk Surveyor, the then Tahsildar, Gudur issued patta on 25.04.1981 in favour of the 2nd defendant, wherein she constructed a thatched house and residing therein. They categorically stated that the plaintiff is no way concerned with the said site and they also pray to dismiss the suit. 7. The trial Court basing on the above pleadings, settled the following issues and additional issue for trial: “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration as prayed for? 2. Whether the 2nd defendant has been granted patta by the Revenue authorities? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property? 4. To what relief?” ADDITIONAL ISSUE: “Whether the plaintiff was not in possession of plaint schedule site prior to granting of patta to the 2nd defendant?” 8. The parties went to trial. On behalf of the plaintiff, PWs. 1 to PW.6 were examined. Exs.A1 to A12 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, DWs. 1 to DW-7 were examined. Exs.B1 to B16 were marked. 9. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff with an observation that the plaintiff failed to prove her title over the entire plaint schedule site to an extent of 38 ankanams as claimed by her. 10. 1 to DW-7 were examined. Exs.B1 to B16 were marked. 9. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff with an observation that the plaintiff failed to prove her title over the entire plaint schedule site to an extent of 38 ankanams as claimed by her. 10. Aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court, the plaintiff presented A.S. No. 9 of 1995 on the file of Additional Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Gudur, which was allowed by the first Appellate Court, setting aside the Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court and decreed the suit, and directed the defendants to deliver the possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff within three months, on the ground that the plaintiff able to prove possessory title. 11. In these circumstances, the present Second Appeal is presented. 12. I have heard learned Counsel Mr. P. Rama Koteswara Rao, representing on behalf of Mr. M. Ravindranath Reddy, learned Counsel for the appellants through virtual hearing as well as learned Counsel for the respondent. There is no representation today for the respondent. The learned Counsel for the respondent already submitted his arguments on previous occasion. 13. The learned Counsel for the appellants would submit that the trial Court rightly dismissed the suit, which was erroneously decreed by the Appellate Court, though there is no pleading and proof with regard to possessory title by the plaintiff. He would further submit that all Gramakantam sites are vested with the Government, which has got authority to issue pattas to landless poor persons, which also deposed by the Mandal Revenue Officer, who was examined as DW-7 in the suit. He relied on the following precedent law: (1) Banne Gandhi and others vs. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District and others, 2007 SCC Online AP 136, wherein the Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court while considering the Writ Petition with regard to Gramakantam sites held at Para No. 7, which reads as under: “7. A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 58 of the Act would show that only certain classes of lands described therein which are not required by the Government for any specific purpose shall vest in the Gram Panchayat. A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 58 of the Act would show that only certain classes of lands described therein which are not required by the Government for any specific purpose shall vest in the Gram Panchayat. The village site poramboke/Grama Kantam land is conspicuous by its absence in the category of lands enumerated in sub-section (1) of Section 58 of the Act. Therefore, Section 58(1) of the Act is not attracted. In an unreported judgment, being W.P. No. 18865 of 2006, dated 25.9.2006, this Court has considered this aspect having regard to the Sarpanch, Polakala Gram Panchayat, Irala Mandal, Chittoor District v. District Collector, Chittoor (supra) and also Board Standing Order 15 of the Andhra Pradesh Board of Revenue Standing Orders. This Court rejected a similar contention observing as under: A bare perusal of Section 58 of the Act would show that grazing grounds, threshing floors, burning and burial grounds, cattle stands, carts tanks and topes at the disposal of the Government vests in the Gram Panchayat. If the Government requires these lands for any specific purpose, sub-section (2) of Section 58 of the Act requires the Government to direct that the poramboke land referred to hereinabove is mentioned in Section 58(1) of the Act and shall cease to vest in the Gram Panchayat. When only specific items of land find place in sub-section (1) of Section 58 of the Act, it is not possible to enlarge these items by including the Government land classified as grama kantam land. Learned Counsel for petitioner placed reliance on judgment of this Court in Sarpanch, Polakala Gram Panchayat, Irala Mandal, Chittoor District v. District Collector, Chittoor (supra). The judgment appears to have been rendered per incuriam without noticing subsection (1) of Section 58 of the Act and there is no discussion or reference to any precedent. Therefore, the judgment being subsilentio is not binding precedent. Secondly under Paras 2 and 3 to BSO 15 of the Andhra Pradesh Board of Revenue Standing Orders, village site poramboke land (grama natham area/grama kantam land) always vests in the Government and is intended for being allotted as house sites in future.” (2) Krishnamurthy S. Setlur (Dead) by LRs. Therefore, the judgment being subsilentio is not binding precedent. Secondly under Paras 2 and 3 to BSO 15 of the Andhra Pradesh Board of Revenue Standing Orders, village