ORDER : 1. The petitioner is presently working as an Assistant Professor (Zoology) in Government College Baloda Bazar. He was appointed on ad-hoc basis and subsequently his services were regularized in pursuance of the Ad-hoc Regularization Rules 1986 vide order dated 29.06.1987. The name of the petitioner is at serial No. 10 of the order. The respondent has granted Senior Grade Pay in the pay scale of Rs. 3000-100-3500-125-5000/- vide order dated 19-12-1996 (Annexure P/2) to the petitioner w.e.f. 14.07.1995. Name of the petitioner is at Serial No. 72 of the order. The respondent has granted selection grade pay scale to the petitioner w.e.f. 14.07.2000 vide order dated 16.07.2003 whereas he is entitled to get selection grade w.e.f. 27.07.1998 as the similar situated employees have granted the benefits of selection grade pay w.e.f. 27.07.1998. 2. It has been further contended that the petitioner is entitled to get selection grade as he is having Ph.D. after completion of 9 years service in place of 11 years service as provided in the order dated 09.11.1999 issued by the State of Madhya Pradesh w.e.f. 1998 whereas same has been granted in the year 2000. It has been further contended that the non-grant of selection grade w.e.f. 27.07.1998 was due to non-communicated adverse confidential report of the year 1995-96, which has been recorded as average. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the adverse Confidential Report was not communicated to the petitioner, but under Right to Information Act, this information has been collected wherein the reason for non-consideration of the case of the petitioner was assigned due to non-communicated average CR. The petitioner has preferred a representation vide Annexure P/6, but the same has not been decided. On the above factual matrix, the petitioner has prayed that the respondent be directed to grant selection grade w.e.f. 27.07.1998 along with all consequential benefits. 4. The State has filed its return, wherein paragraph 6, the State has taken specific plea, which is extracted below: “6. In the case in hand, the Screening Committee duly considered the Annual Confidential Report of the petitioner from the year 1993 till 1997 and it was found that the annual confidential report of the petitioner was not good. The copy of the annual confidential report of the year 1995-1996 is annexed herein as Annexure R/1. In the case in hand, the Screening Committee duly considered the Annual Confidential Report of the petitioner from the year 1993 till 1997 and it was found that the annual confidential report of the petitioner was not good. The copy of the annual confidential report of the year 1995-1996 is annexed herein as Annexure R/1. Thus, the decision was taken that he shall be granted the benefit of selection grade pay scale from the year 2000 in accordance with the rules, which is just and proper. The copy of the M.P. Educational Service (Collegiate Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1990 is marked and annexed herein as Annexure R/2.” 5. On the other hand, learned State counsel would further submit that the State has also taken specific plea that the petitioner has preferred a representation before the Screening Committee which has rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that ACR of the year 1995-96 was average and as such he is not entitled to get the benefit from 1998. It has been further submitted that the petitioner again submitted representation before the Screening Committee which has again constituted on 02.08.2021 and only after due scrutiny, the same has been rejected. He would further submit that the petitioner representation has been rejected in the year 2009 and 2021, which is not challenged, therefore, the petition filed by the petitioner is deserved to be dismissed on account of delay and laches. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the delay in granting the selection grade w.e.f. 27.07.1998 is for the reason that adverse CR of 1995-96, which was never communicated to the petitioner, therefore, this ACR has lost its significance in view of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Devdutt vs. Union of India and Others, 2008 (8) SCC 725 . 7. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the documents placed on record with utmost satisfaction. 8. The issue involved in the case is (1) whether delay on the part of respondent in granting selection grade to the petitioner on the basis of non-communicated ACR, is legal and justified (2) whether the petition suffers from delay and laches. 9. 8. The issue involved in the case is (1) whether delay on the part of respondent in granting selection grade to the petitioner on the basis of non-communicated ACR, is legal and justified (2) whether the petition suffers from delay and laches. 9. The return filed by the State does not reflect whether ACR has been communicated to the petitioner whereas the petitioner in Para 8.6 of the writ petition has taken specific plea that the petitioner received information under Right to Information Act, that annual confidential report of the petitioner for the year 1995-1996 as AVERAGE and the respondents have acted upon the same report for depriving the petitioner from grant of selection grade pay scale w.e.f. 27.07.1998. The erstwhile Government of Madhya Pradesh and State has issued circular with regard to communication of adverse CR to government servant and directed time and again to communicate the same within stipulated time period, but the same has not been adhered to by the respondents in the present case. This clearly vitiats the action of the respondent authorities. It is pertinent to mention here that as per circular issued with regard to confidential report and its communication, the average ACR is adverse, therefore, it is necessary for the respondent to communicate the same. The object behind it that the concerning government servant should be given an opportunity to improve his conduct. In the present case, it has not been communicated. Even otherwise, it is well settled position of law that average grading is nothing but less than an adverse entry, therefore, its communication to give opportunity for submission of representation is necessary. 