site poramboke land (grama natham area/grama kantam land) always vests in the Government and is intended for being allotted as house sites in future.” (2) Krishnamurthy S. Setlur (Dead) by LRs. vs. O.V. Narasimha Setty and others, (2007) 3 SCC 569 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that in the matter of adverse possession, the Courts have to find out the plea taken by the plaintiff in the plaint. In the plaint, the plaintiff who claims to be owner by adverse possession has to plead actual possession. He has to plead the period and the date from which he claims to be in possession. The plaintiff has to plead and prove that his possession was continuous, exclusive and undisturbed to the knowledge of the real owner of the land. He has to show a hostile title. He has to communicate his hostility to the real owner. None of these aspects have been considered by the High Court in its impugned judgment. As stated above, the impugned judgment is under Section 96 CPC, it is not a judgment under Section 100 CPC. As stated above, adverse possession or ouster is an inference to be drawn from the facts proved that work is of the first Appellate Court. (Part of Para 13) (3) G. Saraswathi and another vs. Rathinammal and others, (2018) 3 SCC 340 , wherein it is held that while disposing of appeals, the Appellate Court has to follow Order 41, Rule 31 of CPC by framing necessary points and shall decide the same. (4) Corporation of City of Bangalore vs. Zulekha Bi and others, (2008) 11 SCC 306 , wherein it is held that when suit is filed for declaration of title, it is for the plaintiff to prove its title and possession by producing document in their possession. (5) Union of India and others vs. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others, (2014) 2 SCC 269 , wherein it is held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that burden is on the plaintiff to establish its case, irrespective of whether defendants prove their case or not. He prays to allow the Second Appeal. 14. (5) Union of India and others vs. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others, (2014) 2 SCC 269 , wherein it is held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that burden is on the plaintiff to establish its case, irrespective of whether defendants prove their case or not. He prays to allow the Second Appeal. 14. The learned Counsel for the 1st respondent/plaintiff would submit that the plaintiff occupied Gramakantam land, which is not belong to the Government, which vested with the village, due to that the Tahsildar has no authority to issue Ex.B1/patta to the 2nd defendant. He would further submit that as per Section 58 (1) of A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, the Tahsildar has no right to grant patta in favour of the 2nd defendant, and the evidence of the plaintiff’s witnesses coupled with documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff proved her contention with regard to long possession, which rightly considered by the First Appellate Court. He prays to dismiss the Second Appeal. 15. This Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law, which are: “1. Whether in the light of the Provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 of CPC, Appellate Court can render a Judgment without framing points for consideration (vide Judgment Order 41, Rule 31, 1997 (3) ALT 266 : 1999 (1) ALT 821 : 1997 (2) ALT 785 and 1999 (2) ALT 256 . Whether the Provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 of CPC are mandatory and hence, the Decree and Judgment of 1st Appellate Court are not legal? 2. Whether in a suit filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession of which plaintiff has no title that plaint schedule land belongs to Government, possession cold be granted in favour of the plaintiff and admittedly the land was gone to Government? 3. Whether the suit filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession with respect to the Government poramboke land, which is hit for not issuing notice under Section 80 of CPC and hence the suit itself is not maintainable?” 16. As per Section 100 of CPC, this Court can interfere with the Judgment of the Appellate Court, if it is satisfied that case involves a substantial question of law. 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Chandrabhan (Deceased) through LRs. As per Section 100 of CPC, this Court can interfere with the Judgment of the Appellate Court, if it is satisfied that case involves a substantial question of law. 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Chandrabhan (Deceased) through LRs. and Others vs. Saraswati and Others in Civil Appeal No. NIL of 2022 and Arising Out of S.L.P. (C) No. 8736 of 2016 dated 22.09.2022, explained the scope of Section 100 of CPC and laid down the principles relating to Section 100 of CPC at Para No. 33 of the Judgment, which reads as under: “33. The principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is a misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in constructing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (Emphasis supplied) (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which effects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the Courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying law erroneously; or (iii) the Courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence” it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 18. In the present case, the claim of the plaintiff is based on possession who admittedly failed to plead adverse possession in the plaint. When the plaintiff is claiming declaration of title basing on her possession, she has to prove her possession for a period of 30 years, as she is claiming adverse possession over Gramakantam land, and she shall prove that her possession is hostile, open and uninterrupted. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Government of Kerala and another vs. Joseph and others in Civil Appeal No. 3142 of 2010, dated 09.08.2023 extensively discussed the ‘principles’ of adverse possession at Para Nos. 20, 21, 21 (1) to 21 (8), which reads as under: “20. The principle of adverse possession has been defined by the Privy Council in Perry v. Clissold in the following terms: “It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of the owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the case, his right is forever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.” 21. Before proceeding to do so, it is essential to take note of the law governing such a claim. Before proceeding to do so, it is essential to take note of the law governing such a claim. After a perusal and consideration of various judgments rendered by this Court, the following principles can be observed: 21.1 Possession must be open, clear, continuous and hostile to the claim or possession of the other party; all three classic requirements must coexist - nec vi, i.e. adequate in continuity; nec clam, i.e. adequate in publicity; and nec precario, i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and knowledge: (a) In Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna, the Privy Council held that: “The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity, and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor.” (b) Further, the Council Maharaja Sri Chandra Nandi v. Baijnath Jugal Kishore observed: “It is sufficient that the possession should be overt and without any attempt at concealment, so that the person against whom time is running ought, if he exercises due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening.” (c) A Bench of three judges of this Court in Parsinni v. Sukhi held that: “Party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession must be ‘nec vi, nec clam, nec precario’ i.e. peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate, in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner.” (d) In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India (two-Judge Bench) it was held: “It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario” that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period.” This case was relied on in the case of M. Venkatesh v. Bangalore Development Authority (three-Judge Bench), Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (three-Judge Bench). (e) This Court in a recent case of M. Siddiq (D) through LRs. v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors. (five-Judge Bench) reiterated this principle as under: “748. (e) This Court in a recent case of M. Siddiq (D) through LRs. v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors. (five-Judge Bench) reiterated this principle as under: “748. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous - possession which meets the requirement of being ‘nec vi nec claim and nec precario’. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence.” 21.2 The person claiming adverse possession must show clear and cogent evidence substantiate such claim. This Court in Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (two- Judge Bench) held that: “5. A possession of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession…” Reference may also be made to M. Siddiq (supra). 21.3 Mere possession over a property for a long period of time does not grant the right of adverse possession on its own: (a) In Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chander and Anr. (two-Judge Bench), this court observed: “1.......It is not merely unauthorised possession on termination of his licence that enables the licensee to claim title by adverse possession but there must be some overt act on the part of the licensee to show that he is claiming adverse title. It is possible that the licensor may not file an action for the purpose of recovering possession of the premises from the licensee after terminating his licence but that by itself cannot enable the licensee to claim title by adverse possession. There must be some overt act on the part of the licensee indicating assertion of hostile title. Mere continuance of unauthorised possession even for a period of more than 12 years is not enough.” Reference may also be made to Arvind Kumar (supra); Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah (two-Judge Bench); Uttam Chand (supra). There must be some overt act on the part of the licensee indicating assertion of hostile title. Mere continuance of unauthorised possession even for a period of more than 12 years is not enough.” Reference may also be made to Arvind Kumar (supra); Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah (two-Judge Bench); Uttam Chand (supra). 21.4 Such clear and continuous possession must be accompanied by animus possidendi - the intention to possess or in other words, the intention to dispossess the rightful owner; in Karnataka Board of Wakf (supra) it was observed: “.......Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature.....” (a) The case of Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam (two-Judge Bench) also shed light on this principle as under: “24. Claim by adverse possession has two elements: (1) the possession of the defendant should become adverse to the plaintiff. (2) the defendant must continue to remain in possession for a period of 12 years thereafter. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. It is now a well-settled principle of law that mere possession of the land would not ripen into possessory title for the said purpose. Possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. For the said purpose, not only animus possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same must be shown to exist at the commencement of the possession......” (b) In Des Raj and Others v. Bhagat Ram (two-Judge Bench) this Court observed: “21. In a case of this nature, where long and continuous possession of the plaintiff-respondent stands admitted, the only question which arose for consideration by the courts below was as to whether the plaintiff had been in possession of the properties in hostile declaration of his title vis-a-vis his co-owners and they were in know thereof.” (c) This court in L.N. Aswathama v. P. Prakash (two-Judge Bench) had observed that permissive possession or possession in the absence of Animus possidendi would not constitute the claim of adverse possession. (d) It was also held in the case of Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao (two-Judge Bench): “15. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. (d) It was also held in the case of Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao (two-Judge Bench): “15. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. Mere possession does not ripen into possessory title until the possessor holds the property adverse to the title of the true owner for the said purpose. The person who claims adverse possession is required to establish the date on which he came in possession, nature of possession, the factum of possession, knowledge to the true owner, duration of possession and that possession was open and undisturbed......” (Emphasis supplied) Referring to the above judgment Subha Rao (supra) this Court has reiterated the cardinality of the presence of Animus possidendi in a case concerning adverse possession in Brijesh Kumar & Anr. v. Shardabai (Dead) by LRs. (two-Judge Bench). 21.5 Such a plea is available not only as a defence when title is questioned, but is also available as a claim to a person who has perfected his title. The prior position of law as set out in Gurudwara Sahab v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala (two-Judge Bench) was that the plea of adverse possession can be used only as a shield by the defendant and not as a sword by the plaintiff. However, the position was changed later by the decision of this Hon’ble Court in the case of Ravinder Kaur (supra) had held that “........Title or interest is acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as a shield by the defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any person who has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a suit for restoration of possession in case of dispossession.....” The position in Ravinder Kaur (supra) was followed in Narasamma & Ors. v. A. Krishnappa (Dead) through LRs. (three-Judge Bench). 21.6 Mere passing of an ejectment order does not cause brake in possession neither causes his dispossession. v. A. Krishnappa (Dead) through LRs. (three-Judge Bench). 21.6 Mere passing of an ejectment order does not cause brake in possession neither causes his dispossession. In Balkrishna v. Satyaprakash (two-Judge Bench) this Court held: “......Mere passing of an order of ejectment against a person claiming to be in adverse possession neither causes his dispossession nor discontinuation of his possession which alone breaks the continuity of possession.” 21.7 When the land subject of proceedings wherein adverse possession has been claimed, belongs to the Government, the Court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care and circumspection as it may lead to Destruction of a right/title of the State to immovable property. In State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (two-Judge Bench) it was held: “12. So far as the question of perfection of title by adverse possession and that too in respect of public property is concerned, the question requires to be considered more seriously and effectively for the reason that it ultimately involves destruction of right/title of the State to immovable property and conferring upon a third-party encroacher title where he had none.” Further, in Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah (two-Judge Bench) it was stated: “......It is our considered view that where an encroacher, illegal occupant or land grabber of public property raises a plea that he has perfected title by adverse possession, the court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, care and circumspection. Any laxity in this regard may result in destruction of right/title of the State to immovable property and give an upper hand to the encroachers, unauthorized occupants or land grabbers.” 21.8 A plea of adverse possession must be pleaded with proper particulars, such as, when the possession became adverse. The court is not to travel beyond pleading to give any relief, in other words, the plea must stand on its own two feet. The court is not to travel beyond pleading to give any relief, in other words, the plea must stand on its own two feet. This Court has held this in the case of V. Rajeshwari v. T.C. Saravanabava (two- Judge Bench): “......A plea not properly raised in the pleadings or in issues at the stage of the trial, would not be permitted to be raised for the first time at the stage of appeal....” It has also been held in the case of State of Uttrakhand v. Mandir Sri Laxman Sidh Maharaj (two-Judge Bench): “......The courts below also should have seen that courts can grant only that relief which is claimed by the plaintiff in the plaint and such relief can be granted only on the pleadings but not beyond it. In other words, courts cannot travel beyond the pleadings for granting any relief.....” Mandir Sri Laxman Sidh Maharaj (supra) was relied on in Dharampal (Dead) v. Punjab Wakf Board (two-Judge Bench) on the same principle.” 