10. Therefore, it is not in dispute that ACR of the petitioner for the year 1995-96 was average which is not less than an adverse entry, same has not been communicated to the petitioner, therefore, it has lost its significance as held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Others vs. G.R. Meghwal, 2022 SCC Online SC 1291 has held in Para 19, 20, 26 and 30 which read as under: “19. In the present case, the learned Tribunal as well as the High Court have directed the department to review the case of the respondent by ignoring the below benchmark of “Good” in the year 2007-2008 mainly on the following grounds: (i) that in the earlier years, the very reporting officer/reviewing authority awarded “Very Good” for the years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 and the very reporting officer/reviewing authority has given below benchmark “Good” for the year 2007-2008 and therefore the same is arbitrary and there is no basis to award the below benchmark - “Good” (ii) that before the below benchmark ACR “Good” for the year 2007-2008, no opportunity was given to the respondent officer to improve himself and no deficiency was pointed out and (iii) that no opportunity was given to the respondent officer to make representation against the proposed below benchmark ACR of the year 2007-2008. While giving the aforesaid findings and while arriving at the aforesaid final conclusion, the Tribunal as well as the High Court have heavily relied upon the decisions of this Court in the case of Sukhdeo (supra); Dev Dutt (supra); Abhijit Ghosh Dastidar (supra).” In the present case, the learned Tribunal as well as the High Court have directed the department to review the case of the respondent by ignoring the below benchmark of “Good” in the year 2007-2008 mainly on the following grounds: (i) that in the earlier years, the very reporting officer/reviewing authority awarded “Very Good” for the years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 and the very reporting officer/reviewing authority has given below benchmark “Good” for the year 2007-2008 and therefore the same is arbitrary and there is no basis to award the below benchmark - “Good” (ii) that before the below benchmark ACR “Good” for the year 2007-2008, no opportunity was given to the respondent officer to improve himself and no deficiency was pointed out and (iii) that no opportunity was given to the respondent officer to make representation against the proposed below benchmark ACR of the year 2007-2008. While giving the aforesaid findings and while arriving at the aforesaid final Sukhdev Singh (supra). However, on considering the aforesaid decisions, it emerges that in the aforesaid cases, the adverse ACRs either were not communicated at all and/or on facts found to be inconsistent and suffering from lack of bona fides. 20. While giving the aforesaid findings and while arriving at the aforesaid final Sukhdev Singh (supra). However, on considering the aforesaid decisions, it emerges that in the aforesaid cases, the adverse ACRs either were not communicated at all and/or on facts found to be inconsistent and suffering from lack of bona fides. 20. In the case of Dev Dutt (supra), this Court has held in paragraphs 36 and 37 as under: “36. In the present case, we are developing the principles of natural justice by holding that fairness and transparency in public administration requires that all entries (whether poor, fair, average, good or very good) in the annual confidential report of a public servant, whether in civil, judicial, police or any other State service (except the military), must be communicated to him within a reasonable period so that he can make a representation for its upgradation. This in our opinion is the correct legal position even though there may be no rule/G.O. requiring communication of the entry, or even if there is a rule/G.O. prohibiting it, because the principle of non-arbitrariness in State action as envisaged by Article 14 of the Constitution in our opinion requires such communication. Article 14 will override all rules or government orders. 37. We further hold that when the entry is communicated to him the public servant should have a right to make a representation against the entry to the authority concerned, and the authority concerned must decide the representation in a fair manner and within a reasonable period. We also hold that the representation must be decided by an authority higher than the one who gave the entry, otherwise the likelihood is that the representation will be summarily rejected without adequate consideration as it would be an appeal from Caesar to Caesar. All this would be conducive to fairness and transparency in public administration, and would result in fairness to public servants. The State must be a model employer, and must act fairly towards its employees. Only then would good governance be possible.” 26. The Tribunal has also noted that adverse remarks were not communicated to the respondent herein within the time limits prescribed for such communication under the prevailing rules governing the ACRs. Further attention of the officer was not drawn during the year itself, to supposed falling standards along with necessary caution/advice so as to give him a chance to improve. The Tribunal has also noted that adverse remarks were not communicated to the respondent herein within the time limits prescribed for such communication under the prevailing rules governing the ACRs. Further attention of the officer was not drawn during the year itself, to supposed falling standards along with necessary caution/advice so as to give him a chance to improve. The Tribunal has further noted that it is not the case of below benchmark grading but a case of recording adverse remarks in the extreme. That the representations made by the respondent were not considered objectively, dispassionately, and fairly as there were contradiction in the qualities or attributes communicated in the said ACRs which were wholly contradictory to each other. In the circumstances, the Tribunal held that “adverse remarks made for the year 2007-08 were sweeping, extreme, and inconsistent with the previous remarks. Hence it was held that the rejection of the representation was unjustified and the same was set aside. It was further observed by the Tribunal that the assessment of 2007-08 were clearly arbitrary and inconsistent and ought not to be allowed to stand in the way of proper assessment of the respondent by the Screening Committee for his suitability to be promoted to a higher grade. Hence, a direction was issued to the Screening Committee to consider and reassess the suitability of the respondent herein for the purpose of grant of SAG by excluding the ACR of 2007-08 and if the respondent was found suitable for grant of consequential benefits. Against the order of the Tribunal the Union of India, the appellant herein preferred a writ petition before the High Court, which reiterated what had been observed by the Tribunal in paragraph 6 of its order and dismissed the writ petition. 