19. A perusal of plaint, it is nowhere mentioned by the plaintiff that she acquired the property by adverse possession in respect of Gramakantam land and her only contention in the plaint is that she occupied the plaint schedule property long back, which is Gramakantam site and prior to that also her father was in occupation of the same. It is nowhere explained when her father occupied the plaint schedule property. She also pleaded that in the year 1979 she constructed 3 ankanams of thatched house in that site, but rightly discussed by the learned trial Judge that house tax receipts, marked as Exs.A7 to A9 are not disclosing the door number of the house and assessment number or any other particulars in order to establish that tax was collected for the house existing in the plaint schedule property. A perusal of Judgment of the Appellate Court, which shows that from Para Nos. 2 to 9, the learned Appellate Judge re-produced the Judgment of the trial Court, but failed to frame any points as required under Order 41, Rule 31 of CPC, which reads as under: “31. Contents, date and signature of judgment: The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state: (a) the points for determination. (b) the decision thereon. (c) the reasons for the decision. Contents, date and signature of judgment: The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state: (a) the points for determination. (b) the decision thereon. (c) the reasons for the decision. (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled, and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring there in.” 20. The first Appellate Court’s Judgment should show application of mind and reflect the reasons on the basis of which it agrees or disagrees with the trial Court. It is the duty of the first Appellate Court to appreciate the entire evidence and arrive at its own independent conclusion for the reasons assigned, either of affirmance or difference. So, the Appellate Court must address itself to the dispute and so frame the points for consideration, which is mandatory, which failed to follow by the learned Appellate Judge. Though, the plaintiff has not specifically pleaded in her plaint that she acquired title by adverse possession, the Appellate Judge declared the title of the plaintiff by observing that the plaintiff filed the suit on the basis of possessory title and proved her possession by filing Ex.A1, which is certified copy of Decree in previous suit, and failed to consider Ex.B1/patta admittedly granted to the 2nd defendant, which deposed by DW-7/Mandal Revenue Officer. As per the ratio laid by the Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court in Banne Gandhi and others case referred supra, who interpreted Section 58 (1) of A.P. Panchayat Raj Act and categorically held that “as per Paras 2 and 3 to BSO 15 of the Andhra Pradesh Board of Revenue Standing Orders, village site poramboke land (Gramanatham area/Gramakantam land) always vests in the Government and is intended for being allotted as house sites in future.” Therefore, it cannot be said that the 5th defendant has no authority to issue Ex.B1, though DW-7 Mandal Revenue Officer has deposed that Ex.B1 was stayed, that itself is not a ground to grant the relief of declaration of title and possession in favour of the plaintiff, when she failed to plead and prove possessory title in respect of plaint schedule property. 21. 21. The learned trial Judge elaborately discussed the oral evidence available on record and documents produced by the trial Court came to right conclusion that the plaintiff failed to prove her title over plaint schedule property before alleged dispossession. There is no dispute that Ex.B1/patta was granted in favour of the 2nd defendant in respect of plaint schedule property, and thereafter the 2nd defendant along with her family members have been residing in the plaint schedule property and they also filed Exs.B6 to B15/electricity consumption charges in respect of plaint schedule property. As rightly argued by the learned Counsel for the appellants/ defendant Nos. 1 to 3 that in a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, the plaintiff has to succeed on its own contention, irrespective of defendants’ proving their case or not. When the plaintiff is claiming possessory title over the plaint schedule property, she has to specifically plead and prove the same, which failed by the plaintiff as seen from the averments in the plaint and evidence, which failed to consider by the learned Appellate Judge. 22. Therefore, this Court is of an opinion that the Judgment of the first Appellate Court, declaring possessory title of the plaintiff and granting the relief of recovery of possession is erroneous. Even when the plaintiff filed the suit in respect of Gramakantam site, she failed to add the Government as one of the defendants in the suit, which noticed by the learned trial Judge and rightly directed the plaintiff to add the Government as one of the defendants, who supported the contention of the defendant Nos. 1 to 3. As the Government is added as one of the defendants in the suit by the plaintiff after filing the suit before pronouncing the Judgment, there is no requirement of issuing Section 80 of CPC notice, as no relief is claimed by the plaintiff in the plaint at the first instance, and the relief is claimed against the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 only. 23. The substantial questions of law 1, 2 framed by this Court for consideration are answered in favour of the appellants/defendants. 24. In the result, this Second Appeal is allowed. The Judgment and Decree in AS No. 9 of 1995 are set aside. Consequently, OS No. 159 of 1988 on the file of District Munsif, Kota is hereby dismissed. 23. The substantial questions of law 1, 2 framed by this Court for consideration are answered in favour of the appellants/defendants. 24. In the result, this Second Appeal is allowed. The Judgment and Decree in AS No. 9 of 1995 are set aside. Consequently, OS No. 159 of 1988 on the file of District Munsif, Kota is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. The Interim Orders granted earlier, if any, shall stand vacated.