30. Therefore, in view of the above and in the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the fact that though the respondent was graded as “Very Good” in the ACRs for the years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 and was graded only “Good” in the ACR for the year 2007-2008 by the very same reporting and reviewing officer, despite the fact that specifically the respondent was given the opportunity against the ACR for the year 2007-2008. However, no valid reasons are given for rejecting the representation, we are of the opinion that in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the learned Tribunal and the High Court have not committed any error in directing the Department to call for a review meeting of the Screening Committee to re-assess the suitability of the respondent for the purpose of grant of SAG and while doing so to exclude the ACR for the year 2007-2008. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, no interference of this Court is called for.” 11. The petitioner has been deprived from grant of selection grade from 27.07.1998 due to non-communicated ACR, which is against the law, therefore, the respondents are directed to grant selection grade to the petitioner w.e.f. 27.07.1998, but this court cannot loss sight of the fact that the present petition has been filed in the year 2021 i.e. after lapse of 13 years, but grant of pay scale is continue cause of action as salary is payable in every month to the government servant, in such situation, the petition on the count of delay and laches, is not liable to be dismissed, but how the relief has to be molded has to be looked into by this Court. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rushibhai Jagvdishchandra Pathak vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation decided on 18.5.2022 in Civil Appeal No. 4134 of 2022 and other connected matters has examined this issue and granted relief to the petitioner for last three from the date of filing of the petition and has held in Para 10, 11, 12 and 13 as under: “10. At the same time, the law recognizes a ‘continuing’ cause of action which may give rise to a ‘recurring’ cause of action as in the case of salary or pension. This Court in M.R. Gupta vs. Union of India and Others, has held that so long as the employee is in service, a fresh cause of action would arise every month when they are paid their salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to the rules. If the employee’s claim is found to be correct on merits, they would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay-scale in future and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. If the employee’s claim is found to be correct on merits, they would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay-scale in future and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. The Court held that the arrears should be calculated and paid as long as they have not become time-barred. The entire claim for the past period should not be rejected. 11. Relying upon the aforesaid ratio, this Court in the case of Union of India and Others vs. Tarsem Singh, while referring to the decision in Shiv Dass vs. Union of India and Others, quoted the following passages from the latter decision: “8........The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. xxx xxx xxx 10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition......If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years.” In Tarsem Singh (supra), reference was also made to Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the following passage from Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare vs. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, which had explained the concept of continuing wrong in the context of Section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908, corresponding to Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963, observing that: “31......It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury.” Accordingly, in Tarsem Singh (supra) it has been held that principles underlying ‘continuing wrongs’ and ‘recurring/successive wrongs’ have been applied to service law disputes. A ‘continuing wrong’ refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. ‘Recurring/successive wrongs’ are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. Having held so, this Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) had further elucidated some exceptions to the aforesaid rule in the following words: “To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc. affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc. affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 12. In Tarsem Singh (supra), the delay of 16 years in approaching the courts affected the consequential claim for arrears and thus, this Court set aside the direction to pay arrears for 16 years with interest. The Court restricted “the relief relating to arrears to only three years before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to date of writ petition, whichever was lesser.” Further, the grant of interest on arrears was also denied. 13. The aforesaid ratio in Tarsem Singh (supra) has been followed by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and Others vs. Yogendra Shrivastava and Asger Ibrahim Amin vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India.” 12. In the light of aforesaid decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is held that fixation of pay is continue cause of action as such the State is directed to consider the case of the petitioner for grant of selection grade with effect from 27-7-1998 as has been granted to other similarly situated employees after conducting DPC or screening or whatever procedure is prescribed under the rule and if the petitioner fulfills all the requisite conditions of the circular, notification, policies prevailing at the relevant time and there is no other impediment in granting selection grade to the petitioner, the same shall be carried out after revising the pay scale from 27.07.1998 notionally and arrears will be paid for last three years from the date of filing of the petition on 18.11.2021. 13. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the writ petition is allowed. 14. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand disposed of.